Dissecting the second Armitage-Nye Report, part 3

This is the third of three posts looking at the contents of the newly released second Armitage-Nye Report (the first two can be found here and here). An article about the report can be read here from the FT, which remains the best international English-language source of Japan-related news. (And the report can be downloaded here.)

The previous notes discussed the general background of the report and the report's ideas about the evolving structure of East Asian international relations.

Now I will turn my attention to the report's main purpose: answering, in the report's words, whether "the fundamentals of the alliance strong enough to deal with the array of significant challenges that will arise in the decades ahead."

In light of the recent rough patch that the alliance has gone through in recent months, which I recently discussed here, the answer to this question is not necessarily obvious. The report's authors suggest that in order to ensure the alliance's continuing importance to the region, the alliance needs a firmer foundation that will reduce its vulnerability to the vicissitudes of domestic politics in both countries and the temptation, particularly on the part of a weary America, to cut deals with China and other regional powers that could enable the US to scale back its commitments to the Asia-Pacific region. Accordingly, they argue, "The alliance can and should remain at the core of the United States’ Asia strategy. The key to the success of this strategy is for the alliance itself to continue to evolve from an exclusive alliance based on a common threat toward a more open, inclusive alliance based on common interests and values" (p. 15).

It is shared values, they insist, that make the US and Japan natural partners in the region and undermine the logic of a US-China condominium in the region.

Accordingly, the report calls for a comprehensive push that will reinvigorate the US-Japan relationship politically and economically and make it a dynamic player in the regional power game:

Turning away from the U.S.-Japan alliance or lowering our expectations of Japan would likely have a negative impact on regional stability and its role in the region. Instead of a Japan that underpins the international system in 2020, it may become comfortable as a “middle power” at best, and recalcitrant, prickly, and nationalistic at worst. Not to encourage Japan to play a more active role in support of international stability and security is to deny the international community Japan’s full potential. But if U.S. strategy continues to have high expectations for Japan that meld with Japanese national sentiment, Japan will stand as a powerful model for the region of what leadership based on democratic values means (p. 15).

As with the first Armitage-Nye Report back in 2000, this report makes a number of specific policy recommendations to Tokyo, including reforms to strengthen the national security establishment, encouraging the GOJ to give proper support to the JSDF as Japan's commitments grow, and praising Japan for its constitutional debate. The authors are careful to note, however, that decisions stemming from domestic debates on these issues can only be made by Japan, and that while there are outcomes that the US would prefer to see, there's nothing the US can or will do to sway the discussion in favored directions.

One bilateral recommendation that deserves mention is the report's call for work to begin immediately on a comprehensive US-Japan FTA (comprehensive meaning that it includes even the thorny issue of agriculture). The authors acknowledge the difficulties that negotiating such an agreement would entail, but they insist that doing so will bolster the alliance. In other words, there is no longer a neat dividing line between the security and economic facets of the US-Japan relationship. It has to be considered as a unified whole, with decisions in one area having clear implications in others.

As for the security relationship, the report includes an annex containing a list of technical measure that should be implemented to strengthen US-Japan security cooperation, a list in some ways shows how much is still left to be completed from the 1997 revision of the guidelines for defense cooperation.

This is not a revolutionary document. It is a practical guide to ensuring that the US-Japan alliance remains the primary vehicle by which the US is engaged in regional affairs for the next several decades.

As with the first report, however, much will depend on the four p's. To quote my dissertation (sorry!), the US government's willingness to push for cooperation has depended on

personnel, whether security experts with connections to Japan were in powerful positions that enabled them push cooperation forward; presidential support, whether the president was engaged enough to provide a mandate for agreement on cooperation to proceed; politics, whether the USG’s Japan experts were insulated from public pressure on Japan policy; and perceptions, specifically of threats in the regional and international environments that determined the alliance’s value to the US. For the US to desire an agreement strongly, the right personnel required a presidential mandate, little public interference, and a threatening environment, especially in East Asia.

For the moment, it seems that the first three are missing, and the fourth is unclear (although the importance of threat perceptions may be changing as the region becomes increasingly shaped by "co-opetition" between Japan and the US, and China). Indeed, as the report notes about the US-Japan-China triangle:

...A bipolar structure with only the United States and Japan facing China would be ineffective, because it would force other regional powers to choose between two competing poles. Some might side with the United States and Japan, but most regional powers would choose strict neutrality or align with China. Ultimately, this would weaken the powerful example of American and Japanese democracy and return the region to a Cold War or nineteenth century balance-of-power logic that does not favor stability in the region or contribute to China’s potential for positive change. Stability in East Asia will rest on the quality of U.S.-Japan-China relations, and even though the United States is closely allied with Japan, Washington should encourage good relations among all three (p. 14).

This is why it's hard to see exactly what the US-Japan relationship will look like in 2020, because this report calls for making the alliance both more durable and more flexible, an alliance in which Japan is able to play a more independent role while at the same time being bound more closely to the US politically, economically, and militarily. As the global security environment becomes more fluid, the US will increasingly demand more flexibility while simultaneously relying more on its allies in the developed world.

Accordingly, the US-Japan relationship may well continue as it is today, with the US, at the same time that it is deepening military cooperation with Japan -- by, for example, deploying F-22 fighters to Kadena in Okinawa, incidentally satisfying one of this report's recommendations -- seeking, for example, more military exchanges with China and pursuing a deal with North Korea that is not particularly in Japan's national interest. (This is essentially the legacy of outgoing PACOM chief Admiral William Fallon.) Dense ties with Japan will not stop the US from acting as it sees fit in the region, nor will such ties keep Japan from acting as it sees fit. The density of the US-Japan relationship essentially makes it a platform for both to secure their interests and values in the region; however, without political cooperation -- without constant communication at the highest levels between both governments -- the arrangement may not be durable enough to retain its importance to either country.

So that is the big question. As Japan begins to act independently of the US, in pursuit of interests that may or may not overlap with American interests, are political leaders in both countries ready to accept that there may be disagreements, and do they realize that the durability of the relationship will depend on their willingness to explain their policies to each other?

Hysteria on China

This op-ed by James Pinkerton (via RealClearPolitics) is typical of the hysteria in many corners of the chattering classes that has greeted China's test of an ASAT missile, the kind of breezy certainty that China is definitely, one-hundred percent, no doubt about it the biggest threat America faces and we better do something about it NOW.

In the Jain / Buddhist / et al parable of the blind men and the elephant, Pinkerton has grasped the tail firmly and is utterly convinced that he's holding a snake that has to be smothered now.

This kind of thinking is utterly retrograde -- much like Lou Dobbs's fulminating against "Red China."

As I've said before, China is exactly like the elephant in the above-mentioned parable. No country can form policy based on a single facet of its behavior, and to do so is to court disaster.

As for Pinkerton, I specifically object to this throw away line:

The Chinese military is not independent. So, if China shot down a satellite, it's because the leadership in Beijing wanted it shot down - as part of its plans for fighting a possible war with the United States.

Of course, no bureaucracy is entirely independent of the government of which it is a part. But the trend in recent years has been greater autonomy for the People's Liberation Army as it has become less politicized and more professionalized -- and accordingly, a more serious force to be reckoned with in bureaucratic disputes.

So it is entirely possible that the Foreign Ministry's surprise is not feigned. The PLA simply might have neglected to inform other ministries of a policy area that is exclusively its domain. Hmm, not altogether different than the acrimony between Foggy Bottom and the Pentagon. Of course, it is unsettling that no one in the PRC's government anticipated that this might concern other countries, but then the PRC's opacity -- and, in particular, the PLA's opacity -- is not news to anyone.

And as for China's "plans for fighting a possible war with the United States," well, of course. If you're going to be in a war, you might as well put yourself in a position to succeed. But the question that Pinkerton neglects to ask is whether the US and China are likely to find themselves coming to blows. If he asked that, he would see that apart for Taiwan, there is no bilateral issue between the US and China today that could result in war. Will there be friction? Absolutely. No power of China's magnitude could rise without causing major global friction. But this is not a re-run of Imperial Germany or Imperial Japan. If anything, it is a re-run of the rise of the United States, which caused friction but did not spark a major global war. And given the decline in the importance of violence in great-power relations, there is even less reason to anticipate Sino-US conflict.

Regarding Taiwan, as the Taiwanese public backs away from the brinkmanship of Chen Shui-bian and returns to the realism of the Kuomintang, the risks of war in the Taiwan Straits will diminish, and the situation will return to as it was in the 1980s, when the US and China had a mutual understanding of the situation resulting in its being significantly demilitarized.

China challenges the regional security order

Reports have emerged that China successfully tested an anti-satellite missile last week, after two previous failures (BBC; CNN). The implications of this test are obvious but not necessarily ominous.

The question is, in light of Japan's recent overtures to improve cooperation with China and with a visit by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao scheduled for this spring, what will be Japan's response to this test, given its implications for the efficacy of the US-Japan alliance in securing the region and responding to crises (especially in the Taiwan Straits)? The Abe Cabinet has provided an initial response in relatively measured tones, reiterating Japanese concerns about a lack of transparency in China's military modernization program. If criticism does not go much further than this, chances are this will not be an important turning point in the Sino-Japanese rapprochement -- but until the full international response unfolds it is too early to say.

This is also interesting in light of China's successful overtures to ASEAN in the Philippines, with its proposal for a China-ASEAN free trade area, which prompted Gloria Arroyo, president of the Philippines, to say, "We are very happy to have China as our big brother in this region." As Sheng Lijun points out in this piece posted at YaleGlobal Online, ASEAN's member states are both drawn to China and concerned about its power, leaving room for the US to counter Chinese influence:

While there is less public talk of a “China threat,” Washington can take some comfort from the fact that distrust of China remains deep-rooted in the region and may grow if a rising China enters too deep. ASEAN countries have not joined the China bandwagon but “hedge,” engaging China while developing robust ties with the US and other extra-regional powers to balance China. Asian countries generally do not have much trust for one another and the US is perceived as the least distrusted of all major powers. Asian nations need the US as a balancer and double insurance when they develop their relations with China. ASEAN is aware that without a strong relationship with the US, China may take ASEAN for granted.

A vigorous but balanced relationship with the US is seen as not only security insurance but also an incentive for China to offer more economic sweeteners. Barring a sudden and major change in the international strategic landscape and a disaster in US Southeast Asia policy that would unexpectedly boost China’s influence by default, the more China pushes in deepening its relations with ASEAN, the more ASEAN may feel that it needs a strong relationship with the US and other extra-regional power to keep the balance.

How will ASEAN react to this display of China's dark side, so shortly after it was hailed for its positive role in the region? Will it contribute to undermining the perceived reliability of the US as regional security guarantor, and lead Southeast Asian nations to seek the best possible arrangements with Beijing? Or will it serve to highlight the importance of the US as a check to China's ambitions?

Thomas Barnett offers a perspective on China's test of an ASAT missile that is somewhat in tune with my own thinking. The US-China relationship and the relationships between China and its neighbors are far too complex to reduce to a cold war-style antagonism, which is what much of the preliminary media coverage of this test tries to do.

Which goes to show that while this test is an important reminder that China's rise has a dark side, it's only that: a reminder. It's no surprise that China would develop ASAT technology and other weapons that could neutralize American advantages in any potential conflict, but that does not mean that China desires war or that war between the US and China is inevitable.

Overdue

Leading news in Japan's newspaper's today is a report that the US military is finally compiling detailed plans for a crisis on the Korean Peninsula in cooperation with the Japanese government, the Self-Defense Forces, local governments, and private actors. (See the Yomiuri Shimbun's article here.)

As the title of this post suggests, the only thing surprising about the reports about revisions to OP 5055 is that it took a North Korean nuclear test for Japan to realize that it couldn't wait until after a crisis to outline, in detail, what it would do in the event of a crisis in the area surrounding Japan that involved the evacuation of civilians from trouble spots, potential mass casualty medical care, provisions for refugees, and arrangements to allow the US military to use civilian airports and harbors and use civilian transportation.

These talks should have happened ten years ago, after the US and Japan agreed that "situations in areas surrounding Japan" (SIASJ) were of immense importance to the alliance. Waiting until now was terribly risky, and shows how for all the positive developments in the alliance since the 1980s, a lot of work remains to be done.

The cuts continue

No, not Japan's budget cuts, because, according to this article in the IHT, the government's draft budget shows that next year's budget will increase slightly.

Rather, I'm referring to this other article in the IHT, which reports that Japan's defense budget will continue to carry the burden of budget cuts. Makes you wonder why people are so alarmed about Japanese remilitarization, doesn't it?

How is a country with a shrinking defense budget -- and, within the defense budget, more spending on missile defense and expenditures related to the relocation of US forces from Okinawa to Guam -- supposed to become a major power in the region in terms of power projection? Under Koizumi, and now under Abe, Japan's defense establishment has been forced to accept budget cuts despite being asked to do more than ever before.

What reason does anyone have to think that this will change anytime soon, as Japan continues to age, with all the expenditures that an aging society entails?

From 庁 to 省 (From agency to ministry)

Aside from the highly controversial education reform bill, the special session of the Diet now concluding -- it was extended an extra four days -- also passed a bill elevating Japan's Defense Agency from an agency subordinate to the Cabinet to a ministry with full status equivalent to other government ministries.

This reform has been in the pipeline for a while now, and constitutes an administrative reform more than a policy reform: the new Defense Ministry will have its own budget, the ability to submit legislation without having to go through the Cabinet, and less concretely, symbolically raises Japan's defense establishment not only in relation to other countries' defense ministries, but also vis-a-vis Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, as a careful observer of these matters with whom I correspond regularly suggested, the Defense Ministry will have access to a better crop of recruits from elite universities than it had as the JDA.

In many ways, this legislation simply ratifies changes that the JDA has undergone over the past two decades. In particular, since the end of the cold war the JDA has gone from an agency that was effectively used to cordon the JSDF off from the Japanese political system to an organization staffed by security policy experts better able to manage Japan's defense policy in a fluid and uncertain international environment. The JDA went from an agency staffed by bureaucrats seconded from the Foreign and Finance ministries to an organization in which a core group of young policy experts from within the agency rose to positions of prominence, improving the JDA's ability to fight for preferred policies and secure an important seat at the table, particularly in discussions with the US.

Beyond the symbolic change from agency to ministry, the law passed last week makes "international peace cooperation activities" a fundamental mission of the JSDF, which means that for the first time in its history the JSDF's core purpose necessarily involves missions outside of Japan. (Thanks to my aforementioned correspondent for comments on this change.) As with the elevation of the JDA, this simply makes the JSDF's shift from a static defense force to an active force fit for overseas deployment de jure -- it doesn't actually change government policy, at least in the short term.

I think it's imperative for the international media to break itself of the habit of conjuring up Japan's post-war past whenever anything related to Japan's changing international position comes up, as this CNN article does. Yes, we get it; Japan has a controversial past. But anyone paying attention over the past fifteen years would notice that Japan has gotten into the habit of contributing its armed forces to UN peacekeeping missions. Rather than hint at the specter of Japanese "remilitarization," the international media should be talking about how this fits into a re-envisioning of Japan's international role as a country that specializes, in part, in peacemaking and reconstruction missions abroad.

In any case, the big, fundamental change underlying both of these reforms is a greater willingness in Japan to study the changing international and regional environments and determine how changes impact Japan's national interests. As this Yomiuri editorial on the Defense Ministry bill suggests, there's plenty for Japan's national security policymakers to consider.

Rather than worry about Japanese "remilitarization," the proper response should be relief that Japan is finally moving positively in the direction of bearing a greater share of the burden to provide global peace and security.

Thankfully the DPJ, after some initial grumbles about this bill, came to its senses and largely supported a piece of legislation that not only makes sense, but is also consistent with the DPJ's interest in a more autonomous Japan.

Japan considers its own NSC

This past weekend saw Prime Minister Abe move into the Kantei, meaning that he will now be on the job twenty-four hours a day. It is hard to believe that the head of government of a major developed democracy could spend the first month of his term living away from the Official Residence.

Abe's move comes at the same time as a special committee of experts -- chaired by Abe -- begins meetings to consider how to create a Japanese National Security Council. A security council in some form is long overdue, because it will enable the Government of Japan to formulate more systemic responses to changes in the regional and global environments.

The question is what kind of NSC Japan should make. How much independent authority should it possess? Should it play a coordinating role as a opposed to a policymaking role?

These are questions that the US has grappled with since the NSC was created in the early years of the cold war -- and as David Rothkopf's Running the World shows, the US has never been settled on the proper role the NSC should play in the national security establishment. Much has depended on the personalities involved, both at the White House and in key cabinet posts.

There is no question that Japan will have to tackle similar issues if and when it establishes a national security council at the Kantei. But as Michigan political scientist John Creighton Campbell argues in an interview published in today's edition of the English language Asahi, Japan would be wise not to move too far in the direction of executive centralization. He said:

The Kantei is not going to be big enough to control the policy information necessary for devising detailed policymaking and implementation in most areas. That means that the bureaucrats will have to be involved and the question is how to do it. I think there are lessons from Japanese-style management, which is based on having lower-level people involved in meetings and consultations before finally arriving at a decision. The leader's role is not as obtrusive as the "man on a white horse" style that Americans like. We used to joke that in the United States we could reach a decision in a week but it takes a year to convince the lower levels to go along. In Japan, making the decision takes a long time but it can be implemented quickly because everyone had participated. That is an oversimplification, of course, but I do think Abe and his circle are ignoring some successful Japanese approaches and overvaluing our rather peculiar system in the United States.

Perhaps the best administrative reform Japan can make to its national security establishment -- and its policymaking apparatus in general -- would be to ensure that ministerial and vice ministerial portfolios are distributed to policy experts in the governing party and not to the most senior party member in line for a promotion. There has been a move in this direction in recent years, and it should continue.

That should be the national security council Japan aims for: a panel of strong, knowledgeable cabinet ministers in firm control of their ministries, supported by a staff of experts at the Kantei as they formulate Japan's grand strategy and set clear goals for what role Japan intends to play in the US-Japan alliance, in the region, and in the world -- and how it fulfill its duties in these various capacities.

Unless this exercise results in an answer to that nagging question, it's hardly worth the effort.

A changing US-Japan alliance?

Meanwhile in the midst of the nuclear weapons flap, two senior US State Department officials were in Tokyo for meetings with Foreign Minister Aso. Nicholas Burns, undersecretary of state for political affairs, and Robert Joseph, undersecretary for arms control and international security, met with Mr. Aso to continue alliance coordination in response to the DPRK's nuclear test but also to coordinate positions in advance of a meeting between the five parties -- the two allies plus China, South Korea, and Russia -- on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Hanoi in mid-November.

Such coordination is, of course, to be expected and is not especially notable except that it shows the goal to which the two allies should aspire. Policy consultation should be ongoing; it should not be limited to emergency situations. That is how Japan can be the "Great Britain" of Asia (as called for in the 2000 Armitage-Nye Report) -- not through the use of force or having nuclear weapons, but to be an indispensable partner politically, capable of taking the lead on important issues, including regional democratization. Accordingly, the sooner the alliance establishes a standing politico-military planning and coordination cell in Tokyo, staffed by suitably high-ranking officers and diplomats, the sooner the alliance will be able to play a more creative role in the region.

Without such a step, alliance cooperation will remain reactive, as is the case now.

The Yomiuri Shimbun weighs in

Having already written at length on the nuclear debate once today, I still feel the need to comment on the Yomiuri Shimbun's editorial today (in Japanese) -- 「議論すら封じるのはおかしい」 (roughly, "It is laughable to even try to stifle the discussion."

The Yomiuri argues, as I have elsewhere, that the debate is less about nuclear weapons and more about how Japan should contribute to international peace and security, and how it should respond to the growing North Korean threat. The editorial maintains that the three non-nuclear principles are outdated, a product of the cold war no longer appropriate given the evolving security environment in East Asia, and it concludes by saying that just as talk of constitutional reform was once taboo, such that any mention of which would result in a cabinet reshuffle, so must talk of nuclear weapons go from being taboo to being openly and earnestly debated.

Given that heads have yet to roll in this latest flap, clearly the power of nuclear taboo has been eroded, although it still retains some power.

Japan will not become a normal great power so long as restrictions remain upon even talking about radical changes to Japan's security policy. Japan has yet to make an unambiguous statement of how it will exercise its power and contribute to regional and a global security; while nuclear weapons will most likely not be a part of that role, it is still important that Japan has an open debate in which any and all options are discussed -- including acquiring nuclear weapons and distancing itself from the United States. It need not and should not embrace these options, of course, but so long as Japan remains bound by taboos and implicit restrictions, it will remain unable to contribute properly to global order.

The nuclear debate "fallout" continues to spread

Quite a bit has happened in the intervening days since Mr. Nikai called for restraint. As I expected, it seems that the "loose lips" of Mr. Aso and Mr. Nakagawa have led to greater outrage from other parties and more calls for prudence from LDP senior officials.

First, as this article in the Asahi Shimbun reports, the New Komeito Party, the LDP's coalition partner, has publicly aired its misgivings about calls for a debate about nuclear weapons. New Komeito, the political party founded by the Buddhist organization Soka Gakkai, is strongly opposed to nuclear weapons (and I should add, aggressive military force in general -- see its policy aims here [link in English]).

Accordingly, Asahi reports, Sasagawa Takashi, responsible for maintaining LDP party discipline, advised at a liaison group meeting of senior LDP officials that the party must "hasten to extinguish the fire" and ease the concerns of the New Komeito. LDP Secretary-General Nakagawa Hidenao echoed Mr. Sasagawa, insisting that this issue will not be discussed by the party, and that, even if the LDP and the Abe Cabinet were to consider revising Japan's three non-nuclear principles, which prohibit Japan from producing, possessing, or permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on its soil, it would have considerable difficulties in doing so, not least because of fears that doing so would undermine American support.

And what did Abe have to say? "The government's policy is already decided. There will be absolutely no changes."

Will this sustained assault by nearly all of the LDP's heavyweights silence Mr. Nakagawa (Mr. Aso has apparently decided not to mention nuclear weapons anymore)?

If not, perhaps the DPJ -- together with New Komeito -- will raise the pressure, resulting in the LDP's forcing its wayward leaders out. The Yomiuri Shimbun reported that the DPJ is doing just that; Secretary-General Hatoyama Yukio, in fact, said in a speech in Tokyo on Monday, "If Prime Minister Abe cannot dismiss Mr. Aso, then we will introduce a non-confidence motion against Mr. Aso." Mr. Nakagawa, the LDP secretary-general, replied by pointing out Mr. Hatoyama's hypocrisy, considering that Mr. Hatoyama is on record of having voiced his support in 1999 for a debate on nuclear weapons.

Mr. Nakagawa's reply may be effective at pointing out the DPJ's difficult political position (discussed here) but it doesn't change the fact that by not squelching this issue early, Mr. Abe may have stumbled into the first serious political crisis of his tenure. If the LDP's executives had come out immediately to denounce their colleagues for their indiscretions and reaffirm the LDP's and the government's commitment to the three non-nuclear principles, this incident might have reinforced the impression formed by his early trips to China and South Korea that Mr. Abe is in fact quite moderate and not eager to introduce radical revisions to Japan's security policy. By waiting to respond, however, Mr. Abe has tarnished his reputation, undermined the LDP's relationship with its coalition partner, given a gift to the opposition, and exposed cracks in the LDP.

If anything, the LDP's cracks may continue to grow, as the creation by former LDP secretary-general Kato Koichi of an LDP study group on Japanese foreign and security policy vis-a-vis Asia -- characterized as an "anti-Abe" study group by the Japan Times -- indicates. This issue, together with the nuclear weapons issue and the question of whether the LDP should readmit members ousted for their opposition to postal reform, shows that not only is the LDP riven with policy differences -- as a party geared to securing power instead of promoting an ideology, it's always been home to a variety of policy positions -- but the mechanisms it has used to manage disagreements have broken down. This is not a new development, but because Prime Minister Koizumi had a relatively clear sense of what he wanted to do and little fear of going after opponents within the LDP, the differences were less visible.

Mr. Koizumi, in fact, was the epitome of what Mr. Abe calls in the introduction to his 「美しい国へ」 (Toward a Beautiful Country) a "戦う政治家" (fighting politician) -- which Mr. Abe defines as 「批判を恐れず行動する政治家」, "a politician who acts without fear of criticism" (my translation).
Mr. Abe, however, has yet to show whether he has the same quality.

In the coming weeks, as the special session of the Diet draws to a close, expect Mr. Abe to go on the offensive in policy terms, to establish his reputation as a reformer and draw attention away from the nuclear question. He will likely begin with a serious push to pass the reform of the Fundamental Law on Education. Should he fail to recover from this first political blow to his cabinet, his tenure may well be short-lived.

Nuclear "indiscretion" causing problems for Abe?

The Yomiuri Shimbun reports today that Nikai Toshiro, head of the LDP's Diet Strategy Committee (国会対策委員会, kokkai taisaku iinkai, usually abbreviated as 国対, kokutai), publicly cautioned Foreign Minister Aso Taro and LDP Policy Affairs Research Council chief Nakagawa Shoichi to exercise "prudence" in their remarks on Japan's acquiring nuclear weapons.

The source of this comment is interesting. Mr. Nikai, as head of the LDP's kokutai, is responsible for managing the LDP's nemawashi -- behind-the-scenes consensus-building -- in the Diet, meeting with kokutai heads from other parties to smooth over disputes and formulate compromises. Accordingly, Mr. Nikai is not necessarily a policymaker. As Columbia University's Gerald Curtis wrote in his The Logic of Japanese Politics: "The role of the kokutai is not to negotiate the substance of policy, but to arrive at understandings about how to advance the parliamentary process. More than policy expertise, a successful kokutai chairman needs to have the ability to arrange political deals" (p. 119, but for an excellent account of how the Japanese political system has changed since the end of the cold war the entire book is highly recommended).

As such, while the Yomiuri reports that Mr. Nikai based his remarks on concerns that "the international community might misinterpret" Messrs. Nakagawa and Aso's calls for a national debate on whether Japan should acquire nuclear weapons, I believe that given Mr. Nikai's responsibility for ensuring orderly relations with other parties in the Diet, his comments have greater significance domestically.

The Yomiuri article tacitly confirms my suspicions, because it goes on to discuss how other parties have reacted to these remarks by Prime Minister Abe's senior advisors. The article notes that opposition parties have called for Mr. Abe to dismiss Mr. Aso (they're not really in a position to call for the dismissal of Mr. Nakagawa, who is merely a party official), suggesting that opposition pressure may have led Mr. Nikai to call on both officials to exercise restraint. The article quotes Mr. Tagaki Yoshiaki, the Democratic Party of Japan's kokutai chief, as saying, "The foreign minister's remarks go against national policy; they should not be ignored."

Mr. Nikai's remarks may be directed at Mr. Abe as much as at his impertinent advisors. Mr. Abe has tried to have it both ways, publicly declaring that Japan will not acquire nuclear weapons at this time and proclaiming that his cabinet will not debate the issue, while at the same time doing nothing to stop his advisors from calling for a debate on nuclear weapons. Mr. Nikai seems to be saying that Mr. Abe's strategy will not be without political consequences -- permitting these men to continue calling for a nuclear debate may upset relations with opposition parties (and the Komeito, the LDP's coalition partner), making it more difficult to move his agenda forward in the coming months. Moreover, should this issue continue to fester it could provide an angle from which the DPJ can attack Mr. Abe's leadership in the run-up to the 2007 Upper House election.

Mr. Nakagawa, meanwhile, continued his quest to mention the need for a nuclear debate in any and every possible setting yesterday in an appearance on Fuji TV. It may just be the case that Japan is not ready to have this debate now, and sooner or later he will have to accept that or else cause not inconsiderable harm to his party and its leader.

Nukaga calls for Japanese cruise missiles

The Yomiuri Shimbun reports (article in Japanese) that former JDA Director-General Nukaga Fukushiro gave a talk at a Keidanren (the Japan Business Federation) symposium on North Korea's nuclear test and East Asian security. In his remarks, Mr. Nukaga asked: "If North Korea decided to use force and fired a Nodong at Japan, which American warships then shot down, would the constitution problem be a good reason to remain indifferent to using our Aegis cruisers to shoot down a Taepodong 2 fired at the United States?" Thus he calls for an end to the constitutional interpretation that prohibits Japan from exercising its right to collective self-defense. He rightly suggests that doing so need not obligate Japan to collaborate in every US campaign around the world -- Japan can set limits to what it can do and can't do (as it's always done). He insists that the main focus on US-Japan security cooperation must be in situations in areas surrounding Japan.

More controversially, in his remarks Mr. Nukaga called for Japan to investigate whether it should develop a Tomahawk-like cruise missile that would enable it to strike at "enemy bases" (presumably meaning North Korean bases).

There are several problems with this idea. The first is technical. Would a Japanese strike force actually be useful as a deterrent given that North Korea's intermediate-range Nodong missiles -- the missiles that pose a major risk to Japan -- are launched with difficult-to-locate mobile launchers and can be fueled on a short notice? (For more on North Korea's missile, see this March 2006 report [pdf] from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.)

The second problem would be the impact of an independent Japanese conventional deterrent on alliance cooperation with the US. In terms of defense industrial cooperation, would Raytheon, current manufacturer of the Tomahawk, assent to Japan's developing its own cruise missile instead of buying off the shelf from Raytheon? (This question is of particular interest because the president of Raytheon's international division is Torkel Patterson, a Japan expert who was head of Asian affairs at the National Security Council early in the Bush administration.)

More fundamentally, how would an independent Japanese deterrent affect US deployments in Japan? Would Japanese cruise missiles make a forward-deployed US conventional deterrent unnecessary?

The third problem is the impact on the region. Japan would have a hard time convincing its neighbors that its cruise missiles are strictly defensive, and thus a cruise missile program would risk contributing to arms race with China and South Korea, not to mention North Korea. This latter difficulty is the least significant -- Japan cannot predicate its security policy on what its neighbors might do in response -- but at the same time it is not an irrelevant consideration.

Of course, all of this is speculative, because Japan still has a long way to go before it will be in a position to deploy an independent deterrent. For the moment, the big question remains how Japan would pay for such a deterrent, and whether the Diet would cough up the money even if it were available. I have my doubts.

At the same time, remarks like Mr. Nukaga's are encouraging, because it means that Japanese leaders are at least thinking and talking about Japanese defense policy and how it should change as the regional and international environments change. A "normal" Japan is impossible without a sophisticated national conversation on security policy.

New survey on Japan's Iraq mission

The Yomiuri Shimbun reports today on a government survey that shows that among those surveyed (around 1800 people), 71.5 per cent said they "valued" the JSDF's reconstruction operation in Iraq, with only 22.6 per cent saying that they didn't value the mission.

Among those who said they valued it, as with earlier polls, they pointed to the mission's contributions to the Iraqi people, its role in improving the security environment, and its contribution to improving Japan's position in the world.

At the same time, the survey shows what I've said before: the Japanese people will support a Japan that cooperates by sending troops abroad to uphold stability, keep the peace, and rebuild shattered societies, but it will not support dispatches to fight -- not yet. As the JDA concluded from this survey (my translation), "There has been increasing popular recognition of how the JSDF helped Iraq, but the public also highly values that the JSDF troops left Iraq without suffering any fatalities."

Japan's (predictable) response

As I discussed here, Japan has little reason to celebrate North Korea's returning to the six-party talks.

As this article in the Japan Times shows (link in English), senior cabinet and party officials have been cool to the news out of Beijing. The Japanese government, of course, was not in position to insist on the importance of conditions, and must accept Pyongyang's about-face. But Japan doesn't have to like it:

"We really don't know why the North has decided to return to the talks," a senior Foreign Ministry said on condition of anonymity.

"(North Korea) has just returned to the talks after walking out on them. We are trying not to attach too much value on the return itself," the official said, stressing that Japan's goal is the total end of Pyongyang's nuclear threat, not just the resumption of the talks.

Tokyo has also refrained from issuing a formal statement on Pyongyang's return to the talks, the official said.

Of course, Japan hardly has a monopoly on skepticism about North Korea's return to the negotiating table.

As this New York Times article shows, the response in the US government and the Washington policymaking community is split between those who believe that some positive outcome could result from the talks and those who believe that North Korea is just stalling for time. One major fault line appears to be between -- surprise! -- the State Department on the one hand, and Rumsfeld-Cheney duo on the other (supported by experts at AEI and the Heritage Foundation).

Now, as for me, I fall somewhere between the two. I do not expect these talks to disarm North Korea, as I've said on a number of previous occasions. At the same time, I don't think the US loses much by participating in the talks. The US should not, of course, be in a hurry to make major concessions; North Korea's bargaining history means that it must make the first substantial step or any "agreement" reached would lack all credibilty.

In any case, North Korea isn't the only country buying time through negotiations -- an argument made by AEI's Nicholas Eberstadt in the Times article. The talks give the UN time to figure out what exactly is included in the sanctions, and it gives the US time to coordinate with its allies and map out a game plan for how to contain a nuclear North Korea over the long term, which at the moment could be a very long time.

Abe reviews the fleet

On the 29th of October, Prime Minister Abe reviewed the Japanese fleet at Sagami Bay in Kanagawa. In this week's issue of his email magazine, Abe poetically recounts the review, speaking of clouds giving way to an autumnal blue sky, of the deep azure of the sea, and of the majesty and magnificence of the line of warships preparing to return to the Indian Ocean, where, thanks to a recent extension of the enabling law, they will continue to provide refueling capabilities in support of coalition operations in Afghanistan.

The real meat of his message, however, is towards the end. He writes [my translation]: "In our country, we cannot do without the Self-Forces in their capacity for crisis management and disaster relief and reconstruction. Abroad, the Self-Defense Forces exert great effort [literally, 汗を流しています, to sweat] around the clock to contribute to international peace and stability. I am working to develop a system by which international peace cooperation operations are the primary function of the Self-Defense Forces [emphasis added]."

This statement is consistent with the broad thrust of Japanese security policy is the past fifteen years, since the passage of the International Peace Cooperation Law. Japan will develop a military force that can serve as a pillar of international stability, which reflects Japan's dependence on trade, especially energy imports from the Middle East and limits imposed by its massive debt burden. Let the US invest in major platforms suited to inflicting massive amounts of damage over incredible distances; Japan will excel in providing humanitarian assistance in failing and failed states and providing rear-area support to warfighters when the situation requires it.

The only question that remains is whether the Japanese public will support such a role for Japan. Indications suggest that the Japanese people can countenance the JSDF being sent abroad to help stabilize troubled countries. While this poll, conducted by the Asahi Shimbun in June 2006, showed that those surveyed were pleased to see the Ground Self-Defense Forces leave Iraq (and a majority wished they had left sooner), the same poll showed that 49% of those surveyed felt that the Iraq deployment was "good for Japan." Among those who said that it was good, 46% said it was good because it "contributed to the rebuilding of Iraq," with the second-greatest response being the 30% who said that it "demonstrated Japan's presence in the international community." (Both figures were considerably greater than the 14% who said it was good for relations with the US.)

This confirms the impression I got from speaking with Japan Defense Agency (JDA) officials in May: they told me that the Japanese public will support a more active JSDF, but only in activities that contribute to peace and stability.

What remains to be seen, however, is whether public support would hold up should a soldier die in the line of duty. The Japanese people's resolve to see their country play a greater role in upholding the international system has yet to be tested.

UPDATE: I want to add a brief note to emphasize to readers just how extraordinary Abe's fleet review is. Consider that sixteen years ago, during the Gulf crisis, JSDF officers could not even consult with the prime minister, because he feared that receiving advice from the armed forces would skew his judgement in deciding how Japan should respond to the crisis. At that time, civilian control of the military, exercised through the director-general of the JDA, meant using civilian officials to cordon off the military from the rest of society. Until recently, senior bureaucrats were not even from within the JDA itself -- they were seconded from other ministries. Aside from some cooperation on anti-submarine warfare with the US during the 1980s, the JSDF was expected to sit with its tanks up in Hokkaido and wait for the Russians to come.

And now Abe is reviewing the MSDF fleet, dressed in morning coat and top hat, and issuing public messages full of effusive praise -- and there is no negative reaction in the press or in the Diet.

So while Japan's security policy remains restricted in many ways, public and official attitudes about Japan's playing a greater role in the region and the world by contributing armed forces to operations overseas have changed substantially, suggesting that it is only a matter of time before Japan loosens the constitutional restrictions that have tied its hands.