The birth of the post-1996 alliance

Prime Minister Aso Taro has arrived in Washington in advance of his meeting with President Barack Obama Tuesday.

Despite Obama's welcoming Aso as the first foreign leader to meet with him in Washington, and despite Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit to Tokyo last week, the Japanese establishment continues to fret about the new administration's approach to Japan. Sankei, for example, notes the "exceptionally warm welcome" being bestowed on Aso by Obama — especially considering that the president is due to give a State of the Union address Tuesday evening — but wonders whether the Obama administration is as committed to Japan as appearances would suggest.

I have been somewhat irritated with the lengths to which the Obama administration has gone to demonstrate its commitment to the alliance (I still think this visit to Washington by Aso is a mistake). But looking at the agenda for the meeting between Obama and Aso, it appears that the new administration is preparing to embark on a new course for the alliance even as it preserves the old forms of alliance reassurance.

Obama is preparing to make winning in Afghanistan a top priority for his administration, making the war in Afghanistan, in Stephen Walt's words, "Obama's war."

The expectation is that Japan will be a part of that effort. But unlike the previous administration, the Obama administration looks unwilling to praise Japan for marginal, symbolic contributions to the effort. While respecting Japan's constraints on the use of force abroad, the adminstration appears ready to take Japan at its word. Japanese leaders talk of the need to contribute abroad even as they are reluctant to commit the Self-Defense Forces? Fine, then make a meaningful civilian contribution, the new administration has signaled. As Walt wrote in regard to NATO in Afghanistan, "Is Obama able to persuade our NATO allies to increase their own efforts there, or will they mostly free-ride on Uncle Sam? (And watch out for token deployments intended to signal that the rest of NATO is with us on this one, but that have no real effect on the ground)." The same applies to Japan, with a substantial civilian reconstruction contribution in place of military efforts.

The new administration will surely be watching, and it will surely not accept political instability at home as an excuse.

But beyond the Afghanistan question, reports suggest that the Obama-Aso meeting will address more than the usual bundle of security questions: the security relationship will be on the agenda, but it will share pride of place with the global economic crisis and climate change (although Yomiuri reports that Aso plans to keep the abductees on the agenda and will give the president a blue ribbon, the symbol of the abductee rescue movement). The Japanese government will get a closer look at a president who wants to solve global problems, and will not be content with symbolic and rhetorical nods in the direction of these problems. As MTC suggests, Aso could be in for a rude surprise Tuesday. This administration will most likely not share the Bush administration's seemingly endless patience with Japan, patience that faltered in the final years of the administration as it struggled to implement the 2006 realignment agreement and keep Japan committed to the six-party talks.

The Obama administration has work to do, and it will cooperate with any government in the region ready to come along. This is the message that came out of Clinton's Asia trip, especially her final stop in China.

I hope that the DPJ is paying attention. In the Obama administration the DPJ has a potential partner in building a new, more equal partnership, if not the perfectly equal partnership desired by Ozawa Ichiro. (It is arguable whether it is possible for any US ally to enjoy a perfectly equal partnership with the US given the inevitable gap in capabilities.)

Some in the party clearly understand the possibilities should the DPJ form a government this year. Okada Katsuya, once and possibly future DPJ leader, spoke at a Mainichi forum on Monday at which he stated, "[The US-Japan alliance] should be a framework to deal with global warming and poverty; it is wholly unnecessary to limit it to military affairs." That's not to say that he fails to appreciate the military importance of the alliance — in the same speech he acknowledged the importance of US bases in Japan not just for the defense of Japan, but for activities in the broader Asia-Pacific region — but like the Obama administration, Okada seems prepared to take the alliance in a different direction, acknowledging that with Japan's constraints unlikely to be lowered anytime soon, it is a waste of the alliance to continue to insist on more security cooperation.

The question is whether enough DPJ members, not least Ozawa, share Okada's assessment.

Hatoyama Yukio, DPJ secretary-general, also delivered a speech Monday, in English, to a meeting of foreign businesspeople, in which he said that a DPJ government would shift from "foreign policy subservient to the United States to an emphasis on international cooperation." Japan, he said, would speak frankly to the US in the event of foolhardy military activities if the DPJ gets the opportunity to form a government. This kind of comment may look anti-American — and is certainly red meat for a skeptical public — but it does not appear inconsistent with the Obama administration's approach. It matters less under what auspices Japan's global contributions occur than that they occur. Similarly, I do not think the Obama administration would find much to reject in Ozawa's statement Monday that foreign policy under his watch would stress the Sino-Japanese relationship, a development that would clearly help the US work more closely with China and serve to stabilize the region further.

I remain convinced that reports of the DPJ's "anti-Americanism" are overblown, that the DPJ is anti-alliance only if one takes the alliance to have one ideal form, that articulated under the Bush administration in cooperation with Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe.

Hence the title of this post. The Obama administration is clearly interested in making something of the alliance, but it appears disinclined to continue down the path of the security-above-all-else alliance that emerged out of the 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto joint security declaration and was pushed hard by the Bush administration. Why should it, when to do so means continuing to slam into the wall of Japan's reluctance to untie its hands on security policy?

The DPJ, at least rhetorically, may be a more suitable partner for the Obama administration, but ultimately it will make little difference who is prime minister and what party is in power. Japan's constraints are here to stay, at least for the time being, and the Obama administration is prepared to get more out of the alliance even while respecting Japan's limitations. Japan has a US president willing to respect Japan's limitations and perhaps even listen to the Japanese people; I hope Japan's leaders recognize that and act accordingly.

Don't expect Japanese troops in Afghanistan

With five or six weeks until the start of the autumn extraordinary session of the Diet, one of Fukuda Yasuo's responsibilities during the recess is determining his government's approach to the Japanese contributions to operations in and around Afghanistan. The enabling law for the current Maritime Self-Defense Forces refueling mission will expire in January, meaning that if the government wants to extend the mission it will have to do it during the upcoming session.

As noted last month, the government was investigating whether to ramp up Japan's commitment to Afghanistan to include the deployment of Ground Self-Defense Forces personnel to Afghanistan.

Komeito, the LDP's partner in government, may have killed the idea of a ground component. Ota Akihiro, Komeito secretary-general, said Saturday that there are few within the government and the LDP — and, by implication, the bulk of his party — who are enthusiastic about sending ground troops to Afghanistan. Komeito's opposition is probably enough to ensure that the government will do nothing more than push for an extension of the refueling mission, which the DPJ will oppose, prompting the government to use Article 59 to pass the bill for the second straight year. Recall that the LDP has previously conceded to Komeito on this issue: the very fact that the government has to renew the mission again this year is the result of a concession to Komeito last year, shortly after Mr. Fukuda took the reins.

Given that Komeito's thirty-one lower house members give the government its two-thirds majority, it's safe to assume that the lowest common denominator will win the day on this issue, meaning a repeat of last year's spectacle.

Japanese boots, Afghan ground?

In the Fukuda government's continuing quest to determine its strategy in regard to the time-limited MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, Machimura Nobutaka, chief cabinet secretary, floated a new idea over the weekend: expanding the Japanese contribution in Afghanistan to include JSDF personnel on the ground. The prime minister addressed Mr. Machimura's remarks the following day, suggesting that it's a possibility, but will ultimately depend on the facts on the ground.

This is not a new idea. Recall that in the midst of the debate last autumn, Ozawa Ichiro floated this idea (only to have it promptly dismissed by his own party and characterized as dangerously reckless by the government).

Not quite so reckless eight months later?

It seems that the government thinks that this might be a way to tempt the DPJ into supporting an extension of Japanese involvement in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Not surprisingly, the DPJ was circumspect in its reply. Hatoyama Yukio said, "We cannot approve immediately. We must think prudently." In other words, we'll wait and see what the public opinion polls tell us (Ed. — Or whether this coincides with Ozawa Ichiro's co-existence doctrine?) before making a decision.

I recognize that on foreign policy there's little for the DPJ to gain in taking an assertive stance that might make the life easier for the government. But given the public's relative indifference to foreign policy, there's also little to lose. I recognize that the DPJ is engaged in a desperate struggle to paper over internal differences. But sooner or later it would be nice if the DPJ were to take a decisive stance on foreign policy. If it wants to oppose Japanese involvement in Afghanistan, fine. If it wants to support it on humanitarian grounds, fine. If it wants to use it as an opportunity for Japan to cooperate with countries other than the US, fine. But regardless of the position, make a case for it.

This is probably too much to ask of the DPJ. And so it is unlikely that the government will push for an expanded Afghanistan mission that includes both ground and maritime elements.

The DPJ will submit its own bill after all

In the latest twist in the saga over Japan's involvement in operations in and around Afghanistan, the DPJ has decided that it will submit its own bill today.

Asahi notes that the DPJ move is in response to recent public opinion polls that show rising opposition to the MSDF's resuming its refueling mission.

Hatoyama Yukio explained that the party's decision was rooted in a desire to explain the party's thinking directly to the people.

It's not clear to me what changed to inspire this about-face. If anything, there's less need for the DPJ to take on a position of its own now that the LDP has destroyed the plurality of support it once enjoyed on this issue.

The DPJ's position remains unchanged from the start of this Diet session. The DPJ bill will call for humanitarian contributions in Afghanistan, without armed participation in ISAF. Of course, the more substantial the Japanese contribution on the ground, the greater the need for allied forces to ensure the safety of Japanese personnel. With concerns being raised from all corners about the inadequacies of current allied forces in Afghanistan — the latest being the Rudd government — I don't expect that the allied countries will be pleased to have to divert forces away from fighting the insurgency to defend an unarmed Japanese detachment.

Additionally, taking this approach, the DPJ may give the LDP an opportunity to regroup, enabling the government to remind the Japanese people that the refueling mission provides a low-risk way for Japan to meet its supposed international obligations and argue that although the DPJ plan is "non-military," it places a burden on other countries and puts Japanese personnel in harm's way.

I remain baffled by Mr. Ozawa's thinking. I agree that the DPJ owes it to the Japanese people to explain their thinking and provide alternatives to the government's plans, but having decided not to do so on this issue — and having paid no cost as far as I can see — I don't understand why the DPJ would change at the last minute and submit its own bill.

Political Japan's never-ending year goes on

After this past week's drama, the LDP and the DPJ are now returning to business. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is in town for his first visit since taking office, with a packed agenda of issues of concern; Nagata-cho is abuzz with rumors about an early election to be called by the LDP to catch the DPJ off balance. Indeed, Hatoyama Yukio suggested that with the DPJ in tough straits, the government may opt to "ask the people for their trust" and call a general election. "It is thought to be entirely possible for a dissolution by the end of the year and a general election in January." (Is the DPJ trying to make Mr. Fukuda and the LDP overconfident so that they might opt for a general election and quite likely throw away the supermajority?)

In any case, it looks like there will be another month of the sparring and rumormongering, as the Fukuda government has announced plans to extend the extraordinary — and extraordinary — session of the Diet another thirty-five days to enable his government to pass a new law authorizing the MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. The government hopes to have the bill pass the Lower House by early next week at the latest, which will then dare the DPJ to reject it in the Upper House.

The never-ending Diet session, which began, you'll recall, nearly two months ago with then-Prime Minister Abe's giving an oddly belligerent maiden speech before resigning two days later, forcing the Diet to wait while the LDP selected a new leader. Since then we've had sniping across the Pacific, the justice minister's suggesting that he's two degrees of separation from a member of Al Qaeda, the withdrawal of MSDF ships from the Indian Ocean, and the bizarre saga of Ozawa Ichiro's resignation that wasn't.

All of this, of course, is on top of events earlier in the year: the decline and fall of Mr. Abe, the demise of Matsuoka Toshikatsu, the as-of-yet unresolved pensions scandal, the LDP's historic defeat in July, and who knows how many other episodes of note that I've already forgotten.

And for all that, here we are, with momentum in the LDP's favor as it renews its push for a new law in support of coalition operations in Afghanistan.

In spite of (or maybe because of?) the grand coalition debacle, the LDP is redoubling its efforts to secure some manner of coordination with the DPJ. According to a Sankei headline, in fact, the government and the LDP are making "amorous glances" to the DPJ in pursuit of policy cooperation. The DPJ, facing the prospect of the government's anti-terror bill hitting the Upper House soon, has agreed on the basic outline of its counter proposal and will have it ready for presentation next week. The DPJ apparently intends to include a proposal for sea lane defense, as well as civilian support for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Whether the parties will cooperate on this issue remains to be seen, but as Jun Okumura rightly points out, there are other, less controversial areas where the two parties can easily cooperate. It's just a question of whether the DPJ can stifle its self-destructive, confrontational urges and shake hands with Mr. Fukuda.

The end of the beginning

I'm not entirely clear to me why the cabinet decision to submit a new bill on the MSDF refueling mission deserves this kind of treatment from the BBC, considering that the government announced days ago that it would make its final decision on October 17th — and that there was no doubt that the government would decide to submit its bill to the Diet.

This is nothing more than the end of the beginning, a decision that introduces a new, parliamentary front in the battle over the MSDF mission. The new law limits refueling to ships explicitly involved in maritime interdiction operations and eliminates provisions about parliamentary approval, which will undoubtedly be subject to intense debate in the Diet.

It is still unclear exactly how this drama will play out, and what role the DPJ counteroffer of civilian contributions to Afghanistan's reconstruction — Mr. Ozawa agreed to the compromise position earlier this week — will play in the final outcome, but the debate is moving forward. My money remains on the government's getting its way, extending the Diet session to the end of the year and passing the bill over an Upper House veto. Mr. Fukuda will undoubtedly make all manner of conciliatory gesture to the DPJ, in part as a way to coax the public to support the government's doing whatever necessary to pass the bill.

But I could be wrong, because it's still unclear precisely how a divided Diet will function and how the public will react to the parties' efforts to cope with it, meaning the cabinet's deciding to support the continuation of the refueling mission does not have the air of finality that it might have had four months ago.

Will a reprimand placate the DPJ?

Yamaoka Kenji and Ooshima Tadamori, the DPJ and LDP Diet strategy chairman respectively, met on Tuesday to discuss Nakatani Gen's absurd smear of opponents of the refueling mission as "terrorists."

Mr. Yamaoka reportedly demanded that Mr. Nakatani be removed from his post as director of the House of Representatives special anti-terrorism committee.

Mr. Ooshima's response was, I imagine, probably unsatisfactory. He reminded Mr. Nakatani of the need to cooperate with the DPJ, and so he should "mind his words and actions." In the Upper House Budget Committee, Prime Minister Fukuda reinforced, for good measure, his government's flexibility when it comes to cooperation with the DPJ, especially when it comes to Japan's activities in and around Afghanistan. "A constructive way of debating is important," he said.

I suspect that a mild warning to Mr. Nakatani will not be enough to satisfy the DPJ, and it may be any day now before, say, Mr. Ozawa says something incendiary in response.

Thrust and parry on Afghanistan

Prime Minister Fukuda and members of his cabinet were grilled in Upper House Budget Committee deliberations on Monday, and continued their defense of Japan's participation in coalition activities in the Indian Ocean on grounds of Japan's obligations to the international community as the second largest economic power.

The sparring in the Upper House this week comes in the midst of results of a new opinion poll by Asahi, which show a small gain in support for the refueling mission since last month's poll, with support rising from 35% to 39%, with 44% opposed. For an Asahi poll, that seems to be a decidedly close margin. At the same time, however, the poll recorded marked opposition to a new law authorizing the mission, with 28% in favor and 48% opposed to a new law.

The poll also contains some good news for Mr. Fukuda's hopes for a long tenure. While it recorded a slight drop in support for his cabinet from 53% to 47% and a slight rise in its unfavorable rating from 27% to 30%, the poll also recorded a sharp drop (50 to 32%) in respondents who think that a snap election should be called quickly, and a similarly sharp rise (43 to 60%) who think that it's not necessary to call a general election soon. The poll also recorded a nine-point drop (41 to 32%) in support for a DPJ-centered coalition government, with support for an LDP-centered coalition holding steady at 33%.

Meanwhile, in advance of the scheduled October 17th cabinet decision, the government has agreed that the new law will apply for but one year, a concession by the LDP to Komeito — whose rank-and-file membership is as or more dissatisfied than ever with the now eight-year-old coalition with the LDP. I would expect more concessions to Komeito on legislation in the months to come. What choice does the LDP have? Nothing the LDP can do will probably make the Komeito rank-and-file happy, but the LDP at least needs to give the Komeito leadership something that can be presented to the rank-and-file as a positive outcome of the coalition.

But while the government continues the work of restoring the damage inflicted by Mr. Abe, the DPJ is lurching forward, seemingly making up strategy as it goes along. The DPJ leadership has reportedly decided to submit its own version of a law authorizing Japanese contributions in and around Afghanistan — but the content of said bill remains to be decided. Mr. Ozawa, of course, wants the bill to mandate a JSDF contribution to ISAF, but the compromise position seems to be civilian participation in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT).

It's unclear to me why Japan can't do both — and that might be what happens, particularly if the DPJ bill only mandates a civilian contribution to Afghanistan reconstruction. Of course, LDP approval of the DPJ plan won't be enough to buy DPJ acquiescence on the refueling mission.

I still find it difficult to see how the DPJ can "win." Winning in this case means making passage of the bill over an Upper House veto politically untenable for the government, but it is not clear to me how the DPJ can reverse the trend in the government's favor on this issue. In Budget Committee deliberations, the DPJ seems to have been unable to score a direct hit on Mr. Fukuda, who if he keeps this up may earn a reputation as a "teflon" prime minister. The muddled DPJ response certainly can't help, particularly compared to the government's straightforward, low-risk plan that simply calls for continuing what the MSDF has been doing for six years. Easy to understand, and unambiguous, as long as the government can continue to bat away allegations about Japanese fuel being used for the US war in Iraq.

UPDATE — It looks like Jun Okumura and I have similar takes on the situation.

Locking horns in the Budget Committee

On Tuesday the Budget Committee of the Lower House of the Diet convened; the Budget Committee, of course, is the main stage for clashes between government and opposition, and will provide Mr. Fukuda with plenty of time to elaborate on his policy plans, if he indeed has any.

While there are a host of economic issues that will be discussed — there will no doubt be some spirited exchanges on the pensions issue — the debate over a new bill authorizing the MSDF mission in the Indian will indubitably overshadow everything else. The debate has been transformed somewhat with Mr. Ozawa's declaration last week that he has no problem with Japan's sending ground troops as part of ISAF even as he maintains that the refueling mission is unconstitutional. Mainichi asks what Mr. Ozawa's motive is for purposing this new step, but, as I argued last week, the new proposal should by no means be considered inconsistent with Mr. Ozawa's history. In fact, it probably marks a return to the Ozawa that earned the plaudits of Americans for his advocacy of a "normal" Japan. The government has fiercely dismissed Mr. Ozawa's proposal — Defense Minister Ishiba went so far as to describe Mr. Ozawa as "being callous about the lives of SDF members," which seems a bit rich coming from the self-described "defense otaku."

Indeed, as Mainichi wrote regarding Mr. Ishiba's rebuttal and Kan Naoto's defense of Mr. Ozawa, "We now have the 'topsy-turvy' [the article uses nejire, literally 'twisted,' but I think topsy-turvy gets closer to the idea] spectacle of Mr. Ishiba's advancing traditional 'defend the constitution' arguments and Mr. Kan's advancing arguments in favor of the proactive dispatch of troops abroad."

The government is not likely to cave on its plan for sticking to refueling at sea. In the Diet today, Mr. Fukuda reiterated that the MSDF mission is constitutional, and no doubt consciously contrasted the government's position with the DPJ's by saying, "This action does not entail the use of force prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution, and thus is not in violation of the Constitution." Indeed, Mr. Ozawa may have made it easier for the government to pass its new law, and the LDP will presumably push to contrast the government's "responsible" position with Mr. Ozawa's "reckless" position at every turn. Not surprisingly, former LDP secretary-general Nakagawa Hidenao called for a direct debate between Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Ozawa focused on this issue.

I have a hard time seeing how Mr. Ozawa will get his way on the issue. Indeed, he may have guaranteed that the government gets its way, with full public support, by suggesting an armed approach that is not only unlikely to receive the support of the Japanese people, but also likely to draw considerable opposition from within the DPJ. Even while being right — and I think he is, because contributing to ISAF is exactly what Japan should be doing if it's serious about normalizing its security policy — I can't see this gambit as serving any purpose other than signaling to observers that Mr. Ozawa and his party aren't the do-nothing pacifists that they have been painted as since coming out against the extension of the anti-terror law. Accordingly, within the DPJ the "realistic" option for an alternative bill is proposing civilian aid to PRTs, which means that Japanese personnel will still need to be defended by some other country's military.

That said, the government still has work to do on building support for its new bill, as much within the LDP as within the government at large. Mainichi suggests that some members of the LDP are concerned about the threat posed to civilian control by the new law's waiving of the requirement that both houses approve the dispatch. And one of the central questions I have about the Budget Committee hearings is whether the DPJ will be able to get some traction on the issue of Japanese fuel being used by US warships participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Foreign Minister Komura has stated once again — based on information received from the US — that no Japanese fuel was diverted, but I don't think this will end the discussion, nor should it. The DPJ will comb through whatever it can find, in the hope of getting a snowball effect in public opposition to the government, much like it achieved in the spring with revelations about lost pensions.

Japan keeps free riding

Today marks the first anniversary of North Korea's presumed subterranean nuclear test, which initially prompted criticism and sanctions from the international community but has since — in some way — led to renewed attention from the US and thus the latest progress towards denuclearized North Korea.

One year ago, of course, Japan was praised for its swift reaction to the test, imposing a broad spectrum of economic sanctions on its pariah neighbor.

And now? The Japanese government has renewed its sanctions, which prohibit the import of all North Korean goods and bans North Korean ships from Japanese ports, for another six months. The reason, according to Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura, is that there has been inadequate progress on the abductions issue (no surprise there).

Based on the Japanese government's actions, one could easily forget that four other countries have equal or greater stakes in resolving the situation on the Korean peninsula. And so Japan continues to free ride on the efforts and sacrifices of others, not least the US, its most important ally. The US — or more specifically Chris Hill, with the backing of Secretary Rice and the president — is pushing hard and is actually willing to deal with a regime that not too along was a charter member of the "Axis of Evil." Japan, the country with the most to fear from North Korea's arsenal, is also contributing the least to efforts to implement an agreement to neutralize it.

Looks like Mr. Fukuda will not be bucking the LDP's conservatives after all — not altogether surprising given his vulnerable position.

Meanwhile, I think the difference between Japan's approaches to the North Korea and Afghanistan issues is revealing. On the former, Japan is, of course, pursuing a hard line independent of the US; in addressing what its leaders (and many of its people) believe to be a multi-dimensional threat to national security, Japan is acting pretty much alone, with little or no consideration of its international reputation or the desires of its partners. In regard to the latter, the government claims to be acting out of deference both to the US but also to the international community, especially the countries participating in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. At the same time, however, the Japanese government supports doing the minimum necessary to earn the respect of other nations.

Accordingly, for all the talk of Japan's normalization, it turns out to be not only uneven across time — it has experienced lags and backsliding — but also across space: Japan is not prepared to risk anything substantial in an area in which its interests are not directly affected. This impression is reinforced when one considers that the implicit reasoning behind Japan's support for the Iraq war, for example, was that supporting the US would firm up US support for Japan vis-a-vis North Korea.

Of course, all this amounts to Japan's being a fairly typical middling power, concerned more about its fundamental security interests — which necessarily involve its periphery — than about abstract concerns for global order and stability. Japan's normalization will likely continue to be conditional, which is worth keeping in mind when reading more hysterical accounts of Japan's changing security policy.

Boots for ships?

The DPJ, JCP, SDP, and Kokumin Shinto collectively informed the government on Tuesday in a meeting of Kokutai chairs that they cannot cooperate with the government on the MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean, due to the lack of a provision mandating prior approval from the Diet. Indeed, at a press conference on Tuesday Mr. Ozawa made a point of questioning the constitutionality of the mission.

But Mr. Ozawa has also opened the door to a compromise with the government.

How? Well, it turns out that Mr. Ozawa wants not just civilian aid workers on the ground in Afghanistan, but GSDF troops contributing to ISAF efforts to maintain order in Afghanistan. He even suggested, according to Mainichi, that GSDF troops participating in ISAF might be able to use their weapons if necessary.

Although the article hinted darkly at "objections" within the DPJ, Mr. Ozawa's comments are still of interest. Is the government so hung up on having ships in the Indian Ocean that it won't even consider the idea of GSDF troops on the ground, a contribution that would probably be even more appreciated internationally than the refueling operation? If so, why? I wonder if this isn't a matter of wanting to commit in the least costly way while still pocketing appreciation from abroad for Japan's contributions. It's not like Japan's risking much at the moment. (For all we know, the MSDF sailors are having dance parties at sea.) Is it a kind of rigid legalism on the part of MOFA — the US wants ships, we deliver ships? Is it a fear of the casualties that could result from sending GSDF troops to Afghanistan could derail Japan's "normalization"?

Meanwhile, Mr. Ozawa's remarks should dispel the wild mischaracterizations of Mr. Ozawa that have been flung about over the past couple of months, mostly in the western press. (Try this recent one by Richard Halloran.) The guy's no anti-American pacifist — he's just struggling to keep together a party riven with disagreements on foreign policy. Accordingly, if a LDP-DPJ compromise with the government were to emerge on the grounds of a GSDF dispatch to Afghanistan, I would be curious about whether the DPJ caucus in the Upper House, which strikes me as having a more Socialist coloration, would follow along meekly or whether it would cause trouble for their party's Fearless Leader.

The LDP readies its bill

On the heels of Mr. Fukuda's maiden speech to the Diet, the government has outlined a new bill on the MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean and will begin working with relevant cabinet ministers and within the governing coalition to hammer out a final draft, before appealing to the DPJ to cooperate.

Perhaps, then, Jun Okumura is right: a perfunctory effort to get the DPJ to sign on, then a quick push through the House of Representatives by mid-October (Jun said October 16th), meaning that the sixty-day waiting period would end sometime in December. It seems that the government will be unable to avoid extending the Diet session into December.

The terms of the government's draft, accordingly to Asahi, are much more limited than the special measures law, stripping the mission down to its refueling core (instead of also being permitted to do searches and disaster relief). Acknowledging opposition criticism, the government will provide information on the mission at fixed intervals — and it will acknowledge the farcical UN resolution as a basis for action. The LDP wants the bill to last two years, but apparently Komeito would prefer only one.

But any differences within the coalition will presumably be ironed out. It seems that Mr. Fukuda may be able to achieve what Mr. Abe couldn't, with minimal turbulence. The DPJ will ask its questions and demand documents — it has already begun its parliamentary inquest — but it won't be able to do much more than delay the inevitable. Mr. Ozawa may still be able to spin it as a victory of some kind, saying that he stood up to both the government and the US and refused to cave, but it seems that it won't serve as the rallying cry that perhaps the DPJ leadership intended when it took this stance after the election.

In other words, in with a bang, out with a whimper.

A very typical scandal

In case anyone thinks that the DPJ will buy the dodge attempted by CCS Machimura on The Sunday Project — discussed by Jun Okumura in this post — this post by Nagashima Akihisa should disabuse you of that notion.

Mr. Machimura attempted to shift the blame to the US for reports that US warships used Japanese-provided fuel for activities related to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

As seems typical for Mr. Nagashima's blog posts, he is "dumbfounded" by Mr. Machimura's remarks, suggesting that in all likelihood the government knew exactly what was going on in the Indian Ocean.

This "scandal" has the makings of other Japanese scandals, with unanswered question following unanswered question (i.e., the question of whether Japan provided 200,000 or 800,000 tons of fuel), which of course justifies the position taken by Mr. Nagashima and other DPJ hawks that the problem isn't the mission, but the government's failure to provide adequate information about the MSDF's activities. This whole "Iraq or Afghanistan" question has probably destroyed whatever opportunity remained of the government's using the anti-terror bill to divide the DPJ, if such an opportunity even remained — apparently the government doesn't even have the information that the DPJ wants (and if it's playing dumb, well, that's even more inexcusable).

In the meantime, the DPJ continues to support a role on the ground in Afghanistan, doing "DDR": disarmament, demobilization, and reconstruction. Shadow Defense Minister Asao reiterated the DPJ's support for a government plan to put personnel — presumably civilians — on the ground in Afghanistan in support of DDR activities.

I have to disagree with Jun Okumura on point related to this, however. I see no way for this bill to pass this year. Depending on how quickly the Lower House acts on a new bill, we're still looking at a two-month waiting period before the Lower House can vote for the bill again, even longer if the Diet session isn't extended to last into December or the new year. I find it hard to believe that the DPJ won't use the full sixty days to embarrass the government, questioning witness after witness after witness about the mission.

The Fukuda cabinet might be able to raise the costs to the DPJ of opting for this strategy, but I think that will depend on the height of the ceiling for public support for this mission. The recent polls on this matter show that the support the government enjoys is soft — of the "can't be helped" variety rather than the "absolutely must do this" variety.

Thanks Japan!

The UN Security Council has passed its latest resolution authorizing the activities of the ISAF in Afghanistan, and, as I discussed yesterday, took care to thank Japan for its contribution to Operating Enduring Freedom.

There's very little of note regarding this resolution, except that for the first time it did not pass unanimously — Russia decided to abstain, arguing that OEF is beyond what the UN is capable of supporting.

Will this latest resolution make any difference in the debate in Japan? If the previous resolutions passed by the Security Council authorizing coalition activities in Afghanistan were not enough for Mr. Ozawa, I doubt that this latest measure, with its cloying attempt to coax Japan's continuing involvement, will make any difference.

But there you have it: the UN officially appreciates Japan's Indian Ocean gas station. (And if you think this is just me being unfairly dismissive, a certain prominent Tokyo University academic and public intellectual described it in just those terms when we spoke last year.)

The Afghanistan mission is doomed, for the time being

In the midst of the chaos at the top of the LDP and the government, Yamasaki Taku has announced that any new legislation to enable the MSDF to contribute to coalition operations in and around Afghanistan will be postponed to next year's regular Diet session. Mr. Abe's "international promise" is effectively dead.

This is interesting in light of a recent Mainichi poll that actually found that a majority of respondents favor continuation of the MSDF mission, by a margin of 49% to 42%. Not surprisingly, among the LDP supporters surveyed a whopping 83% supported the mission. I was surprised, however, to find that 39% of independents and 31% of DPJ supporters approve of extending the mission. While the 31% is dwarfed by the 62% opposed, I wonder what the figures would be in a survey of DPJ parliamentarians. Could Mr. Maehara actually get 31% of his fellow Dietmen (and women) to support what was his initial position on the MSDF mission?

In any case, the public is clearly not irrevocably hostile to the idea of the MSDF's contributions, which leads me to wonder whether putting the government in surer hands might lead to the majority support that Mr. Yamasaki said was necessary when he began deliberations on a new bill. In the meantime, I suspect this move will clear the way for LDP cooperation with the DPJ on a civilian reconstruction aid bill to ensure Japanese participation in some form until the Diet can deliberate on another JSDF enabling bill next year.

Why has the debate on the anti-terror special measures law problem not deepened?

That's the question asked by Amaki Naoto in a post that wonders why the DPJ has not responded to the arguments made by Kurt Campbell, Michael Green, and others about the nature of the mission in Afghanistan.

Amaki, of course, is convinced that it is all a US war, and thus the DPJ should make the reasons for its opposition more explicit. (He wonders whether the reason for the DPJ's timidity is an "absence of excellent men of talent" in the party.)

I disagree with Amaki's assessment of the Afghanistan campaign — apparently "the US war on terror is by no means connected to world peace and security" — but I think his overall question about the debate is an important one. It seems to be running in circles, with a DPJ member's saying something about the government failing to provide enough information about the MSDF's activities, and a US official's declaring the importance of Japan's contribution to the campaign (the LDP has been conspicuously absent, except, it seems, to reassure the US that it will do everything in its power to see the bill passed).

The latest contribution on the latter score is a speech by Ambassador Schieffer at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, in which, according to Chris Nelson, he acknowledged the DPJ's need to oppose the government, but wished it would find another way to do it. He also, of course, repeated the line that Japan's participation is "extremely important."

The Abe government, meanwhile, is gearing up its preparations on this issue for the Diet session set to open Monday, including the drafting of a new law to replace the existing law. The government acknowledges, however, that a second law is no more certain to pass than the existing law. Defense Minister Komura has suggested the government can be flexible about including provisions for civilian contributions to reconstruction and a requirement for prior consent from the Diet, but Mr. Ozawa remains adamant that any JSDF contribution be grounded in a UNSC resolution. (Can someone explain to me why the existing UNSC resolutions are inadequate? Does Mr. Ozawa want the UNSC to ask Japan explicitly to contribute?) In Sydney, Foreign Minister Machimura outlined what the likely chain of events will be: the law will lapse and the DPJ will declare victory, but debate on the new law will continue beyond the 2nd, resulting in its passage and the commencement of a new mission.

The government, commendably, remains extremely reluctant to act independently of the opposition in the Diet (undoubtedly for fear of public backlash).

But there are bigger questions involved in this discussion that have, as of yet, been unvoiced. What this debate ultimately should be about is the globalization of the US-Japan alliance that has occurred in the past six years. The mutual security treaty contains no provision that would provide for US-Japan cooperation in either Afghanistan or Iraq. But there has been a noticeable shift in Washington whereby there is now an expectation that Japan cooperate with the US throughout the world. I fear that this trend could undermine the ability of the alliance to serve its focus on situations in which "the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened," if only by tainting cooperation with the US as necessarily offensive. Given the drift that has set in in alliance cooperation, both governments should refocus their efforts on ensuring that the alliance will be prepared to act in response to crises in East Asia. On that count, the Afghanistan mission is, at best, a distraction.

In short, if Japan is to contribute to missions like the reconstruction of Afghanistan, it should do so independent of the US. Indeed, Tokyo should make it a point in such instances to emphasize that its cooperation has nothing to do with its alliance with the US. Japan was able to decide to contribute to PKO missions independently throughout the world during the 1990s; the reconstruction missions in Afghanistan and Iraq should be treated the same way. It is obviously too late for this, thanks to both the US and the LDP. But doing so would make for more open debate about Japan's international responsibilities, instead of making the debate a matter of each party's basing its position on its relationship with Washington.

The LDP, somewhere between a rock and a hard place

US officials — including the president — continue to voice their desire that Japan renew the anti-terror special measures law (the latest contributor is National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley), and the new Abe Cabinet continues to signal its willingness to compromise with the DPJ in getting the law passed.

It's not entirely clear to me how to square the difference between these two conditions. From the US, the LDP is being pressured to act forcefully and do whatever it takes to get the law passed, including, presumably, forcing the law through the Lower House in the face of an Upper House "veto." From the Japanese political system, meanwhile, the LDP is facing pressure to act responsibly, to defer to the desires of the people and the newly elected opposition majority in the Upper House. At the same time, I remain convinced that every statement by an American official insisting that Japan pass the law makes it all the more likely that the DPJ will remain uncompromising out of a desire not to appear to be caving in to US pressure.

The result of this two-pronged pressure on the LDP? Ishihara Nobuteru, newly selected LDP PARC chairman, actually suggested that if the bill doesn't pass, it could potentially result in the dissolution of the Lower House and a general election. Given that Mr. Ozawa has stated repeatedly that the DPJ's goal this autumn is to force an early general election, I can't see how Mr. Ishihara's admission will help his government's stated goal of inducing the DPJ to cooperate.

Mr. Ishihara also called attention to the role of the MSDF in enabling Pakistani vessels to participate in Operation Enduring Freedom — Japan is "the only country technically able to refuel Pakistani ships" — an argument he repeated on The Sunday Project as I write this. Maybe this is a stupidly obvious question, but can't the Pakistanis refuel their own ships? And will the coalition really suffer if Pakistani ships can't serve in the flotilla in the Indian Ocean? I don't buy the argument made by Mr. Ishihara that Japan is responsible for keeping Pakistan in the fight: It's not like Pakistan can opt out simply by removing its ships, given that the war has spilled over its borders. (And now, on The Sunday Project, Mr. Nukaga seems to be joining the argument on the terror bill as a second defense minister.)

It's too early to rule out a compromise, but as the weeks go on, the challenge facing the government is growing inexorably.

Kicking the Gulf War syndrome

Germany's Prime Minister Angela Merkel, in Tokyo for talks with Prime Minister Abe, has called on the DPJ to consent to Japan's continuing its offshore participation in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

It's about time that a leader of one of the dozens of countries in Afghanistan other than the US bothered to ask Japan to continue its contribution. Germany's contingent, remember, is the third largest in the International Security Assistance Force, with personnel working in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in the north of Afghanistan and airplanes providing reconnaissance support. It has also suffered twenty-one deaths, eleven in combat (the Bundeswehr faces similiar restrictions to the JSDF when it comes to the use of force, but has used force to defend itself when attacked). And so bravo to Frau Merkel for providing a reminder that it's not just about the US — but it's probably too little, too late to avoid the impression that the MSDF contribution is simply a matter of the US-Japan alliance. NATO and other participating countries should have been making the argument from the beginning, instead of Ambassador Schieffer and experts back in Washington.

Meanwhile, the DPJ has announced that it is prepared to submit legislation in the forthcoming special session of the Diet that will provide for expanded civilian support for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. I somehow doubt that the government will be satisfied with the DPJ's alternative proposal, but then I see little practical reason why this wouldn't be an adequate substitute, particularly if Japan put more people on the ground to work with PRTs in a civilian capacity. The idea is that Japan contribute and not shirk its international responsibilities; nowhere is it said that its contribution must come in martial form, especially considering the restrictions that come with a JSDF deployment.

Of course, this debate has little to do with the practical value of Japan's contribution to Afghanistan. It is about symbolism: it is about the Japanese government's being able to say to the world that Japan's one-country pacifism is dead and gone. It concerns, in short, Japan's "Gulf War syndrome" — the shame, referred to over and over again in the sixteen years since the Gulf War, of not being thanked by Kuwait because Japan only contributed money, and not personnel, and even then it was "too little, too late." But arguably Japan made the point that it had changed in 2001 by reacting quickly to dispatch MSDF vessels to the Indian Ocean. Now, six years later, it is not inappropriate to ask if perhaps there is another way to contribute.

The DPJ may eventually consent to continuing the MSDF's mission, but before consenting it is right to ask questions about the mission — and to call attention to the government's slavishness to the US. Japanese security policy should not be held hostage to the need to prove and reprove Japan's loyalty to the US, and the more the forthcoming debate calls attention to this problem, the better it will be for Japan over the long term.