The final word on Fukuda

The word in the Japanese media is that Fukuda Yasuo's resignation came as a complete surprise, reportedly made even without consulting with his wife.

The LDP was blindsided. The public, it seems, is angry over Mr. Fukuda's "irresponsibility." The DPJ has already called for a general election.

I was not among those who wrote Mr. Fukuda off last year as a mere caretaker. I gave him credit for being a better politician than he appeared and not simply a reversion to the old LDP. I still think that. But I'm convinced that Mr. Fukuda was the right man at the wrong time.

His various public statements, including his first policy address, his speech to the LDP national convention in January, his second policy address, and his May foreign policy address all evince a clear understanding of the nature of Japan's crisis. Mr. Fukuda clearly understands how Japan has to change; indeed, he may understand better than just about everyone in the LDP, Mr. Koizumi included. (I'm inclined to agree with Masuzoe Yoichi's description of Mr. Koizumi as a better destroyer than builder — Japan at this point needs the latter just as much as it needs the former.) When he spoke of the hardships facing the Japanese people, I did not question his sincerity.

The problem is that he faced a political situation that would have stumped all but the ablest of politicians, which Mr. Fukuda is not. I think that he would have been a huge success had he followed Mr. Koizumi in 2006, being more of a builder than Mr. Koizumi and probably being better liked by the public than Mr. Koizumi. I don't mean loved or admired in the way that Mr. Koizumi was, like a rock idol, but rather someone who the public would have trusted to listen to them, to be frank with them, and to do his best to address his concerns and begin the hard work of building a new Japanese system for the twenty-first century. Even Mr. Koizumi, for all his popularity, did not enjoy a relationship like that with the public — as suggested by scornful remarks about his policy legacy.

But Mr. Fukuda took over in September 2007, after Abe Shinzo had already reduced his inheritance to rubble. The agenda facing Mr. Fukuda was more daunting than the previous year, and he faced more obstacles to governing than Mr. Abe had. Mr. Fukuda had to deal with a resurgent DPJ in control of the upper house, but he also had to command an LDP deeply divided over its future in the wake of Mr. Koizumi and the LDP's 2007 election defeat (the former being in some way a cause of the latter) and soothe an agitated Komeito. He failed to overcome all of these challenges. He may well have made them worse: the DPJ looks poised to win the next election, the LDP is no less divided than last year, and Komeito may be on the brink of breaking with the LDP. Press reports will focus on the role of the divided Diet (i.e.,, democracy) in undermining his government, but the LDP deserves at least as much blame. Throughout his tenure Mr. Fukuda had to battle with his own party about priorities, policy, and political strategy. His victories were scarce, and, as he made clear in his statement last night, his frustrations many.

Yes, Mr. Fukuda failed, but success is likely to have eluded most other politicians. The reality is that the LDP as it exists today is incapable of governing Japan.

Mr. Fukuda's resignation may not just be the trigger for a general election; it may be the catalyst for a political realignment. Sonoda Hiroyuki yesterday called for the creation of a new party with part of the DPJ (presumably that also means part of the LDP will be involved too). The manner in which the LDP elects Mr. Fukuda's successor will be crucial for determining whether and how the party survives. I have written that Mr. Aso is likely to be the successor, but that is by no means guaranteed. There is talk of a Koizumi return, although I suspect that at this point Mr. Koizumi would rather return at the head of his own party instead of resurrecting the corpse of the LDP. For the moment there is no apparent rival to Mr. Aso (the foreign press is talking of Koike Yuriko, but I don't think she'll be able to repeat Mr. Koizumi's 2001 feat). But should Mr. Aso somehow not win the prize, I don't think Mr. Aso and his conservative comrades will be long for the LDP. Similarly, Mr. Aso's election could alienate some LDP members — like Mr. Nakagawa and the other remaining Koizumians — to the point of forcing them to leave the LDP and form their own party.

This is the shipwreck that Mr. Fukuda has left behind, though little fault of his own. The LDP is deeply divided along lines of how Japan should be governed, and the differing schools of thought seem disinclined to put the good of the LDP before their individual agendas.

The result may be that we are nearing the end of Japan's long bakumatsu. After years of watching the old system decay — and be prematurely declared dead — the ancien regime may finally be dead.

Before the year is up the DPJ may get its first chance to form a government. The voters seem to be in a hanging mood, especially after a second consecutive LDP prime minister resigned surprisingly. This act will by no means transform Japan overnight — nothing will do that — but it will be the catharsis that signals the final break with LDP rule. Even if the LDP returns to power in the future, it will invariably be a different LDP, one humbled by its time in opposition and splintered.

For that, Mr. Fukuda should at least deserve a footnote when the history of the present era is written. He may not have delivered much — although it's possible that the Fukuda Doctrine in foreign policy may outlast his government — but he at least pointed the way that Japan must go if it is to succeed in the twenty-first century. That's certainly more than one could say of his predecessor.

Aso Taro's poisoned chalice

With Fukuda Yasuo's resignation, there is little question that the frontrunner to replace him (perhaps the only candidate to replace him) is Aso Taro.

Mr. Aso may regret it.

Taking the helm with the LDP in even greater shambles than it was when he ran against Mr. Fukuda in September 2007 to succeed Abe Shinzo, a Prime Minister Aso would have to rush to sort out a new cabinet lineup (or would he keep Mr. Fukuda's second?) and sort out his agenda. Provided that he can wave off demands for a general election, the autumn extraordinary session will now be starting closer to the end of September, leaving the government even less time to push its stimulus package and an extension of the MSDF mission through the Diet. The latter looks increasingly unlikely, no matter how resolutely Mr. Aso asserts that it must be done. Moreover, it is unlikely that Mr. Aso would have any more control over Komeito than Mr. Fukuda, Mr. Aso's supposed "pipeline" to Komeito notwithstanding.

In these circumstances, the pressure for a general election immediately may prove irresistible.

But Mr. Aso has finally climbed to the top of the greasy pole.

For a look at how he went from defeated party presidential candidate to prohibitive favorite to succeed Mr. Fukuda, see this post, this post, this article at the website of the Far Eastern Economic Review, and this post on Mori Yoshiro's endorsement of Mr. Aso.

There will be lots of talk in the coming days about Mr. Aso's conservatism. While undoubtedly true, it is not the most important factor in understanding how the coming months will play out. Mr. Aso's popularity is undeniable. The voting public may be willing to give him the benefit of the doubt, and certainly won't hold his conservatism against him should he find the right way to deliver the message that under his leadership the government will be more responsive to people's hardships than under his predecessors or the DPJ. It's possible that enough voters will buy that message and return the LDP with a slim majority. While a slim majority will not "untwist" the Diet, Mr. Aso would use his popular appeal to claim it as a mandate and appeal directly to the public over the heads of "opposition forces" in the LDP and the opposition camp, a la Koizumi Junichiro.

Whether he has the deftness to pull off such a feat is one question; whether the circumstances will permit it is another. I'm dubious about the possibility of the LDP's riding out the chaos under the leadership of Mr. Aso. I think the LDP has exhausted its line of credit with the public, and will find itself cut off at election time. The public may be ready to resolve the divided Diet by delivering the lower house to the DPJ.

Expect that the first task for Mr. Aso will be buying time, trying to make the case that an election does not need to be held immediately — perhaps an argument like the government cannot afford to be distracted by an election when the economy is faltering and when urgent action is needed to address the insecurities of the people.

The onslaught begins

Last week, when Amari Akira announced his support for Aso Taro's taking over for Fukuda Yasuo when the latter's public approval dips below twenty percent, I wondered, "Will Mr. Amari's remarks be followed by a series of leaks to the press from anonymous LDP sources about disarray in the government and Mr. Fukuda's inadequacies as leaders, in the hope that a whisper campaign can drive the approval rating down to Mr. Amari's target?"

Nakagawa Shoichi, the "N" in the NASA and HANA clubs, creator of the "True Conservative Policy Study Group," and like Mr. Amari a confidante of Mr. Aso, lambasted Mr. Fukuda in remarks in Hokkaido Saturday, criticizing "do-nothing politics" and the "do-nothing prime minister."

The context of his remarks was a call for greater economic stimulus that includes tax cuts on investments and financial flows (echoing METI's plan for tax reform that encourages Japanese companies to repatriate profits earned abroad).

Nevertheless, the message is unmistakable: Mr. Nakagawa and other conservatives are clearly interested in damaging Mr. Fukuda's image in the hope of pushing his numbers down to the threshhold identified by Mr. Amari.

But apparently I was wrong to think that pressure on Mr. Fukuda would take the form of an "anonymous" whisper campaign, because far from being something as subtle as a whisper campaign, Mr. Nakagawa opted for a frontal assault against the prime minister.

I doubt that this will be the last we hear from the conservatives. They clearly smell the blood in the water. And Mr. Aso appears to be helping his own cause by refusing to let the furor over MAFF Minister Ota Seiichi's remarks die.

So who's next? Suga Yoshihide, the "S" in the NASA club (who still holds a party leadership post as vice chairman of the LDP's election strategy committee)? Or Abe Shinzo himself? I expect, however, that being a member of the Machimura faction Mr. Abe will receive a stern reprimand from Mr. Mori should he join the chorus. Not that that would stop him.

The point is that this appears to be only the beginning of a conservative campaign to undermine Mr. Fukuda's image in the hope of driving him out. The question remains whether the prime minister will exercise his nuclear option — calling a general election — instead of yielding to pressure to step down.

Amari calls for Aso

In the wake of Mori Yoshiro's "endorsement" of Aso Taro on Sunday, Amari Akira, METI minister in the first Fukuda cabinet, gave a full-throated call on Mr. Aso's behalf on the BS11 program "Inside Out."

"In the event that the Fukuda cabinet's approval rating falls beneath twenty percent," he said, "calls for a reorganization of the leadership will come forth from LDP members insecure about an election. A consensus has been achieved within the party for that time: Secretary-General Aso Taro."

Given that Mr. Amari is one of the conservatives close to Mr. Aso — he is one of the so-called NASA club, along with Nakagawa Shoichi (N), Mr. Aso (A), and Suga Yoshihide (S) — it is tempting to dismiss his remarks as fully expected and thus indicative of nothing new.

But it is telling that Mr. Amari followed immediately after Mr. Mori. Mr. Mori may have, whether he intended to or not, declared open season on Fukuda Yasuo. Note how Mr. Amari framed his remarks: he (and Mr. Aso himself?) is not content to wait until events unfold and an election is held. Considering that the cabinet approval rating is hovering in the mid-20s still — remind me why the prime minister reshuffled? — twenty percent is not particularly distant. Will Mr. Amari's remarks be followed by a series of leaks to the press from anonymous LDP sources about disarray in the government and Mr. Fukuda's inadequacies as leaders, in the hope that a whisper campaign can drive the approval rating down to Mr. Amari's target?

What would the prime minister do in the face of such an onslaught? Would he capitulate and step down, or would he exercise his nuclear option and call a general election?

Last year Mr. Aso and Yosano Kaoru were rumored to have carried out a coup against Abe Shinzo. Are we about to see an actual Aso coup? Will September see another prime minister resign?

Fukuda passes, for now

It appears increasingly unlikely that Fukuda Yasuo will decide to reshuffle his cabinet before the autumn Diet session.

NHK is reporting that at the very least there will be no decision on a reshuffle before the end of the month, as two members of the cabinet are delayed in returning from WTO talks abroad.

Mr. Fukuda told reporters — rather sternly — that "not once have I said something about [a cabinet reshuffle]."

This gets to the heart of the matter. The persistence of the cabinet reshuffle story on the basis of complete silence from the prime minister shows both how the media can be the cat's paw of certain ruling party politicians and how a herd mentality among the major media organizations can transform the political discussion. For weeks political discussion has focused on the prospects of a reshuffle, thanks to persistent leaks "from within the ruling party" on the likelihood and timing of a reshuffle.

It was about time that the prime minister stood up to the media's groundless speculation. Unfortunately there may be little Mr. Fukuda can do about the manipulators of the media within his own party, who may now use the media to fuel speculation about the need to replace Mr. Fukuda with someone else quickly. As Nikkei reports today, "there is a possiblity that the 'post-Fukuda era' will appear rapidly."

The post-Fukuda landscape remains open — for now

Aso Taro, who has presumably been vying for the LDP presidency since losing it to Fukuda Yasuo in September 2007, was asked about his intentions at a speech on Monday. Like his potential rival, Yosano Kaoru, Mr. Aso demurred, declining to declare what has been openly acknowledged for months.

I suppose it would be inappropriate for Mr. Aso to start measuring Mr. Fukuda's coffin overtly, especially when he can let the media (and other members of the LDP) do it for him. But no one should take his humility at face value.

As noted previously, Mr. Aso's assumed candidacy has already upset the resurrection of the Kochikai, the onetime mainstream faction that was most notably home to dovish, liberal internationalist prime ministers Ikeda Hayato and Miyazawa Kiichi. An article in AERA, a weekly magazine, illustrates why the rebirth of the Kochikai does not mean the resurrection of the liberal internationalists as a major force within the LDP. The party, the article, notes has moved rightward in the years since the faction split in the aftermath of Kato Koichi's abortive rebellion against then-prime minister Mori Yoshiro in 2000. Not surprisingly, the resurrected faction is a diminished version of the faction that existed in 2000. The difference? The Aso faction, which in 2000 was the Kono (Yohei) group, did not reunite with the Koga and Tanigaki factions, largely because Mr. Aso's policy perspective is vastly different from the policy positions of leaders of the Kochikai.

Mr. Aso's candidacy poses a threat to factional discipline in all LDP factions, the Kochikai included, thanks to Mr. Aso's popularity among younger, reformist LDP members who are distributed throughout the party. Thanks to his "insurgents," Mr. Aso's showing in September 2007 was surprisingly strong considering that he was opposed by all factions but his own. It seems that Mr. Aso has learned his lesson, however: rather than tempt his supporters to buck their faction leaders, he appears to be using the fact of his cross-factional support to make appeals directly to faction chiefs. Two days after the Kochikai's first party, Mr. Aso met with Koga Makoto in an effort to heal a longstanding personal rift — presumably in the hope that Mr. Koga will swing the faction behind Mr. Aso's candidacy (which, as noted previously, would risk alienating his partner, Tanigaki Sadakazu).

Meanwhile the Machimura faction's failure to back a post-Fukuda candidate thus far is now an established fact. Mainichi, reporting on the occasion of the faction's party Monday night (which was attended by approximately 5000 guests), notes that the faction's chiefs are divided on whether to support a candidate from within the faction who if elected would be the fifth consecutive LDP president from the faction. Nakagawa Hidenao spoke of a "hero or heroine," presumably suggesting that he is continuing to back Koike Yuriko, despite Mori Yoshiro's openly dismissing her prospects. Mainichi rules out both Mr. Nakagawa and Machimura Nobutaka, the chief cabinet secretary and titular faction head. No word on Mr. Mori's thinking. Mainichi suggests that the faction leadership wants to nominate someone from within the faction for fear of forfeiting the faction's position, but there is no obvious contender — and the worst outcome of all (for the faction) would be for the faction to nominate one of its own over the opposition of a significant minority, prompting that minority to vote for another candidate.

Division within the Machimura faction is probably good news for both Mr. Aso and Mr. Yosano, as it raises the possibility that either might receive the support of the largest LDP faction should it prove unable to resolve its deadlock.

Indeed, it seems conceivable to me that Mr. Aso might offer a "Tanakasone" arrangement to Mr. Mori and the other leaders of the Machimura faction, agreeing to pack his cabinet with members of the Machimura faction in exchange for its support in the party election.

The post-Fukuda era looms

Asahi conducted a poll of LDP and DPJ prefectural chapters asking about support for the current party leaders.

In the DPJ, Ozawa Ichiro's relationship with the prefectural chapters is secure: forty-four of forty-seven want him to remain as party head to lead the DPJ into the next general election.

The news for Fukuda Yasuo, however, is bleak. Twelve chapters want Mr. Fukuda to lead the LDP into the next general election; twenty-two want a new leader (no indication what the other thirteen said). Interestingly, there is little correlation between how a prefecture voted in the September 2007 leadership election and its support for Mr. Fukuda today. The reasons given for discontent with Mr. Fukuda are typical: low public support numbers, poor leadership skills, an inability to make progress on the many pressing policy issues facing the Fukuda government. Asked how they think is an appropriate replacement for Mr. Fukuda, only seven chapters answered with a name (as opposed to qualities desired in a leader), and all seven provided the same name: Aso Taro.

The news from the prefectures contributes to a growing sense in Tokyo that Mr. Fukuda is running out of time, a sense that has grown in the weeks since the LDP's defeat in the Yamaguchi-2 by-election as the party has studied its defeat. There is growing talk in the media of the post-Fukuda era, as the media probes the two leading post-Fukuda candidates, Mr. Aso and Yosano Kaoru, the leading anyone-but-Aso candidate for the LDP presidency. (A Google News search finds ninety-eight uses of the term "post-Fukuda" over the past week.) As expected, Mr. Yosano's failure to say yes or no to questions about his ambitions has only fed media speculation about his designs on Mr. Fukuda's job, and now Mr. Aso and Mr. Yosano are spoken of in the same breath as having barely concealed intentions to hasten the arrival of the post-Fukuda era. Indeed, both men have articles in the June issue of Bungei Shunju discussing their plans for saving Japan.

Mr. Aso is at the point where he can no longer deny his intentions. At a press conference Friday, Mr. Yosano was asked whether he intends to aim for the premiership. His response skirted the question: "I am a person who takes pride in his work, and if I have a task, I perform it with all my might. I have no awareness of my individual ambition — I want to do good work." Not quite "I'm in. And I'm in to win." But it is consistent with his overall media approach in recent months: Mr. Yosano has emphasized his desire to do what needs to be done to save Japan (raising the consumption tax rate, for example), regardless of what the polls say.

It is still unclear who has the edge in the post-Fukuda horse race. By dint of his having the support of the LDP's conservative ideologues concentrated in the True Conservative Policy Research Group, his following among prefectural chapters and the public at large, and his tireless efforts to proclaim his understanding of the insecurities of the Japanese people, Mr. Aso probably remains the front runner.

He may also be poised to claim the support of the newly reunited Kochikai, which officially reemerged on Tuesday and with sixty-one members is the third largest faction in the LDP. At its launch the new old faction is already troubled; the phrase that has been used in the press is "setting to sea in the same bed with different dreams." The reason for tension is that there are hints that some faction members are open to supporting Mr. Aso's bid for the party presidency, despite Tanigaki Sadakazu, perennial candidate for the leadership (and likely candidate in the next leadership election), being the faction's number two. Mr. Tanigaki assumed that the new faction would be a major platform for his next bid for the leadership and has reportedly threatened to leave the faction if it fails to support him.

That said, the all-important Machimura faction (i.e., Mori Yoshiro) has yet to signal which way it is leaning, despite Mr. Aso's active courting of Mr. Mori and other Machimura faction chiefs. The post-Fukuda non-campaign campaign is in full swing, the candidates are emerging, and the LDP barons are starting to choose sides — with Mr. Fukuda helpless in the midst of the open campaigning for his job.

The LDP's dilemmas

Yamamoto Ichita, taking a break from rocking out, writes of the divide between LDP veterans and youngsters in the debate over Prime Minister Fukuda's plan to shift the special road construction fund into the general fund from 2009.

The question is how the prime minister should proceed. At present, the HR will be voting next week to override the HC and pass the road construction plan in its current form, even as the prime minister has promised a new plan. Mr. Yamamoto himself sees no inconsistency in passing the existing plan and then revising after the fact; he recognizes, however, that the public doesn't see it this way. Mr. Yamamoto and other potential rebels want official decisions by the cabinet and the LDP executive in support of Mr. Fukuda's plan. Party veterans, according to Mr. Yamamoto, fear that giving Mr. Fukuda's plan official imprimatur also means giving opponents the opportunity to sabotage the plan. Mr. Yamamoto chalks up the dispute to differing perceptions of election timing.

Is it really as simple as that? This seems to be another example of the cautious/risk-taking divide within the LDP in the face of conservative reaction (in this case in the form of the road tribe resistance to reform). For the "veterans" — Mr. Yamamoto's word — a direct, open schism in the LDP as a result of fights in the party council and the cabinet is a greater concern than the possible electoral consequences of going forward solely on the basis of the prime minister's promise. The young reformists want official decisions, even if it means open confrontation with the opponents of road construction reform and a greater risk of failure. As before — see the case from 2005 when the LDP council forced revisions to the postal reform bills on Mr. Koizumi by virtue of an unprecedented majority (as opposed to unanimous) vote — the veterans are willing to violate procedures and customs if doing so minimizes the risks to the party (as they see it).

Without official decisions, Mr. Fukuda's strategy on his compromise plan amounts to telling the people, "Trust me." It entails back-loading LDP resistance to the plan, in the hope that somehow the resistance will be placated over time. The reformists' approach entails front-loading resistance, tackling it head on, at the beginning. Even if Mr. Fukuda's plan gets derailed while in deliberation, at least the "opposition forces" will be out in the open, enabling the prime minister to draw a firm line on reform, à la Koizumi, and possibly revive his crumbling cabinet.

And even that probably won't be enough to save Mr. Fukuda, given that the DPJ's obvious retort is if it can be done from 2009, why not from 2008?

Regardless, the party's dilemma remains. Tahara Soichiro points out in Liberal Time that although there is probably a majority within the LDP in favor of ousting Mr. Fukuda, but is deterred from pushing for his replacement for fear that the formation of a new government will prompt irresistible calls for a general election. No one in the LDP is ready to risk that, given that it could be a massacre for LDP and Komeito candidates.

But how long will Mr. Fukuda be protected by fears of a general election?

I still suspect that he has until July, after which the party will take its chances on a new leader — and perhaps even resign itself to a general election that I expect will trigger the realignment once the general election produces a nearly split HR. In short, Mr. Fukuda will most likely not have the opportunity to see his road construction plan through to fruition.

Koike fever?

Within days of Mori Yoshiro's calling the prospect of Korike Yuriko, former defense minister, a "joke," Sankei writes that "Koike fever" is taking hold — even though Ms. Koike claims to share Mr. Mori's assessment of a Koike candidacy.

The basis for this "fever" is unclear to me.

The examples cited by Sankei? A long speech to a meeting of the LDP young turks, Nakagawa Hidenao's calling her "a new leader who will be responsible for Japan's future" on a visit to China in March, her participation in Mr. Koizumi's new study group, and Koizumian political instincts.

All well and good, but this strikes me as a thin foundation for declaring that Ms. Koike is in a position to seize the LDP leadership. Does she in fact have any of the support that would make her a viable candidate in a post-Fukuda party race? Being an able politician is not necessarily a criterion for being elected as head of the LDP, and Ms. Koike's "flexibility," which led her to migrate from party to party over the course of the 1990s before ending up in the LDP and Mr. Koizumi's cabinet, surely is less of an asset when it comes to vying for the LDP leadership.

Does she have the support of the party's prefectural chapters, which gave not inconsiderable support to Aso Taro in September 2007 — and which Mr. Aso has courted assiduously since the last LDP leadership election?

Does she have the support of any LDP faction, not least the biggest one, and the LDP's kingpins more generally? The "endorsement" of Nakagawa Hidenao is undoubtedly helpful, but surely Mr. Mori's put-down outweighs his Machimura faction comrade's praise (stunning considering that Ms. Koike is a member of the Machimura faction). Meanwhile, the manner in which she was chased out of the Defense Ministry as the party's leaders closed ranks to defend Moriya Takemasa suggests that she is short on allies in the highest councils of the LDP, not least because she's a woman.

I would welcome her candidacy; she would certainly be an improvement (and a better choice than Mr. Aso). But I must (sadly) agree with Mr. Mori: her prospects are a joke. She will not be elected as head of the LDP as it exists today. She might find a way to the premiership if Mr. Koizumi leads his followers out of the LDP and pushes Ms. Koike forward as his new party's candidate, but for now I feel confident saying that she will not be Mr. Fukuda's successor as LDP president and prime minister.

Mori discusses the post-Fukuda era

Mori Yoshiro, the man who probably has as good a claim as anyone to the title of LDP kingmaker, appeared on The Sunday Project yesterday.

He treated viewers to his assessments of potential successors for Mr. Fukuda, although he made clear that he still stands behind the prime minister (although who knows how much longer that guarantee will last). He dismissed Koike Yuriko's prime ministerial prospects as a "joke," noting that "only the mass media is talking about this." He gave general praise to both Aso Taro and Yosano Kaoru, who are shaping up as the leading contenders to replace Mr. Fukuda. He called particular attention to Mr. Aso's popularity. He also hinted that he's willing to consider a general election within the year. It is obvious that despite his protestations, Mr. Mori is thinking about the post-Fukuda era.

Interestingly, in a Jiji poll asking which politician would make an appropriate prime minister, Mr. Aso ranked second with 16% to Koizumi Junichiro's 21.2%, ahead of both Ozawa Ichiro (7.2%) and...Prime Minister Fukuda (7.1%). The gap between Mr. Koizumi and Mr. Aso was narrower among self-described LDP supporters, 31.3% to 28.3%, with Mr. Fukuda drawing only 12.5% from LDP supporters. Mr. Yosano and Ms. Koike barely registered on the poll, receiving .7% and 1.5% respectively.

In light of these figures, is Mr. Mori leaning to Mr. Aso? Is he willing to embrace the argument that the LDP can be saved only by charisma? He's giving few hints, but I wonder whether Mr. Aso's charm campaign is having some effect on the LDP boss — which leads me to wonder what promises Mr. Aso has made to him in their discussions over the past several months.

Meanwhile, it's entirely possible that Ms. Koike will have the last laugh if Mr. Koizumi's new study group is in fact a proto-party.

Aso, campaigning

Aso Taro's eponymous faction held a party on Friday night, with more than 2000 guests in attendance. Undoubtedly he was in good spirits, as his faction acquired two new members the previous day, Muto Yoji (HR, Gifu-3) and Hasegawa Tamon (HC, Ibaraki). The faction now has twenty members including Mr. Aso, meaning that with two more faction members Mr. Aso will be able to secure the necessary nominations to contest the LDP presidency from entirely within his own faction.

A number of faction chiefs and party officials were in attendance, and many made introductions. Mori Yoshiro, the putative head of the Machimura faction and thus the man with perhaps the greatest say of Mr. Aso's fate, was also in attendance, although he made no introductions.

The various guests tried to dissuade Mr. Aso from overtly challenging Mr. Fukuda. Ibuki Bunmei, LDP secretary-general, said: "Mr. Aso is a powerful candidate for prime minister and LDP president, but with the DPJ as it is now, whoever becomes prime minister will not be able to resolve the situation easily."

In case anyone still doubts his intentions, Aso Taro is campaigning to replace Fukuda Yasuo as head of the LDP and prime minister of Japan. Nominally still loyal to the prime minister, he clearly expects that his chance is coming sooner rather than later.

It is still an open question as to whether he has successfully wooed Mr. Mori and with him the Machimura faction.

He can probably rely on more solid support from the LDP's prefectural chapters. Mr. Aso was in Kochi prefecture this weekend making his pitch for regional decentralization. I wonder whether LDP-controlled prefectural and local governments would prefer to remain dependent upon Tokyo instead of being responsible for their own finances and policies as envisioned by Mr. Aso's radical plan. The fight over road construction has revealed that for the most part the LDP isn't interested in innovative solutions to the rural question. Why else would LDP leaders continue to assert the importance of road construction to the development of lightly populated prefectures despite evidence to the contrary?

In short, while Mr. Aso may be in a better position to contend for the LDP leadership in both Tokyo and the prefectures than last September, there are still questions concerning his support in the parliamentary party — and his ability to secure such overwhelming support in the prefectural chapters to make it difficult for the parliamentary party to reject his candidacy once more.

And despite his preparations, I don't envision Mr. Aso doing anything to force Mr. Fukuda out — he will nominally support the prime minister up until the moment that the party's powers-that-be abandon him.

Yosano speaks

According to Sankei, Yosano Kaoru, the former chief cabinet secretary shaping up to be a major contender to succeed Fukuda Yasuo, will be releasing his first book next week, entitled Dōdōtaru Seiji (perhaps best translated as Bold Politics).

Mr. Yosano's message is that Japan's leaders must be willing to exert all efforts to do what's right, without regard for the popularity of a measure. Not surprisingly, Mr. Yosano is a tireless advocate for an increase in the consumption tax rate. Sankei also notes that Mr. Yosano calls for the promotion of "mild reforms" to unify society, correcting, according to Nikkei, the "strains" of the Koizumi-Abe years. No indication what that means in practical terms; hopefully the book contains a few more details.

As I noted earlier this week, Mr. Yosano has tried to be coy about his plans in the post-Fukuda era. After publishing a book outlining his vision of governance, it will be hard for him to deny that he has higher ambitions. We can expect more brief articles outlining one aspect or another of his thinking as reporters pepper him with questions.

While I'll reserve full judgment until I read the book — if I read the book — it's not entirely clear to me how this Yosano line would differ from the Fukuda line, other than a willingness to tackle the consumption tax issue head on (and presumably commit political suicide on it if necessary). The LDP's problems are structural. It is a party without an identity in an era in which it actually has to stand for something other than holding power. While genuinely bold and risky decisions by an LDP leader might provide the LDP with a new identity, especially said leader was willing to oust dissenters and purify the party, "mild reform" just sounds like more evasion, an attempt to soften axes of conflict to ensure that the LDP's various schools of thought can cooperate in order to save the party form itself.

The breaking point is coming sooner or later. It's just a question of what issue proves decisive in forcing a splintering — and which group acts first.

Three weeks and counting

Aso Taro continues to position himself as the LDP's savior in a rapidly approaching post-Fukuda period — in MTC's extended (and excellent) Fukuda-as-currency analogy, Mr. Aso is hoping that he is the best store of value in a chaotic environment.

His latest move is to come out on behalf of the restoration of the temporary tax on gasoline, using the environmental logic to make the case for the tax (and perhaps to present himself as a kinder, gentler Aso Taro.) Appearing at an event in Yamaguchi prefecture with Abe Shinzo in advance of the April 27 by-election in Yamaguchi-2, Mr. Aso said, "Since the gasoline tax is cheaper, it invites the consumption of more gasoline; for Japan, which is hosting an environment summit, this is an extremely bad state of affairs." Mr. Abe used the somewhat contradictory road construction logic, placing road construction above the environment, odd given his new environmental policy responsibilities: "I think that the consumers had a good feeling about the fall in the gasoline price, roads cannot be built and maintained. The LDP has a great responsibility to resolve this situation immediately."

I think that while Mr. Aso (and his fellow conservatives) believe that the tax should be reinstated irrespective of the politics of the matter, Mr. Aso also figures that supporting it strengthens his political position. In the event of a new leadership election, it hardly matters that his position is antithetical to the vast majority of Japanese. It does matter that his position is consistent with forty-one LDP prefectural chapters, according to an Asahi survey of LDP and DPJ prefectural chapters. His views on the tax are also consistent with the bulk of the LDP's parliamentary membership, although as noted by Yamamoto Ichita, it remains uncertain whether Mr. Fukuda will be able to muster the necessary two-thirds majority to pass the temporary tax at the end of April. Mr. Yamamoto reports that nearly 200 LDP representatives support passing it again, leaving the government 120 votes short. Even if the government manages to corral Komeito members and the majority of the remaining LDP members, it will take a mere sixteen votes to scuttle the tax bill.

Would the LDP be willing to exile the sixteen (or more), in the process tossing away its supermajority? The potential dissenters, whoever they are, are incredibly powerful at this moment in time — their actions, aside from determining whether Japanese citizens have to pay more for gasoline, could be decisive in toppling the Fukuda government, breaking up the LDP, triggering a realignment, forcing a general election, or all of the above. It's safe to assume that Mr. Ozawa will be working hard to get them to defect to the DPJ, just as the LDP's elders will be doing the best they can to buy their allegiance (and/or threaten them with political oblivion).

As for the DPJ, based on the Asahi survey, the DPJ has its own problems with its prefectural chapters, which are split nearly evenly on the question of absorbing gasoline tax revenue into the general fund, with a slight majority (23-20) in favor of it. Oddly enough, forty-six of forty-seven chapters support Mr. Ozawa's response to the LDP's plan; forty-six (all except Tochigi) also oppose the extension of the temporary tax. In short, nearly half the DPJ's prefectural chapters support the continuation of the road construction special fund, just with less revenue due to the end of the temporary tax.

The DPJ can do little more but hold the line, try to tempt LDP defectors, and watch as the LDP continues to tear itself apart on this issue.

And Mr. Aso? He may yet get his chance to lead. As before, the deciding vote will be cast by the Machimura faction's elders, Mori Yoshiro, Machimura Nobutaka, and Nakagawa Hidenao. For the moment, Mr. Fukuda still has their confidence, but how long before they begin looking for a safer investment? And does Mr. Aso stand a chance of earning it?

It's probably safe to say that the revote on the tax bill will make or break Mr. Fukuda. If he can somehow muster the supermajority, he will likely survive until the G8 summit, if not longer. If he can't, his government will be finished.