The new Fukuda doctrine

On Thursday of last week, Prime Minister Fukuda gave a keynote foreign policy address at the fourteenth annual International Conference on the Future of Asia, hosted by Nikkei in Tokyo.

Not for the first time Mr. Fukuda gave me reason to lament his political troubles at home, as he gave a speech that was stunning in the breadth of his vision, his clear assessment of the challenges and opportunities facing Japan today, and his recognition that Japan needs to make serious changes if it is to retain power and influence in Asia.

After expressing his sadness over lives lost in the Szechuan earthquake and the Burmese cyclone, the prime minister opened by citing his father's "Fukuda Doctrine," articulated in 1977, and pointing to the changes that have occurred in Asia in the three decades since, pointing in particular to the prosperity and development achieved by ASEAN members and other Asian countries. (In a plug for this week's TICAD in Yokohama, Mr. Fukuda suggested that Africa can learn from Asia's experience and achieve a similar economic miracle.)

In a rare citation of Fernand Braudel by a head of government, Mr. Fukuda appealed to the attendees to work over the next thirty years to make the Pacific Ocean an "inland sea" that is the center of global order, the same role played by the Mediterranean — as documented by Braudel in his work on the Mediterranean world — in pre-modern and early modern European history. He emphasized liberalization and diversity in the Asia-Pacific, which will enable all involved to pursue "unlimited possibilities."

This regional vision is a bit too flighty for me, although interestingly, Mr. Fukuda does not mention APEC once in this speech, surprising considering that APEC includes countries from all sides of the Asia-Pacific (but excludes India, an increasingly important player in the East Asian balance) and is the primary institution dedicated to liberalization in the Asia-Pacific. As an APEC skeptic, I'm not disappointed, but this concept of "Pacific as inland sea" seems more poetic than practical.

The interesting portion of the speech is the section after Mr. Fukuda's discourse on Braudel. In this section — which includes five promises for concrete action necessary to create an Asia-Pacific network community — Mr. Fukuda casts Japanese foreign policy, including the US-Japan relationship, in a new light and suggests how Japan will be able to preserve its influence despite domestic limitations.

The key for Mr. Fukuda is reassessing Japan's relationships. He spoke at some length about forging a new relationship with a Russia looking to develop the Russian Far East and East Siberia and play a greater role in East Asia. Mr. Fukuda expressed his hopes for a Russo-Japanese peace treaty and his belief that Russia can make a contribution to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific. He called attention to Japan's contributions to development in South Asia, especially in India, contributions that will undoubtedly intensify in coming decades.

Moving on to his five promises, Mr. Fukuda first spoke at length about the importance of ASEAN, promising to deepen cooperation with the organization by promoting a special ambassador to ASEAN and creating a full diplomatic mission in the near future. He emphasized the importance of the Japan-ASEAN comprehensive economic partnership agreement currently under negotiation and pledged that Japan will work with ASEAN to combat economic inequality and cooperate to promote food and energy security.

His second promise concerned the United States. Compared to the eight paragraphs he spent discussing ASEAN, Mr. Fukuda talked about Japan's relationship with the US in a mere two.

Point number two, Japan promises to reinforce public goods in the Asia-Pacific in its alliance with the US.

It goes without saying that the US is the single most important member of the Asia-Pacific region. I always say that 'If the US-Japan alliance is strengthened, it will resonate in Asia diplomacy.' In Asia unstable, uncertain factors like the North Korea problem still remain. The resolution of the Korean peninsula question is indispensable for the stable development of all of Northeast Asia. Today, the US-Japan alliance, more than being a device for the security of Japan, has taken on the role of a mechanism for the stability of the Asia-Pacific. Accordingly, the future outlook for Asia is of a peaceful place — in other words, a low-risk, secure place, a place in which trade and cultural exchanges can continue to expand. And so I think that this is a cornerstone of a prosperous Asia.

This is consistent with the vision of the alliance outlined by Mr. Fukuda during his visit to Washington in November 2007, a vision with which I am deeply sympathetic. The US will remain an important player in Asia, but its role will be less transformative and more about providing public goods, as the prime minister said. The US has long done this, but it will increasingly become the crux of the US role in Asia and the raison d'etre of the US-Japan alliance. Not merely an alliance for the defense of Japan, not a global alliance that is a mile wide but an inch deep, not an alliance dedicated to promoting democracy or dragon-slaying, but an alliance that recognizes the importance of stability in East Asia and in which Washington and Tokyo use all the tools at their disposal — and work with all potential partners — to pursue regional stability. Whether Washington embraces this vision will depend on the next president.

Relatedly, Mr. Fukuda reiterated his promise to make Japan a "peace cooperation state." "Peace cooperation" includes a role for Japan's self-defense forces, as the prime minister emphasized the need to work together to patrol the straits of Malacca, clearing them of pirates and terrorists. (Presumably the Japanese coast guard would also be involved.) It also includes peacekeeping and state-building activities in countries like Cambodia and East Timor and disaster prevention and relief, both of which will entail more cooperation with ASEAN. To this end, Mr. Fukuda wants to create an "Asian disaster and disease prevention network."

His fourth promise involves the promotion of more intellectual and cultural exchanges in the region, especially among youth. His fifth concerns combating climate change, consistent with Mr. Fukuda's goals for the G8 summit and domestic plans to promote a low-carbon emissions society.

He concluded his speech by acknowledging that this vision may seem optimistic in light of the gloomy mood abroad in the world, but suggests that the only way forward is together. He further acknowledges that Japan must make changes at home even as it works with its Asian neighbors to solve collective problems. His short list of challenges for Japan — which he has previously discussed — include promote greater equality between men and women, opening up Japan specifically to foreign investment and to foreign influences more broadly, and overcoming the problems of a shrinking, low-birth rate society.

As before, I am deeply impressed by Mr. Fukuda's vision for Japan and its place in the world in the twenty-first century. It is worth noting that in his vision for Japanese foreign policy, there is no need for constitution revision or reinterpretation. If anything, he argues implicitly that Japan needs to be less concerned about its military capabilities and more concerned about its diplomatic assets, namely its relationships with other countries in the region. The US-Japan alliance (and, mutatis mutandis, armed force), while important, cannot be Japan's only tool for solving problems in the region. Moreover, he recognizes that if Japan is going to play an important role in the region, it cannot afford to neglect its relationships with its neighbors and other regional powers. (And, presumably, it cannot afford to allow those relationships to be dragged down by bits of barren rock.)

How unfortunate that Mr. Fukuda was elected in September 2007 instead of September 2006, when he would have had enough support with which to make substantial progress in reconfiguring Japan's foreign policy and tackling the domestic problems that threaten to limit its influence. As of now, it is unclear whether this new Fukuda doctrine will survive its progenitor's government.

Stirrings in Heiligendamm

Prime Minister Abe and President Putin met on Thursday evening (Friday morning, Japan time) as planned and discussed what seems like every outstanding issue in Russo-Japanese relations: fishing rights, the Northern Territories, the development of Siberia's energy resources, and a Russo-Japanese peace treaty.

Few conclusions, however, were reached, and it seems that there will be no direct exchange of visits after all, with the next face-to-face being at the APEC meeting in Australia in September.

But, while the outcome of the meeting seems to be more modest than I expected, I still think there's reason to think that the months leading up to the next summit will be spent with both countries exploring options for a grand bargain on outstanding bilateral issues, not least the Northern Territories question.

Again, I think the strategic logic is unimpeachable; both, relatively friendless in the region, need more options. But the road to an agreement will be arduous, and based on the coverage of the Abe-Putin summit, it seems that Japan and Russia are starting from scratch.

Lavrov visits the Northern Territories

Interpret this as you will, but in advance of the Abe-Putin meeting on the sidelines of the G8 summit in Heiligendamm, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is touring the Kuril Islands (Northern Territories), the first visit by a Russian foreign minister since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

At a press conference in Sakhalin, Lavrov claimed that his inspection of the islands is not designed to find a solution to the territorial question, but rather a matter of finding a way for both countries to profit.

Whether Lavrov's remarks should be taken at face value are open to question; as I discussed here, the time may be right for Russia and Japan to forge an agreement on the heretofore irresolvable Northern Territories issue.

So again, watch the meeting between Putin and Abe this week.

Keep an eye on Russia

In recent days, Russia has announced plans to tighten sanctions on North Korea, with an emphasis on arms, spare parts, and luxury goods — this is the first concrete step Russia has taken in regard to sanctions since the aftermath of the October nuclear test.

While Russia has its own reasons to be irritated with North Korea, due to North Korea's outstanding debts to Russia from the Soviet period, I cannot help but wonder if this step has more to do with Russia's relations with other regional powers than with North Korea. I am thinking, of course, of Russo-Japanese relations.

With Abe and Putin due to meet soon on the sidelines of the G8 summit in Germany, Russia could very well be taking this step, which brings it closer to Japan's position, as a way of creating some momentum towards a grand bargain with Japan that resolves the Northern Territories issue, strengthens energy ties, and gives both Japan and Russia greater strategic flexibility in Northeast Asia. The logic of closer Russo-Japanese ties was spelled out during Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov's February visit to Japan, during which officials discussed creating "A Relationship Grounded in Shared Strategic Interests."

The time for Russo-Japanese rapprochement may be right. As noted by Asahi's Yoshibumi Wakamiya back in December, Russo-Japanese relations tend to move in fifty-year cycles, and the regional environment is such that both Moscow and Tokyo could see the value in overcoming the thorny and heretofore irresolvable Northern Territories issue for the sake of larger strategic interests. For Russia, greater cooperation with Japan reduces its dependence on China as a regional partner, whose growth, after all, is potentially harmful to Russian control of Siberia. (And it will also help raise the bidding price for its energy resources.) For Japan — for Abe — rapprochement with Russia will give Japan that much more strategic independence in the region, a move to greater strategic flexibility to match the similar shift underway in US Asia policy. (As a result, US tension with Russia may not have any impact on Tokyo's Russia policy.)

Securing a grand bargain with Russia may well become more appealing to Abe as his domestic political situation weakens, particularly if the Upper Elections go poorly. Like his grandfather Kishi, Abe has come to rely on trips abroad that show himself playing the statesman to raise his popular support and thus enable him to pursue other parts of his agenda. As George Packard wrote of Kishi, "Kishi tried to strengthen his power case through popular support, making trips to Southeast Asia, Washington, Europe, and Latin America, but he never succeeded in launching a 'Kishi boom' or even in developing a large popular following. Nor was he the type of politician who could play the 'strong-man role' that Yoshida had made famous." And for Abe, sensitive to his position as an LDP prince, the appeal of reaching an agreement that proved elusive to earlier generations of LDP leaders may prove irresistible. (Remember that his late father, Shintaro, was greatly interested in an agreement with Russia).

Accordingly, a compromise on the Northern Territories — which to date has been impossible, with Japan demanding the return of all the Kurils — may take shape. The contents of a compromise will have to be hammered out in the coming months, but look for a softening of Japan's public position on the islands in the aftermath of the Abe-Putin summit on the sidelines of the G8 meeting in Germany. (Asahi's Takahashi Kosuke surveyed options here.) Consider that MOFA's press secretary said, earlier this month, "Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wants to enrich the bilateral relationship; put a human face, if you like, on the bilateral relationship. But, beyond that, I cannot speculate on what actually Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is going to pick up as important issues to be discussed by the two nations." This suggests to me that any Russian initiative is being handled in the Kantei, and that the prime minister may have a surprise in store for Heiligendamm.

So in Germany, expect a road map to an agreement, with a more firm announcement about an exchange of visits, with Putin visiting Tokyo and Abe visiting Moscow before the year is out, with Putin perhaps making the first visit. Maybe Abe will even get Putin to voice his heartfelt understanding of the plight of Japan's abductees.

And then look for a complicated dance within and between Russia and Japan, as they figure out the contours of an agreement that will satisfy both.

Asia's shifting balance

The past week has brought a host of stories pointing to how the balance of power — both globally and in Asia — is shifting, suggesting that the assumptions made by each major regional power will have to change accordingly.

First, Taiwan's place as the most likely cause of war between China and the US (with or without Japan) may well be shifting, due to growing appreciation on the part of the US that as the potential costs of war with China have risen, the costs of providing a security "blank check" to Taiwan have risen in parallel. It is not surprising, therefore, that Stephen Young, head of the American Institute in Taiwan (the de facto embassy), has called upon Taiwan to pass a budget that provides funding for US-provided weaponry. Is this a last-ditch effort by the US to urge the Chen administration to focus more on trying to correct the cross-strait balance and less on provoking China with moves toward de jure independence?

At the same time, Taiwan has selected Joseph Wu, a member of Chen's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), as its representative in Washington; Wu acknowledges that in the face of deepening US-China ties, Taiwan will increasingly have to struggle to earn Washington's support, not to mention its attention. Meanwhile, it seems that some in Taiwan — most notably Ma Ying-jeou, the KMT's newly selected candidate for next year's presidential elections — recognize that Taiwan's future is increasingly across the strait, at least economically. Ma has called for removing restrictions on Taiwanese economic activities in mainland China, which raises the obvious question of whether a diplomatically isolated Taiwan that is increasingly economically dependent on China will be able to retain de facto independence for long.

In other words, strategic ambiguity is becoming ever more ambiguous, which undoubtedly is important for the US-Japan alliance (and may even explain why Taiwan was absent from the most recent SCC statement).

But fluctuation in the regional balance is not limited to Taiwan. Indeed, perhaps the more serious changes involve Japan, which is learning to look outside of the alliance for friends and partners. For all the talk about the strength of the alliance — Richard Armitage echoed the rhetoric emanating from last week's bilateral meetings in Washington in an interview in Mainichi — the US-Japan relationship is, oddly enough, much healthier in security cooperation between the US Military and JSDF than in political cooperation between the two governments. As the Economist reports this week, Abe's visit to the Middle East this past week is largely a product of Japanese realpolitik, with the Abe Cabinet looking out for Japan's security interests independent of other concerns. Similar thinking can be found in the growing trend in favor of a Russo-Japanese rapprochement, with Foreign Minister Aso, on a visit to Moscow, agreeing to schedule a summit between Abe and Putin at next month's G8 meeting in Germany.

And so the new regional balance of power comes into view. It is not an old-fashioned military balance of power, because the US presence in the region, with the help of its alliance with Japan, means that the US will continue to be primus inter pares as far as military power is concerned. In the shadow of the US military primacy, however, competition for energy, for trade, for commodities, and for the future of political and economic development in the region is burgeoning. Thus Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's advice to President Bush cannot be taken lightly: the US and Japan must become more flexible politically, even as they deepens military ties. But without political coordination and communication — clear explanations of the reasoning behind their respective independent initiatives — US-Japan security cooperation will be unsustainable over the long term.

After all, can the alliance survive without a clearly defined purpose, which is, in effect, the meaning of the "globalization" of the US-Japan alliance? Or will it flounder, just as NATO has floundered as it has tried to become more global in its vocation?

Putin meets Hu

I feel like the title of this post could be the beginning of a corny geopolitics-themed Abbot and Costello parody.

But seriously, the Japanese media seems to be keeping a close eye on the meeting in Moscow between Presidents Hu and Putin. This Mainichi article, for example, calls attention to the two countries agreeing to strengthen their "strategic partnership. Yomiuri, meanwhile, ran two articles about the China-Russia summit, this one on the facts of the meeting and a longer, analytic article that does not appear to be online.

While it is entirely appropriate for the Japanese press to watch discussions between two of the four powers constituting the East Asian strategic quadrangle -- the subject of this book by Robyn Lim -- I suspect Japan's media, particularly conservative publications like Yomiuri, are interested in part because closer relations between China and Russia plays into the "antagonistic Asia" storyline. Two large continental empires with illiberal political system versus...the maritime democratic allies, standing shoulder to shoulder as they did during the cold war, except this time Japan would no doubt love to play a more active military role.

I think, however, that observers should not overestimate the value of the China-Russia partnership. While there are a number of areas in which Beijing and Moscow have reasons to cooperate -- perhaps starting from their joint defense of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states -- neither state, but Russia in particular, will benefit from being tied too closely to the other. And let's not forget that there is plenty of friction between the two, not least the millions of Chinese flowing into Siberia. Frankly, the less fettered Russia's position in the region, the better. Following up last month's visits to Japan by several Russian officials to talk energy, I would not be surprised if momentum builds towards a Japan-Russia rapprochement. The more Russia can triangulate between energy-hungry China and Japan, the more it will gain and the more secure its position in the Far East will be.

So while Russia and China may find international cooperation useful in, for example, the UN Security Council, I have doubts about whether Beijing and Moscow will be especially chummy in East Asian matters. The regional security environment is becoming increasingly fluid, militating against a firmer Sino-Russian partnership, and, I fear, more intense political cooperation between the US and Japan.