Koike versus the "soft liners"

On Tuesday, Koike Yuriko, former defense minister and aspirant to the LDP presidency, announced her resignation as chair of the LDP's special committee on base countermeasures.

She told the media that her resignation was intended as a protest against the decision to soften the language on preemption in the LDP Policy Research Council's defense division in the recommendations for this year's National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) sent to Prime Minister Asō Tarō this month. She sees the longstanding doctrine of "nonaggressive defense" as injurious to the national defense, unacceptably tying the government's hands in addressing threats to Japanese national security.

Koike has a point: if Japan is to acquire the capabilities to strike at "enemy bases," it might as well be straightforward about the circumstances in which it intends to use said capabilities. What is the deterrent value, after all, of capabilities that Japan may or may not use if faced with an imminent missile launch?

This feud may be indicative of what I thought the response to the remarks (mentioned here) by Cui Tiankai, China's ambassador to Japan, would be among LDP members. While it is unclear at what point the language was softened to rule out preemptive strikes even while calling for capabilities to strike enemy bases, Ambassador Cui's remarks surely reinforced concerns by LDP members like Yamasaki Taku that Japan must be careful about sending the wrong signals abroad — while reinforcing the resolve of hawks like Koike who unabashedly want Japan to be ready and able to carry out preemptive strikes.

Naturally there is also the question of Koike hopes to achieve by resigning her post in this fashion. She has reinserted herself into the discussion of a hot-button issue just as the Asō government has entered into what might be its endgame. She has taken a hardline position on an issue of prime importance to Asō's conservative backers, perhaps in hope of prying their support away should the prime minister be forced out before an election. Of course, I am not questioning the sincerity of her beliefs — just the timing and form of her protest.

It's a small step, but it could be an important one. If Asō does not survive long enough to lead the LDP into the general election, the conservatives might reason that backing Koike is a way to ensure that their approach to North Korea and national security generally enjoy top priority in the LDP's election campaign — while allowing Koike to take the fall should the LDP lose disastrously in the general election. (Of course, I remain skeptical that the prime minister's critics will be able to force him out before a general election.)

Meanwhile, I am curious about the political salience of the debate over preemption in the LDP. Curiously, I have yet to see a single poll that asked respondents for their opinion on the idea of preemptive strikes and the acquisition of capabilities in order to carry out attacks on North Korean bases. I suspect that there's little interest in the issue as a priority, especially if respondents were informed that acquiring new capabilities would entail greater defense spending, but I am keen to see some data on this question. If a poll has asked this question and I've missed it, do send it my way. Otherwise, the question remains: why no polling on preemption?

There is another question in the preemption debate that advocates like Koike have not addressed forthrightly. Can Japan actually preempt a possible North Korean attack? Jiji calls attention to a recent report by the International Crisis Group that suggests that North Korea has an estimated 320 Rodong intermediate range ballistic missiles on mobile launchers directed at Japan, exceeding the previous estimate of 200. Would Japan be able to find these missiles, let alone destroy them? Have Koike and other hawks made an honest assessment of what capabilities Japan will realistically need to possess in order to carry out this mission? If Japan is to have a proper debate about preemption versus deterrence, the advocates of preemption ought to be honest about what the JSDF would need to possess — and what such an arms program would cost.

For now, all I see is posturing from politicians like Koike about how Japan lacks a "true national defense."

The LDP finds something to agree on

While the Nishimatsu scandal continues to ripple through both the LDP and the DPJ and while all wonder whether next week will see Ozawa Ichiro's resignation as DPJ president, LDP members of all stripes continue to criticize Ozawa for remarks made prior to when the scandal broke regarding the future of the US military presence in Japan.

Prime Minister Aso Taro, speaking to the LDP's Hiroshima prefectural chapter last Saturday, singled out Ozawa for criticism, arguing that his perspective is unrealistic — without a sizeable increase in the defense budget Japan cannot meet threats from abroad alone — and therefore irresponsible.

Foreign Minister Nakasone Hirofumi, speaking in Kanazawa on Sunday, echoed the prime minister's remarks, describing Ozawa's remarks as "irresponsible" for questioning the US presence in Japan, which he described as essential for stability in the area surrounding Japan.

But criticism of Ozawa is not limited to members of the government. Koike Yuriko, stepping up her quixotic campaign against the prime minister, has decided that the key to elevating her profile is in attacking Ozawa and the DPJ, especially on security policy. In an appearance in Nara prefecture, she suggested that security policy ought to be the central issue of the general election, because the DPJ is all over the place on security policy and would prefer that discussing security policy were taboo. (Ozawa's remarks by their very nature belie the idea of the DPJ's making security policy a taboo — as far as I can tell, the LDP is the party trying to make a taboo of a foreign policy issue in asserting the sacrosanctity of the US military presence. But I digress.)

It is the rare issue that can get Aso and Koike to agree, but Koike is being a bit too clever if she thinks that the key to LDP victory lies in a debate with the DPJ over security policy.

Is the public concerned enough to be unsettled by Ozawa's questioning the long-term future of the US military presence in Japan? The cabinet's latest defense affairs survey — mentioned in this post — says relatively little about public attentiveness to defense issues. Yes, the first question found that 64.7% of respondents are interested in the JSDF and defense issues (50.6% interested to some extent, compared to 14.1% extremely interested), but this survey provides no sense of where defense issues rank in comparison with other issues of concern to the public. The most interesting data points concern the value of the alliance. 76.4% of respondents (31.3% see it as useful, 45% agree that if they had to say, they would say it's useful). 77.3% of respondents support the status quo in US-Japan defense arrangements, with USFJ working with the JSDF to defend Japan. Only 9.9% support the proposition that Japan should defend itself by abrogating the US-Japan security treaty and having the JSDF alone defend the country, while a mere 4.2% support the "pacifism in one country" idea of abrogating the security treaty and shrinking or elimanating the JSDF. But this question does not provide the Ozawa option of a minimized US presence (under the treaty, of course) and a bolstered role for the JSDF in defending Japan.

The survey does find that respondents are insecure: 69.2% feared that Japan could be dragged into a war, with the leading reason being "international tension and conflict" (cited by 75.4% of those who feared war). It also suggests that Japanese are minimally afraid of being entrapped by the alliance, with 16.7% of respondents fearing war believing that the security treaty would be the reason, compared with 45% of the respondents who felt that, thanks to the US-Japan security treaty, Japan will not be swept up in war. At the same time, however, the survey did find some evidence of fears of abandonment by the US, as "the relationship between China and the US" ranked fourth among matters of interest to Japan's peace and security following the Korean peninsula, international terrorism, and the Middle East, and slightly above China's military modernization and maritime activites. (Korea I understand, but international terrorism and the Middle East ranking above concerns about China? It seems hard to believe.)

But does all of this add up to condemnation for Ozawa and the DPJ and support for the LDP? This is a picture of a Japanese public increasingly alarmed by the world beyond Japan's shores. The public does not want to abandon the alliance, which at this juncture would mean that Japan would be friendless as far as security goes, but that does not mean that the public has any great love for the alliance either. This survey suggests that Japanese citizens see the alliance as necessary — what alternative is there? — but they do not see it as a vehicle for either assisting the US internationally or contributing to global peace and security. There is a substantial drop from respondents who view the defense of Japan as the JSDF's primary mission (70%, following the 78.4% who see disaster relief as its primary mission) to the 43.6% who see "peace cooperation activities" as the JSDF's raison d'etre. The breakdown is largely the same when respondents were asked about what role the JSDF should play in the future.

There is little desire to rock the boat, which translates into support of the status quo in which US forces are based in Japan, play an important role in defending Japan alongside the JSDF, and to a lesser extent ensuring peace and stability in East Asia as per Article VI of the treaty. I wish this survey had included a few other questions pertaining to the appropriate level of US forces in Japan, the role they ought to play, the precise nature of "international tension and conflict," and amount of support for the current level of defense spending, but the picture that emerges is of a Japanese people with comparatively little interest in an expeditionary role for the JSDF and more interest in how Japan is to defend itself in an uncertain international environment. For the moment the public is content that the US is an important part of the defense of Japan, but does the public think and accept the alliance as an indefinite arrangement, and does it accept that it is best not to talk about the possibility of an alternative to the current arrangement?

All of which goes to say that LDP leaders are mistaken to conclude that they will be able to score political points by hammering Ozawa for his remarks. The public is worried, but I would wager that whatever worry is captured in this poll is outweighed by worries about matters closer to home. Should the LDP decide that defense policy ought to be the basis, it may discover for the second time in as many elections that there is a price to be paid for ignoring the priorities of the public.

Meanwhile it is worth mentioning that the Nakasone and Aso critiques of Ozawa, at least as reported in the media, do not disagree with Ozawa in principle, but criticize him on pragmatic grounds, for being irresponsible in proposing an alternative to the status quo that might anger the ally upon which Japan is dependent for its security. I think any conservative arguing in good faith has no choice but to take this line of attack; there is too much history of conservatives, including the august progenitors of the prime minister and the foreign minister, railing about independence and autonomy for them to attack the principle of more independent Japanese defense capabilities. Indeed, one does not need to go back in time to find conservatives making this argument: Sakurai Yoshiko, in an article in the March 12 issue of Shukan Shincho, takes the benign out of benign neglect from the Obama administration, and argues that the new administration is slighting Japan to treat with China — and that China would prefer a Japan restrained by its dependence on the US military. There is a gap between Sakurai and the conservatives in power in the LDP, but just how great a divide is unclear. What is clear is that for now it is politically expendient for LDP officials to defend the status quo on security policy, and, moreover, Ozawa's off-the-cuff remarks notwithstanding, the DPJ is hardly offering a radical departure from the status quo.

Despite Koike's desire for a national security election, the forthcoming general election will resemble the last general election, focusing on pensions, health, jobs, and overall confidence in the ruling party.

The space between Ozawa and the DPJ

The first round of polls following last week's arrest of Okubo Toshinori, Ozawa Ichiro's secretary, has been released, and not surprisingly there are few bright spots for Ozawa and the DPJ.

Oddly enough, the most favorable poll for Ozawa was the Sankei/Fuji News Network poll, which despite Sankei's having pulled out all stops to push for Ozawa to resign following the arrest found that 47.4% of respondents thought Ozawa should resign, compared with 41.4% who thought there was no reason for him to resign. The same poll did record a slight drop in support for the DPJ and a larger drop in the number of respondents who thought that Ozawa would be most appropriate as prime minister (although he still maintains a slight lead over Aso Taro).

Other polls contain worse news for Ozawa. Asahi's poll found that 57% of respondents thought Ozawa should resign, compared to only 26% who supported his staying on as DPJ leader. But despite that, Ozawa still enjoyed a ten-point margin in response to the question of who would make the most appropriate prime minister, despite losing twelve points. Similarly, for 56% of respondents the scandal has not worsened their image of the DPJ, compared with 40% of respondents for whom it has.

Kyodo's poll — discussed in this Sankei article — found that 61% of respondents think Ozawa should go, but Kyodo too found that Ozawa still remains preferable to Aso, and, more significantly, that a DPJ-centered government remains preferable to an LDP-centered government.

Mainichi's poll noted a similar pattern, although 73% of respondents prefer neither Ozawa nor Aso as prime minister.

Meanwhile in all the polls the Aso cabinet's support remained at abysmal levels, although some polls recorded a slight improvement.

There is actually good news for the DPJ in all of these polls, namely that the public appears to be able to separate the DPJ from its leader in a way that it can't (or won't) do for the the LDP and its leader. Perhaps, oddly enough, the DPJ is protected by the ubiquitous image of Ozawa as "old LDP." Perhaps voters are able to separate "old LDP" Ozawa in their minds, chiding the DPJ for employing his services without assuming that the DPJ equals Ozawa. The gap may be temporary, particularly if the press keeps up its relentless campaign to force Ozawa out, but it does suggest that the DPJ could still be victorious with Ozawa at the helm. It might not be pretty — the young reformists will surely do everything in their power to distance themselves from Ozawa — but DPJ members may be able to inoculate themselves from their party leader in a way that LDP members wish they could. For example, Asao Keiichiro, shadow defense minister (and my former boss), said on TV Saturday that if it turns out that Ozawa knew about the Nishimatsu donations, "he's out." This is the same message delivered by Hatoyama Yukio on NHK Sunday, when he suggested that if new information comes to light, Ozawa's resignation may be unavoidable.

This approach is sound: let reformist candidates distance themselves from Ozawa, dampen overt talk about who should replace him (potential successors like Okada Katsuya have been quiet through the scandal), and if Ozawa ultimately has no choice but to step down, minimize the collateral damage to DPJ candidates and hope for an orderly transition. In the meantime, let Ozawa do what he does best: visit with candidates in places where voters will be more indifferent to the cloud of scandal trailing Ozawa. It is far from the ideal of a two-party system with two centralized, top-down parties with strong leaders and clear policy agendas vying for majorities, but there is little in Japanese politics that resembles the ideal.

The DPJ is still in an enviable position for an opposition party within months of a general election. The LDP is utterly incapable of exploiting Ozawa's troubles, weighed down by the albatross that is Prime Minister Aso. Sankei reports that Koike Yuriko is ramping up efforts in a bid to replace Aso in advance of a general election, which I suspect may be more wishful thinking on the part of Sankei than evidence of a serious campaign on Koike's part. Does she really want to take the helm of the party now, in the face of certain defeat? It seems more likely to me that she is positioning herself to be the inevitable leader in the aftermath of the general election, when a broken LDP might be willing to countenance an unconventional leader like Koike. But now? I still have a hard time seeing Aso step down willingly before a general election, and despite the desperation of LDP leaders I think Koike will have a hard time convincing them that she is the answer to their problems.

There may yet be more bad news to come for Ozawa and the DPJ, but if nothing more is forthcoming — if the media is starved of innuendo with which to pressure Ozawa — than the DPJ may be able to contain the damage and press forward. This is far from the best of scenarios, but in campaigning or in governing the DPJ may be unable to do better than Ozawa.

Change you can believe in? Far from it. But a DPJ government — even under Ozawa — would still be a step in the right direction.

No honeymoon for Aso

Voting will begin today in the LDP's presidential election, which looks to be little more than a coronation for Aso Taro.

Ishikawa prefecture had its vote on Saturday, and it appears that Ishikawa will give all three of its votes to Mr. Aso. I expect Ishikawa will be only the first of many sweeps to come.

But will it matter at all? In the early days of the LDP race, it seemed possible that Mr. Aso might be able to heal the LDP's wounds as if by magic, as if simply by having the five candidates stand side by side in apparent agreement on the problems facing Japan (and their solutions), the public would forget the years of incompetent governance and re-embrace the LDP and its "charismatic" new leader.

Alas, the fairy tale is not to be.

Mr. Aso had apparently hoped that he could do like Fukuda Yasuo, but better, using his popularity to unite the whole party in his government, heal the rift with Komeito, and then wheel about to face down Ozawa Ichiro and the DPJ, first in the Diet, then in a general election campaign to come shortly after Mr. Aso bested the DPJ in Diet deliberations on a supplement budget containing an economic stimulus package. Key to his plan was ensuring that all voices were represented in his cabinet, to which end he stated that he would be happy to include his four competitors in his cabinet and party leadership.

Koike Yuriko, however, has thrown water on his scheme, declaring that the "policy differences are too great" to be included in one cabinet. The others might be more willing than Ms. Koike to join with Mr. Aso, but I doubt it. With that statement Ms. Koike has made clear that for all the cordiality in the LDP's campaign events, the party is no less divided than it was on Sept. 1, when Mr. Fukuda resigned. Mr. Aso's embrace of populism may make some LDP members happy — unlike Mr. Abe, Mr. Aso will come bearing gifts, not words — but there are plenty of LDP members unhappy about his new approach, not least the Koizumi children now on the chopping block when an election comes. Incidentally, if Mr. Aso is unable to form a cabinet that unites the LDP's disparate schools of thought, will he fall back on his conservative allies to form a cabinet?

An election that Mr. Aso doesn't prefer to discuss, perhaps because he's realizing that the much-discussed October 26 election may not leave him enough time to bolster his and the LDP's standing. He singled out Asahi for criticism on this score at a campaign event Friday at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, reminding listeners that Asahi doesn't hold the right of dissolving the Diet and calling an election. He insisted that people "should not speak carelessly" about the timing of an election, and made clear that a response to the worsening economy will take priority of holding an election.

As MTC makes clear (welcome back!), all of the talk about economic stimulus may ultimately be irrelevant when the general election comes. There is an unmistakable logic to Mr. Ozawa's recent maneuvers; his coalition, argues MTC, is "an angry, broad-based, below-the-Nagatachō-radar movement," stitching together any and all who have reason to be angry at how the LDP has governed. This coalition provides very little clue to how a DPJ-led coalition government will govern, but that's besides the point. Whether the government calls an election next month or at year's end, there is little Mr. Aso can do to undermine the coalition of the angry, whose grievances are the result of years of neglect or worse on the part of LDP-led governments.

Mr. Aso may be able to blunt the impact of Mr. Ozawa's strategy — certainly better than the alternatives — but ultimately he has little control over his own fate. He will have no more control over his party and his coalition than his predecessor, and he will face potentially unbearable pressure to call an election. There will be no honeymoon for Mr. Aso.

Koizumi speaks

Just one day after telling an audience of young reformers that he would not say who he was supporting, it appears that Koizumi Junichiro has come out in support of Koike Yuriko, the woman who he elevated to his cabinet shortly after her arrival in the LDP.

Sankei reports that Mr. Koizumi met Friday with Koike lieutenants Eto Seishiro, Tanabe Tsutomu, and Ono Jiro — all solders in the Koizumi revolution — and told them that Ms. Koike has his vote, and that he thinks she can beat Ozawa Ichiro.

He may even believe the latter.

I do not think that Mr. Koizumi's endorsement will be enough to swing the election.

First, I think that Mr. Aso's band of eighty is more disciplined than Mr. Koizumi's club of 83. I think the bulk of the LDP is embittered towards Mr. Koizumi and his legacy — for good reason, seeing as how Mr. Koizumi promised to destroy the LDP, which had worked so well at enriching many of its members, their constituents, and their supporters for so long — and has made no secret of a desire to stamp out the remnants of Mr. Koizumi's legacy. Hence the decision to readmit the postal rebels. And the decision to withhold support for the reelection campaigns of the Koizumi children.

It is Mr. Aso who now best embodies the LDP desire for — in Mr. Ozawa's favorite phrase — change so that things remain the same.

Of course Mr. Koizumi may yet have the last laugh.

Aso seals the deal, and the LDP pats itself on the back

The campaign to replace Fukuda Yasuo as LDP president and prime minister officially began on Wednesday, with the five candidates — Aso Taro, Koike Yuriko, Yosano Kaoru, Ishihara Nobuteru, and Ishiba Shigeru — holding a joint press conference before traveling the country to campaign.

The press conference makes clear just how farcical claims of the LDP's "open" election are. Yes, there are five candidates vying for the slot, compared with Ozawa Ichiro's uncontested reelection as DPJ president. But for all the talk of an open election, the candidates papered over points of disagreement, refused to commit to any concrete steps to fix the budget, and took turns criticizing Mr. Ozawa for his failures to consult, explain, and persuade — and his party's lack of experience at governing (because the LDP's track record suggests that experience correlates strongly with performance, right?).

In reality, the LDP couldn't have wished for a better way to see off the bad taste left by Mr. Fukuda. The LDP gets a chance to show up the DPJ — see! this is what intraparty democracy looks like — without there being little chance of genuine and open disagreement or the possibility that something unexpected might happen (see below). If I were more conspiratorially minded, I would think that the candidates were hand-picked to maximize the PR advantage to the LDP. (In the same vein, reading that Ms. Koike was forced to close her campaign office for an ambiguous problem with the real estate agent really makes me wonder whether there is something to this — did she not get the memo that she's in the race as window dressing, and therefore someone had to send the message that she shouldn't take the election too seriously?) But I'm not inclined to think that the LDP elders coordinated the campaign of five. Nakagawa Hidenao is certainly taking the race seriously enough. It appears that the LDP just got lucky: Mr. Fukuda resigned just in time for the election to coincide precisely with the DPJ's uncontested election and enough of the LDP's younger, more popular figures feel they stand a chance against Mr. Aso, helping the LDP look more dynamic and in touch than both Mr. Ozawa — that old dictator — and the hapless Mr. Fukuda.

But there really is little doubt that Mr. Aso will win the premiership.

Polls of both LDP Diet members and party rank-and-file suggest that Mr. Aso may be in a position to secure a majority in the first round, obviating the need for a second. Asahi surmises that it is probable that he will do so, looking at the support for Mr. Aso in the prefectural chapters and in the parliamentary party. Asahi projects that Mr. Aso will receive at least 63 of the 141 votes from prefectural chapters, with a final tally considerably more than 63. Suggesting the strength of Mr. Aso's grassroots support, Asahi expects that Mr. Aso will win three votes even in prefectural chapters distributing votes proportionally.

Asahi also expects him to receive a majority of LDP parliamentarians, but given that the preferences of faction leaders no longer determine how faction members vote, it is harder to predict exactly how the parliamentary vote will break down. It is clear, however, that we are witnessing the first officially post-factional LDP presidential election: the Tsushima (second largest), Koga (third largest), Yamasaki (fourth largest), and the Komura (eighth largest) factions have announced that their members will be free to vote for whichever candidate they prefer, and with the Machimura faction divided between supporters of Mr. Aso and Ms. Koike, the Machimura faction is effectively following the same rule. Yomiuri estimates that Mr. Aso has the support of forty percent of the 386 Diet members (approximately 155 members), meaning that he needs only 109 more votes to win the election in the first round. It's possible that he will receive those 109 votes from the prefectural chapters alone, which will in turn bolster his parliamentary votes (undoubtedly some Diet members will be swayed by the results from their home prefectures).

Public opinion polls confirm Mr. Aso's support. Yomiuri finds that Mr. Aso is the only candidate but Mr. Ishihara who beats Mr. Ozawa in face-to-face matchup, and by a large margin: 59% to 27.6%. Mr. Ishihara barely edges out Mr. Ozawa, 43.5% to 40.1%, while the other three all trail Mr. Ozawa by more than ten percentage points. Asahi's nationwide poll found Mr. Aso to be the most appropriate candidate for the premiership with 42% support, with Mr. Ishihara once again ranking second with 10%. Mr. Aso won points for his perceived "ability to get things done."

But no matter how sizeable Mr. Aso's victory, he will be under pressure to perform immediately. As already noted by Ken Worsley and elaborated further by Mary Stokes at Nouriel Roubini's Global EconoMonitor, Japan's economy shrank by 3% annualized in the second quarter, instead of the original figure of 2.4%. The outlook for the new government is bleak — get the economy growing again, only to get the economy healthy enough to take measures to fix the budget deficit (i.e., a consumption tax increase, which all the LDP candidates see as necessary at some point in time).

Even if the new government passes a stimulus package as a prelude to an election which it then proceeds to win, it will be in an unenviable position. The DPJ may prefer that it lose the next election, leaving an Aso government with the tasks of battling the recession and then the budget.

The LDP field coalesces

Despite a political situation that has already consumed the careers of two LDP prime ministers — cowards, says Newsweek's Christian Caryl, and he has a point — there are now four candidates running to serve as the next LDP president and prime minister.

I think Aso Taro remains the front runner, for reasons enunciated here and here.

Arguably his position is strengthened by the proliferation of anti-Aso candidates.

Not only will Mr. Aso be running against Koike Yuriko, the "structural reform" candidate, but Yosano Kaoru, the leading "fiscal reconstructionist," and Ishihara Nobuteru, a veteran of Koizumi's cabinets and briefly LDP policy chief under Abe Shinzo, have also announced their candidacies.

Each has significant liabilities, effectively summarized by Yamauchi Koichi, the blogging first-term LDP lower house member:

Mr. Aso supports abandoning fiscal discipline to provide economic stimulus for suffering citizens.

Mr. Yosano is of the "fiscal reconstruction school, the consumption tax increase school."

As for Mr. Ishihara, "it is reported that he is of the structural reform category," but on political reform he approved the return of postal rebels to the LDP.

And about Ms. Koike, the candidate who I would expect him to support, he writes, "Ms. Koike is of the structural reform school and is Japan's first female prime ministerial candidate — she has a newness and I have a relatively good impression of her. But regarding economic policy and administrative reform, I still don't have a good understanding of Ms. Koike's thinking."

While foreigners know Mr. Aso best for his history of outrageous statements and his nationalism, he clearly stands above his rivals in this race.

Ms. Koike is an unknown, her candidacy perhaps more a reflection of Koizumi nostalgia (speaking of which, Mr. K has been curiously absent during the past week) among the media than a durable base of support from either her fellow LDP Diet members or the party's grassroots.

Mr. Yosano is saddled with the burden of being the only LDP leader with the spine to speak of a consumption tax hike, which might be necessary down the road but is a non-starter within the LDP for the foreseeable future.

Mr. Ishihara perhaps stands the best chance of upsetting Mr. Aso. A representative from Tokyo, he might be able to pry away Mr. Aso's urban supporters. He is articulate but has a lower profile than Mr. Aso — Mr. Aso can and will claim that he stands the best chance of stopping Ozawa Ichiro and the DPJ in its tracks (by stealing a page from Mr. Ozawa's playbook), citing polls like this one from Asahi showing substantial support for Mr. Aso as the next prime minister. But who will be voting for Mr. Ishihara? Will Ms. Koike and Mr. Ishihara split the reformist vote? Will he be able to draw conservatives away from Mr. Aso?

Mr. Aso has the most clearly defined base of support, and quite possibly the supporters most eager to win (or reclaim) the premiership. He has concluded — like Mr. Ozawa — that the next general election will be won in the LDP's old rural heartland, and it will be won by promising as much as possible to rural voters and mentioning structural reform as little as possible. He will ride that strategy into the premiership, and, he hopes, into a general election mandate.

I've said it before, but it bears repeating: Aso Taro has learned from Mr. Abe's disastrous government. Whether he is genuinely concerned about the hardships experienced by the Japanese people or not, Mr. Aso knows that addressing them is the only way for a government to last. It is also the only way for a prime minister to indulge his interest in foreign policy. Accordingly, Mr. Aso has been silent on foreign policy and may even be willing to sacrifice the refueling mission to shore up the LDP's ties with Komeito to bolster the coalition government.

Do not underestimate Aso Taro.

Fault lines

Does anyone think that the Machimura faction, that 89-member monster of a faction that sits at the intersection of the LDP's divisions between "neo-liberal" reformers, party leaders, and ideological conservatives, will survive this party election?

Following up on both his previous dismissal of Koike Yuriko's prospects and his endorsement of Aso Taro, Mori Yoshiro said of Nakagawa Hidenao's promotion — he being one of the faction's three titular leaders — of Ms. Koike, "The position of the daihyo sewanin [Mr. Nakagawa's difficult-to-translate title] of pushing (Ms. Koike) to the fore is a bit of a problem."

"He says 'a candidate must stand on behalf of the reformists,' but is not Secretary-General Aso a reformist?"

Whatever you want to call Mr. Aso — I agree with Jun Okumura that it is far too simplistic to dismiss Mr. Aso with the word "conservative," not because he isn't, but because the label conceals more than it reveals — the LDP's reform school clearly does not view him as one of their own and is desperate for an alternative. Indeed, their desperation can be seen in the fears of the Koizumi kids, as they sense that Fukuda Yasuo's resignation and the chaos it has engendered can only hurt them in the eyes of the public. For the Koizumi kids, this party leadership election may represent one last chance to pick a leader who will enable them to go before their constituents and declare that reform lives.

But the reform school is not the only LDP group desperately seeking an anyone-but-Aso candidate.

Yamasaki Taku, Kato Koichi, and Koga Makoto, three doyens of the LDP's once-dominant mainstream conservatism (which in the contemporary context makes them the LDP's liberals, in Mr. Kato's own reckoning), met Wednesday to discuss an anti-Aso candidate. It is worth noting that despite Messrs. Yamasaki and Koga being faction heads, the article notes that they spoke as individuals, implying that they were not speaking on behalf of their factions.

It seems that we are witnessing a post-faction LDP presidential election, less than a year after the Fukuda election in which conventional wisdom proclaimed that the factions were back in control. This campaign is already breaking down along ideological lines, not factional lines. As I've argued previously, the relevant groupings are not the factions but the ideological study groups and associations that cross factional lines. Mr. Aso's campaign rests not on his twenty-member faction — which conveniently has enough members to nominate him as a candidate — but on the party-wide network of conservatives that backed his candidacy last year in defiance of their faction heads and who subsequently organized (in part) under the aegis of Nakagawa Shoichi's "True Conservative Policy Research Group." Similarly, Mr. Nakagawa's Koizumians, while clustered within the Machimura faction, can also be found in other factions and among the party's independent members. The liberals, such as they exist, are also found in more than one faction.

Seeing how this LDP presidential election campaign is unfolding, I think it is safe to assume that the recommendations of faction heads will have little or no role in determining how the LDP's parliamentarians vote on Sept. 22. Ideology, not faction will determine who the LDP chooses.

I still think Mr. Aso will emerge at the top based both on his support at the grassroots and the strength of the conservatives in the contemporary LDP — who are hungry to reclaim what they lost when Abe Shinzo resigned, but the LDP that emerges on Sept. 22 will not be the same LDP that existed at the moment of Mr. Fukuda's resignation.

UPDATE: I should add that in addition to the three major ideological groupings there is the cautious bulk of the LDP parliamentary party, which will give its allegiance to no camp but the one that appears to be the most beneficial for their electoral prospects. I think Mr. Mori, with his mission of preserving LDP dominance, best speaks for this segment, which is why I think Mr. Aso will prevail. Mr. Aso may be the less risky choice — at least for the average LDP member — come the next general election.

Gauging Aso's chances

For the second year in a row, Aso Taro is the early frontrunner to seize the LDP leadership.

As noted yesterday, whether he wins this year will depend on his gaining an additional 68 votes over his 2007 total. One way to do that will be to build significantly on the 65 of 141 prefectural chapter votes that he received in September 2007.

Both Sankei and Asahi have published snap surveys of the prefectural chapter executives, providing a glimpse of how the LDP grassroots are looking at the chaos in Tokyo.

Sankei's survey found that twenty-two of forty-seven chapters indicated their support for Mr. Aso; the remaining twenty-five are waiting to see how the race unfolds. As far as the reasons for supporting Mr. Aso, Ibaraki's executives pointed to what could make the difference: his desire "to continue to discuss economic problems thoroughly." Presumably this is an oblique reference to his populism, to his claim to want to address the hardships of Japan's rural regions, an argument that would undercut Koike Yuriko, who would run as the candidate of Koizumi-Nakagawa (Hidenao) reformism.

Asahi recorded slightly more support, with twenty-five chapters — a majority — indicating their support for Mr. Aso. Asahi does not offer a complete list, but of the supporting prefectures listed, most of them gave either all three or two of three votes to Mr. Aso last year. Asahi also found that there is only slight support (eight chapters) for calling a general election soon after the party election.

Given that as of last year only four prefectural chapters chose a candidate without a vote, whether among registered party members or local leaders, these surveys tell us little about how the vote will break down. They might even understate the support for Mr. Aso among the LDP rank-and-file.

In fact, looking at the distribution of Mr. Aso's support last year it is difficult to see where Ms. Koike or another LDP reformist would succeed. In the four prefectures of Tokyo, Chiba, Kanagawa, and Saitama, Mr. Aso defeated Mr. Fukuda by a margin of 61,766 votes to 48,491 votes. Mr. Fukuda barely won in Saitama (444 votes out of 20,553 cast), while Mr. Aso won with sizeable to impressive margins of victory in the other three. (His most impressive victory nationwide was in Ehime, however, where he received 12,598 votes to Mr. Fukuda's 1,160.) In short not only is Mr. Aso popular, but he's popular in places where a reformist candidate would expect to run strong.

A year later, with the LDP in shambles and Mr. Aso riding high, he will likely build upon the bedrock of support that came out for him last year despite the overwhelming support within the LDP establishment for Mr. Fukuda.

At this point there is no sure thing — there's still a week until candidates have to declare — but Mr. Aso's position is strong, and with the party's turning away from Koizumian "neo-liberalism" it will probably take another populist to defeat Mr. Aso.

Koike prepares

The LDP is finalizing the schedule for its election: September 22, the day following the DPJ's reelection of Ozawa Ichiro.

While it still looks as if Aso Taro will claim the prize, it appears that his election will not go nearly as smoothly as Mr. Ozawa's.

Mainichi reports that Koike Yuriko has expressed her desire to run, and has begun making preparations for a campaign, running as the candidate of Koizumi and Nakagawa (Hidenao).

Given the latter's increasing isolation within the LDP, I wonder whether Ms. Koike's prospects are realistic.

Mr. Aso simply has to build upon his strong showing last September to win; Ms. Koike has to build a national organization to compete with Mr. Aso from scratch. Recall that Mr. Aso managed to win 197 votes of a total 529 votes in last year's election, putting him 68 short of victory. He won 65 of 141 prefectural chapter votes, a number he will likely increase as a result of his travels around the country. He surprisingly received 132 Diet member votes last year — surprising because it showed the extent to which faction members bucked their leaders. A similar trend could redound to Ms. Koike's favor this year, but it is unlikely that there are enough Koizumians to push Ms. Koike over the top. Ms. Koike also lacks the support of the Mori Yoshiro, the punative head of her own faction, the Machimura faction. Mr. Mori will undoubtedly lean heavily on faction members to support Mr. Aso, if they aren't already doing so.

But if Mr. Nakagawa backs Ms. Koike anyway, this election campaign will likely mean the end of the Machimura faction.

Surely Mr. Nakagawa is aware of the aforementioned figures about Mr. Aso's performance. Surely he knows how difficult it will be to upset Mr. Aso, who has used the past year to prepare systematically for this coming election.

Perhaps Ms. Koike's campaign is intended as a pretext for the departure of Mr. Nakagawa and his followers from the LDP entirely, a last stand before bolting. Mr. Aso will win, only to find his party shrinking beneath his feet.

Far-fetched perhaps, but less and less far-fetched every day.

Here comes Koike and friends

With Fukuda Yasuo set to finalize a schedule for a cabinet reshuffle after consultations with Komeito — according to Machimura Nobutaka, the prime minister is waiting for reports on the latest failed Doha Round negotiations before proceeding — the cabinet reshuffle is a go, possibly as early as 4 Aug (Monday).

The media has immediately shifted from hounding the prime minister to reshuffle to speculating about who will be included in the new cabinet.

This is the sort of thing at which the Japanese political press excels. In the coming days, readers and viewers will be treated to an endless parade of bios of possible ministers, figures showing the impact of past cabinet reshuffles on public approval ratings, speculation about the post-Fukuda horse race, and other facts, figures, and hypotheses about the political game. Much if not most of it will be rubbish; it will be difficult to find anyone asking the obvious questions about the reshuffle.

Will it make any difference whatsoever?

Will the new ministers serve for long enough to impact their ministries?

What exactly is the Fukuda iro (color)?

Is the prime minister actually in control of his government and the LDP?

The early speculation about the reshuffle suggests that Mr. Fukuda will do like Mr. Abe and attempt to harness the glamour of the LDP's leading ladies to boost his popularity. Recall how Koike Yuriko was ushered into the defense ministry last July to replace the hapless (and it turns out, horribly corrupt) Kyuma Fumio just in time for the official campaign for the upper house election.

Mr. Fukuda may repeat the trick, if Yukan Fuji is to be believed. The cover of the Friday edition shows Ms. Koike and Nakagawa Hidenao, her leading backer, watching boxing together, and proclaims, "Koike as Chief Cabinet Secretary rises to the surface — figuring in the post-Fukuda outlook." The hope, according to an unnamed LDP member, is that having Ms. Koike as the government's spokeswoman will make the difference in the government's public support.

"Prime Minister Fukuda does not like her performance. But if she can use her competitive instinct and her ability to steal the limelight — as when she published her tell-all book after her resignation — as cabinet spokesman, then the approval rating will likely increase. It will also satisfy former Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro's hope of wanting someone from his Machimura faction taking either LDP secretary-general or chief cabinet secretary."

Presumably Mr. Mori would prefer someone other than the woman whose prospects he has derided as his faction's representative in these senior positions, but the sentiment remains relevant. If the sentiments expressed in this article and on the morning talk shows today are accurate, the prime minister and/or his advisers think that adding a glamorous sheen in the form of Ms. Koike as well as some combination of Noda Seiko, Obuchi Yuko, and one or two other female LDP politicians will distract the public from the Fukuda government's inability to govern and raise the chances that Mr. Fukuda will last long enough to lead the LDP into the next general election.

Judging from her time in Ichigaya, it is probably inappropriate for Mr. Fukuda to expect too much help from Ms. Koike, not necessarily through any deficiency of her own — although the Yukan Fuji article suggests that like Mr. Machimura, the incumbent chief cabinet secretary, her nemawashi skills are in question — but because she has too many enemies with the LDP, whether because of her sex or because of her reputation as a "wandering bird" (previously discussed here).

The immediate surfacing of a women-heavy cabinet suggests how transparently bogus one of the major reasons for the reshuffle — the need to define a Fukuda color that is distinct from Mr. Abe's — is. How would appointing Ms. Koike, who was first Abe Shinzo's national security adviser and then his minister of defense, distance Mr. Fukuda from Mr. Abe? How does that clarify the Fukuda color, unless by Fukuda color people mean the literal color of the cabinet, in which case Ms. Koike and the other women under consideration might add some much needed brightness to the sea of dark suits?

Not surprisingly, this reshuffle will be nothing more than an exercise in image management. Any talk of the policy implications of the reshuffle is mostly hot air, considering that it seems that Masuzoe Yoichi — who holds the most critical portfolio in light of the health and welfare-heavy agenda — will stay put as minister for health, labor, and welfare.

Will the Japanese people fall for it?

I doubt it. I don't think the public will fall for the media hype that would surround a cabinet with Ms. Koike as chief cabinet secretary. I think the Japanese people are waiting for results, and barring results, will hold the LDP accountable at election time, reshuffle or no reshuffle.

The Koizumi mystery

I hesitate to link an article in Shokun!, but I think this short article raises an important point.

The article wonders about Koizumi Junichiro's support for Koike Yuriko as a candidate for the premiership and his renewed involvement in politics more generally, particularly his recently formed nonpartisan study groups that may resemble proto-parties. It dismisses Ms. Koike's prospects — citing Mori Yoshiro — and attributes talk of her candidacy to Mr. Koizumi's "loose tongue."

There is something to this complaint regarding the former prime minister. Since his resumption of political activity, the media has taken to reporting on his every word, no matter how mundane. Every public appearance and every prognostication on the political situation receives mention, which in turn heightens speculation about Mr. Koizumi's intentions, which in turn leads to greater coverage of his activities, and so on — a giant snowball of media speculation based on thin shreds of evidence. Perhaps observers of Japanese politics — myself included — speculate about Mr. Koizumi's plans because we want Mr. Koizumi to have plans to retake power in a triumphant flourish.

Mr. Koizumi may dream of a return to prominence. He may harbor plans to bolt from the LDP and form his own party. But he has also given few hints as to what his plans might be. Officially, he backs Prime Minister Fukuda and sees no reason why the government should yield to calls for an early election. That's the extent of what we know; the rest is speculation.

There is, of course, a place for speculation about possible realignment scenarios, but it is necessary to step back from time to time and remember just how little we know about the intentions of the figures likely to play important roles in a political realignment.

Koike fever?

Within days of Mori Yoshiro's calling the prospect of Korike Yuriko, former defense minister, a "joke," Sankei writes that "Koike fever" is taking hold — even though Ms. Koike claims to share Mr. Mori's assessment of a Koike candidacy.

The basis for this "fever" is unclear to me.

The examples cited by Sankei? A long speech to a meeting of the LDP young turks, Nakagawa Hidenao's calling her "a new leader who will be responsible for Japan's future" on a visit to China in March, her participation in Mr. Koizumi's new study group, and Koizumian political instincts.

All well and good, but this strikes me as a thin foundation for declaring that Ms. Koike is in a position to seize the LDP leadership. Does she in fact have any of the support that would make her a viable candidate in a post-Fukuda party race? Being an able politician is not necessarily a criterion for being elected as head of the LDP, and Ms. Koike's "flexibility," which led her to migrate from party to party over the course of the 1990s before ending up in the LDP and Mr. Koizumi's cabinet, surely is less of an asset when it comes to vying for the LDP leadership.

Does she have the support of the party's prefectural chapters, which gave not inconsiderable support to Aso Taro in September 2007 — and which Mr. Aso has courted assiduously since the last LDP leadership election?

Does she have the support of any LDP faction, not least the biggest one, and the LDP's kingpins more generally? The "endorsement" of Nakagawa Hidenao is undoubtedly helpful, but surely Mr. Mori's put-down outweighs his Machimura faction comrade's praise (stunning considering that Ms. Koike is a member of the Machimura faction). Meanwhile, the manner in which she was chased out of the Defense Ministry as the party's leaders closed ranks to defend Moriya Takemasa suggests that she is short on allies in the highest councils of the LDP, not least because she's a woman.

I would welcome her candidacy; she would certainly be an improvement (and a better choice than Mr. Aso). But I must (sadly) agree with Mr. Mori: her prospects are a joke. She will not be elected as head of the LDP as it exists today. She might find a way to the premiership if Mr. Koizumi leads his followers out of the LDP and pushes Ms. Koike forward as his new party's candidate, but for now I feel confident saying that she will not be Mr. Fukuda's successor as LDP president and prime minister.

Mori discusses the post-Fukuda era

Mori Yoshiro, the man who probably has as good a claim as anyone to the title of LDP kingmaker, appeared on The Sunday Project yesterday.

He treated viewers to his assessments of potential successors for Mr. Fukuda, although he made clear that he still stands behind the prime minister (although who knows how much longer that guarantee will last). He dismissed Koike Yuriko's prime ministerial prospects as a "joke," noting that "only the mass media is talking about this." He gave general praise to both Aso Taro and Yosano Kaoru, who are shaping up as the leading contenders to replace Mr. Fukuda. He called particular attention to Mr. Aso's popularity. He also hinted that he's willing to consider a general election within the year. It is obvious that despite his protestations, Mr. Mori is thinking about the post-Fukuda era.

Interestingly, in a Jiji poll asking which politician would make an appropriate prime minister, Mr. Aso ranked second with 16% to Koizumi Junichiro's 21.2%, ahead of both Ozawa Ichiro (7.2%) and...Prime Minister Fukuda (7.1%). The gap between Mr. Koizumi and Mr. Aso was narrower among self-described LDP supporters, 31.3% to 28.3%, with Mr. Fukuda drawing only 12.5% from LDP supporters. Mr. Yosano and Ms. Koike barely registered on the poll, receiving .7% and 1.5% respectively.

In light of these figures, is Mr. Mori leaning to Mr. Aso? Is he willing to embrace the argument that the LDP can be saved only by charisma? He's giving few hints, but I wonder whether Mr. Aso's charm campaign is having some effect on the LDP boss — which leads me to wonder what promises Mr. Aso has made to him in their discussions over the past several months.

Meanwhile, it's entirely possible that Ms. Koike will have the last laugh if Mr. Koizumi's new study group is in fact a proto-party.

Koike to depart

It seems that Koike Yuriko, pegged by many to be one of the bright spots in the new cabinet, has said at a press conference in India that she wants to resign to take responsibility for the Aegis data leak, for which no one has taken responsibility.

She also said she wants to "pass the baton" to someone who can get the extension of the anti-terror law passed.

The former reason strikes me as bizarre, seeing as how she wasn't defense minister when details of the data leak emerged; presumably this resignation is driven more by her provoking the wrath of Mr. Moriya and bringing his allies down upon her head.

I have to imagine that she has lost the confidence of the ministry, making her position untenable. The MOD/JDA has struggled for years to develop its own base of talented personnel after decades of having its top officials seconded from MOFA and MOF, and I can't imagine that long-serving ministry officials are particularly fond of Minister Koike after her attempt to bring her own deputy in from outside the ministry — breaking standard operating procedure to do so.

Still, couldn't she have found something better than, "No one has taken responsibility for the Aegis leak, so I will?"

More prime ministerial trouble

With Prime Minister Abe set to depart on his latest diplomatic jaunt on August 19th, the situation in Tokyo continues to worsen.

The latest scandal involves Defense Minister Koike Yuriko, who is in a showdown with Administrative Vice Minister Moriya Takemasa, a long-serving defense bureaucrat who rose from within the ministry's ranks (instead of being seconded from more influential ministries as many JDA personnel were throughout the cold war). Jun Okumura (here, here, and here) and MTC (here) have addressed this feud in considerable detail, and there are no details I can add to their thorough accounts.

Koike's move to circumvent proper channels in firing the unusually long-serving, politically connected vice minister — a move not coordinated with the rest of the government — has brought the criticism of the chief cabinet secretary, but Defense Minister Koike may well win out in the end, provided the Abe Cabinet survives (seeing as how it seems that she will be staying put). It is interesting that it took a squabble between politicians and bureaucrats for Mr. Shiozaki to criticize a cabinet minister, on behalf of a bureaucrat of course. Former JDA chief Nakatani Gen has criticized Prime Minister Abe for failing to exercise his power as head of the military, but then the prime minister has consistently failed to manage his government until it is too late, so Mr. Nakatani should hardly be surprised.

The consequences of the Koike-Moriya flap for the prime minister will likely be small — after all, it's not like bureaucrats are any more popular with the public than politicians, and Mr. Koizumi certainly showed that an enterprising politician can make political hay by attacking the bureaucrats. But it does contribute to the growing impression of a government unhinged, unchecked, unrestrained by any notion of democratic accountability, the rule of law, or common sense.

Meanwhile, another senior LDP leader has criticized the prime minister, with Lower House President Kono Yohei criticizing the prime minister's call for Japan to abandon the postwar regime as turning its back on the legacy of the Yoshida Doctrine.

I think it's great that LDP leaders have decided to criticize their leader's pet projects and slogans, as well as his decision to stay in power, but I can't help but wonder if public statements critical of Mr. Abe are having any effect, or if they're just raising the signal-to-noise ratio and making it easier for the prime minister to ignore critical statements. It's entirely clear at this point that public criticism of Mr. Abe from within the LDP will not be enough to unseat him; only action — concerted and public — will be able to override the premier's persisent "no." It is foolish, for example, to think that former Prime Minister Mori will be able to unseat the prime minister simply be voicing his displeasure in as many public fora as possible.

Ambassador Schieffer, stand down please

J. Thomas Schieffer, US ambassador to Japan, is continuing with his campaign to convince the DPJ to change its opposition to the extension of the anti-terror special measures law, giving interviews to major dailies on the spat between the US and the DPJ. (Mainichi interview here; Asahi interview here.)

The message is more or less the same in both of the interviews I read, but a quote in the Mainichi interview especially caught my eye. Ambassador Schieffer said, "If Japan makes this kind of statement of backing away from the war on terror, it will send a 'terrible message' not only to the United States but to the international community."

Now, I happen to think this is true. Japan's commitment in Afghanistan is to the UN-sanctioned coalition working to rebuild Afghanistan (and indirectly to the people of Afghanistan), not to the US. Go back and read the US-Japan mutual security treaty. There is no provision that provides for allied cooperation outside of the Far East, a term that has never been properly defined and is generally understood to apply to potential scenarios in the region and not to a foreordained geographic area. In any event, cooperation between the US and Japan in Afghanistan and Iraq are not explicitly included in the alliance, although naturally the alliance has a lot to do with why Japan is in both places.

However, if the international community is so concerned about Japan's pulling its refueling detachment out of the Indian Ocean, wouldn't that message be far more convincing coming from someone other than the ambassador of the US to Japan? Why not Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, secretary-general of NATO, twenty-five of whose member nations outside of the US have contributed to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan? Why not Ban Ki-moon, UN secretary-general, whose organization has approved the multinational coalition's activities in Afghanistan with multiple resolutions? Why not the governments of other countries involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, or the government of Afghanistan itself? Does Ambassador Schieffer not realize that regardless of what he says, his persistent lobbying on the issue makes it into a US-Japan issue and decreases the chances that Ozawa and the DPJ will compromise, if only to avoid appearing as to have caved in to US pressure?

Thankfully the White House has announced that President Bush will not be stopping in Japan when he goes to Australia next month for the APEC summit, a visit that would have occurred around the anniversary of 9/11 and would undoubtedly have resulted in even more US pressure on the DPJ to change its position.

I want Japan to continue to participate in the multinational coalition supporting Afghanistan; I think it's the right thing to do, and I think Japan ought to be involved in a mission in which nearly every developed democracy is involved. But Japan's continuing involvement should not be the result of US browbeating or arm-twisting, because the alliance will not last much longer if it functions on the basis of the US government's leaning hard on Japan when it wants Tokyo to do something. The Japanese government — ideally with the support of the Japanese people — has to want to participate in international missions. To make Japan do otherwise — to put the government in the position of having to force enabling legislation through the Diet — is to sow the seeds of the alliance's destruction. (Of course, the Abe government, as Defense Minister Koike made clear last week, seems content with US gaiatsu on this issue, whatever the consequences for the alliance.)

So, Ambassador Schieffer, consider the consequences of your continuing to pressure the DPJ to change course — and cease and desist. It is in the interest of the US for Japan to play a more active global role as a great power among great powers, not as the submissive ally of the US doing Washington's bidding.

Koike opens a second front

As the skirmishes over the extension of the anti-terror special measures law intensify, Defense Minister Koike Yuriko has decided to take the fight to Washington, DC at the same time that DPJ President Ozawa Ichiro met with US Ambassador Thomas Schieffer.

On Wednesday morning, Koike met with US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who expressed his appreciation of the role played by Japan in the war on terror. She also met with Vice President Cheney, who thanked Japan for its support in Afghanistan and Iraq and took care to note Japan's long-term importance due to the rapid rise of Chinese military power. Koike, meanwhile, used the occasion to criticize Ozawa for his hypocrisy in having pushed hard for Japanese involvement in the Gulf War but opting to back away from support for Japanese contributions in Afghanistan and Iraq. (Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki in Tokyo also contributed to the offensive against Ozawa, citing the deaths of Japanese citizens on 9/11 to illustrate the part Japan has to play in the war on terror.)

I think it is a mistake on the part of the Bush administration to encourage Japan to think of its contribution in Afghanistan as contributions to the alliance. Doing so encourages Japanese citizens to associate a minor supporting role in a broad coalition of countries participating in the reconstruction of Afghanistan with serving as spearcarrier for the wholly unpopular Bush administration. MTC is right to point out just how much unease there is with the US across the political spectrum — I am constantly amazed at just how anxious Japanese seem to be about being entrapped in an American war. At the same time, however, no matter how inconsequential Japan's material contributions are in the Indian Ocean, it is important that Japan is there, for reasons having nothing to do with Japan's relationship with the US.

There is no question that Japanese foreign policy is America-centric to a degree unhealthy for both Japan and the US. The US shouldn't want a Japan that is incapable of acting on its own and feels it necessary to follow along with the US even when its interests aren't at stake — because that constrains the US to some extent. At the same time, the Japanese government must not be left in a position where it is forced to follow the US even against its own interests, because it has no choice. The extension of the bill permitting Japanese support in the Indian Ocean is an excellent opportunity to recast Japan's activities as part of a broader coalition that enjoys the imprimatur of the UN, Ozawa's sophistry about its being post-facto support notwithstanding. Yes, the war may have began as the US response to 9/11, but by now the reconstruction of Afghanistan is a broadly legitimate if under-supported mission to ensure that the country does not revert to wholesale lawlessness, an open wound in the heart of Eurasia.

MTC mentions that there is no constituency for renewal. He's right — but that's not a good thing, and it means that Japan's political leadership needs to be ever more diligent in making the case that Japan does in fact have a role to play, however small and far from the battlefield. The fact that there is no constituency for renewal, that to the Japanese people it's all the same whether or not the JSDF serves in coalitions abroad, means that it will be remarkably easy for Japan to backslide into the easy life of a security consumer (which undermines the idea, expressed by Norimitsu Onishi and others, that Japan is on a linear track to becoming a more formidable security actor in the region and the world). Doing so would, of course, result in a Japan as dependent on the US as ever.

As such, a mooted DPJ plan that would call for a withdrawal from Iraq, reported in the FT earlier this week, might be a way for Japan to distance itself from the US while at the same time reaffirming its commitment to bear some of the burden for global order by extending the MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean. Of course, thanks to the Abe government's response to the DPJ call to reject the latter — huddling close to the US by sending Koike-san to DC — it will be harder for the government to convince the Japanese people that the Afghanistan mission is anything but a contribution to the alliance with the US. If Japan is to take a different approach to this issue — rejecting Japan's slavishly following the US, while reaffirming Japan's commitment to contribute to global security in some trifling way — the DPJ will have to articulate this line. Mr. Maehara and his followers may be of some use in this respect should the party leadership choose to change course. (I agree with MTC that the chances of Mr. Maehara's leaving the party are slim at best, and that having egregiously bungled his leadership of the DPJ, no one seems to be in a hurry to give him the reins again.)

No one benefits from the pensions scandal?

The Asahi Shimbun published a chart today that shows public opinion regarding responses to the the pensions crisis (sadly, it does not appear to be online).

Asked if they appreciated the Abe Cabinet's response to the pensions scandal, 59% of respondents said they did not appreciate it to 24% who did.

That's not so surprising, but the following is:

Asked if they appreciate how the DPJ has wrestled with the pensions scandal, 45% said they did not appreciate it to 27% who said that they did.

The poll also shows that insecurity caused by the scandal has diminished only slightly.

Consider that given a scandal of massive proportions, the DPJ still cannot spark enthusiasm among voters for its program. Consider also that despite the three years since the last Upper House election, the LDP and the DPJ are in the exact same range of popularity that they were a month before the election three years ago (2004, DPJ-25% to LDP-24%; 2007, DPJ-25% to LDP-19%).

I think this illustrates a point I made yesterday: the public doubts the entire political class. After the mismanagement of the post-bubble economy, the clumsy responses to the Hanshin earthquake and the Aum subway attack, the worsening financial crisis in the late 1990s, and then the tease that was Koizumi, the Japanese people have had enough (and who can blame them). The pensions scandal is just another brick in the wall, and it was a mistake to assume that it would automatically cause a surge of support for the DPJ. And so while the LDP feels the loss of public trust more acutely than other party, clearly voters are not all that discriminating when it comes to casting doubt on Japan's political class.

And so now that the Abe Cabinet's "162 days of achievement" — the title of this week's Abe mail magazine (I kid you not) — are over, the political environment will become a little more ambiguous, and more challenging for the DPJ. Stories about the government's ramming bills through the Diet will be replaced by light-hearted stories about Koike Yuriko's experiences in her new job (like her struggles to find what to wear to her first review of the troops). The emanation of decrees from the Kantei will be replaced by the realities of the campaign. Politics will become local, momentarily, with candidates and their supporters interacting with voters, calling in favors, emphasizing their incumbency and long service to the people. Remember, this is what the LDP is good at: the DPJ is still not even close to the LDP when it comes to local organization, although the gap has closed somewhat. While Abe will do his best to make life difficult for LDP candidates — an article the other day, in Yomiuri I believe, quoted an LDP candidate in Shikoku discussing how inconvenient the prime minister's visit will be — in general the campaign machines will do their job, counteracting to some degree the pervasive gloom in the government camp.

The government may still be due for a blow, but a few weeks of softball news stories and asinine (dare I say apolitical) campaigning, combined with an election date selected to ensure that no one will be around to vote, may be enough to make the blow more like that of a pillow than a boxer's first.

And yet the DPJ just revised its target upward from 50 to 55? (Over)confidence? Braggadocio?

Why does Japan need a pipeline?

Prime Minister Abe, in this week's mail magazine, echoes some of the media coverage of his appointment of Koike Yuriko as the new defense minister in describing her as a "pipeline" to the US: "Koike-san has pipelines to ministers responsible for defense and foreign policy in other countries, and she is well versed in security policy."

Why on earth does the defense minister of one of the world's biggest defense spenders and ally of the world's greatest military power need to have unique pipelines to other governments? If she calls through normal channels, are they going to put her on hold?

It is this cloak of meekness that Japan needs to shed if it is going to be taken seriously as a security provider. (Oh, and the sensitivity that leads a defense minister to resign after stating facts that are acknowledged more or less universally outside of Japan — but then doing that would mean "[sticking] to dry, strategic arguments," as Asahi's Tensei Jingo column warns us not to do.)

This whole sorry episode — including the trumpeting of Defense Minister Koike's foreign network — shows just how far Japan has to go before it can be called a "normal" country. For all the new laws, for the dispatches of the JSDF abroad (including the ASDF into the line of fire in Iraq), for all the rhetoric emanating from the government, the thinking of the Japanese people remains thoroughly steeped in the sentiments of "one-country pacifism." The Japanese people remain deeply uneasy about all things martial, even as they benefit from the US Military's ensuring that Japanese consumers enjoy access to Middle Eastern oil.

I recognize that the contradiction makes many Japanese uncomfortable — I discussed this here — but rather than just pausing to acknowledge the contradiction, and then carrying on as always, Japanese leaders will have to face up to reality, to stop indulging in "compassion for the people who suffered under those mushroom clouds" and start focusing on how they can actually ensure that no people need suffer the same fate again. Chances are that resolutions and high-minded statements of principles will not be enough to do it. There is a place for remembering the events of August 6 and August 9, 1945, but memory and sentiment cannot be the whole of the story.

This is the problem with the argument made in recent years by Kenneth Pyle, Michael Green, and others that Japan is the consummate realist: I do not disagree that Japan has benefited from the leadership of some extraordinary strategists since it modernized, but they have operated largely out of sight of the Japanese people, and as a result the people have little appreciation for the strategic considerations that have guided Japan's actions in the international system. I recognize this is a problem for many countries, but the problem seems especially acute in Japan. Look at the "awakening" on North Korea that has occurred over the past decade. While the 1998 Taepodong launch was important, while nuclear fears are important, both pale in comparison to public sentiment on the abductions (explained in part but not entirely by the government's emphasis on the issue). It has taken a soft, sentimental issue for the Japanese people to pay attention to a threat next door.

For many countries, even for many democracies, this would not be a problem, but in Japan security and defense policy are less insulated from public sentiment than in other democracies; indeed, in security and defense policy the government is uniquely vulnerable to public pressure, as the Kyuma resignation illustrates. While Kyuma's resignation was not about defense policy in particular, it was about defense policy in general, including how Japan should think about nuclear weapons — and even how Japan should think about its alliance with the US. A foreign policy tied to public sentiment is dangerous, vulnerable to either undershooting or overshooting, as even the US has learned in the years following 9/11, with considerable costs in blood and treasure.

Meanwhile, the Kyuma affair shines light on the problems of history. "Nuclear weapons do not fall from the sky of their own accord," notes Asahi. "People make them, and people release them on other people's orders." True and true. But what about the people who launch wars of aggression on an entire region? And what about people who wage war with no regard to the laws of war governing the treatment of prisoners of war? And what about people who are willing to sacrifice the lives of civilians in order to continuing waging their war?

Indeed, Asahi's column is a great example of how pacifists have furthered the interests of Japan's hypernationalists, because the history of Imperial Japan's aggression becomes obscured by Japan's suffering from American bombing. A responsible column would have, even while condemning the US for the bombing, spared at least a sentence to criticize the government in Tokyo that had laid Okinawa to waste and was prepared to do the same for the rest of Japan in order to resist the US.