Who's in charge here?

MTC asks an extremely pertinent question about which I have been wondering all week.

While pleasantly surprised by the new cabinet, MTC wonders who exactly was responsible for picking the new lineup. Mr. Abe no doubt has many people whispering in his ear — perhaps he would think more clearly if that wasn't the case — but it is necessary to ask whose guidance was decisive in shaping the new cabinet.

And now that the cabinet and the new party leadership are in place, it's equally important to ask who will be calling the shots; I remain unconvinced that the new cabinet is Mr. Abe's in anything but name only. Not his agenda, not his way of operating — and perhaps not even his people.

One major player will no doubt be new LDP secretary-general Aso Taro. Asahi writes today about Aso's consolidation of power through his control over the new personnel appointments, through which he sought to disarm critics and favor the factions (leading to new widely voiced fear that this cabinet marks a return to the old LDP). For example, Aso named Kosaka Kenji, organizer of an anti-Abe study group, as deputy of the party's Diet strategy committee. In the process, the influence of Mr. Koizumi within the party may be waning, as his followers in the Koizumi non-faction, anti-faction faction have found themselves blocked from power. Koizumi's followers, however, insist that it will benefit them in the long run: "This latest lineup is a reversion. With this, there will be a rise in new Diet members who think 'I will not join a faction.'"

I think such optimism might be misplaced, but at the same time, despair about the return of the old LDP is also misplaced. The old LDP has been destroyed, as promised by Mr. Koizumi. There is no going back to the old way of collusion between bureaucracy and LDP policy specialists and factions, at the expense of the cabinet.

What seems to be emerging instead is a tighter union between party and cabinet. The policy initiating powers of the Kantei have grown, but more at the expense of PARC than of the bureaucracy, which seems to have recovered, at least partially, from its mid-1990s nadir. (The vacuum created by Mr. Abe's poor leadership has undoubtedly helped this process along.) In the new cabinet, we may see a more cohesive LDP working with the bureaucracy as a whole to form policy, thanks to the presence of Mr. Yosano at the head of cabinet secretariat. An article in today's Asahi, not online of course, talks about the new chief cabinet secretary's "respect for the bureaucracy," suggesting that with his hand at the controls of government, the LDP will move further away from the anti-bureaucratic populism of Mr. Koizumi.

Recognizing the shifting balance is an important corrective, at least partially, to the argument made by Tomohito Shinoda in his recent book Koizumi Diplomacy, in which he outlines the emergence of the Kantei as a policy actor in its own right, especially in security policy. Shinoda is not wrong to point to various cases in the past two decades in which the Kantei has played a decisive role in decision making, but as the title implies, the key factor in his cases was often having the right personnel in place (whether Mr. Ozawa as an assistant CCS in the late 1980s or Mr. Koizumi as prime minister) than any permanent institutional change. If there's one constant in Japanese politics, it's that the formal institutions and rules often matter less than the informal arrangements grounded in custom, culture, and personality. The balance of power within the government can change greatly depending on who is sitting where.

Accordingly, the bureaucracy's comeback is due to continue under the second Abe cabinet, thanks both to accommodative, cautious leadership in the LDP and stalemate due to the DPJ's control of the Upper House.

No magic bullet

The first opinion polls for the new cabinet are out, and the second Abe Cabinet's unfavorable rating still top the favorable rating by a considerable margin.

In fact, both Mainichi and Asahi have recorded the same figures: 33% supportive, 53% opposed. Asking supporters why they valued the new cabinet, Mainichi records that 39% answered that they appreciated the entry of political heavyweights, and another 39% answered that they see the new cabinet as a sign of the desire to continue reform. Only 3% answered that the new cabinet demonstrates Abe's leadership abilities. The leading responses among the unfavorable were that the new cabinet signifies a return to faction rule (31%) and does not show a willingness to continue reform (26%).

Asahi, meanwhile, asked whether Abe should serve out his term as LDP president or leave early. 41% of respondents favored his staying in office, 47% opposed — and among those who favored his staying, a whopping 72% gave the "passive" reply that "there is no other appropriate person." Asahi also recorded for the LDP and the DPJ 25% and 32% support ratings respectively.

Yomiuri and Sankei have recorded higher support numbers, 44.2% and 40.5% respectively, but the responses to other questions show that the rise in support is not a measure of confidence in the premier. In Sankei, for example, more respondents (34.3%) said that they supported the new cabinet because there is no alternative than said they have confidence in Mr. Abe (25%). Whatever support the new cabinet enjoys is in spite of the prime minister, not because of him.

Sankei also recorded much higher support for the LDP compared to the DPJ: 38.8% to 25.6% in Sankei. (Yomiuri found support changed less than one percent since its last poll, with the LDP edging out the DPJ, 31.8% to 30.9%.)

In other words, it is not at all clear that the election has changed anything. The government still does not enjoy the confidence of the people, the prime minister is still governing on the basis of his party's being unable to agree on a successor, and the opposition still does not command an overwhelming amount of support. Whatever the individual strengths of the new cabinet ministers, the government is still burdened by the Abe albatross, as Richard Lloyd Parry of the Times convincingly argues.

Fasten your seat belts for months, or years, of stasis, indecision, and otherwise ineffectual governance.

What role will Masuzoe play?

"The leader's magnanimity, symbolized by the appointment of Mr. Masuzoe."

That is the headline on a Mainichi article discussing the appointment of Masuzoe Yoichi as the new minister of healthy and welfare. Mr. Masuzoe, you will recall, was one of the fiercest critics of Mr. Abe's staying in office, arguing that the prime minister's decision ignored the will of the people as expressed in the Upper House elections.

Abe said in a press conference late Monday that he appointed Masuzoe to the critical post because he is capable of explaining to the people due to his "deep knowledge of pensions." Masuzoe was equally nonchalant about his appointment, saying, "Criticism is criticism. Now we must make the LDP one."

On some level, the prime minister deserves credit for bringing a staunch opponent into his cabinet, but the real credit will be earned when we see the impact Masuzoe has on the Abe government. Is he being brought into the government to be silenced, or will his presence actually serve to make the government more responsible to the voters, more honest about its mistakes, and more amenable to compromise and moderation? In other words, will Masuzoe have more impact on the Abe cabinet than the Abe cabinet has on him?

The press — for the most part — holds its praise

As the Japanese political world digests the newly announced cabinet reshuffle, the major dailies have each editorialized on the new cabinet, sounding some similar notes. Reading Asahi, Sankei, and Yomiuri, each editorial seemed pleasantly surprised by the quality of the individuals tapped by the prime minister for his new cabinet and the LDP executive. None, however, thinks that the new cabinet drastically alters the political landscape, because the Abe government still has to find the best way to deal with the Upper House being in opposition hands.

Asahi acknowledges that the new cabinet signifies a real change — although less than meets the eye, due to the retention of certain members of the first cabinet (i.e., Mr. Ibuki) — from the first Abe Cabinet, but by turning to a cabinet of LDP heavyweights, "the fading of Mr. Abe's presence will not be avoided. Asahi, of course, is not prepared to give the new cabinet a honeymoon period, demanding to know what the second Abe Cabinet's policy goals are, and it expects that the DPJ will be equally unforgiving.

The conservative Sankei Shimbun praised the new lineup, but pointed to the daunting task facing the new lineup in implementing policy in light of the ascendant DPJ — although Sankei thinks that rather than yielding to the DPJ and seeking compromise, the new cabinet should insist that it will not cave on important policies.

Right-of-center Yomiuri, which has easily been the Abe government's most loyal supporter in the media, acknowledges that the "journey ahead is full of troubles," but then proceeds to praise the talents of the new LDP leadership team, suggesting that Mr. Aso will be up to the challenge of uniting the party, and that Messrs. Ishihara and Nikai will be adept at working with the DPJ, Ishihara from his experience as one of the "new breed" of young policy-wonk legislators who worked across party lines in the 1998 "Finance Diet," Nikai from his time spent in opposition alongside Mr. Ozawa. Indeed, on this subject of cooperation with the DPJ, Yomiuri not surprisingly called for the new cabinet to cooperate with the DPJ as much as possible, echoing its recent call for an LDP-DPJ grand coalition (in fact, the last portion of the editorial more or less repeats the previous editorial, suggesting that if the government runs into trouble, it should form a grand coalition).

Yomiuri was equally effusive in its praise for the new cabinet, and has high hopes for Mr. Yosano's elevation to chief cabinet secretary. In fact, despite opening the editorial acknowledging the difficult task facing the new Abe cabinet, Yomiuri actually spends remarkably little time talking about the nature of the challenges and proposing the best course of action to overcome them. In short, there are lots of policy problems, and the best way to deal with them is cooperation. It's not exactly a vote of confidence, though, that in its editorial on the new cabinet Yomiuri once again suggested that the best course of action might be a grand coalition.

In general, then, the mood sees to be "wait-and-see." There is a sense that the new cabinet is certainly capable, but whether it will be able to do anything more than buy the LDP some time with which to sort out its structural problems remains to be seen. There is also the sense that Prime Minister Abe, now surrounded by serious, senior party leaders, will be taking a back seat in the management of his government, particularly with the able Mr. Yosano as chief cabinet secretary.

Said Yomiuri about the new CCS: "It is heard that there is hope that he will act not just as the cabinet's spokesman, but that he will play a central role in policy coordination within the government and between the government and the ruling parties." Rather than falling into line behind the prime minister, it seems that the new cabinet will be issuing orders to Mr. Abe, formulating the government's policy message, setting its Diet strategy, and otherwise trying to avoid the mistakes that doomed the first Abe Cabinet.

Turning of the tide

Methinks that the momentum that the DPJ has enjoyed since the Upper House elections is about to dissipate.

The new LDP leadership's first pronouncement has been to emphasize the need to cooperate with the opposition. Mr. Aso said today, "The important task given to the LDP is restoring confidence and effectively dealing with the people's insecurity about the future." Mr. Ishihara, meanwhile, suggested that the party's utmost mission is cooperating with the opposition as much as possible. This, of course, is bowing to post-election reality, but it will make it more difficult for the DPJ to persist in its confrontational Diet strategy. The LDP and the DPJ may ultimately be unable to cooperate on legislation, but now, should the LDP have to use the Lower House to override an Upper House veto or inaction, it can credibly shift the blame to the DPJ.

This new dynamic is of most immediate importance for the extension of the anti-terror special measures law. Foreign Minister Machimura signaled that the government will exert "all its power" to get the DPJ's understanding on the law. That sounds a lot more credible coming from the new cabinet than it did from a cabinet that was shedding members weekly and headed by a prime minister who didn't have a clue as to how to stop digging, let alone escape from the hole. Expect the DPJ to begin searching for the terms of a compromise in the coming weeks; indeed, NHK reported today that Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi, shadow foreign minister in the DPJ's shadow cabinet will be visiting Washington in mid-September to exchange opinions with US legislators and possibly discuss a way for Japan to contribute other than the current MSDF mission. (Full disclosure: I provided advice on people Yamaguchi should meet while in Washington.)

The Abe cabinet will no doubt enjoy a boost in popularity in the coming weeks — I agree with MTC that the new lineup is a considerable improvement over the previous team, and I expect that Japanese voters will think the same. But over the long term, both the Abe government and the LDP are still in trouble, and must figure out the party's post-Koizumi identity.

The DPJ is still in an advantageous position, but now it has a competent opponent on the other side. If the DPJ is be in a position to win the next general election, it will have to earn it. The party cannot rely on the new Abe cabinet to make the same stupid mistakes that paved the way to victory in July.

The adults are back?

The new cabinet appointments have been dribbling out over the course of the afternoon — apologies for, literally, being out to lunch — and the first impression I get is that the collective experience of the new Abe cabinet is of experience and competence. And while Abe may have made it a point not to take the recommendations of the factions, it appears that appointments have been distributed among the factions.

Also of interest is the number of ministers who left in the 1993 Ozawa rebellion and then drifted back to the LDP, much like now former Defense Minister Koike.

I do not expect that this cabinet will be as prone to the amateur mistakes and gaffes of the first Abe Cabinet, but like Jun Okumura, I don't think this is a cabinet good for much more than muddling through. The only question is how long the muddle will last.

Here is the roster:

Chief Cabinet Secretary (aka, the prime minister's prime minister) — Yosano Kaoru (69, no faction), MITI minister under Obuchi, first elected in 1972

Foreign Affairs — Machimura Nobutaka (62, Machimura faction), former foreign minister and leader of the faction to which Abe belongs; not much surprise here

Finance — Nukaga Fukushiro (63, Tsushima faction), JDA chief under Obuchi and again under Koizumi (not exactly clear what finance experience Nukaga brings to the table)

Health and Welfare — Masuzoe Yoichi (58, UH, no faction), Todai professor, TV commentator, and outspoken critic of Abe in the aftermath of the election

Defense — Komura Masahiko (65, Komura faction), opponent of Koizumi, foreign minister under Obuchi who said "No rice support without resolution to the abductions issue"

Justice — Hatoyama Kunio (58, Tsushima faction), member of the Hatoyama clan (brother of Yukio, DPJ secretary-general), onetime LDP rebel who served in the Hata Cabinet and journeyed back to the LDP

Environment — Katashita Ichiro (58, Tsushima faction), former member of Ozawa's New Frontier party, joined the LDP in 1997

Internal Affairs — Masuda Hiroya (55, non-Diet member), former governor of Iwate

Agriculture — Endo Takehiko (68, Yamasaki faction), first elected in 1986 and unusually does not have a record of heading LDP agriculture policy committees and subcommittees

Public Safety — Izumi Shinya (70, UH, Nikai faction), elected in 1992 to the Upper House as an LDP candidate, he left for Hosokawa's JRP, and then Ozawa's NFP and Liberal Party before joining the Conservative Party and then returning to the LDP in 2003

Okinawa/Northern Territories — Kishida Fumio (50, Koga faction), youngest of the new appointees, serving in his first cabinet

Child policy — Kamikawa Yoko (54, Koga faction), serving in her first cabinet

MEXT Minister Ibuki, METI Minister Amari, Transport Minister Fuyushiba (Komeito), Administrative Reform Minister Watanabe, Special Cabinet Minister Ota (non-Diet) remain in their posts.

Reshuffle day — LDP leadership

NHK has just announced the new LDP leadership, and in general it looks to be a better team than that which served for the past year.

As expected, Aso Taro (Aso faction, 66) has been moved over to party headquarters to become LDP secretary-general; whether this will be a career cul-de-sac for Aso remains to be seen, but it does mean that the face of party has some popularity with the public, given that Aso is something of a henjin. (It also suggests that Abe will be sharing power — Sankei is already calling it the Abe-Aso system.)

The new general affairs chairman, meanwhile, will be outgoing Kokutai chairman Nikai Toshihiro (Nikai faction, 68). Given the state of unrest within the LDP, Nikai may also be an improvement, being a voice of reason and compromise in the midst of ideologues.

Most interesting is the appointment of Ishihara Nobuteru (no faction), son of Tokyo governor Shintaro, as Nakagawa Shoichi's successor as PARC chairman. Ishihara, who turned fifty earlier this year, held ministerial portfolios under Koizumi and is generally regarded as a future leader of the LDP. He is also a dedicated Koizumian, if the statement at his webpage on Japan in the twenty-first century is any indication.

Another Koizumi veteran, Oshima Tadamori (Tamura faction, 60), a MAFF minister under Koizumi, has been named the new Kokutai chairman. And Suga Yoshihide, who until recently was a candidate for a significant ministerial post, has been given the lowly post of election strategy chairman.

The decider reflects (or not)

Mr. Abe has returned from his Asian tour (this is the term used in the Japanese press; apparently Japan hasn't quite returned to Asia), and is getting ready to announce his new cabinet on Monday.

There are few hints as to the comprehensive makeup of the new cabinet and LDP executive, but there are a few people who look certain to be offered positions. A number of sources suggest that Machimura Nobutaka, former foreign minister and head of the Machimura faction to which Mr. Abe belongs will be named chief cabinet secretary, Aso Taro will be named LDP secretary-general, and Yano Tetsuro, Upper House member and former vice minister of foreign affairs, will be given an unspecified position of power. Komeito's Fuyushiba Tetsuzou will likely stay on as transport minister. (Mainichi)

Yomiuri suggests that in light of allegations about funding improprieties, Mr. Suga may find himself out of a job, and indicates that ministerial portfolios will be given to Nakagawa Shoichi, Niwa Yuuya, and former foreign minister Komura Masahiko.

But beyond the roster of the new cabinet, the big question is whether Mr. Abe has actually learned anything after a month of "reflecting upon that which should be reflected." In the event that Mr. Abe has not yet completed his reflecting, Asahi's editorial today suggests five ways in which Mr. Abe should reflect on last month's loss, although Asahi reiterates its opinion that the surest way for the prime minister to reflect on the defeat would be to leave office entirely.

Asahi's five: (1) Know the importance of personnel, (2) be mindful of the ability to manage crises, (3) be responsible for your speech, (4) review basic policy, (5) abandon arrogance (i.e., not ramming legislation through the Diet).

It is revealing that Asahi's advice to the young prime minister have more to do with image management than with policy; this suggests, correctly I think, that the root of the LDP's defeat last month was poor political leadership, not bad policy. The message in this editorial is that being a political novice, having served in the Diet for a mere thirteen years before coming prime minister, Mr. Abe needs to skilled political operators around him to prevent him from making amateur mistakes. Asahi is quick to point out that it is not calling for a return to the rule of the factions, but simply a cabinet staffed with politicians chosen for their political skills, not for their loyalty to the prime minister.

Whether Mr. Abe will actually change his ways remains to be seen, but I remain skeptical. His makeup as a politician is rooted in abstract ideology — politics of the bird's eye view — not the messy busy of governing, which means being sensitive to the public and other actors in the political system. Accordingly, his rhetoric, rather than inspiring support and trust, just leaves listeners confused, asking questions like Asahi's: "What is a beautiful country?" "Does repudiating the postwar mean he wants to return to the prewar regime?" There was nothing inevitable about the LDP defeat in the Upper House elections. But Mr. Abe misused his bully pulpit from day one, preferring meaningless slogans to inspiring, transformational leadership, tolerating incompetence from his advisers, and otherwise preferring standing pat to using the Lower House super-majority to address the concerns of Japanese citizens. He wouldn't have had to do much. As Mr. Koizumi showed, the illusion of reform — saying the right words — can go a long way towards rallying support for an agenda.

In other words, the problem with the Abe Cabinet has been Mr. Abe himself, and the reshuffle will do nothing to change that. The new cabinet may allow Mr. Abe to muddle through indefinitely, but arguably Japan can do better.

This is getting ridiculous

Back in May, in wake of Mr. Matsuoka's suicide and the nomination of Mr. Akagi to be his replacement, back when it wasn't clear whether Mr. Abe would lead his party to its worst ever defeat at the polls, I noted, semi-facetiously, in a post on Mr. Akagi, "No cabinet-eligible LDP politician has clean hands."

Now we learn, thanks to MTC, that yet another member of the Abe Cabinet has been accused of misusing political funds: Suga Yoshihide, minister of internal affairs and communications. Perhaps given that up until this point Suga has been scandal-free, rumors suggested that he would be given an important post in the new cabinet (at one point I recall reading that he was being considered for chief cabinet secretary).

But with Nakagawa Hidenao, outgoing LDP secretary-general, suggesting that members joining the cabinet must have clean records, suddenly it looks like there may be another opening in the new cabinet.

Nakagawa's rule is laughable, in light of what seems to be a universal problem in the LDP (and maybe even in the DPJ, for all we know). Violating the political funds law appears to be a way of life for LDP members — and for what? As Tahara Soichiro wrote in an article mentioned in this post, the funds seem to be going to provide meal and entertainment expenses so that members can entertain constituents and supporters when they visit Tokyo. And for that the majority of the LDP seems to be disqualified from holding ministerial positions.

At some point, when a law is respected largely in the breach, it may be time to reconsider the provisions of the law.

In the meantime, however, this latest scandal should further demolish any expectations that the new Abe Cabinet will be more successful than the last. Perhaps Abe's remaining in office is the best of all situations. A few more months of Mr. Abe could guarantee a DPJ victory in the next general election, forcing the LDP to spend time in the political wilderness thinking about its future.

Beautiful no more

Since election night, there has been a conspicuous absence from the pronouncements of the Abe government: we no longer hear Mr. Abe speaking of building a "beautiful country."

Mainichi suggests that the Abe camp has been reflecting on the meaning of the slogan, despite Abe's assertion that he doesn't think the election results repudiated his "course of reform." Seko Hiroshige, Abe's media advisor, is responsible for the "Building a beautiful country project," and he has suggested that the government think about how to build a beautiful country that pays mind to the concerns of Japanese citizens — a nod, as Mainichi notes, in the direction of the DPJ's "lifestyle is number one" campaign slogan.

At the time of the Abe Cabinet's inauguration, the "beautiful country" slogan was merely baffling and something of a joke; as the cabinet's popularity has tanked, the joke has become less and less funny and more a symbol of the extent to which the government was totally out of touch with the Japanese people and even members of the LDP. In short, with the electoral defeat and the coming cabinet reshuffle, the slogan should be heading to ignominious retirement. And yet it's not: the project is, according to Mainichi, considering some 3500 reform proposals that will be announced around the same time as the reshuffle.

Perhaps the new cabinet will be less tolerant of governing by vague slogans and will force the prime minister to reconfigure how he presents his agenda to the public. There are, however, few signs as of yet that Mr. Abe is going to defer to the judgment of the LDP elders. Yomiuri today speculates on some possibilities for the new cabinet, but there seems to be nothing definite. Some names mentioned by Yomiuri are former Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka, LDP policy chief (and Abe ally) Nakagawa Shoichi, Niwa/Koga faction chief Niwa Yuuya, and former Kokutai chairman Ooshima Tadamori (possibly to return to the same post), as well as Nikai Toshihiro.

There are fewer hints as to who will take which portfolio. There is a suggestion that Machimura will be the chief cabinet secretary — Shiozaki seems to have little chance of survival — because "the only true support for the prime minister is from people in the Machimura faction." Nakagawa, meanwhile, will likely take an economic portfolio (or the MAFF portfolio, which his late father held) in the hope of not weakening the impression that it is Mr. Abe's cabinet.

With a week remaining, no one should anticipate — in case anyone did — that the impending reshuffle will be the key to giving the Abe cabinet some traction, because it seems that Mr. Abe will continue to rely on those who support him unquestioningly and reject those LDP members who have criticized his government, especially since the election.

And as for those 3500 proposals under consideration? There is no reason to expect that Mr. Abe is prepared to abandon the "no reform without growth" formula that has characterized his government since day one.

More prime ministerial trouble

With Prime Minister Abe set to depart on his latest diplomatic jaunt on August 19th, the situation in Tokyo continues to worsen.

The latest scandal involves Defense Minister Koike Yuriko, who is in a showdown with Administrative Vice Minister Moriya Takemasa, a long-serving defense bureaucrat who rose from within the ministry's ranks (instead of being seconded from more influential ministries as many JDA personnel were throughout the cold war). Jun Okumura (here, here, and here) and MTC (here) have addressed this feud in considerable detail, and there are no details I can add to their thorough accounts.

Koike's move to circumvent proper channels in firing the unusually long-serving, politically connected vice minister — a move not coordinated with the rest of the government — has brought the criticism of the chief cabinet secretary, but Defense Minister Koike may well win out in the end, provided the Abe Cabinet survives (seeing as how it seems that she will be staying put). It is interesting that it took a squabble between politicians and bureaucrats for Mr. Shiozaki to criticize a cabinet minister, on behalf of a bureaucrat of course. Former JDA chief Nakatani Gen has criticized Prime Minister Abe for failing to exercise his power as head of the military, but then the prime minister has consistently failed to manage his government until it is too late, so Mr. Nakatani should hardly be surprised.

The consequences of the Koike-Moriya flap for the prime minister will likely be small — after all, it's not like bureaucrats are any more popular with the public than politicians, and Mr. Koizumi certainly showed that an enterprising politician can make political hay by attacking the bureaucrats. But it does contribute to the growing impression of a government unhinged, unchecked, unrestrained by any notion of democratic accountability, the rule of law, or common sense.

Meanwhile, another senior LDP leader has criticized the prime minister, with Lower House President Kono Yohei criticizing the prime minister's call for Japan to abandon the postwar regime as turning its back on the legacy of the Yoshida Doctrine.

I think it's great that LDP leaders have decided to criticize their leader's pet projects and slogans, as well as his decision to stay in power, but I can't help but wonder if public statements critical of Mr. Abe are having any effect, or if they're just raising the signal-to-noise ratio and making it easier for the prime minister to ignore critical statements. It's entirely clear at this point that public criticism of Mr. Abe from within the LDP will not be enough to unseat him; only action — concerted and public — will be able to override the premier's persisent "no." It is foolish, for example, to think that former Prime Minister Mori will be able to unseat the prime minister simply be voicing his displeasure in as many public fora as possible.

A step forward?

It seems that incumbent LDP Diet Strategy Committee Chairman Nikai Toshihiro is being considered as Shiozaki Yasuhisa's replacement as chief cabinet secretary. Nikai, a onetime member of the Takeshita faction (like Ozawa) who left the LDP to join former Prime Minister Hosokawa's Japan Renewal Party in 1993 and served as a vice-minister in Hosokawa's cabinet, is an experienced politician who might be able to manage the government's agenda with the Upper House in the hands of the opposition. (He was also tapped by Koizumi to head the committee responsible for postal privatization following the September 2005 postal reform election.)

The challenge facing the next chief cabinet secretary and the Abe cabinet as a whole is, of course, the drafting of compromise legislation that forces the DPJ to choose between playing a constructive policy role and opposing the government in a manner that will force the government to rule solely on the back of its super-majority and prompt public disapproval. Nikai, Mainichi suggests, has a "pipeline" to Ozawa from their time together in the ragtag coalition that governed from 1993-1994, which might be used to undercut the DPJ's position.

I remain convinced, of course, that Prime Minister Abe, lacking the confidence of people and party, is doomed sooner or later, but it's not difficult to imagine that the combination of a new prime minister and an adroit Diet manager like Nikai could revive the LDP's fortunes enough to take the wind out of Ozawa's sails and prompt doubts to return about the DPJ's viability.

But none of that will be possible without a new prime minister. Every step Mr. Abe takes seems to be the wrong one, the latest being this belated announcement — noted by MTC — of the postponement of the start of the autumn extraordinary Diet session to September 10th, giving the prime minister time to travel to the APEC summit in Australia (to say his farewells?) and apparently to give new cabinet members time to prepare.

As Casey Stengel might say if he were still alive and, er, observing Japanese politics, "Can't anybody here play this game?"

Mori keeps talking; will Abe listen?

Former Prime Minister Mori took his campaign against Prime Minister Abe to the airwaves on Sunday, appearing on Japan's Sunday morning talk shows to talk about the coming cabinet reshuffle.

The most headline-worthy portion of his remarks, based on articles in the major dailies, seems to be his call for Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki to be replaced due to his inability to manage the Diet, but he also called for Fukuda and prominent Abe critic Tanigaki to be included in the cabinet.

We've already seen Mr. Abe reject Mr. Mori's direct request on election night that he resign. One has to wonder whether the prime minister will also reject the LDP bigwig's suggestions on the composition of his next cabinet. If so, is this another sign of the new balance of power between prime minister and party? Or is it the sole remaining way for Prime Minister Abe to assert his authority? Whatever the case may be, it seems significant that Mr. Mori has been forced to repeat his calls for the prime minister to choose a broadly inclusive cabinet in any and every forum available, with little apparent impact thus far.

If Mori is unable to make the deeply unpopular and increasingly powerless prime minister see reason, who exactly holds the power in the LDP at the present time?

The shape of the cabinet to come?

Over at Shisaku, MTC relays a Yomiuri story reporting that Foreign Minister Aso will be Nakagawa Hidenao's replacement as LDP secretary-general.

MTC correctly notes that the LDP secretariat is hardly the ideal position from which Aso can claim the premiership, indeed, it will likely burden him with the trying task of hammering together a unified LDP capable of competing in the next general election. This would no doubt make him more enemies within the party than he already has and seemingly forestall his plans to be the party's leader in the next general election. (Dissent within the party continues, with Nakatani Gen, another former JDA chief, calling for Abe's resignation.)

Meanwhile, the report about Aso squares with an article in the 9 August issue of Shukan Bunshun, which outlines the possible roster for a new Abe cabinet:

If one generalizes from the predictions of political journalists and LDP notables, everyone agrees that Aso will be secretary-general and Suga [Yoshihide, internal affairs minister] will be chief cabinet secretary. If one looks to future party presidential elections, Nikai Toshihiro as secretary-general is also possible.

"In order that the Abe-Shiozaki duo is not felt to be changing, why not have Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki sidestep into the post of minister of financial affairs or another economic porfolio? Mr. Aisawa Ichiro from the Tanigaki faction and Kamoshita Ichiro from the Tsushima faction will probably be nominated. The time is coming for Kishida Fumio of the Koga faction to enter the cabinet. There is also the view that in order for Secretary-General Nakagawa to return to his faction, faction chief Machimura will hand over the leadership and become the head of the Policy Affairs Research Council. With recommendations from factions tending to harden and bear fruit, for a surprise concurrent policy change, former Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda will also be appointed foreign minister." [Former LDP notable]

If Fukuda were in fact to be named foreign minister at the same time that Aso was relegated to perform the dirty work of LDP secretary-general, it could very well transform the race to succeed Abe, or, alternatively, could lead to speculation as to who will actually be in control of the Abe Cabinet.

As for the other mooted names, Aisawa Ichiro is an exact contemporary of the prime minister, a third-generation Lower House member from Okayama, and a foreign affairs expert who belongs to Diet members' leagues in support of cordial relations between Japan and China and Japan and South Korea. Kamoshita, a representative from Tokyo, was once a member of Ozawa's New Frontier Party before joining the LDP in 1997. Kishida, meanwhile, is forty-eight, has been reelected five times, and is currently the deputy head of the LDP's Diet Strategy Committee. With Suga, perhaps the one prominent member of Abe's cabinet not to face corruption charges or to be guilty of indiscreet speech, would likely provide a steady hand on the tiller. Together with the continuing presence of the popular Koike Yuriko as defense minister, this would be a cabinet designed not to achieve brilliant policy initiatives, but to stabilize the LDP's position and perhaps pave the way for a bloodless coup.

That said, an article in the latest issue of Shukan Bunshun suggests that struggle is underway for the chief cabinet secretary's post, with Suga challenged by supporters of Koike and Upper House member Matsuzoe Yoichi, with the latter, an open opponent of Abe's staying in office, selected in order to co-opt him and to signal a "new Abe." A similar logic could lead to the appointment of Ishiba to the defense ministry and even Fukuda's appointment as foreign minister.

Undoubtedly Mr. Abe recognizes that deferring to the factions diminishes his authority as head of government and party, hence his insistence upon ignoring factional nominations for ministerial posts. The factions have until 27 August to impress upon Mr. Abe the wisdom of their nominations, as Mr. Abe has determined that that will be the date he shuffles his cabinet. The composition of the new cabinet will say much about the new balance of power within the party and the prime minister's chances for survival beyond this year.

More signs of Abe's end

Mainichi has a long account of the meeting between (now former) LDP Secretary-General Nakagawa, Upper House head Aoki, and LDP boss former Prime Minister Mori on Sunday evening as the returns came in suggesting a major LDP defeat.

In case anyone still has any doubts, this article makes it clear that it is wholly unclear whose confidence Abe still enjoys. He is alone, but for his band of followers, and undoubtedly with each passing day, with each new poll that shows his cabinet's support rate dipping lower and records public opposition to his remaining in office, his position and with it his party's position grows ever more tenuous.

On that evening, Mori, Aoki, and Nakagawa had apparently discussed and agreed upon a caretaker Fukuda government, because Fukuda would "be calming, and ensure a sense of stability." "But," the article continues, "Fukuda is 71. Mori, who values Fukuda, persistently argued that this is a 'provisional emergency plan.'" However, Nakagawa, representing the trio, met with the prime minister, who completely rejected the plan, and informed Mori directly that he will not go. The article suggests that Abe's decision has killed the Fukuda caretaker government plan, but I'm not entirely sure whether that plan is dead or simply on hold until the "opposition forces" (to borrow a phrase from the Koizumi era and put it to entirely different use) can gather strength and force the prime minister to face the reality of his situation.

So again, what mandate does the Abe government enjoy at present? By whose leave is Abe still ensconced in the Kantei? Will the only way to get him out be a full-scale reenactment of the 1960 ampo demonstrations that Mr. Abe remembers so fondly? None of this should be all that surprising. Perhaps the most significant lesson I learned from reading his book is that Abe is driven by a sense of mission; while vague and ill-defined to the rest of the world, it is apparently clear to him inside his head, and nothing or nobody is going to interfere with his mission. Maybe Japan should think twice about the presidentialization of the premiership, if it is only going to result in a Kantei completely unaccountable to the rest of the government and the rest of a country as a whole.

Doing the Abe shuffle

Prime Minister Abe has reportedly committed to executing a cabinet and party leadership reshuffle by the end of August, following his summer travels to India, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

This despite pressure from within the party to act quickly, with former Prime Minister Mori suggesting that waiting too long for a reshuffle would be a "body blow" to the Abe cabinet. (If waiting too long to reshuffle would be a body blow, what exactly does one call the impact of completely ignoring the results of a historic election defeat?)

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Abe has insisted that he intends to once again reject cabinet personnel decisions based on factional recommendations, despite having been told by party elders that his next cabinet ought to be more representative, including members of all factions. Instead it seems he continue to rely on those he feels he can trust, like Mr. Aso for example. The decline of the LDP's factions and the emergence of Kantei-centered policy making, while having been exaggerated somewhat, has been hailed as a largely beneficial shift in Japanese governance, supposedly signaling the rise of government according to national rather than sectional interests. There is much to be said for this argument. But, at the same time, the Abe Cabinet has been instructive in the vices of Kantei government and the neglected virtues of Habatsu government.

While not accountable to the people in any sort of liberal-democratic sense, the power of the factions within the LDP ensured that the prime minister was responsible to somebody, that even if the prime minister was incapable of seeing the errors of his ways there were plenty of people within the party waiting to interject, criticizing the premier (constructively or otherwise) in the hope of changing the government's course of action. There was feedback, in other words. In the week since the election, however, we have learned the extent to which not only is Mr. Abe not accountable to anybody, he's also not getting serious feedback from anyone either. Like his buddy George, Mr. Abe seems to be in an echo chamber of his own making.

I'm certainly not hankering for the golden age of the factions, but at the same time, in the short term a greater role for the factions would minimize the destructiveness of Abe's obliviousness, ensuring that the government pays some attention to the needs of the Japanese people, and easing the transition to the post-Abe era. Because the post-Abe era is coming, sooner or later. The signs continue to mount. In this week's Shukan Bunshun Matsuzoe Yoichi, the top vote-getter on the LDP's PR list last week, criticizes Abe for his response to the election. He writes: "Mr. Abe, it must be remembered, was selected as president by LDP party members, but that does not necessarily mean he was selected by the people. The two-thirds majority of seats in the House of Representatives were taken by former Prime Minister Koizumi, not Mr. Abe. Therefore, it is essential that he takes the people's judgment humbly and listens carefully." He then suggests that he thinks that the responsibility is Mr. Abe's, and that he should resign. (Mr. Matsuzoe's article follows an article by Mr. Ishiba in which he reiterates his thinking on why the prime minister should go.)

Of course, even if Mr. Abe goes, and soon, the LDP is in trouble, due to the legacy of decades of corrupt practices and unresponsive government that have been brought to the forefront of public attention by the resignation and suicide of four members of Mr. Abe's cabinet. Is there anyone among the older generation of LDP leaders who has clean hands? As Tahara Soichiro, a journalist, notes in an article in Liberal Time:

Office expenses are a convenient wallet that can only be used by politicians. It is only office expenses because it is not necessary to attach receipts. Therefore, for not a few LDP politicians, a very convenient way of using bad money is designating it under the pretense of office expenses. The four ministers, while facing the doubts and anger of the people, were resolute in rejecting the airing of their receipts, for the reason that if their receipts for office expenses were made public, it would cause a troublesome situation for the whole LDP...

When supporters and voters come from the home district, the member must treat them to a meal. However, if we look beneath the surface, this amounts to a violation of the Public Office Election Law. It is for this reason that office expenses are appropriated. It is an exceedingly simple structure...

For voters, once, 'roads are built, bridges are built, community centers are built' — large projects were undertaken. However, now, under policies advocating fiscal reform, large public works could not be undertaken. The remnant of such politics is meal expenses."

So the question I asked regarding Mr. Akagi's appointment is relevant for every cabinet position. Is there a cabinet-capable LDP politician without inappropriate conduct buried in his closet?

Even with a new cabinet, therefore, Abe will not escape from harm's way. He will still find himself dogged by scandals, forced to explain and apologize for his ministers' activities, and unable to earn the confidence of the people.

No surprises here

Akagi Norihiko, the late Matsuoka Toshikatsu's successor as minister of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, has resigned after two scandal-tainted months in the cabinet.

His resignation in and of itself is not newsworthy. It is inconceivable that he would remain in the cabinet given that he has spent his entire tenure fending off corruption charges and in general not answering questions, whether about financial improprieties or the bandages on his face.

What is interesting, however, is the response within the LDP to his departure. An article in Asahi on Akagi's resignation suggests that more than half the party's members think it "natural" that he resign. Apparently they think his scandals are a major reason explaining why the LDP lost big in the Upper House elections.

Now, there is no question that Akagi's follies were part of the story of the election, but would the LDP have somehow done better had he resigned earlier? I strongly doubt it. His improprieties were symptoms of widespread malfeasance in the LDP, but one need not look far for other, more egregious examples (this was my initial reaction to Akagi's appointment, in fact). Moreover, I suspect that as far as corruption is concerned, public distrust of politicians and bureaucrats is deep and goes back years, even decades; more recent examples serve merely to keep the fire of public disgust burning strongly.

I suspect that whoever the government finds to replace Akagi, he will likely have the same fiscal improprieties tucked away in his closet, especially if he is an "agricultural expert."

Who misses Koizumi more, the Japanese people or the foreign press?

This week's Economist and today's FT both carry articles discussing the shadow cast by former Prime Minister Koizumi over the Upper House elections — and over his hapless and, according to Mr. Koizumi, kawaiso successor.

I have no doubt that there are segments of public opinion and sections of the LDP that would be glad to see Mr. Koizumi sweep back into the spotlight and the premiership, the greatest comeback since Michael Jordan decided that baseball really wasn't his thing after all. But these articles suggest another part of the story: foreign correspondents responsible for Japan are longing for the bygone Koizumi days, when the prime minister was always good for a quirky story for the readers back home.

David Pilling's article in the FT shows "Samurai" Koizumi on the campaign trail in Saitama, and documents how he wows the crowd, making Prime Minister Abe an object of pity, not of scorn. Pilling, of course, is sure to note the problem with leaning on Mr. Koizumi too much: "While helping to rally the LDP faithful, they also remind voters of the differences between his charismatic term and that of the less experienced Mr Abe, who has struggled to win over the Japanese public." It is not for nothing that Mr. Abe turned down earlier offers of support from Mr. Koizumi; the Abe camp is all-too-aware of the differences between their man and the beloved Mr. Koizumi. Of course, now, with his government's back firmly to the wall, Mr. Abe will hold nothing in reserve and so Mr. Koizumi is on the trail, cracking jokes.

The Economist goes a step further and asks the question of whether Mr. Koizumi or Mr. Abe is the exception as far as twenty-first century Japanese prime ministers go. I have weighed in on this matter before (also here and here) — I think Mr. Abe signifies a reversion to pre-Koizumi LDP governance. The Economist seems to fall on the other side of the divide, largely on the basis of the persistence of a Koizumi "anti-factions, non-faction" faction in the LDP, a study group of some thirty Koizumi followers who are "market-oriented and internationalist" and who will not, according to Inoguchi Kuniko, leave the LDP and can in fact draw DPJ members into the LDP fold.

I think The Economist overstates the significance of this Koizumi coterie. These Koizumians are a tribute to the power of his reformist ideas, for certain, but the very existence of the group does not automatically suggest that they carry weight within the party. Indeed, the strength of the Koizumi "faction" will be tested this month as the Upper House members elected by way of Mr. Koizumi's coattails in 2001 face their first post-Koizumi challenge while being led into the fray by a prime minister who has actively distanced himself from their champion. And in the aftermath of the election, the LDP's ability to entice members of the DPJ to defect may be tested if the governing coalition has to struggle to cobble together a working majority in the Upper House.

Whatever the future of the LDP, it does not seem to be going in the direction desired by Mr. Koizumi. Having fended off Mr. Koizumi and his calls to destroy the LDP, the party's barons are not about to go down that road again — which could very well hasten the party's demise, particularly as the political system shifts to reflect the ongoing urbanization of Japan.

Keys to victory

With less than two weeks to election day, the campaign is beginning to take shape. Allow me to play John Madden (substitute a TV sports analyst of your choice) for a moment and give you what I think are the LDP's and the DPJ's Keys to Victory.

Insert flashy opening montage + brassy theme music here.

For the LDP, the key seems to be if not changing the subject, at least spinning it in such a way that allows the LDP cast the pensions issue in such a light so that it reflects not on the LDP per se, but on the "postwar regime" as a whole, giving credence to Abe's "getting rid of the postwar regime" message. And so voters will hear speeches like this one by Nikai Toshihiro, chairman of the LDP's Diet Strategy Committee, described in an article in Asahi (not online).

"People who say they are worried about the pensions problem, please raise your hands." On the evening of the 15th, Nikai Toshihiro, the LDP's Diet strategy committee chairman, spoke before a crowd of 400 people at an official candidate's assembly in Osaka. Seeing no one raise a hand, Nikai continued. "No one, it seems. This is the reality. The 'head wind' is nothing to fear. An airplane flies straight into a head wind." (Note: head wind is the ubiquitous term being used by the media to described the conditions facing the LDP in advance of the election.)

「年金問題で心配だ、と言う人は手を挙げてくれませんか」。１５日夜、自民党
の二階俊博国対委員長は、大阪市内であった党公認候補の決起集会で４００人を前にこう訪ねた。誰も手を挙げないのを見て、二階氏は続けた。「いないでしょ。これが現実なんです。逆風は何も怖いことはありません。飛行機は逆風を突いて飛ぶんです」。

A chart published in the same article shows a gradual softening of public concern on the pensions and "politics and money" issues. The question for the LDP is whether public concerns are softening fast enough. With less than two weeks to the election (instead of one), the Abe Cabinet's delaying tactics may yet reap dividends. With each day that passes, with each campaign speech by LDP candidates and senior officials explaining to voters why the current problems are anything but the government's fault, public opposition is likely to soften further in the next two weeks. It will probably not translate into higher support for the government — but the government does not need to be loved, it just needs to not be hated with such a passion that people march to the polls on the 29th to send a message to the government. The government will probably be helped further by Mr. Abe's leaving the hustings in Kyushu to rush back to Tokyo upon receiving news of the earthquake in Niigata.

Indeed, if Asahi's latest poll is to be believed, getting Abe away from candidates might be the best thing that the LDP can do, with forty-five percent of respondents noting that their opinions of Abe have worsened following his handling of the ongoing Akagi affair.

Meanwhile in the face of the LDP's efforts to soften public outrage, the key for the DPJ is turnout, turnout, turnout — which means playing upon (and perhaps playing up) the fears and insecurities of voters. Having handled a succession of DPJ fliers and the party's manifesto, I can attest to the party's message as being little more than a drumbeat of worrying news about taxes and pensions. The latest looks like pensions passbook, with details inside about who is at risk from having their pensions vanish. In other words, for the headwind to persist, the DPJ needs to continue to huff and puff. (Don't take this analysis as criticism of the DPJ — there are problems, and the government should be held accountable. I'm just talking about campaign strategy.)

From where I stand, it seems that without more bad news, another two weeks of repeating the facts may eventually lose its efficacy as a way of raising turnout. Of course, the Abe Cabinet may yet oblige the DPJ with yet another scandal that helps the opposition make its point. But barring that, another thirteen days of mollifying words — delivered by LDP candidates themselves, many of whom have been elected two or more times and thus can somewhat distance themselves from the Abe Cabinet, if not the LDP — may be enough to undermine the DPJ's efforts and snatch a victory (or an outcome that can be spun as a victory) from the jaws of defeat.

As I made clear in my discussion of the campaigns in the twenty-nine single-member districts, victory for the DPJ is far from certain — and there is a floor to how low the LDP can go.

Komori rages at Asahi

Don't you hate when journalists — especially those who make no secret of where they stand — criticize other journalists and media outlets for their biases?

And yet Komori Yoshihisa has thrown down the gauntlet, charging the Asahi Shimbun with waging a political campaign against Mr. Abe and his cabinet. He hurls a litany of charges at Asahi: it is trying to present the Upper House election as a "de facto vote of confidence," when it is no such thing; it has completely ignored the Abe cabinet's efforts on constitution revision and bureaucratic reform, and Mr. Abe's diplomatic initiatives to reinvigorate Japan's foreign relationships; it has continued to focus on sensational reporting and criticism on such matters as Matsuoka's suicide, the Kyuma indiscretion, and recent revelations about MAFF Minister Akagi's alleged political funding violations; it has played up the Abe cabinet's responsibility for the pensions scandal and growing inequality; and for not properly proclaiming in headlines each uptick in the cabinet's popularity in opinion polls.

In other words, as he repeats throughout this post, Asahi is producing "propaganda" because it wants to see Abe fall.

It seems Komori has been in Washington too long, and listening to American conservatives complain about media bias — in other words, mastering the art of smearing your rivals without actually addressing their criticism.

Does Asahi want Abe gone? Yes, and its editorials have repeatedly made this clear. But then, Japanese newspapers follow the British model more than the American model. No one can mistake the Guardian for the Daily Telegraph. As a commentator at Komori's blog notes, the opposite of Asahi is Yomiuri, which is slow to criticize the government and which praises the Abe cabinet's "achievements," however small and insignificant. Would Komori prefer that Asahi follow the same line as Yomiuri? Why even bother with competing newspapers, then, if they are only competing in how much they can praise the government?

I wonder if Komori's rant is a sign of the right's vulnerability in advance of the election. Facing a potentially disastrous defeat the the polls, they may already be looking around for those to blame (anyone but the prime minister, of course). The ferociousness of Komori's attack on Asahi for suggesting that a major defeat in the weaker Upper House would be a vote of no-confidence in the government foreshadows, I think, the likely response from Abe and his followers in the event that the governing coalition loses its majority.

"The Upper House is not that important," they will undoubtedly say. "Anyway, the media was focused on distracting, sensational issues, and not our plans for the country."

The thought that Abe will relinquish power easily when his government rests on a two-thirds majority, which enables the Lower House to govern without the Upper House if necessary (see Article 59), is wishful thinking. Look for others like Komori to begin making the case for Abe staying in office regardless of this month's returns.