Alliance tension out in the open

The Asahi Shimbun's English edition printed a story today suggesting that US Secretary of State Rice told Japanese officials last month that resolving the abductions issue is not a precondition for the removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

In previous posts such as this one, I suggested that Japan seems to overestimate the willingness of the Bush administration, in its feeble dotage, to stand alongside Japan on the abductions issue should a breakthrough (however unlikely) become possible. And yet Abe seems content to rely upon pablum emanating from the White House, instead of concrete signals emanating from the State Department that the US is ready to deal, with or without Japan.

As this article suggests, what seemed like a more abstract problem now looks to be very real, with an unnamed US government source quoted in the article as saying, "[this] was the first public statement that clearly separated the abduction issue from the decision to remove a nation from the terrorism list."

While the "Agreed Framework 2.0" could collapse at any time — diminishing Japanese fears of abandonment in the process — this story further supports my suspicions that for all the chummy rhetoric emanating from Washington late last month, there are genuine political problems facing the alliance that neither government seems willing or able to face.

What will happen at the first sign of a crisis? Does anyone else think that Kim Jong-il might have something in store to force the issue?

Was Abe's trip a success?

That's the argument made by an editorial in the Japan Times and Jun Okumura at GlobalTalk 21. The Yomiuri, meanwhile, was cautiously optimistic, suggesting that while there were positive results from the Bush-Abe summit, the future is unclear, and there is a greater need for better bilateral communication (a point I've stressed on a number of occasions).

Okumura, for his part, limits his praise to the abductions issue, as it seems to have been successfully shunted off the agenda thanks to Abe's discussion with congressional leaders on Thursday. The Japan Times, however, suggests that unity has been achieved on North Korea policy.

But has it? My concern remains the same as it was when the February agreement was forged. If North Korea decides to comply in some form on the nuclear issue, but remains stubborn on the abductions issue, is the US really going to nix a potential breakthrough? Granted, I doubt a real breakthrough is likely anytime soon (or at all), but one should not underestimate the skill of North Korean diplomats, particularly when it comes to finding ways to outwit and divide the US and Japan.

The Japanese and English-language press have been full of stories praising Abe's diplomatic deftness, and there is no question that Abe has a gift for summitry, arguably because it fits his profile as a Gaullist-style political leader concerned with the direction of the ship of state over the long term. Abe has subsequently demonstrated his deftness in the Middle East, and the Japanese people seem to have acknowledged his ability to conduct diplomacy with other heads of state and government.

But does Abe's talent for diplomacy mean that his summits should automatically be judged a successful, particularly regarding his summit in Washington? Beyond the cordial facade, the US-Japan relationship has serious issues, not least the question of whether the US will continue to require the alliance with Japan as the foundation for its position in Asia in the coming decades (and the parallel question of whether Japan can afford to look solely to the US for support in the region). As the region becomes ever more fluid, will the US and Japan be able to sustain the political coordination necessary to confront regional challenges without a standing arrangement that unifies bilateral political and security planning?

In short, the Abe-Bush summit did nothing to address the fundamental disconnect in the alliance: cooperation between the US Military and the JSDF is deep and sustained, but it lacks a detailed plan for the future of the alliance, particularly if Abe succeeds in re-interpreting the constitution to permit limited collective self-defense. What is the purpose of the alliance? Is it a global alliance committed to spreading values shared by the US and Japan (as suggested by Foreign Minister Aso Taro's initiative to create an "arc of freedom and prosperity)? Is it, as per Article VI of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, committed to the maintenance of the security in the Far East? If so, what does maintaining security in the Far East mean? Or is it simply an alliance for the defense of Japan, a purpose that seems increasingly irrelevant as Japan becomes more than capable of defending itself and the US prepares to realign its forward-deployed forces?

Can a US-Japan summit that did not even touch upon these issues be considered a successful summit?

Abe in Washington, day two

Bush and Abe have eaten their burgers, they've talked, and they've had a press conference that shows how little will actually come out of their meeting.

The press coverage (FT; Washington Post) focuses on statements that hint at a firming up of the US position in the Six-Party talks -- "Our partners in the six-party talks are patient, but our patience is not unlimited" -- but then there is little more than a hint of the consequences North Korea will face if it fails to comply:

The interesting thing about our position is that if it looks like the North Korean leader is not going to honor his agreement, if it looks like that there are reasons other than the financial arrangements that will cause him to say, well, I really don't mean what I said, we now have a structure in place to continue to provide a strong message to the North Korean. We have the capability of more sanctions. We have the capability of convincing other nations to send a clear message.

Given recent signals from the other parties in the talks — South Korea's rice contributions, for example -- does the president really anticipate a robust reply from the others to North Korean intransigence?

Meanwhile, the abductions issue was raised, of course, and Bush responded with rhetoric that I'm sure warmed his buddy Shinzo's heart:

Any discussion about ways forward, however, shouldn't -- should not obscure my strong sentiment about the abductee issue. The Prime Minister mentioned how Mrs. Yokota was affected by her visit to the Oval Office -- well, I was affected by her visit to the Oval Office. It broke my heart to be in the presence of a Japanese mother whose love for her daughter has not diminished over time and her grief is sincere and real. I remember her bringing the picture of the child as she remembers her, right there where I go to work every day, and sitting it on the couch next to her.

So I'm deeply affected by her. She needs to understand that her visit added a human dimension to an issue which is obviously very important to the Japanese people. And I will never forget her visit and I will work with my friend and the Japanese government to get this issue resolved in a way that touches the human heart, in a way that -- it's got more than just a, kind of a diplomatic ring to it, as far as I'm concerned. It's a human issue now to me; it's a tangible, emotional issue. And thank you for bringing the question up.

Any hint of a concrete guideline as to what will constitute progress on this issue? Nope.

So while Bush and Abe were perhaps able to clear some of the air, there still remains a fundamental problem: the US threshold for staying committed the talks remains higher than Japan's, in part due to the simple fact that the president is not particularly focused on them in the first place, leaving the State Department to craft the US bargaining position.

Meanwhile, the joint statement released from the summit focuses on energy and the environment, perhaps helping to meet Japan's goal of making an environment "in which it will be easy for the US to participate" in a post-Kyoto agreement.

So, as usual for a summit of this nature, the offerings were bland and uninspiring...but thankfully the portions were small.

Hopefully the 2 + 2 meeting next week will be meatier.

Abe in Washington, day one

Apropos of US Asia policy over the past several years, Prime Minister Abe's arrival in Washington was overshadowed by the Senate's passage of a war spending bill that includes a withdrawal plan -- entirely consistent with the US government's "Iraq, Iraq, Iraq" foreign policy.

While discussions between Bush and Abe over cheeseburgers and apple pie at Camp David on Friday will be unaffected by the bill, the attention Washington might have paid to questions about the future of the US-Japan alliance will most likely not be forthcoming.

In any event, prior to the low-key dinner at the White House on Thursday night, Abe met with a bipartisan group of congressional leaders, where, of course, the comfort women issue was raised -- prompting Abe to express his apologies once again both as an individual and as prime minister. Interestingly, the Sankei Shimbun reports that Tom Lantos (D-CA-12), chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, said, "It is fitting that Japan should become a great power even in the area of security. To accomplish this, I strongly support Prime Minister Abe's policy of constitution revision." This is a good reminder that on the US-Japan alliance, there is a broad bipartisan consensus supporting bilateral security cooperation.

His schedule also included visits to Arlington National Cemetery and the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland, where he met with veterans wounded in Afghanistan and Iraq.

And, of course, Abe Akie and Laura Bush toured Mount Vernon, prompting Steve Clemons to speculate on how Bill Clinton would handle these duties if Hillary Clinton is elected president.

Does any of this mean anything? Arguably no. Abe's genuflections to congressional leaders might defuse some of the tension surrounding the comfort women issue -- although this op-ed co-authored by former House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Henry Hyde in the Washington Times (hat tip: Shisaku) suggests that the vein of opposition from the right, due to the influence of veterans of the Pacific theater, is deeper than Democratic initiation of the resolution would suggest.

Meanwhile, on North Korea, is Abe going to be able to reverse the "Bush shock"? Is another reminder of the plight of Japan's abductees going to make any difference for the US position? And are the two governments really capable of following through on last year's agreement on the realignment of the US military presence in Japan?

I do not anticipate these issues to be resolved at Friday's summit at Camp David or at next week's 2 + 2 meeting of foreign and defense ministers and secretaries. When looking at US-Japan relations over the past two decades, at least on the US side the principals at the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom mattered relatively little, except as sponsors of their subordinates' work on the alliance.

The sub-cabinet officials -- the assistant and deputy assistant secretaries -- holding Asia and Japan portfolios have been far more important. With Chris Hill the most prominent of the sub-ministerial Asia hands and Richard Lawless's departure pending, alliance matters are of secondary importance within Asia policy (which is itself of secondary or tertiary importance in US foreign policy as a whole). Commitment from President Bush, together with Prime Minister Abe, might be able to create an environment within which sub-cabinet officials could discuss the alliance's future in more concrete terms -- but that commitment is unlikely to be forthcoming, and even if it was, the personnel lineup at State, Defense, and the NSC does not favor the alliance.

I will reserve final judgment until the joint statement is released Friday, but I have no expectations for dramatic change. The alliance is on cruise control, and cruise control means drift.

UPDATE: Speaking of personnel, the Yomiuri Shimbun reports that Victor Cha, director for East Asian affairs (including Japan, the Koreas, Australia, and New Zealand) at the National Security Council, will be leaving the administration and returning to Georgetown. The Yomiuri's take is that this is yet another blow to the influence of North Korea hawks in the administration and a victory for the "dialogue faction." Of course, the gap between the US and Japanese negotiating positions on North Korea has grown as the influence of the hawks in Washington has declined.

I wonder who the administration will find to serve in this post for the remainder of the term, not an insignificant span of time by any means. (Although it's hard to believe that the Bush administration still has more than twenty months before it expires.) As with the departure of Richard Lawless, Japan and the Koreas will be watching closely as to who succeeds Cha.

Japan's long road to normalization

Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations and director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff early in the Bush administration, has an op-ed on the occasion of Abe's visit that title of which says it all: "Asia's Overlooked Great Power." (Hat tip: Project Syndicate)

Most of Haass' essay is innocuous, typical proposals about more regional cooperation and a more apologetic stance on the history question, but one point he made strikes me as problematic.

He writes, "Intellectuals, journalists, and politicians are now saying and writing things about Japan’s role in the world that were unthinkable a decade ago. It is a question of when, not if, the Japanese amend Article IX of their constitution, which limits the role of Japan’s armed forces to self-defense."

I don't disagree with the former point. One of the more interesting pieces of Japan's normalization has been the normalization of the security policy debate, with the removal of taboos on what security policies can be considered and an eagerness to discuss the regional and global security environments. But a more robust security debate has not necessarily resulted in -- nor resulted from -- an abiding change how the Japanese people think about their nation's role in the world. While fears of North Korea have enabled the Japanese government to deepen missile defense cooperation with the US, it is unclear the extent to which the abductions issue -- as opposed to direct concerns about North Korea's ballistic missiles and nuclear arsenal -- has shaped Japanese public opinion on North Korea. And beyond North Korea, the Japanese people aren't exactly clamoring for their country to take on more risky missions abroad that could result in combat deaths.

Will this reluctance ultimately give way?

I don't think so. The process of normalization has not been, and will not be, a linear process. It has proceeded with baby steps and the occasional step backwards -- and lots of standing still. While the younger generation of politicians, bureaucrats, and commentators has shown itself to be far more willing and eager to see a more robust Japanese global role, they operate in a policy environment in which change happens slowly and in which compromise is a matter of course. And there are a number of politicians who may favor a more prominent Japanese role abroad, but would prefer to be a European-style "soft power" great power. (I suspect that that stance will not be tenable given Japan's highly uncertain regional environment.)

As such, Haass should not be so quick to assume that constitution revision is a foregone conclusion. Given falling support for revision and given that Abe's government may not last the year, Article 9 may live long beyond the sixtieth birthday that it is celebrating this year. I am convinced that re-interpretation is far more likely, but while re-interpretation of the prohibition on the right of collective self-defense would resolve some of the ambiguity surrounding Japan's defense role, especially in the US-Japan alliance, doubts would remain -- and doubts mean that every proposed action (outside of actions requiring immediate response, i.e. a missile launch) will be subject to endless debate in the Diet, parsing whether the proposed mission fits with the new interpretation.

So change is happening, and will continue to happen, but not in the direct, clear-cut, expeditious manner expected by Haass.

Mr. Abe goes to Washington

Abe is set to begin his visit to Washington, which means that there is a surge of media coverage repeating the same questions that I have been asking at this blog for the past six months. Domestically, does Abe represent a return to the pre-Koizumi style of LDP governance? Internationally, is Abe truly committed to the alliance, or is he a Gaullist who views it more as a relationship of convenience (meaning Japan should have capabilities independent of the alliance)?

The doubts surrounding Abe come out strongly in Mary Kissel's interview with Abe in the Wall Street Journal, previously discussed here. Kissel makes the same point that I made in this post yesterday:

Mr. Abe might yet surprise on the domestic front; he deliberately mentioned that Japan's tax rates are higher than the OECD average--a signal corporate-tax burdens could ease. His team could aim for something small; perhaps by resolving a long-running dispute over U.S. beef imports, or by cracking open immigration.

But in the long run, that's not the kind of sweeping reform Japan so desperately cries out for. Mr. Abe needs to make Japan an easier place to do business for foreigners, break down regulatory barriers to trade and keep plugging away at the anti-reform base in the LDP. Period.

Once again, the Koizumi formula is the way to go: political reform must precede or accompany structural reform of the economy.

As for this weekend's agenda, the transcript of a press conference with Dennis Wilder, the National Security Council's Senior Director for Asian Affairs, is available here.

Several things stand out.

First, there will be no escaping the comfort women issue. Even if President Bush leaves it out of discussions, as I expect he will, press coverage of Abe's visit will necessarily mention the resolution before Congress and Abe's ambiguous response, from which he has backtracked.

Second, there will be no way for Abe to avoid comparisons with Koizumi, which, as I've mentioned before, is something that Abe's advisers are working assiduously to avoid within Japan. In part due to the heavily covered visit to Graceland last summer, Koizumi raised expectations of Japanese prime ministers in the US as well -- Koizumi indubitably became more recognized among Americans than all of his predecessors combined.

If you read the transcript above, there is much talk about the Bush-Koizumi relationship. Wilder even made clear that since leaving office Koizumi remains "a close friend." This means that throughout the weekend, this man


will be casting his shadow over the proceedings at the White House and Camp David -- and there's not a thing Abe can do about it.

Of course the US-Japan relationship is bigger than the relationship between the president and the prime minister, but close cooperation at the top facilitates greater cooperation at the ministerial and sub-ministerial levels, ensuring that the work of individuals focused exclusively on the bilateral relationship enjoys the blessings of the leaders who make the ultimate decisions.

So that's the big question for the weekend. Will Bush and Abe be able to forge a cordial relationship, that while not having the same bonhomie of the Bush-Koizumi relationship, will be able to serve as the basis for efforts to strengthen the US-Japan relationship during the waning years of the Bush administration and remove some of the doubts that have set in over the past six months?

The offensive continues

Yesterday I wrote that the Abe Cabinet launched an "offensive" on the question of collective self-defense.

It seems that that offensive continued today, with Prime Minister Abe meeting with Richard Armitage, former deputy secretary of state, co-chair of the groups that produced the two reports on the US-Japan alliance that bear his name (alongside Joseph Nye), and all-around advocate of greater US-Japan cooperation. (At present, it seems that Sankei is the only major daily covering this story.)

The article reports [my translation]: "Armitage said after the talk, 'If the conclusion leads to more flexibility, it will be good for Japan. He indicated his hope that Japan will become able to exercise its right of collective self-defense. On the other hand, he pointed out that 'it's Japan's decision' and he stressed that Japan is struggling [with the issue] itself."

I expect that in advance of this weekend's summit, Armitage will inform the president about the contents of his conversation with Abe -- and whoever else he happens to meet while visiting -- making clear to the president that Abe is committed to overcoming the prohibition on collective self-defense, the biggest obstacle standing in the way of greater US-Japan security cooperation.

Thus Armitage's meeting with Abe is as much a part of the offensive as remarks in the Diet by Abe's senior advisers, helping to clear the ground in Washington for changes that could be in the offing.

Those changes are far from guaranteed, however, as Komeito Secretary General Kitagawa Kazuo made clear in his remarks in the Diet today, in which he warned the government to be "prudent" in its reconsideration of the prohibition on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, suggesting that the current interpretation provides for the cases under consideration.

Nevertheless, as I said yesterday, the push for reinterpretation may prove more important than constitution revision, which remains a distant prospect, the national referendum bill notwithstanding. Washington must be ready, however, to work with Tokyo to determine the structure of the alliance should Japan become able to act as a full (or fuller) ally.

Collective self-defense offensive

In the past day, the Abe Cabinet has been on the offensive on the question of the review of the prohibition on the right of collective self-defense.

Yesterday, Prime Minister Abe said at a press conference, "As the era changes, I want to have a debate about how the constitution should be interpreted."

At the Diet, controversial LDP PARC chairman Nakagawa Shoichi gave a speech explaining the thinking behind the collective self-defense study group. (The same article reports that in accordance with Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki's reassurance that any recommendations made by the study group will go through the normal LDP policy channels, Ishiba Shigeru, JDA director-general under Koizumi and currently chairman of the LDP-PARC National Defense division, Defense Policy Investigative Subcommittee, will spearhead the debate.)

Then, today, Defense Minister Kyuma reiterated to the press the points made by Abe yesterday about the importance of reviewing the constitutional interpretation that prohibits the exercise of the right of collective self-defense.

The Abe Cabinet's push behind the review is important, perhaps more important than the push to revise the Constitution -- because reinterpreting the constitution to permit collective self-defense, even in limited cases, is a far easier way of strengthening Japanese security policy than revising the constitution. Should the government succeed, it will impact the US-Japan alliance immediately, directly, and concretely.

Perhaps this reflects a tactical shift by the cabinet, recognizing that with constitution revision a distant prospect, the government's efforts are better spent trying to realize a very real policy shift in the short term. There is probably a PR element too, allowing Abe to demonstrate to President Bush this weekend that his government is pushing all-out for a more generous reinterpretation of the constitution.

But make no mistake: reinterpreting the constitution would be a hugely important step in the normalization of Japanese security policy.

Abe's first six months

The FT's David Pilling provides a solid summary of Abe Shinzo's first six months in the Kantei.

Being a summary, there is, of course, little new in this article, but it serves as a good reminder of the problems with the Abe Cabinet -- and of Abe's tendencies as a leader.

I found this paragraph, though, particularly distressing:

Those close to him say he would have benefited from a fight for the premiership. Many of the ruling Liberal Democratic party factions take credit for propelling him to office and all are busily seeking political patronage and influence. As a result, Mr Abe has appeared far more willing than the stubborn and single-minded Mr Koizumi to listen to often competing advice.

If Abe somehow manages to go the distance, remaining as president of the LDP for the maximum six years, how will six years of governance in this vein leave the LDP -- and Japan? Imagine six years of window-dressing legislation like the education reform, that seeks to create a more self-confident Japan even as public finances and public services crumble in the face of Japan's demographic collapse.

None of this will, of course, be discussed at Camp David this coming week, at least not in any particular depth. Abe will no doubt reassure President Bush that he is in firm command at home, that he is moving his agenda forward -- pointing to recent legislative victories -- while reassuring Bush that the Japanese government remains his firmest ally. (Bush will no doubt be pleased to hear that -- remember this cartoon -- and there will no doubt be lots of flighty rhetoric about how strong the alliance is today.)

In light of the anticipated love fest, however, I wonder how Bush will go about telling Abe that the US will not be selling the F-22 to Japan anytime soon, no matter how much Abe, Kyuma, and company lay on the "bar-none ranch" rhetoric. Given that the US has already said no to John Howard's Australia, the Bush administration's other remaining close ally, I just don't anticipate the US turning around and offering to amend the Obey amendment's restrictions for Japan. (For more on the F-22 question, check out Shisaku.)

Book of the week

In honor of Prime Minister Abe's visit to Washington later this week, this week's selection for book of the week is an oldie but a goodie -- senior Asahi correspondent Funabashi Yoichi's Alliance Adrift, an account of the process of reaffirming and redefining the US-Japan alliance during the middle and late Clinton administration.

As I have argued consistently, the alliance is in the midst of a similar period of political drift, and as Abe heads to Washington to patch up relations, it is worthwhile to look back to see how the US and Japanese governments struggled with and briefly overcame problems in the relationship.

Abe interviewed in the Washington Post

In advance of Abe's impending visit to Washington, DC, the Washington Post has published an interview of Abe by Lally Weymouth, journalist and daughter of the late Katherine Graham. It is unclear in which language the interview was conducted or whether Abe was speaking through an interpreter.

But regardless of the language, Abe once again displays his inability to say anything of substance.

It is no fault of Weymouth's. Her questions were pointed, and she actually pressed Abe on the comfort women issue. She also asked whether Japan feels "sidelined" in the six-party talks over the abductions issue, to which Abe laughably replied, "On this question, Japan and the United States are fully coordinated." Really? Fully coordinated? Based on what? "I discussed this matter on the phone with President Bush." If Abe actually thinks this, then he has learned nothing from the shift in US foreign policy that resulted in the current (failing) agreement in the first place.

What follows is typical boilerplate about cooperation in East Asia with China and Japan's bearing a greater share of the burdens of maintaining regional and global order, after which Weymouth raises the question of the Constitution. She questioned him as to whether a major impetus for constitution revision is a desire to have a constitution written by Japanese hands, to which he replied, "...The important thing is that we write the constitution ourselves. Because the constitution is the basic law of the land."

I'm not quite sure how those two sentences are connected. Yes, the constitution is the basic law of the land, but is the current constitution somehow less than a "basic law of the land" because it was drafted during the occupation? I recognize that there are good reasons for Japan to revise its constitution -- which, in Abe's defense, he does articulate in this interview -- but wounded pride from having a constitution written by occupation authorities shouldn't be one of them. After sixty years of governance under the postwar constitution, the national pride argument just doesn't hold water. Japan has made its constitution its own.

The conversation then moved to the comfort women issue, in regard to which Abe stated, "As a human being, I would like to express my sympathies, and also as prime minister of Japan I need to apologize to them." If he needs to apologize, what's stopping him? He is the prime minister, after all. If he thinks it's important, then he ought to quit talking about apologizing and just do it.

All in all, there's not all that much to take from this, other than that Abe remains a slippery character -- just as I wrote back in November when Abe was interviewed by the FT's David Pilling.

Reviewing collective self-defense

While all of political Japan continues to discuss the assassination of Nagasaki Mayor Ito -- which I discussed here -- I am interested in the ongoing preparations for Prime Minister Abe's visit to Washington at the end of the month.

Today, the Sankei Shimbun reports, Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki addressed questions about the Cabinet's study group on whether to permit the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. Namely, Shiozaki confirmed that no changes will be made to the constitutional interpretation prohibiting collective self-defense without the ruling party's approval. He said, "Naturally, policy cannot be changed without getting the ruling party's understanding." He added, "While the security situation changes, should we not effectively reconstruct the legal foundation? The relationship with the Constitution is being investigated within the administration. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's position is that we should think together with Komeito about what legal foundation is necessary."

Shiozaki uses the word 与党 (yotoo), which can be translated as "ruling party," "government party," or "majority party," but I have a hunch that when push comes to shove, Shiozaki really means to say 自民党 (LDP). While the statement about including Komeito suggests that he might mean ruling coalition, is Abe really going to let Komeito -- which has declared its opposition to both constitution revision and the exercise of the right of collective self-defense -- determine his government's agenda on the normalization of Japanese security policy?

Beyond that, the important point to derive from Shiozaki's statement is that Japan's security policy, unlike that of every other major power, is legislature-directed. Normalization is a legislative process; over the past fifteen years, Japan has -- aside from token, though important, PKO and reconstruction operations -- done little more than pass laws that expand Japan's security policy potential, starting with the International Peace Cooperation Law and continuing on through the series of laws to implement the revised US-Japan Guidelines and permit Japanese contributions to coalition efforts in the Indian Ocean and Iraq.

Despite the "presidentialization" of the Kantei, the Diet remains the place to watch for developments in security policy.

A gift to Bush?

Prime Minister Abe has announced the formation of a special study group chaired by former Japanese ambassador to the US Yanai Shunji to study rolling back restrictions on Japan's exercise of its right of collective self-defense in limited cases, including, according to the Yomiuri Shimbun, (1) the use of missile defense to destroy a ballistic missile targeting an ally (i.e., the US, (2) in the event of an attack on allied ships sailing with MSDF ships on the high seas, (3) in the event of an attack on another country's forces engaged in reconstruction (i.e., in a situation similar to the ASDF deployment in Iraq), and (4) to resist in the case of efforts to obstruct UN peacekeeping operations.

The prohibition on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is the product of a long-standing constitutional interpretation drafted by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, which means, of course, that a re-interpretation can make collective self-defense permissible in these cases. But the study group is informal and its recommendations non-binding; as reported in the Japan Times, a move to permit collective defense in any circumstances is likely to draw opposition both within and outside the government.

This is an important step, because it is the prohibition on collective self-defense that has prevented the US-Japan alliance from becoming a proper alliance in which each ally is committed to the defense of the other. It signals that the bounds of acceptable discourse on Japanese security policy continue to expand, and that the expansion of the Kantei's top-down policy making powers -- which may soon include a national security council, the legislation having been submitted to the Diet last week -- continues unabated in security policy. Just how much stronger the Kantei has become will depend, of course, on how the collective self-defense review process resolves.

The timing of this study group, meanwhile, is important, giving Abe concrete evidence of his government's steps to strengthen the alliance to present to President Bush at the end of the month. (The Japan Times thinks that Abe may be trying to change the subject away from comfort women.)

In the case of the latter, at this point I doubt there is much that Abe can do to change the subject, and as for the former, I don't think the US government will be assuaged by the creation of a study group, given that there is still a long way to go before Japan can be called a "normal" country. The obstacles to embracing even limited collective self-defense are many.

(The editorial cartoon left, from Yomiuri, shows Bush and Abe embracing each other, bound by "falling rates of support"; the captions reads "Believe in each other?")

The healing power of Dice-K?

Perhaps the baseball gods are smiling on the US-Japan relationship, with wunderkind Matsuzaka Daisuke's first start for the Red Sox a masterful performance.

What better way for the allies to change the subject away from all that nastiness about comfort women and North Korean nuclear weapons? State Department spokesman and Red Sox fan Sean McCormack evidently, according to Jiji, interrupted a press conference to thank the Seibu Lions for Matsuzaka. (Although Japanese Finance Minister Omi Koji criticized NHK for excessive coverage of Matsuzaka's debut -- hey Omi! get on message.)

Yes, baseball, what a nice way to paper over the serious problems facing the alliance in advance of Abe's visit. I wonder if Bush and Abe will be playing a game of catch at Camp David, just as Bush did with Koizumi on the latter's first visit to the US as prime minister.

Can you see this man playing a game of "catch ball" with President Bush?

Lawless departs: an opportunity for change?

In this post from yesterday about Prime Minister Abe's visit to Washington at the end of the month, I mentioned that one factor in the Bush administration's inability to focus on advancing the process of redefining the US-Japan alliance is the lack of experienced Japan hands in senior positions.

Now, according to OneFreeKorea, Richard Lawless, deputy under secretary of defense for Asia-Pacific security affairs, is stepping down. OneFreeKorea focuses on his role in the US realignment in Korea, but Lawless played as significant a role in the realignment of US forces in Japan, working tirelessly to conclude the agreement approved by the Security Consultative Committee last May -- ostensibly resolving an issue on which both sides had been actively seeking an agreement since 1995. (The transcript of the press conference announcing the agreement is available here.)

I have heard, however, that Lawless has been ill for some time, explaining in part the relative lack of progress since the May 2006 2 + 2 meeting confirming the agreement.

The question now is who will replace him. I wonder if Lawless's retirement will clear the way for Michael Green's return to the administration. Whatever the case may be, this is an opportunity for the Bush administration to right itself on Japan policy. Handing the Asia-Pacific portfolio to a Japan hand (as opposed to a Korea or China hand) would send a clear signal to Japan that while the US is seeking an agreement with North Korea and deepening its ties with China, the alliance with Japan remains the single most important element of US Asia policy.

I also wonder if discussion of Lawless's replacement will make it on the agenda for this month's summit.

UPDATE: Robert Koehler of The Marmot's Hole suggests that Lawless will likely be replaced by James Shinn, onetime National Intelligence Officer for East Asia at the National Intelligence Council, former senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and current principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia-Pacific security affairs. Shinn, perhaps unusually for someone in his line of work, had a long career in business after a stint at the State Department (see the biography provided here by the National Bureau of Asian Research [about halfway down the page]). Based on his publication record from his time at CFR, Shinn does not fall into one camp in the region, which might make him a suitable compromise candidate.

UPDATE, the second: The Yomiuri Shimbun's article on Lawless's departure is here. Yomiuri views it primarily as the departure of yet another North Korea hawk from the administration, and mentions Shinn as a possible successor, although it quotes "someone connected to the US government" as saying that Shinn is a "bureaucratic type whose negotiating skills are unknown." Don't think that the Japanese government isn't paying close attention. It is very much interested in who will fill the post responsible for the US realignment in Japan and represent the Pentagon in the six-party talks (and, as the Japanese government surely hopes, balance the waxing influence of Christopher Hill in US Asia policy).

Comfort women, not on the agenda; how about drift?

So reports Jiji regarding the meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Abe scheduled for the end of this month during Japan's Golden Week holidays.

This is not altogether surprising; despite Ambassador Schieffer's voicing concerns about Abe's response to the congressional comfort women resolution (mentioned in this post), I would be shocked if the issue was taken up by more senior administration officials, especially given the state of relations between the administration and the Democratic Congress. If anything, I would not be surprised if the US sends a new ambassador to Japan in the aftermath of Abe's visit.

The agenda, according to Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki, will focus largely on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. Without knowing more details about the agenda, I assume that the summit will be more or less boilerplate about the importance of the US-Japan alliance to the region, much like Vice President Cheney's visit to Japan in February, rather than frank and forthright discussion of the sources of the friction that has emerged between the allies since Prime Minister Abe took office.

As regular readers of this blog know, I am concerned about the clear signs of drift in the US-Japan alliance that have presented since former Prime Minister Koizumi visited Washington (and Graceland) last summer. The only cure for drift is sustained engagement by the senior leaderships of both countries, from the sub-cabinet level up to the chief executives and back down. I fear, however, that the Bush administration, under siege at home and abroad and lacking Japan experts in its midst, is inadequately prepared to dedicate itself to pursuing more open, constructive political cooperation with Japan -- and the Abe Cabinet, between its plummeting popularity and a general laxness in its approach to the US-Japan alliance, seems hardly capable of picking up the slack.

Accordingly, in the face of the challenges of a fluid regional security environment, the region's most significant security partnership -- anchor of the US position in East Asia since the end of World War II -- appears powerless.

I hope I'm wrong. I hope there's strength yet. But if President Bush and Prime Minister Abe -- and, more importantly, the US and Japanese foreign and defense ministers, in the 2 + 2 meeting following the summit -- do not have frank and open discussions about the evolving regional security environment, about approaches to the emergence of China, and about differences between the US and Japanese positions in the six-party talks (if they make it to the end of the month), my fears may well be justified.