The US finally goes through with delisting North Korea

The thinkable is finally the actual.

After more than a year since it became plausible for the US to remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism as a reward for cooperation in negotiations over the North Korean nuclear program, the US State Department has announced that it will remove North Korea from the list. With the global financial system melting down, this move appears to have been timed in the hope that it would receive less scrutiny than it would otherwise. The US move may also been in response to signs that North Korea may be preparing another nuclear test.

Whatever the Bush administration's reasoning, the usual suspects in Japan once again reacted with shock at the US decision. Finance Minister Nakagawa Shoichi, in Washington for talks related to the financial crisis, reverted to his role as conservative hatchet man to criticize the US government for failing to consult with Japan, for abandoning the abductees, and for being played for a fool by North Korea. The media is reporting this as a demonstration of Japan's being "left out," observing that Prime Minister Aso received notice from Washington a mere half hour before it announced its decision. (Asahi described this as "a nightmare for the Japanese government.") Mainichi suggested that the decision illustrates the need for a rethink by the Japanese government. The abductee families characterized the decision as "an act of betrayal."

My sentiments are little different than they were in June 2008, when the Bush administration indicated that it was prepared to move forward with the delisting (before North Korea failed to follow through). Whatever the wisdom of the decision — there appear to be considerable holes regarding verification in the agreement, among other problems, as outlined by Victor Cha, former director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council — the rift between the US and Japan is the product of fundamental misunderstandings going back several years that have gone unaddressed by successive Japanese prime ministers and the Bush administration.

First, the Japanese government has mistakenly placed too much emphasis on the abductees and too little emphasis on the nuclear question. In emphasizing the abductee problem, Japan also came to really excessively on US pressure on North Korea. The alarm expressed above is symptomatic of this dependence: without US pressure, Tokyo has little hope of using sticks to force North Korea to be more cooperation on the abductions issue. Japan can keep extending its sanctions, but absent simultaneous US sanctions, they have little chance of working (not that joint US-Japan sanctions have had much effect).

Second, in connection to Japan's emphasis on the abductions issue, the Japanese government has also placed far too much emphasis on the US state sponsors of terrorism list, a designation which Secretary Rice called "a formality," thus making this step "completely meaningless" in practical terms. The Japanese government attached great importance to the designation because it took it literally. North Korea is a state sponsor of terrorism thanks to its abductions of foreign nationals. Until it makes amends for the abductions, it is still a state sponsor of terrorism and therefore still belongs on the list. For the US, the designation was just another bargaining chip in the pursuit of a denuclearized North Korea. It appears that the US did little to disabuse Japan of its impression.

Discussion of the strengths and weaknesses (mostly the weaknesses) of the agreement will undoubtedly rage in the coming days. But the significance of this agreement is simple: the Bush administration has made it resolutely clear that US North Korea policy is not "action for action" as suggested by President Bush in June. Rather, the US has decided that it will buy North Korea's participation in the six-party talks and non-escalation of its nuclear activities through gradual concessions. Bowing to the reality of the situation in which the US has few alternatives to committing to negotiations, bilateral and multilateral, the Bush administration has made clear that bribery is now the essence of US North Korea policy. That's not necessarily a bad thing. Given that North Korea's price isn't particularly onerous and given that the alternatives (a war on the Korean Peninsula, unchecked nuclear proliferation, collapse of the DPRK before the US and North Korea's neighbors are prepared to respond) are all worse than bribery, this may be the best possible approach.

Naturally Japan won't see it that way. Instead there will be talk of betrayal, abandonment, and potentially the need for greater Japanese independence from the US (recall Mr. Aso's role in the debate over a debate on nuclear weapons that raged in the early days of the Abe cabinet). But I don't see how this turn of events helps Mr. Aso. Having been blindsided by the US decision, Mr. Aso looks little different from his predecessors, despite his foreign policy experience and his purported Washington connections. Despite his commitment to resolving the abductions issue, the US finally decided to proceed with delisting under his watch. I still maintain that foreign policy will have little impact on the next general election, but at the very least it's possible that voters will wonder whether there is something to Ozawa Ichiro's critique of the LDP's foreign policy as subordinating Japan to the US without getting anything in return. The US has furnished Mr. Ozawa with a resonant example with which to make his case.

Meanwhile Japan has little reason to hope that the US will shift again on North Korea in the future. Should Barack Obama win the presidency next month, it is conceivable that he will embrace the "bribery" approach. Indeed, his approach — at least in the statement his campaign released in response to the delisting — is a succinct summary of the Bush administration's approach: bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, a commitment to complete, verifiable denuclearization, and addressing the abductees issue at some point in the future. If John McCain wins, he will likely tack back to the Cheney line, reversing concessions to North Korea and restoring the US-Japan partnership on North Korea that prevailed 2002-2007. Senator McCain's response emphasized the failure to consult with "our closest partners in Northeast Asia," which presumably means Japan followed by South Korea. (The candidates' statements can be found here.)

Little wonder that Japanese conservatives are cheering for Senator McCain. (And little wonder that Komori Yasuhisa is repeating Republican talking points verbatim on Senator Obama at his blog.) (For more on the likely differences between an Obama and a McCain administration on Asia, see my article in the current Japan Inc.)

A problem-oriented or a partner-oriented US Asia policy

The Asahi Shimbun has published an op-ed by Richard Danzig and Joseph Nye, who as foreign policy advisers to Senator Barack Obama outline how an Obama administration will approach relations with Japan.

Superificially, there are not too many points of divergence with the Yomiuri op-ed penned by Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman last month.

Both Danzig-Nye and McCain-Lieberman argue that the alliance rests on both shared interests and shared values. Both see the alliance as central to US policy in Asia. (Danzig-Nye end their piece by saying, "Close cooperation with Japan is the starting point for US policy and interests in Asia.") Both acknowledge the need for a broader bilateral agenda, although the Danzig-Nye piece is more explicit about what that agenda might contain.

Beyond the repetition of the standard mantras about the alliance, however, there are significant differences in the role they envision for the alliance in the region. The difference can be summarized thusly. Mr. Obama's Asia policy would be problem oriented: he sees problems in the region that must be solved, and is not especially discriminatory as to how they're solved. Mr. McCain's Asia policy would be values oriented, or, more precisely, partner oriented: who the US works with matters more than what it works on. Accordingly, Mr. Obama recognizes the value of the US-Japan alliance and other standing alliances in the region, but it seems that he would proceed from problem to partner; Mr. McCain would start by consulting closely with partners, and then, in cooperation with democratic allies in the region, would proceed to address regional problems and work with other countries in the region (i.e. China).

The difference in these perspectives can be seen in how the candidates responded to the latest development in the six-party talks. Mr. Obama hailed the "progress" but suggested that the degree to which sanctions are lifted should depend on the degree to which North Korea cooperates (i.e., his concerns are problem oriented); Mr. McCain cited the fears of Japan and South Korea to question whether the time is right to lift sanctions (i.e., prioritizing relations with US allies over the problem-solving process).

One can also see this difference in the respective op-eds.

First, the "Obama" op-ed makes no mention of China as a issue area for the alliance. The McCain-Lieberman op-ed, however, argues that a stronger alliance is critical to working with a stronger China, noting, "It is precisely by strengthening our alliance and deepening our cooperation that Japan and the United States can lay the necessary groundwork for more durable, stable, and successful relations with China." Note that in regard to China, a McCain administration would work with Japan first, and then proceed to build a new framework for relations with China.

Second, a McCain administration would revive the now-dormant effort to enhance cooperation among "the great Pacific democracies," citing Japan, Australia, and India specifically (interesting how India, a country that is nowhere near the Pacific, is mentioned but South Korea, a burgeoning democracy actually on Asia's Pacific littoral, is presumably included among "others"). A bulk of the McCain-Lieberman op-ed addresses the importance of democracy (and its promotion) in East Asia, meaning that "shared values" would inform a McCain administration's Asia policy. For Mr. Obama, it seems, shared values serve as a basis for the US-Japan relationship but not necessarily as the center of the bilateral agenda.

Indeed, echoing Prime Minister Fukuda's recent argument about the alliance's role in the region, Mr. Obama sees the value of the alliance in terms of whether it promotes stability in the region, and seeks to embed the alliance in a broader regional organization that will help restore regional confidence in the US.

As Messrs. Danzig and Nye write, "It is essential that both countries cooperate closely to develop a new regional framework that will protect our essential interests and values. Mr. Obama, in a debate last autumn regarding the construction of an international framework for Asia, said, 'America ought to be regarded as a partner with a high degree of credibility.' Without reducing the US-Japan alliance's central role as the 'foundation for regional stability,' it is possible to create new frameworks and dialogues."

(Also absent from the Danzig-Nye piece is any of the protectionist rhetoric that Mr. Obama recently directed toward South Korea and Japan, an indication that it is awfully difficult to be both protectionist and a regional leader, a lesson that Japan ought to understand well.)

In short, there are differences in how an Obama administration and a McCain administration would approach Japan and Asia.

A McCain administration would have a number of points of continuity from the Bush administration in its Japan policy. While abjuring from explicit containment of China, it would emphasize shared values and seek to deepen ties among the region's democracies. It seems, however, that Mr. McCain has at least learned that the alliance is weakened if the US leads and Japan follows: "If we are to ask more of each other, we must also pay greater attention to each other's concerns and goals." He cites greater cooperation on climate change as one way in which his government would listen more to Japan.

Mr. Obama, meanwhile, seems to share the outlook of Mr. Fukuda and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, among others. Disinclined to divide the region into democracies and autocracies (or non-democracies), Mr. Obama would seek to work with any and all appropriate partners, not just formal allies, in addressing regional challenges — necessarily meaning more cooperation with China, because as the Bush administration has learned, few of the region's most intractable problems can be solved without China's involvement.

In practice, the difference between a problem-oriented and a partner-oriented Asia policy may not be all that great, provided that Mr. McCain does not go overboard in pursuing an Asian alliance of democracies and provided that Mr. Obama doesn't take up Japan passing like the last Democratic president and remembers that formal allies are important tools too.

The challenge for Japan, meanwhile, is the same regardless of which candidate wins in November. It needs to articulate its goals and interests in Asia and learn to say no to the US when it disagrees with US policy.

"Unsustainable Inequities"

After nearly six months of work, during which it has passed from the hands of one leading US foreign policy periodical to another, an article questioning the fundamentals of the US-Japan alliance that I have co-authored with Douglas Turner has finally seen the light of day.

It is available online here at Policy Innovations, a publication of the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs.

Guam makes The Colbert Report

Stephen Colbert interviewed Madeleine Bordallo, Guam's congresswoman, Wednesday evening. Unfortunately Congresswoman Bordallo didn't get a chance to answer the question about Japanese tourists.

The campaign comes to Guam

This weekend, the US presidential campaign comes to Guam, the island territory closer to Japan than the continental US that will soon be home to a vastly expanded US military presence, if all goes according to plan.

Guam will be holding a Democratic caucus, and with Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton struggling for every delegate, the two have given some attention to the island, thanks to its four delegates. (NPR provides a handy guide for the perplexed here.)

With Guam on the receiving end of the realignment of US forces in Japan, this might be the closest the US-Japan alliance gets to the presidential campaign all year. Both candidates have prepared statements on the relocation of US forces to Guam. Senator Obama promises to balance economic needs with social needs in the planning for the expanded military presence; Senator Clinton emphasizes a federal funding commitment and the appointment of a Guam liaison in the Pentagon. Both recognize that the relocation of US forces involves far more than building new facilities for military personnel.

Neither, however, mentions the bilateral dimension. Neither acknowledges that with Japan footing part of the bill, the process will be more complicated than it already is within the federal government.

In short, Guam's caucus will come and go, and the US-Japan alliance will remain invisible in the campaign.

Obama, Koizumi, and the DPJ

I have learned that Ozawa Ichiro reportedly dispatched a DPJ member to observe Barack Obama's presidential campaign in Texas in advance of Tuesday's voting.

He could have saved some money and looked closer to home at the politics of former prime minister Koizumi Junichiro.

There are a few obvious superficial similarities — and a few equally obvious differences. In the former category, the two share certain rhetorical gifts, a "hipness" that enables them to appeal to younger voters (not surprisingly, Rolling Stone has endorsed Mr. Obama), and a sense of being propelled to leadership thanks to the "fierce urgency of now" despite relatively lackluster or short political careers. Perhaps the biggest difference between them is the conditions they face: although Mr. Koizumi has been rightly criticized for the simplicity of his slogans, kaikaku meant something. The Koizumi revolution, while incomplete, was still a revolution, with the LDP's facing its full consequences today. By contrast, while Mr. Obama speaks often of "change," it is still not clear what that will mean in practical terms — and as David Brooks argues in the New York Times, his message of standing for a new kind of politics might not even survive the fight for the Democratic nomination.

But there is something more to the superficial similarities, which may not be so superficial after all. In the massive crowds that greeted Mr. Koizumi at his campaign appearances and the record-breaking crowds who have greeted Mr. Obama in even the most unlikely of places, one sees how both men are capable of tapping into the most visceral hopes of Japanese and American voters. Despite widespread cynicism about the political process in all mature democracies, both politicians make clear that voters are still willing to believe that things can be better, that it is still possible for a more hopeful, responsive politics that addresses the fears and ambitions of the people — and the politician that can tap into that reservoir of hope is a powerful politician indeed. (And, of course, there is always the danger that such politicians will abuse their power, with disastrous consequences that do not bear mentioning because I wish to respect Godwin's law.) There is, of course, a strong likelihood that voters will end up disappointed; Japanese voters were certainly frustrated by Mr. Koizumi's failings. But no matter how many times they are disappointed, they continue to hope for leaders who promise to deliver change that results in a kinder, gentler politics. Hence Mr. Koizumi's resounding victory in 2005, despite the disappointments of the previous four years. Hence the strong approval ratings that greeted both Mr. Abe and Mr. Fukuda to office.

This, then, is the challenge for the DPJ. How can the party tap into the lingering hopes of Japanese voters? There appears to be no messenger on the horizon capable of elevating the DPJ's somewhat muddled message into a transcendent message of hope. The DPJ does not necessarily need a Koizumi of its own — indeed, Mr. Koizumi's aggressive, crisis-driven (dare I say Schmittian) politics were probably better suited for waging intra-LDP battles than for addressing the country's problems — but it does need a leader who can inspire the hopes of Japanese citizens and earn their trust, in the process enabling the DPJ to ask for sacrifices in interests of building new institutions and undertaking necessary and wrenching reforms.

As for Mr. Obama, I hope that he eventually turns from scapegoating trade agreements (and by extension, foreigners) and starts emphasizing structural reforms needed in the US to enable Americans to compete in a post-industrial, globalized economy.

"Certain Victory" for Obama

...Now that the city of Obama has given him his very own hissho daruma, described by Asahi as an "indispensable item" for Japanese elections.

Do-nothing leaders

Being back in the US, I have had a chance to reacquaint myself with American politics — and to be reminded of why I find the American political class so disappointing. The problem isn't just the failure to act; it's a failure to find new conceptual categories for the problems of the twenty-first century. US leaders, in the broad sense, including media elites, have an unfortunate tendency to assume that once the US sheds itself of its Iraq problem (and its Bush problem), it will once again be able to wield power and influence around the world.

The world and the US have changed, however. The unipolar moment is over, if it even existed in the first place. The post-industrialization of the US will continue apace. The democratization of information worldwide will also continue, undermining US military power. As the US is learning, it's harder to use power in a more complex mediaspace that undermines the ability of large organizations to control the information that reaches publics, raising the costs of the use of force. Even as it continues to bolster its military power, the US, beset with economic difficulties, is finding it increasingly difficult to get what it wants globally. (Stratfor's George Friedman addresses the shallowness of the US foreign policy debate in this post at his blog.)

The US political elite, however, is not the only group of leaders fiddling while Rome burns.

Indeed, the G8, struggling to remain relevant in a rapidly changing global environment, is a monument to the collective failures of the leaders of the developed countries.

Tokyo is no exception — Japan's political class might be the world leader in ineffectual leadership. Tahara Soichiro, grand old man of Japanese journalism, calls attention to the government's failures in a short article in the March issue of Liberal Time. His particular grievance is the government's failure to deal effectively with the deepening global economic crisis and its impact on the Japanese economy. His ire is directed at the leaders of both parties, and he actually calls for the dissolution of both the LDP and DPJ — and points to the nascent Sentaku movement as a possible solution to the failures of the Japanese political class.

I think he's unfairly critical of Prime Minister Fukuda. Mr. Fukuda might be of an older generation and might have been ineffectual since taking office, but his keen understanding of the problems facing Japan is unique not just among Japanese politicians, but among G8 politicians more generally. The problem is not individual leaders, but a policymaking process that is a relic of better times, when the greatest task for senior politicians was distributing pork and plum posts to supporters. Indeed, if the Japanese political system was up to the challenge, the rearguard action by the Zoku giin on the temporary gasoline tax would be easily dismissed and the discussion would have from the first focused on how best to use the tax revenue. It is unclear, however, whether the government will accede to the opposition's demand for the end to the road construction earmark.

Changing the system will entail more than just replacing one group of leaders with another. Change must be comprehensive: political, administrative, economic. It is on this point that Mr. Tahara falters. He speculates about which leaders will be capable of doing what must be done — he cites Nakagawa Shoichi in particular (an assessment I don't share) — rather than considering the institutional obstacles to change.

Discarding the old mantras

After winning the Florida Republican primary on Tuesday, Arizona Senator John McCain has more or less solidified his position as the likely Republican presidential candidate. Sankei's Komori Yoshihisa was quick to praise Senator McCain today for his unstinting support for the US-Japan alliance, pointing to lines from Senator McCain's essay in the November/December issue of Foreign Affairs. (He seems especially pleased that Senator McCain quoted former prime minister Abe in a positive light.)

Undoubtedly Komori also likes who is on the list of Senator McCain's foreign policy observers.

The sheer terror with which Komori and other conservatives speak of a Clinton victory suggest to me that a Democratic victory would be a good thing, although personally I'm supporting Senator Obama.

The alliance needs to be shaken up. If the US and Japan learned anything from 2007, it should be that the old formulas about the strength of the alliance and its bedrock of shared interests and values are no longer valid; simply repeating the old mantras of the alliance won't make the alliance any stronger or relevant. There is a need for a bilateral discussion that addresses the alliance's structural problems. I am convinced that a Democratic administration, with an Asia team less wedded to the vision of the alliance peddled by Japan's friends in the Republican Party, will be better able to ask fundamental questions about the alliance. It will be less inclined to tell the Japanese government what it wants to hear. Does anyone think that the team that ran US Japan policy from 2001 will be able to accomplish that?

At the same time, I do think that Japanese fears about Senator Clinton are (somewhat) justified. Perhaps as a result of the influence of revisionist ideas about Japan early in the Clinton administration, both former president and Senator Clinton have at best a blind spot, at worst an abiding dislike for Japan. The challenge is the revitalize the alliance for the twenty-first century, not push Japan to the side. Senator Obama, with his laudable willingness to buck conventional wisdom on foreign policy, may be better prepared to have this discussion.

The Iowa winners

I am back to New York after my sojourn in Tokyo.

In honor of my return to the US, here are links to a couple posts at The Reality-Based Community on Barack Obama and former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee, written by Steven Teles, a former professor of mine. I particularly like his dissection of the sheer insanity of Huckabee's policy ideas.

The vanishing ally

Candidate Clinton has penned her contribution on foreign policy for the ongoing feature in Foreign Affairs on the foreign policies of the major presidential contenders.

I haven't found much of value in the contributions thus far, and Senator Clinton's is no exception. Her world view essentially emphasizes "power and principle." I'm not entirely clear how that differs from, say, Francis Fukuyama's "realistic Wilsonianism" — which perhaps says more about the narrowing of American foreign policy options in the waning months of the Bush administration than it does about Mrs. Clinton's foreign policy perspective.

But Tokyo is paying close attention, because Mrs. Clinton writes, "Our relationship with China will be the most important bilateral relationship in the world in this century." That may be disconcerting for Japan, used to hearing US officials insist on the importance of the US-Japan relationship, but it also happens to be true. The Japanese government should be more concerned that Japan receives even less attention than India, in a section purportedly about America's alliances. Note that India isn't an official ally — and is struggling over whether to accept the Bush administration's gift to India that offers civilian nuclear cooperation, potentially a kind of down payment on a more formalized partnership.

Indeed, in foreign policy statements like this, Japan increasingly appears simply as one ally among many, a tool in the US foreign policy toolbox that no longer merits special attention. This is a shame, because the US-Japan relationship could be an essential part of the US approach to China, helping smooth China's ascension to regional and global leadership (and hold China accountable). Senator Clinton hints at this — she mentions cooperation on clean energy — but no policymaker or presidential candidate has discussed a Sino-US-Japanese triangle.

Japan, it seems, will have to demonstrate its value to the next administration, at least if the Democrats win.

How did it come to this? Some may be tempted to blame Japan, particularly following the bizarre spectacle that is the feud over the MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. But the US — and the Bush administration — are far from blameless. For all the talk about deepening alliance cooperation, it is clear that the purpose of deeper security cooperation has been to make Japan better able to serve Washington. As Ambassador Schieffer's response to DPJ opposition to the refueling mission shows, the Bush administration has expected Japan to follow along quietly; under Messrs. Koizumi and Abe, Washington wasn't disappointed.

The implication of Senator Clinton's essay is that this kind of relationship, in which Japan is seen and not heard, is unsustainable and of not particular value to the US. Henceforth, for Japan to merit special attention from Washington it will, ironically, have to find its voice and learn to act more independently of the US. It will have to demonstrate its ability to undertake political initiatives independent of and even (occasionally) in opposition to the US. Meanwhile, Japan must have a serious discussion on security policy, determining just how dependent Japan should be on the US for its security as the US reconfigures its presence and just how prepared Japan is to contribute its forces abroad, if ever. Any discussion on security policy must be accompanied by a discussion on how Japan can pay for it all — no small matter.

The next administration can play a role in this discussion, not least by changing the tone: no more bullying, no more demanding. Instead, Washington and Tokyo urgently need to discuss the political ends of the alliance, the "constitution" of the alliance in the post-9/11 era. What are the ends to which the US expects Japan to contribute with the JSDF, and to what ends is Japan willing and able to contribute? The gap between the two visions must be openly acknowledged, and shrunk through negotiation as much as possible — but it is in that gap that Japan's future as a political power in East Asia lies, the role to be played outside the formal bounds of the alliance. The more the allies acknowledge that their interests diverge, the more space for Japan to articulate its own interests and carve out its own leadership role in East Asia.

Japan, of course, has often been more than pleased to free ride, because while the US has occasionally tried to cajole Japan to do more, it has never tried very hard or for very long. Demanding that Japan be independent — forcing Japan to be free, as it were — and treating Japan as an equal partner in the alliance (whatever the actual disparities) may be the only way to make Japan think about political ends and means and the role of the alliance in its foreign policy, and raise its value to the US as an ally.

Abe's better half in the FT

David Pilling talks with Abe Akie in this weekend's Lunch with the FT, an exchange that apparently took place back in April before the Abes traveled to Washington, DC.

The interesting thing I find in Pilling's article is the little glimmers of a genuine personality that appear. While that is basically the point of Pilling's interview — the awkward fit of Akie into the role of political wife and first lady — she evidently obliged: "Just then, Akie’s stomach rumbles loudly. To her credit, Akie acknowledges the gurgling and bursts into laughter. She does not cover her mouth with her hand."

But there are only traces of the prime minister himself in the interview. "One problem, she says, is that her husband became prime minister earlier than expected. 'He did not have to fight for this position, to struggle for it. He felt he lacked the preparation to be prime minister.'"

I guess there is something to be said for the old LDP way of choosing its leaders. At least they had to serve time as the head of a ministry or two, learning about how policy is made. To be a wunderkind one actually has to be impressive.

Abe's rise suggests that Japan may not be immune from the dynamic that is making the 2008 crop of candidates for the US presidency one of the least experienced ever, as argued by Matt Bai in the New York Times Magazine. After considering that perhaps less experience could make for a better leader, Bai comes down on the side of experience:

Experience is what prepares presidents to stand by their convictions even when experts urge them not to, like Johnson’s signing the Voting Rights Act, or Harry Truman’s integrating the Armed Services. It is also what enables presidents to recognize when compromise — even odious compromise — is the last, best option, as Bill Clinton did on welfare reform. Lacking that kind of expertise, George W. Bush never did seem to master the balance between principle and pragmatism, the veteran politician’s art of when to build bridges and when to burn them. Whoever gets the nominations next year will want to study Bush’s experience closely — if only because they may not be able to count on their own.

A cure for Japan's fear of Democrats

While Asia has been largely absent from debates among Republican and Democratic candidates for their respective parties' presidential nominations — much to my chagrin — the Washington Post reports that John Hamre of CSIS organized a dinner for Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo to meet with the foreign policy advisers of a number of leading presidential candidates, in response to Chinese interest in such a discussion.

This is a remarkably sound idea. Rather than waiting for the next administration to roll into the White House — and with it the inevitable "new course" in Sino-US relations — China has insinuated itself into the discussion, ensuring that its concerns have been laid on the table before candidates are even nominated. Hopefully this will forestall the appearance of a straw-man China (or a scapegoat China) in campaign debates.

One wonders why Japan hasn't tried to do this, instead of sitting in Tokyo shaking in fear that — gasp! — a Democrat might win the election and immediately begin bashing and/or passing Japan. What an idea, actually talking to candidates...

Bland, blander, blandest

CFR has compiled a brief rundown of where the presidential candidates from both parties stand on North Korea.

There are few positions that stand out: for the most part Democrats repeat the charge from 2004 that President Bush is to blame for refusing to engage directly with North Korea in bilateral talks, Republicans generally holding back from criticizing the six-party forum even while criticizing the agreement it produced. (And yet it seems that Chris Hill has chucked the "no direct talks" policy out the window, so why even bother discussing the merits of one forum versus the other? The US is doing both, now.) Overall, there seems to be little sense of how North Korea fits in the East Asian puzzle, Joseph Biden aside.

One can conclude two things from this: either the crop of presidential candidates is extraordinarily weak as far as Asia is concerned or the ability of the US to induce or coerce North Korea to surrender its nukes is at low ebb (or both). Thankfully there is a good crop of Asia hands — who will hopefully make up for the glaring deficiencies of the candidates — waiting to move into office once this administration finally whimpers to a close.

The hint of a worldview

Barack Obama has delivered his own "major foreign policy speech," at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. (Full text available here; NY Times article here.)

This speech is not worth reading for its policy proposals, which are more or less standard Democratic boilerplate proposals. Rather, as Scott Paul writes at The Washington Note, this kind of speech helps to reveal the candidate's worldview.

Compared to Mitt Romney, whose first major foreign policy address I blogged about here, there is the strong suggestion of an actual worldview and the beginnings of an appreciation that the world that Bush's successors face will be radically different not only from the global environment that Bush faced upon taking office, but also radically different from the pre-Iraq war environment. Obama, it seems, thinks that the changes are simply a function of poor leadership from the US.

But I disagree: while poor US leadership -- and an obsession with the Middle East -- has exacerbated the changes afoot, what's happened is the end of the unipolar era. The changes are structural, which means there's relatively little that the next administration will be able to do to resist them. The post-Bush world will be characterized by soft balancing and "mini"-polarity (regional balances of power), which will create new challenges and opportunities for the next president. And it will require greater skill at wielding American power, with more emphasis on trying to understand how other countries see the world as a way to make them want what we want.

In contrast with Romney, though, at least Obama thought it appropriate to mention Asia, the region to which the world's center of gravity is shifting. He said:

In Asia, the emergence of an economically vibrant, more politically active China offers new opportunities for prosperity and cooperation, but also poses new challenges for the United States and our partners in the region. It is time for the United States to take a more active role here – to build on our strong bilateral relations and informal arrangements like the Six Party talks. As President, I intend to forge a more effective regional framework in Asia that will promote stability, prosperity and help us confront common transnational threats such as tracking down terrorists and responding to global health problems like avian flu.

There's not much new or profound there, but at least he acknowledges that the US has an important role to play in the region.

The speech is worth a glance. Based on this address, there might actually be hope for Obama as a leader in the post-Bush, post-unipolar era.

The shape of months to come?

The Council on Foreign Relations links to a "major" foreign policy speech by former governor of Massachusetts and Republican candidate for president Mitt Romney, delivered at Texas A & M with former President George H.W. Bush in attendance.

Numbers of times China mentioned?

Zero.

Number of times Asia mentioned?

Zero.

How a serious presidential candidate can deliver a foreign policy speech and not reference the Asia-Pacific region once -- not even in passing -- is beyond me. The US is a Pacific nation; Asia's problems are America's problems, and the challenges posed by Asia (especially by China) are not going away.

I realize, of course, that Iraq is a problem that is only getting worse, but the strategic disaster that is Iraq will be compounded if it leads the US to devote insufficient attention to the rapidly changing and growing region that is the Asia-Pacific.

I hope the Democratic contenders can do better. I hope they realize that the foreign policy issue for 2008 cannot simply be "what is to be done about Iraq"; it has to be, as suggested in this post by David Shorr at Democracy Arsenal, what is the future role for American power in the world. Maybe, as Lexington suggests in this week's Economist, Barack Obama has some ideas up his sleeve.

China in charge

The FT ran an article on Wednesday dissecting the process of releasing the frozen $25 million to North Korea. I was especially struck by this line:

Several people familiar with the debate said Hank Paulson, Treasury secretary, agreed to overrule officials responsible for terrorism financing, who objected to the move, after Beijing warned that a failure to return the North Korean funds would hurt the Sino-US strategic economic dialogue.

(This line also caught Daniel Drezner's eye, as seen in this post; he wonders what is going on in the strategic dialogue that would give this linkage weight.)

In case anyone forgot, this agreement is in many ways China's baby -- so it shouldn't be surprising to see China effectively using linkages to pressure the US to change course. I wonder if China has been applying similar pressure to Japan on the abductions issue behind the scenes, particularly as Premier Wen prepares to visit Japan next month.

Meanwhile, the FT article shows that the administration's critics on North Korea policy are more or less powerless. The State Department -- and Christopher Hill -- are in the driver's seat as far as the six-party talks are concerned.

I have to wonder, though, how the Bush administration's turn on North Korea will affect the wide-open race for the 2008 Republican nomination. I have no doubt that the conservative movement agrees with the National Review's assessment of diplomacy with North Korea. Will someone break from the field and secure the support by running against President Bush's new approach to Pyongyang?

"Nobody running in 2008 is qualified to be president"

So says The New Republic's John Judis, in an article that more or less sums up my take on the US presidential election that is still more than a year and a half away.

Judis makes the case that foreign policy being the unique preserve of the presidency, the main criteria by which to evaluate presidential candidates should be the candidate's foreign policy experience. Wrote Judis:

...For a century now, America has played a large, and since World War II, the largest role in global affairs; and by the the Constitution's delegation of military leadership and initiative in treaty-making and appointments, the president rather than Congress has the chief responsibility for America's role in the world. Congress and the public can stop a president from privatizing social security, but the president regularly wages war without a declaration from Congress--and sometimes, as in the case of American intervention in the Balkans, without significant public support. It would seem that the first question voters should be asking is about a candidate's foreign policy experience. And with the war in Iraq still raging, and America's relations with the rest of the world in disrepair, that's particularly true in the forthcoming presidential election. But you wouldn't know if from the current frontrunners.

It is for that reason that I am particularly dismayed about this presidential campaign already.

The US needs to have a serious, sustained national discussion about the US role in the world, and it seems that a presidential campaign would be the ideal time to have such a discussion. But, as Judis, notes, barely any of the candidates have serious, comprehensive ideas about American foreign policy, in part because so few of them have ever been in an important foreign policymaking position. The exception is Senator John McCain, who has long been involved with US foreign and defense policy in the Senate, and as an Asian specialist I'm especially inclined to support Senator McCain because he actually has a clue about the changing shape of the Asia-Pacific region. (It is telling that McCain called attention to the publication of the second Armitage-Nye Report on the floor of the Senate.)

But, that said, I don't think McCain has necessarily risen to the challenge of the moment, which demands a serious reconsideration of American power and the ends to which it can and should be used in an international system that is more complex, a system in which the traditional tools in a state's toolbox (read military power) are harder to use. I'm with Daniel Drezner in this post: the problem is bigger than the perceived failure of American stewardship. It's also not simply a function of setting up the proper international institutions, as this post at Winds of Change seems to suggest in reference to the same piece to which Drezner was responding.

So I will continue to wait for a candidate (or candidates) to outline a more comprehensive foreign policy perspective, but I am not getting my hopes up. I fear that the US will continue to muddle through in response to changing circumstances, rather than pausing to consider the best course of action.

Preserving American dynamism

As the 2008 US presidential election ramps up, it seems that the biggest looming question -- perhaps even bigger than Iraq -- is the question of how to preserve America's economic dynamism in the face of intense competition from the BRICs and others. Will the US economy and society be able to adapt successfully to the post-industrial world?

It seems that Barack Obama hasn't quite accepted that the challenge facing the US will not be solved by the same tired policies, at least according to this piece by economist Thomas Sowell (via RealClearPolitics). Simply easing the pain won't work; nor, for that matter, will propping up the old pillars of the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party needs to become a post-industrial party, that not only pushes for relief to those harmed by globalization, but also realizes the importance of reconstructing the American economy from the ground up, to ensure that younger generations have the tools to compete.

Bill Gates -- perhaps the poster boy for the post-industrial economy -- has an op-ed in the Washington Post pointing to how the American education system needs to change. He writes:

Our schools can do better. Last year, I visited High Tech High in San Diego; it's an amazing school where educators have augmented traditional teaching methods with a rigorous, project-centered curriculum. Students there know they're expected to go on to college. This combination is working: 100 percent of High Tech High graduates are accepted into college, and 29 percent major in math or science. Contrast that with the national average of 17 percent.

To remain competitive in the global economy, we must build on the success of such schools and commit to an ambitious national agenda for education. Government and businesses can both play a role. Companies must advocate for strong education policies and work with schools to foster interest in science and mathematics and to provide an education that is relevant to the needs of business. Government must work with educators to reform schools and improve educational excellence.

Compare that with what Sowell notes about Obama's views on changing the American education system:

He thinks higher teacher pay is the answer to the abysmal failures of our education system, which is already far more expensive than the education provided in countries whose students have for decades consistently outperformed ours on international tests.

This sounds like a great way of rewarding teachers, who, through their unions, have remained one of the biggest pillars of support for the Democratic Party, but not a particularly great way to reconstruct the American education system. Changing American education means changing how and what American students are taught -- not simply pumping in more money for teachers or computers. It will actually require people to think about what's best for America's future, instead of doing what Washington does best: throwing money at problems.

For all of Obama's talk about how he wants to do things differently, is there actually any substance to his rhetoric? And, if not him, is there anyone else in the field who gets it?

Dissecting the second Armitage-Nye Report, part 1

Having read the new Armitage-Nye Report published by CSIS -- once again, available here -- I shall, as promised, provide more thorough commentary on its contents.

As previously noted, the report is subtitled "Getting Asia Right Through 2020," with its purpose being to outline US Asia policy for the next two to three presidential administrations, regardless of the party in power, because, like its predecessor, the second Armitage-Nye Report is a bipartisan project, showing that despite apparent partisan divisions on a host of issues, there is remarkable consensus among foreign policy experts from both parties on how to preserve US influence in a rapidly changing Asia. For that is the challenge. As the report notes:

Arguably, the United States presently suffers from a strategic preoccupation with another region of the world. If engagement in Asia remains episodic, or lacks sufficient senior-level involvement on the part of U.S. officials, a transition in the region’s power hierarchy is possible. Even absent precipitous events, a gradual erosion of U.S. influence could occur if China continues to extend its reach and if the region as a whole loses confidence in the staying power of the United States. (p. 20)

I have previously pointed to Washington's preoccupation with "another region" here, and it is encouraging that a panel of senior foreign policy leaders -- not all of whom are focused solely on Asia -- acknowledges the problem and calls for greater balance and a longer-term view in US foreign policy and strategy. Also encouraging is that, as Armitage pointed out in his remarks introducing the report, a younger generation of foreign policy thinkers played a major role in its drafting, including onetime Clinton administration Pentagon wunderkind Kurt Campbell and the Bush administration's onetime director for Asian affairs at the NSC Michael Green, both of whom will no doubt playing leading Asia policy roles in future administrations of both parties.

According, as the 2008 presidential election heats up, considering that the winner could be president for most of the way to 2020, I am more interested in knowing where the candidates stand on the views outlined in this report than in knowing which type of withdrawal from Iraq they favor, given the long-term implications of the shift to Asia as the "center of gravity" in international politics. (Besides, sooner or later it will be Asian powers looking to sort out the Middle East's problems as they grow ever more dependent on it for energy, a point made by, among others, Tom Barnett.)

I have a lot more to say on this report, so I am going to break up my analysis into two subsequent posts, the first on the report's ideas about the changing shape of the Asia-Pacific region and the second on the report's ideas about how the US-Japan alliance needs to change as the region changes.