The three stooges

At the tail end of the APEC summit, Messrs. Abe, Bush, and Howard met for a much-vaunted security summit that came in the wake of the US-India-Australia-Japan-Singapore exercises in the Indian Ocean (the "quad" + one?).

Commentator Richard Halloran believes that the quad is shaping up to be a "informal defensive pact based on shared national interests and democratic values."

But how durable is the quad? India, for one, remains as committed to pursuing an independent course as ever, maybe even more so as it becomes a political and economic giant. (India has just announced naval exercises with China and Russia — why do exercises with the democracies mean India is joining an informal grouping, but exercises with China and Russia lack larger significance?)

Beyond India, whose commitment to the quad is the weakest, what of the "emerging" US-Japan-Australia triangle? I think things would look considerably different under different political leadership in each member state.

Indeed, it is hard to imagine a group of leaders more harried at home than Bush, Abe, and Howard. Mr. Bush (30% approval, 64% disapproval), of course, has been universally recognized as a lame duck — a lame duck choking on the sands of Iraq — for months. Mr. Abe (negatives in the sixties) has been more or less written off, holding on to power simply because no one is in a position to force him out of office (or no one wants to). Mr. Howard, meanwhile, might be headed for an election defeat at the hands of Kevin Rudd's Labor Party, which has just widened its lead in public opinion polls in advance of the general election expected for later this year.

Would the quad look the same if it was, for example, a meeting between Mr. Rudd, Mr. Ozawa, and Mrs. Clinton (or substitute a Democrat of your choice)? Would these leaders pursue integrated cooperation with the same gusto as the current trio? Would they place the same emphasis on shared values, which serves little other purpose other than to separate them from China?

That's my problem with this whole project. If it is just an "open network" that recognizes the important ties each member has with China, what values does it add? Is Japan's security improved all that much by new security ties with Australia? What can Australia contribute that isn't already provided by the US, if not pressure on China? The same is the reverse, even more so, for Australia — what can Japan possibly contribute to Australia's security? I fear that, intentionally or unintentionally, this arrangement subordinates regional objectives to Japan's needs, given that Japan is perhaps the most insecure of the participating countries. As Halloran writes, "In Japan, strategic thinkers have pointed to open hostility from North Korea, barely concealed hostility from South Korea, and anxiety over long-term threats from China despite recent moves by Beijing to reduce the antagonism."

But why risk raising tensions with China now when the arrangement provides so little in practical terms?

So I remain dubious that this meeting was "historic," as the Sankei Shimbun writes in an editorial today. More like one last caper for a group of leaders facing the ends of their political careers.

Mr. Abe's exit strategy?

The Sydney APEC summit has come and gone — with, to my surprise, only one appearance by the cast of The Chaser (I definitely recommend subscribing to the podcast of their show).

On the sidelines of the summit this weekend, President Bush and Prime Ministers Howard and Abe held their meetings. Not surprisingly, Mr. Bush reminded Mr. Abe about how important his administration finds Japan's contribution to the war on terror, with Mr. Abe telling his buddy George that he will do everything in his power to get the law passed to enable the MSDF to continue its participation.

(Not surprisingly, Asahi speaks of Mr. Bush's demanding extension of the anti-terror law, Yomiuri talks of Mr. Abe's promising support.)

But that's not all Mr. Abe said, apparently.

Reportedly the prime minister said that he is "staking his job" on the passage of the anti-terror special measures law. To have remained defiant this long only to now offer up his head in connection to a bill that looks increasingly certain to be defeated — it gives a little more credence to Peter Ennis's report that Mr. Abe may be gone by November, mentioned in this post. Is the prime minister trying to guarantee that the DPJ's opposition to the law's renewal will remain implacable? Is he deliberately trying to make his position untenable, intensifying opposition from the DPJ, from within the LDP, and from abroad in the increasingly likely event that he will be unable to deliver on his "solemn vow"?

When he says he'll give up his job if he can't get the law passed, does he expect that people will rally to his side, or is Mr. Abe preparing to go out in a blaze of glory, fighting a fight on behalf of the US-Japan alliance that he knows he can't win, a martyr to the idea of a more assertive Japan?

Asia's future seen in Sydney

At the OPEC APEC summit in Sydney, the leaders of APEC's twenty-one member states have been holding bilateral talks in the run-up to the final summit this weekend. I don't put much stock in APEC as an organization that will be able to deliver concrete results — it's simply too big and too diverse — but as a forum for the region's leaders to sit down in the same room and talk about Asia (for the most part) for the better part of a week, it's irreplaceable.

President Bush, taking a break from Iraq, spoke at length about freedom and democracy in Asia, but at the same time, in reiterating the importance of the US security commitment to the region, made clear the limits of US power to deliver political change:

Today, our alliances with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines, and our defense relationships with Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, and others in the region form the bedrock of America's engagement in the Asia Pacific. These security relationships have helped keep the peace in this vital part of the world. They've created conditions that have allowed freedom to expand and markets to grow, and commerce to flow, and young democracies to gain in confidence. America is committed to the security of the Asia Pacific region, and that commitment is unshakable.

This is a fairly accurate description of what the US presence in Asia over the past sixty years has achieved. The US could do nothing more than give its allies the space to change domestically, but as South Koreans, Filipinos, Taiwanese, Indonesians, and others can attest to, the US by no means guaranteed the democratization of their countries, and in fact stood in the way of democratization for most of the cold war. The US role was and is providing the public goods of peace and security that have made it easier for the region's countries to liberalize. (This post at The Marmot's Hole, which wonders about the relevance of American power in Asia, misses this point completely.)

The US will continue to play this background role, enabling a dense web of connections between all the region's countries — even among those presumed to have confrontational relationships. And so talk of a community of Asian democracies is not only irresponsible, creating the impression of ideological battle lines in Asia, but it also ignores the reality of life in twenty-first century Asia.

The Pacific democracies cannot solve the region's problems without China, and they better get used to that fact. President Bush recognizes this on some level, based on the expansiveness of the agenda for his talks with President Hu. Australia, too, is aware that there is no avoiding China, agreeing to convene annual security talks with China from next year. Undoutedly, if Kevin Rudd becomes Australia's next premier, Australia will be even more careful to avoid the impression that it is part of a de facto alliance to contain China — as MTC notes, Rudd, fluent in Mandarin and well versed in Chinese affairs, would hardly be an enthusiastic participant in the democratic community.

Indeed, political change in Australia, the US, and Japan could make the "Asian spirit" more apparent. Mr. Ozawa and the DPJ are obviously not enthusiastic proponents of "values diplomacy," and would presumably highlight political cooperation with China (Mr. Ozawa's trip to China in December will be interesting to watch). In the US, it is difficult to imagine Mr. Bush's successor being as heavy on the rhetoric of democracy, even if a Democratic president might feel pressured to lean on China economically.

The Pacific rim and the Asian littoral is, in fact, much more peaceful than many observers admit (or want to admit). There is always the potential for misunderstandings, of course, but prudent, far-sighted leadership, not least by the US, could do much to diminish the potential for conflict.

That area east of Iraq

President Bush, after an unannounced layover in Baghdad, has arrived in Sydney for the APEC summit.

The Washington Post's article on the trip (inadvertently?) identifies the problem with Asia policy in the waning years of the Bush administration. The headline reads, "Bush Arrives in Australia for Summit," but the body copy proceeds to focus entirely on conditions in Iraq, pausing to mention APEC on to dismiss the idea that the 2007 APEC summit is a "China summit."

The Australian has printed a number of articles in the day leading up to the summit criticizing the Bush administration's inattention to a tremendously significant region of which the US happens to be a significant actor — and in which the power balance in changing quickly. A pair of articles by The Australian's Greg Sheridan, including an interview with former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, criticize the Bush administration's tendency to view everything through "the prism of Iraq." Armitage's criticism of the administration is particularly harsh, especially of Secretary of State Rice, but also of the Asia team. He said, "In the seventh year of an eight-year administration, you've got a lot of third and fourth teamers occupying these positions. I don't think you can expect much from this bunch."

I think the intensity of Mr. Armitage's criticism might have more to do with rivalries from his time in the administration than with the substance of US Asia policy; I disagree with Michael Turton's reading of this interview, because, after all, his argument is that the US isn't paying enough attention to Asia, not that everything the administration is doing is wrong.

Nevertheless, the next administration will inherit a changed Asia, with new constraints and new opportunities. And it's never too early for Washington to start looking to Asia again, because, as Armitage said, "In almost every measure - military budgets, population growths, the need for raw materials - our interests will force us back to Asia."

The US plays the game

With this week devoted to meetings running up to the weekend's APEC summit (I'm curious about what leaders will wear for the Australian "national costume" photo), there is lots of talk about the shape of US Asia policy as the Bush administration comes to a close.

Kim Beazley, a former leader of Australia's Labor Party, writes in an op-ed announcing the creation of a center for US studies at the University of Sydney that the US is coming to value its allies in a whole new way due to the consequences of the Iraq conflict. "One thing is clear now," he writes. "The US values its allies more fervently than at any time since the Kuwait war segued out of the cold war. The allies wanted are those who will share burdens, military and political. The allies needed are those who will help refocus the US on the long-term issues of global politics, such as those emerging in East Asia. To be recognised as a needed ally will require friends to be both."

But does Beazley mean "ally" in the formal sense or in the expedient sense? For my part, I don't think the US can afford to limit its friends to whose with whom it has formal arrangements. US inattention to East Asia at the moment that China and India accelerated their takeoff has created a political vacuum that Beijing and New Delhi have hastened to fill — the US remains an indispensable player, thanks in no small part to its military power in the region, but it cannot abjure from working with all the region's powers to shape the regional environment and keep the peace.

India, meanwhile, is moving the same direction in its thinking, learning to be slightly less self-reliant and work with other powers, the US included. An editorial in the Times of India today argues, "Nobody seriously argues that good relations and enormous trade between China and America have made China a vassal of the US. Why can't our politicians, whether from the right or the left end of the spectrum, give India the same benefit of doubt when it comes to relations with the US?"

Washington, while still distracted by Iraq and the Middle East as a whole, appears to be coming around to a more serious approach to the Asia-Pacific region. There seems to be an appreciation of the goals the US should pursue in the region, and fewer hangups about the partners with whom the US should work to achieve those goals. According to the FT, President Bush is prepared to push hard in Sydney this week for substantive progress on an all-APEC trade agreement that could dovetail nicely with the latest push for progress on the Doha round (which has an unfortunate resemblance to the "Dead Parrot" sketch — "this is an ex-trade round!"). This is in no small part a function of the rising prominence of the State Department in managing the rest of the world while the Pentagon sorts out Iraq (although I must add that Pacific Command has been doing its part as well).

The most obvious example of how State has changed the thrust of US policy in Asia is, of course, the six-party talks, in which Christopher Hill, assistant secretary of state of the Asia-Pacific region, has recommitted the US to the process of negotiating a cessation of North Korean nuclear activities. Now, with the latest bilateral understanding announced in Geneva — in which North Korea has apparently agreed to provide a full accounting of its nuclear activities by year's end — the Bush administration will be working to make its partners in the talks to ratify the agreement and lean on North Korea to fulfill its commitment.

Japan, as the one power that has opted out, will no doubt find itself under increasing pressure in the coming months to play a constructive role in the process, which means backing down on the abductions issue. This eventuality has been building up throughout the year; Tokyo may put off making a decision for just a little longer (as Jun Okumura argues), but as long as the US remains committed to the talks, Mr. Abe will have to decide.

The danger is linkages: if Japan is ultimately pressured by the US to step down on the abductions issue, will the result be even more talk on the Japanese right about the unreliability of the US? ("We go to bat for you on the war on terror, and this is how you repay us?") Ambassador Okazaki, Mr. Abe's "brain," essentially made this argument in an essay in Yomiuri on Sunday, arguing that the US-Japan alliance must come before any greater framework: "The balance of power in East Asia rests ultimately on the power balance between the Japan-U.S. alliance and China. That means we should never forget the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance, which is conscious of China's possible threats."

There is clearly a rift between how the Japanese right sees the alliance and how those in charge of US Asia policy now see it. The Japanese right, which threw its weight behind an active and militarily strong alliance in the early years of the Bush administration, now wonders whether it has been sold a bill of goods — wanting Armitage but getting Chris Hill. In Washington, meanwhile, both State and the military brass (both at the JCS and in Honolulu) seem committed to managing the region as a whole, a view that diminishes the role of the alliance with Japan as part of US strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.

Bush talks sense on China

This week is the 2007 APEC summit in Sydney, and in advance of the week-long summitry, President Bush has been talking Asia — and saying the right things.

In a round table discussion with foreign journalists (hat tip: The Swamp), Mr. Bush spoke of the "complex relationship" between the US and China, but also noted, "...I view China as a positive opportunity." He did not hesitate to mention the economic friction or US concerns about human rights, but the overall picture suggests that as the Bush administration wanes, it increasingly recognizes the importance of China as a partner in the Asia-Pacific region, the single most important bilateral relationship in the region, judging by the time spent talking about it in this press conference. The days of Ambassador Mansfield's bar-none ranch are long gone.

Compare the above interview with an interview Mr. Bush had with NHK's Okushi Kensuke. The NHK interview focused on a couple of bilateral issues — the anti-terror special measures law and the six-party talks — before turning to US policy in Iraq. Both of the above-mentioned issues are trust issues: Washington's (overblown) concerns about the reliability of Japan's commitment to participate in Afghanistan, Tokyo's concerns about being abandoned in the six-party talks (and regarding Afghanistan, fears that the US security guarantee will weaken if Japan doesn't demonstrate its loyalty by contributing to US-led campaigns). The Sino-US relationship, for all the friction and feuding, is a relationship whose concerns are regional and global in scale. The US-Japan relationship, for all its significance for both countries, often amounts to the US doing heavy lifting for Japan on various security issues and occasionally cajoling Japan on trade and monetary issues.

When Mr. Bush meets with Hu Jintao, the agreements reached and decisions made have the potential to be hugely significant for the region, but can one say the same about the outcomes of the meeting between President Bush meets Prime Minister Abe this week?

This isn't to say that the US-Japan relationship is irrelevant or that the US and China are prepared to run the region in a sort of bilateral concert, but it does suggest that the US is increasingly seeing Asia policy through the prism of China policy (as opposed to seeing it through the prism of Japan policy), and that the value of a bilateral relationship to the US will increasingly be the value it has in contributing to "stability" (read a positive and mutually beneficial relationship with China).