The end of values diplomacy

Prime Minister Aso Taro is a firm believer in "values-oriented diplomacy," the use of Japan's foreign policy tools to promote the spread of "universal values" like democracy and human rights.

As foreign minister under Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, he spoke of Japan's role in creating an "arc of freedom and prosperity," a belt of what he saw as nascent democracies on the edge of the Eurasian continent that Japan could take under its wings and nurture to maturity. In his 2006 speech at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Aso argued that Japan had a long record of actions in support of democracy promotion, insisting that the Abe government was doing "nothing more than giving a name to the diplomatic achievements" that had characterized Japanese foreign policy since the end of the cold war and "giving it a new positioning within our overall diplomacy." Aso envisioned cooperation with NATO, the EU, and Asian democracies on behalf of the goal of promoting democracy.

The arc of freedom and prosperity resurfaced in Aso's January address at the opening of the current ordinary session of the Diet, using it to frame Japanese ODA in Africa, Japan's participation in the war on terrorism the overseas contingency operation in Afghanistan, its environmental, energy, and natural resource diplomacy, and, the most recent addition, its anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia. A short while later, in his address to the World Economic Forum in Davos Aso stressed his belief in "Peace and Happiness through Economic Prosperity and Democracy" and reiterated the importance of Japan's efforts to build the arc.

After Aso was chased out of Thailand this week — along with the other leaders of the member countries of the East Asia summit — it is difficult to see the value of "values-oriented diplomacy" as the central concept for Japanese foreign policy.

Aso hurried out of Thailand when demonstrations by supporters of former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra forced the Thai government to cancel ASEAN and EAS meetings. The demonstrations marked the latest step backwards for Thailand, which until the 2006 coup that ousted Shinawatra had been making considerable progress towards more stable democracy since the promulgation of the 1997 constitution. As Tim Meisburger of The Asia Foundation explains, steps in the direction of democracy have been undermined by a political struggle that pits traditional elites against the urban and rural poor mobilized by Shinawatra, resulting in the back-and-forth battles among Yellows and Reds in recent years. As Colum Murphy of Far Eastern Economic Review argues, there are a number of steps that the government of Abhisit Vejjajiva needs to take if Thailand is to reverse its slide into disorder. Whether the Thai government will do so appears uncertain.

The upshot is that despite the Bush administration's emphasis on democracy building in Southeast Asia (see this review of the administration's "accomplishments") and despite Aso's "values-oriented diplomacy," Southeast Asia is less democratic today than it was a decade ago. Neither country has been able to halt Thailand's slide away from democracy. Neither country has been able to advance the cause of democracy in Burma. While Indonesia has just had a parliamentary election that shows that it is "strengthening of the processes of orderly, healthy competition within the Indonesian political system" — prompting the Economist to note that Indonesia "has a fair claim to be South-East Asia’s only fully functioning democracy" — it is doubtful that US or Japanese efforts to promote democracy would rank high on a list of reasons for Indonesia's democratic consolidation.

After Aso's abrupt departure from Thailand, it is time for the prime minister to jettison the promotion of univeral values as the primary goal of Japan's foreign policy. The US has already done so — recall Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's speech to the Asia Society in February, in which she not only did not mention democracy, but actually passed the values agenda off to Southeast Asia, saying "we look forward to working with our other partners and friends in the regions, allies like Thailand and the Philippines, along with Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam, to ensure that ASEAN can live up to its charter, to demonstrate the region’s capacity for leadership on economic, political, human rights, and social issues." Should democracy promotion remain a priority for the US and Japan in the region? Yes, but only one among several, and certainly not the most important.

What should take the place of values-oriented diplomacy? I think Fukuda Yasuo pointed the way last summer in his outline of what would amount to a new middle-power role for Japan in Asia. The new Fukuda doctrine may yet survive its progenitor. What other options are available to the Japanese government?

The new Fukuda doctrine

On Thursday of last week, Prime Minister Fukuda gave a keynote foreign policy address at the fourteenth annual International Conference on the Future of Asia, hosted by Nikkei in Tokyo.

Not for the first time Mr. Fukuda gave me reason to lament his political troubles at home, as he gave a speech that was stunning in the breadth of his vision, his clear assessment of the challenges and opportunities facing Japan today, and his recognition that Japan needs to make serious changes if it is to retain power and influence in Asia.

After expressing his sadness over lives lost in the Szechuan earthquake and the Burmese cyclone, the prime minister opened by citing his father's "Fukuda Doctrine," articulated in 1977, and pointing to the changes that have occurred in Asia in the three decades since, pointing in particular to the prosperity and development achieved by ASEAN members and other Asian countries. (In a plug for this week's TICAD in Yokohama, Mr. Fukuda suggested that Africa can learn from Asia's experience and achieve a similar economic miracle.)

In a rare citation of Fernand Braudel by a head of government, Mr. Fukuda appealed to the attendees to work over the next thirty years to make the Pacific Ocean an "inland sea" that is the center of global order, the same role played by the Mediterranean — as documented by Braudel in his work on the Mediterranean world — in pre-modern and early modern European history. He emphasized liberalization and diversity in the Asia-Pacific, which will enable all involved to pursue "unlimited possibilities."

This regional vision is a bit too flighty for me, although interestingly, Mr. Fukuda does not mention APEC once in this speech, surprising considering that APEC includes countries from all sides of the Asia-Pacific (but excludes India, an increasingly important player in the East Asian balance) and is the primary institution dedicated to liberalization in the Asia-Pacific. As an APEC skeptic, I'm not disappointed, but this concept of "Pacific as inland sea" seems more poetic than practical.

The interesting portion of the speech is the section after Mr. Fukuda's discourse on Braudel. In this section — which includes five promises for concrete action necessary to create an Asia-Pacific network community — Mr. Fukuda casts Japanese foreign policy, including the US-Japan relationship, in a new light and suggests how Japan will be able to preserve its influence despite domestic limitations.

The key for Mr. Fukuda is reassessing Japan's relationships. He spoke at some length about forging a new relationship with a Russia looking to develop the Russian Far East and East Siberia and play a greater role in East Asia. Mr. Fukuda expressed his hopes for a Russo-Japanese peace treaty and his belief that Russia can make a contribution to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific. He called attention to Japan's contributions to development in South Asia, especially in India, contributions that will undoubtedly intensify in coming decades.

Moving on to his five promises, Mr. Fukuda first spoke at length about the importance of ASEAN, promising to deepen cooperation with the organization by promoting a special ambassador to ASEAN and creating a full diplomatic mission in the near future. He emphasized the importance of the Japan-ASEAN comprehensive economic partnership agreement currently under negotiation and pledged that Japan will work with ASEAN to combat economic inequality and cooperate to promote food and energy security.

His second promise concerned the United States. Compared to the eight paragraphs he spent discussing ASEAN, Mr. Fukuda talked about Japan's relationship with the US in a mere two.

Point number two, Japan promises to reinforce public goods in the Asia-Pacific in its alliance with the US.

It goes without saying that the US is the single most important member of the Asia-Pacific region. I always say that 'If the US-Japan alliance is strengthened, it will resonate in Asia diplomacy.' In Asia unstable, uncertain factors like the North Korea problem still remain. The resolution of the Korean peninsula question is indispensable for the stable development of all of Northeast Asia. Today, the US-Japan alliance, more than being a device for the security of Japan, has taken on the role of a mechanism for the stability of the Asia-Pacific. Accordingly, the future outlook for Asia is of a peaceful place — in other words, a low-risk, secure place, a place in which trade and cultural exchanges can continue to expand. And so I think that this is a cornerstone of a prosperous Asia.

This is consistent with the vision of the alliance outlined by Mr. Fukuda during his visit to Washington in November 2007, a vision with which I am deeply sympathetic. The US will remain an important player in Asia, but its role will be less transformative and more about providing public goods, as the prime minister said. The US has long done this, but it will increasingly become the crux of the US role in Asia and the raison d'etre of the US-Japan alliance. Not merely an alliance for the defense of Japan, not a global alliance that is a mile wide but an inch deep, not an alliance dedicated to promoting democracy or dragon-slaying, but an alliance that recognizes the importance of stability in East Asia and in which Washington and Tokyo use all the tools at their disposal — and work with all potential partners — to pursue regional stability. Whether Washington embraces this vision will depend on the next president.

Relatedly, Mr. Fukuda reiterated his promise to make Japan a "peace cooperation state." "Peace cooperation" includes a role for Japan's self-defense forces, as the prime minister emphasized the need to work together to patrol the straits of Malacca, clearing them of pirates and terrorists. (Presumably the Japanese coast guard would also be involved.) It also includes peacekeeping and state-building activities in countries like Cambodia and East Timor and disaster prevention and relief, both of which will entail more cooperation with ASEAN. To this end, Mr. Fukuda wants to create an "Asian disaster and disease prevention network."

His fourth promise involves the promotion of more intellectual and cultural exchanges in the region, especially among youth. His fifth concerns combating climate change, consistent with Mr. Fukuda's goals for the G8 summit and domestic plans to promote a low-carbon emissions society.

He concluded his speech by acknowledging that this vision may seem optimistic in light of the gloomy mood abroad in the world, but suggests that the only way forward is together. He further acknowledges that Japan must make changes at home even as it works with its Asian neighbors to solve collective problems. His short list of challenges for Japan — which he has previously discussed — include promote greater equality between men and women, opening up Japan specifically to foreign investment and to foreign influences more broadly, and overcoming the problems of a shrinking, low-birth rate society.

As before, I am deeply impressed by Mr. Fukuda's vision for Japan and its place in the world in the twenty-first century. It is worth noting that in his vision for Japanese foreign policy, there is no need for constitution revision or reinterpretation. If anything, he argues implicitly that Japan needs to be less concerned about its military capabilities and more concerned about its diplomatic assets, namely its relationships with other countries in the region. The US-Japan alliance (and, mutatis mutandis, armed force), while important, cannot be Japan's only tool for solving problems in the region. Moreover, he recognizes that if Japan is going to play an important role in the region, it cannot afford to neglect its relationships with its neighbors and other regional powers. (And, presumably, it cannot afford to allow those relationships to be dragged down by bits of barren rock.)

How unfortunate that Mr. Fukuda was elected in September 2007 instead of September 2006, when he would have had enough support with which to make substantial progress in reconfiguring Japan's foreign policy and tackling the domestic problems that threaten to limit its influence. As of now, it is unclear whether this new Fukuda doctrine will survive its progenitor's government.

What does Abe's trip mean for Japan and Asia?

Much is being made of Prime Minister Abe's trip to India, where he is scheduled to address India's parliament today.

The trip will likely feature lots of talk of the values shared by Japan and India, naturally to contrast both Asian powers with China.

I remain less than convinced that Japan and India will be able to build a "special relationship" that can function as a kind of pincer movement against China, not least because it is in the interests of neither country to court a Chinese reaction to a more formal partnership.

Economic ties? Sure. More military exercises? Fine. But joint Indo-Japanese leadership in Asian multilateral fora? What are their shared interests? A China that is a "responsible stakeholder" in the region? How exactly will an Indo-Japan partnership serve to make China more responsible?

There's nothing wrong with closer Indo-Japanese relations — and closer ASEAN-Japan relations— but it is important not to get carried away. It is not entirely clear what Japan's vision for the region is, and accordingly it is difficult to imagine Japan's playing anything but a supporting role as the region's map is redrawn over the coming decades. Japanese money will ensure that Tokyo always has a seat at the head table, but I don't think rhetoric about "democratization" and "good governance" constitute Japanese leadership in the region. That was the message Prime Minister Abe delivered to ASEAN in Jakarta, where he talked about the need for ASEAN to foster good governance among its member states and ensure that governments respect the will of the people (it would be nice if he tried that at home).

ASEAN will no doubt be thrilled to play Japan and China off one another, pocketing the investments of both, but I would hardly call that a leadership role for Japan. Indeed, the competition between Japan (and the US) and China over ASEAN suggests that regional leadership may in fact come more from ASEAN than from the great powers that are struggling to enhance their influence over the region, particularly if the US military presence in the region remains in place, providing an implicit security guarantee that keeps the peace, thereby creating the space in which ASEAN can push for a region-wide political and economic community.

So regardless of the rhetoric that the prime minister delivers in Delhi today, it is important to remember that Indo-Japanese cooperation will be but one facet of each country's approach to an increasingly complex Asia. The future of Asia will not rest in the hands of a concert of democratic powers.

Pooling reserves in Asia

The Yomiuri Shimbun's lead editorial today focuses on an agreement reached at the annual meeting of the Asian Development Bank (ABD) to pool currency reserves among the ASEAN + 3 countries so to be able to provide liquidity in the event of a crisis.

Building on the Chiang Mai Initiative, an earlier agreement in ASEAN + 3 that provided for bilateral currency swaps in the event of a crisis, this agreement may signal a new phase in Asian regionalism, although, as this Reuters story notes, the details of the arrangement have yet to be solidified.

I think this agreement may be important for a few reasons: it cements the role of ASEAN + 3 as the critical forum in regional cooperation (much to the chagrin of the US, undoubtedly); it reinforces the counter intuitive pattern of integration whereby ASEAN is the hub and the region's giants (Japan, China, and South Korea) are the spokes; and, together with that, it signals to the world that even as Asia stands up a complement (or a rival) to the IMF, Asian integration remains a largely open affair.

While I think the first two points are probably uncontroversial, the last may require some teasing out.

The key point is that ASEAN is the hub. Because ASEAN, a group of smaller, poorer countries dwarfed by the great powers of Northeast Asia is the hub of regional integration arrangements, there is less of a "Fortress Asia" feel to ASEAN + 3 cooperation than there might otherwise have been if it was occurring under the aegis of China or Japan. With Japan and China cancelling out each other's influence within the grouping, ASEAN has been free to push for a more open environment. ASEAN's thrust — and thus the thrust of ASEAN + 3 initiatives — is largely outward.

Look at ASEAN's recent activities. It has recently opened FTA negotiations with the EU and CEP negotiations with Japan, while continuing with CEP negotiations with the PRC and pushing ahead with the liberalization of markets within ASEAN.

One can argue about whether these agreements are trade-creating or trade-distorting, but the politics of ASEAN-centered regionalism suggest a more dynamic, commercial regionalism than Europe's inward-looking, institution-building regionalism. As numerous commentators have observed, the conditions of Asia make European-style integration unlikely.

The relationship of the ASEAN + 3 pool to the IMF remains to be decided — Yomiuri suggests that it will be complementary — but that relationship will say much about how power has shifted to Asia in the decade since the Asian contagion. As such, even as the region becomes more open to global commerce, it may become less friendly to international financial institutions perceived as harmful to "Asian" interests.

While it is too early to say more about this arrangement, seeing as how it remains inchoate, it is, unmistakably, an important step in Asian regionalism — and a sign of the growing wealth, power, and independence of Asian countries (and not just China).