Seen and heard this evening

Frank Jannuzi, Hitachi fellow, China expert, and Democratic staffer at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (on leave), spoke tonight at Temple University Japan on the second Armitage-Nye Report.

I'm not going to give a full summary of his talk -- much of it was spelling out the thinking of the report's drafters and explaining the points at which he diverged from his co-writers -- but it was worthwhile to get a peek behind the curtain, so to speak.

He did mention a few things worth relating here:

• According to Jannuzi, the average American family gains $1,000/month from US trade with China (presumably due to savings from having shelves stocked with cheap goods). This figure seems believable intuitively, but I'm curious as to how this number was reached. In any case, if it's true, I feel a lot more confident in arguing, as I did in this post, that the administration needs to start making the case for the Sino-American economic relationship loudly and clearly.
• Another figure cited by Jannuzi is that apparently sixty percent of Americans have a favorable view of China, while a survey of congressional staffers found that only approximately ten percent have a positive view of China. I find this surprising, and somewhat hard to believe (the former, not the latter), considering that nearly all reporting about China is negative in some way -- its arms buildup, its unfair economic practices, etc. Maybe Americans don't buy into Lou Dobbs's "Red China" rubbish.
• Among the Japanese in attendance, at least those who asked questions after Jannuzi's talk, there was a palpable sense of unease about the state of the US-Japan alliance. Questioners wondered if maybe the report was too sanguine about the alliance, reflecting my previously stated concerns about drift and a shocking lack of communication and coordination between Tokyo and Washington.
  

All in all, I like Jannuzi's optimism about Sino-American relations, but I wonder if the Armitage-Nye Report, rather than dividing its attention between the region and the alliance, might have been better off focusing on the alliance and exploring how it can dovetail with some form of US-Japan-China security cooperation, an arrangement mentioned in the report in passing.

A new "new world order"?

Apologies for the lag in posting; life in Nagata-cho has gotten busy, leaving little time to dash off notes.

In any case, I want to call attention to an article in Foreign Affairs by Tufts University professor and blogger Daniel Drezner, called "The New New World Order."

Drezner argues that US foreign policy in recent years has been characterized by an increasing willingness to welcome emerging powers, namely China and India, into leadership roles in international society, lest they opt out and create parallel structures: "If China and India are not made to feel welcome inside existing international institutions, they might create new ones -- leaving the United States on the outside looking in."

His thesis links to a notion I've been toying with for some time. In the early years after the cold war, various international relations theorists (realists, by and large) were quick to point out that a new multipolar order would quickly replace the aberrant unipolarity that had followed the fall of the Soviet Union. Numerous articles talked about the inevitability of multipolarity, and speculated as to which powers were the leading candidates to become the next great powers. (Germany and Japan were the leading candidates -- just as Japan's economy stalled and Germany was forced to absorb the enormous costs of reunification with the impoverished East.)

It seems, however, that those realists were right, about fifteen years too soon -- and their vision of multipolarity owed more to bygone nineteenth century European balance of power than to the world order actually coalescing today. It seems that the multipolar order emerging today more resembles the "three-dimensional chessboard" discussed by Joseph Nye and others, in which multipolarity in economics, culture, and politics exist alongside and despite US military dominance.

Rather than resisting this, Drezner argues, the US has embraced the emergence of new powers and sought to revise international order accordingly, given them a stake in the system in a bid to forestall a revolution of the "upstarts."

This is especially interesting in light of the recommendations of the recent second Armitage-Nye Report, which I have previously discussed at length. The picture painted by the report is of a US more willing to cooperate with China, India, and other regional powers -- including Japan -- to shape the regional environment so to accommodate the new giants. The extent to which the US has worked to engage China was revealed today, in a talk by Randall Schriver, partner at Armitage International, former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia/Pacific affairs, and participant in the drafting of the Armitage-Nye Report. (I was attending on behalf of my boss.)

The picture painted by Schriver -- whose brief was to discuss China-Taiwan relations, which ended up encompassing Sino-US relations -- is of a US that, while still hedging somewhat in the event that China takes a belligerent turn, has fully embraced engagement with China, from the president down. Thanks to Secretary Paulson, the China-US Strategic Economic Dialogue ensures that US fears don't subvert the overall economic relationship. Under outgoing chief of Pacific Command William Fallon, the US Military and the PLA held their first joint exercises and engaged in a number of visits and exchanges. The Bush administration, like earlier administrations that have entered office intent on taking a hard line against China, is now pushing for greater engagement with China in the hope that it will become, in the words of former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, a "responsible stakeholder" in international society.

I will close with a number mentioned by Schriver in his talk. In the first Armitage-Nye Report, published in October 2000, China was mentioned a total of six times. In the most recent Armitage-Nye Report, China was mentioned 123 times. It is a new Asia, and, perhaps, a new world order.

Green on US Asia Policy

I didn't catch this until today, but apparently Michael Green, CSIS Japan Chair and participant in the drafting of the latest Armitage-Nye Report, had an op-ed on US Asia Policy in the Washington Post last Tuesday (via CSIS).

The title pretty much says it all: "America's Quiet Victories in Asia."

Green's point is that the US position in Asia is quite firm, in part because it has been diligently built up over decades. Indeed, the US, as an Asian power, has been characterized in a large part by steadiness: steady commitments to allies through deployments in Japan and South Korea, the steady deepening of trade ties, and, since the third wave of democratization swept through the region, steady support for the solidification of democratic regimes. Over time, American steadiness has borne fruit. As Green wrote:

None of these leaders embraced democracy because it was imposed by the United States, nor are they contemplating imposing democracy on their neighbors. Many continue to have major governance and democracy challenges (Thailand's coup for one) and are torn over how to manage the undemocratic disaster that is Burma. Yet all recognize that their economic development and national security depend on the spread of democratic principles and good governance. As these values are consolidated across the region, they will inevitably affect China, Burma and even North Korea.

This sums up the aim of the latest Armitage-Nye Report. The authors clearly desire that the US continue to play a steady, largely silent role in the region, with a light touch, reassuring words, and a willingness to let a newly vibrant Asia make its own way to a more liberal regional order, even if that means that occasional setback along the way. Of course, part of the quiet US role is a continuing military presence in the region, to continue to provide an all-purpose deterrent and supply public goods (open sea lanes, etc.). But even that role is evolving to be less visible, as with the consolidation of US forward deployments in Japan and planned redeployment of Marines to Guam.

Dissecting the second Armitage-Nye Report, part 3

This is the third of three posts looking at the contents of the newly released second Armitage-Nye Report (the first two can be found here and here). An article about the report can be read here from the FT, which remains the best international English-language source of Japan-related news. (And the report can be downloaded here.)

The previous notes discussed the general background of the report and the report's ideas about the evolving structure of East Asian international relations.

Now I will turn my attention to the report's main purpose: answering, in the report's words, whether "the fundamentals of the alliance strong enough to deal with the array of significant challenges that will arise in the decades ahead."

In light of the recent rough patch that the alliance has gone through in recent months, which I recently discussed here, the answer to this question is not necessarily obvious. The report's authors suggest that in order to ensure the alliance's continuing importance to the region, the alliance needs a firmer foundation that will reduce its vulnerability to the vicissitudes of domestic politics in both countries and the temptation, particularly on the part of a weary America, to cut deals with China and other regional powers that could enable the US to scale back its commitments to the Asia-Pacific region. Accordingly, they argue, "The alliance can and should remain at the core of the United States’ Asia strategy. The key to the success of this strategy is for the alliance itself to continue to evolve from an exclusive alliance based on a common threat toward a more open, inclusive alliance based on common interests and values" (p. 15).

It is shared values, they insist, that make the US and Japan natural partners in the region and undermine the logic of a US-China condominium in the region.

Accordingly, the report calls for a comprehensive push that will reinvigorate the US-Japan relationship politically and economically and make it a dynamic player in the regional power game:

Turning away from the U.S.-Japan alliance or lowering our expectations of Japan would likely have a negative impact on regional stability and its role in the region. Instead of a Japan that underpins the international system in 2020, it may become comfortable as a “middle power” at best, and recalcitrant, prickly, and nationalistic at worst. Not to encourage Japan to play a more active role in support of international stability and security is to deny the international community Japan’s full potential. But if U.S. strategy continues to have high expectations for Japan that meld with Japanese national sentiment, Japan will stand as a powerful model for the region of what leadership based on democratic values means (p. 15).

As with the first Armitage-Nye Report back in 2000, this report makes a number of specific policy recommendations to Tokyo, including reforms to strengthen the national security establishment, encouraging the GOJ to give proper support to the JSDF as Japan's commitments grow, and praising Japan for its constitutional debate. The authors are careful to note, however, that decisions stemming from domestic debates on these issues can only be made by Japan, and that while there are outcomes that the US would prefer to see, there's nothing the US can or will do to sway the discussion in favored directions.

One bilateral recommendation that deserves mention is the report's call for work to begin immediately on a comprehensive US-Japan FTA (comprehensive meaning that it includes even the thorny issue of agriculture). The authors acknowledge the difficulties that negotiating such an agreement would entail, but they insist that doing so will bolster the alliance. In other words, there is no longer a neat dividing line between the security and economic facets of the US-Japan relationship. It has to be considered as a unified whole, with decisions in one area having clear implications in others.

As for the security relationship, the report includes an annex containing a list of technical measure that should be implemented to strengthen US-Japan security cooperation, a list in some ways shows how much is still left to be completed from the 1997 revision of the guidelines for defense cooperation.

This is not a revolutionary document. It is a practical guide to ensuring that the US-Japan alliance remains the primary vehicle by which the US is engaged in regional affairs for the next several decades.

As with the first report, however, much will depend on the four p's. To quote my dissertation (sorry!), the US government's willingness to push for cooperation has depended on

personnel, whether security experts with connections to Japan were in powerful positions that enabled them push cooperation forward; presidential support, whether the president was engaged enough to provide a mandate for agreement on cooperation to proceed; politics, whether the USG’s Japan experts were insulated from public pressure on Japan policy; and perceptions, specifically of threats in the regional and international environments that determined the alliance’s value to the US. For the US to desire an agreement strongly, the right personnel required a presidential mandate, little public interference, and a threatening environment, especially in East Asia.

For the moment, it seems that the first three are missing, and the fourth is unclear (although the importance of threat perceptions may be changing as the region becomes increasingly shaped by "co-opetition" between Japan and the US, and China). Indeed, as the report notes about the US-Japan-China triangle:

...A bipolar structure with only the United States and Japan facing China would be ineffective, because it would force other regional powers to choose between two competing poles. Some might side with the United States and Japan, but most regional powers would choose strict neutrality or align with China. Ultimately, this would weaken the powerful example of American and Japanese democracy and return the region to a Cold War or nineteenth century balance-of-power logic that does not favor stability in the region or contribute to China’s potential for positive change. Stability in East Asia will rest on the quality of U.S.-Japan-China relations, and even though the United States is closely allied with Japan, Washington should encourage good relations among all three (p. 14).

This is why it's hard to see exactly what the US-Japan relationship will look like in 2020, because this report calls for making the alliance both more durable and more flexible, an alliance in which Japan is able to play a more independent role while at the same time being bound more closely to the US politically, economically, and militarily. As the global security environment becomes more fluid, the US will increasingly demand more flexibility while simultaneously relying more on its allies in the developed world.

Accordingly, the US-Japan relationship may well continue as it is today, with the US, at the same time that it is deepening military cooperation with Japan -- by, for example, deploying F-22 fighters to Kadena in Okinawa, incidentally satisfying one of this report's recommendations -- seeking, for example, more military exchanges with China and pursuing a deal with North Korea that is not particularly in Japan's national interest. (This is essentially the legacy of outgoing PACOM chief Admiral William Fallon.) Dense ties with Japan will not stop the US from acting as it sees fit in the region, nor will such ties keep Japan from acting as it sees fit. The density of the US-Japan relationship essentially makes it a platform for both to secure their interests and values in the region; however, without political cooperation -- without constant communication at the highest levels between both governments -- the arrangement may not be durable enough to retain its importance to either country.

So that is the big question. As Japan begins to act independently of the US, in pursuit of interests that may or may not overlap with American interests, are political leaders in both countries ready to accept that there may be disagreements, and do they realize that the durability of the relationship will depend on their willingness to explain their policies to each other?

Dissecting the second Armitage-Nye Report, part 2

Continuing from my previous post, this post will focus on the second Armitage-Nye Report's vision of Asia. My thoughts on the report's recommendations for the US-Japan alliance can be read here. (The report can be downloaded from CSIS here.)

All of the report's predictions and policy recommendations stem from a principle stated on its first page: "Getting Asia right in this regard does not mean the imposition of U.S. values on the region, but rather encouraging an environment in which the region’s leaders define their own national success in terms that are consonant with U.S. political and economic objectives."

As the center of gravity shifts to Asia, as Asia emerges as a region with three major powers (China, Japan, and India) existing side-by-side for the first time in modern history, the above principle serves as a concession to this immutable reality of twenty-first century Asia. For better or worse, we are entering an age of "Asia for Asians," during which Asian powers -- including, to the chagrin of certain leaders, Australia and New Zealand -- will largely shape the future of the region. As the report's authors acknowledge, even as the US retains considerable power and influence in the region, it will increasingly be unable to impose outcomes, necessarily entailing that the US step into a less visible, supporting role.

On the whole, then, this report is typical of the "new pragmatism" that seems to be taking hold in Washington in the waning years of the Bush administration. (This is one prominent example.) The Bush administration's post-9/11 revolutionary zeal apparently having burned out, the revolutionaries isolated or out of office, the US foreign policy establishment is in problem-solving mode, this being one example (and the recent six-party agreement being another, as this IHT article suggests).

The biggest "problem" in the region facing Washington is, of course, the rise of China, although problem isn't the best word to use. What China will look like in 2020 is unknown, and, at this point in time, unknowable. The report phrases it thusly:

Even factoring in the possibility of disruption, China will continue to be an engine of regional growth and global dynamism. China’s growing comprehensive national power is already well reflected in its assertive diplomacy aimed at shaping the strategic environment around its borders. One key question for the United States, Japan, and all of Asia is: how will China use its newfound capabilities and resources as it matures as an economic and military power? (p. 3)

Accordingly, as they discuss the strategic triangle of the US, Japan, and China, much of their attention focuses on the goal of encouraging China to channel its power in the region to constructive ends. The authors believe that this goal is achievable, because Beijing, preoccupied with the instability it has unleashed internally by opting for liberalization, is ill-prepared to pursue a revolutionary foreign policy in its near abroad. As the report notes, at some length (worth quoting, because I find it to be a rather succinct expression of my own thoughts on China's rise):

China will grow, but its growth will not necessarily be a linear “rise” without complications. China has massive internal challenges that include an aging society, a weak social safety net, large and growing disparities in development, and systemic corruption—all of which have resulted in social unease. China’s leaders also are faced with growing labor unrest, a weak banking and financial system, lingering ethnic disputes, environmental problems almost unimaginable to Westerners, and vulnerability to epidemic disease. Together, these challenges have caused Chinese leaders to focus internally, thereby putting a premium on external stability. China seeks a stable, peaceful international environment in which to develop its comprehensive national power. China needs to avoid any disruption of its access to national resources (particularly oil and gas) and foreign investment, and it can ill afford major diversions of resources to causes unrelated to the objectives of economic growth and public welfare (p. 3).

The idea of some in the Pentagon and the commentariat that China is spoiling for a fight is wholly fallacious, and harmful to America's long-term interests in the Asia-Pacific region. According to the authors of the report, the US and China share a fundamental interest, namely in "stability": "Our interest is in stability, to which the United States, Japan, China, and all countries in East Asia can play a supportive role. In particular, stability in East Asia will rest on a triangle of U.S.- Japan-China relations, which should be fostered in addition to our strong alliance with Japan" (p. 26).

The report belies the paramount importance of stability to some extent, as the authors emphasize the need to encourage the spread of liberty, which can often undermine stability; this means that the second Armitage-Nye Report embraces somewhat contradictory goals, seeking the spread of values that will undermine a status quo that encourages non-interference by states in the internal affairs of their neighbors at the same time as trying to maintain stability in East Asian international relations. Nevertheless, stability in East Asia has been the most prominent US policy aim in the region since the end of the cold war, when the cold war's predictability gave way to the "uncertainty" (a popular word in strategy documents from the 1990s) of East Asian "minipolarity." If anything, it is even more important to the US now than ever before, as the region's map changes to accommodate the rise of two massive powers.

As such, the authors also focus on India, and its potential as a possible anchor for democratic values in the region. But they are right to point out that India will not be a mere cat's paw for the US, Japan, or any other power. As they wrote:

Washington and Tokyo have both qualitatively improved their respective strategic relationships with India. However, both should move forward based on the assumption that India will not act as either Japan’s or the United States’ counterweight against Beijing, mindful that India has its own synergies with China. New Delhi is cautious with respect to Beijing and is not interested in raising tensions with China. That being said, New Delhi’s Look East Policy is particularly appealing to Asia, and its growing economic, political, and cultural ties to East Asia will make it a larger part of the region’s strategic equation (p. 6).

India remains as much a question mark as China. Will India be seduced by great power and embrace a kind of realpolitik, or will it trumpet its position as the world's most populous democracy as an example to rival China (the Bangalore Consensus versus the Beijing Consensus)? How India answers that question will play a major role in determining what Asia looks like in 2020 and beyond.

While the report also touches on the roles to be played by Southeast Asia, Russia, and regional integration in shaping the region, I am going to withhold comment and instead conclude this already long post by talking about the report's notes on the Korean Peninsula. The authors note that it is essential for both the US and Japan to patch up relations with the Republic of Korea, because, despite Seoul's increasingly continental orientation, the three countries still have shared values that can serve as the basis for enhanced cooperation. However, as acknowledged in the report, the obstacles standing in the way of an re-invigorated US-Japan-South Korea triangle are many, including generational change within South Korea, shared interests in Seoul and Beijing, and the weight of history. These obstacles suggest that while functional cooperation on matters of shared concern (i.e., North Korea) are possible, South Korea will not be an especially enthusiastic partner of the US, Japan, and the region's other democracies in pushing hard for the spread of liberal values -- at least that's not what I expect.

I will return tomorrow with comments on the remaining bulk of the report, the sections focused on the US-Japan alliance.

Dissecting the second Armitage-Nye Report, part 1

Having read the new Armitage-Nye Report published by CSIS -- once again, available here -- I shall, as promised, provide more thorough commentary on its contents.

As previously noted, the report is subtitled "Getting Asia Right Through 2020," with its purpose being to outline US Asia policy for the next two to three presidential administrations, regardless of the party in power, because, like its predecessor, the second Armitage-Nye Report is a bipartisan project, showing that despite apparent partisan divisions on a host of issues, there is remarkable consensus among foreign policy experts from both parties on how to preserve US influence in a rapidly changing Asia. For that is the challenge. As the report notes:

Arguably, the United States presently suffers from a strategic preoccupation with another region of the world. If engagement in Asia remains episodic, or lacks sufficient senior-level involvement on the part of U.S. officials, a transition in the region’s power hierarchy is possible. Even absent precipitous events, a gradual erosion of U.S. influence could occur if China continues to extend its reach and if the region as a whole loses confidence in the staying power of the United States. (p. 20)

I have previously pointed to Washington's preoccupation with "another region" here, and it is encouraging that a panel of senior foreign policy leaders -- not all of whom are focused solely on Asia -- acknowledges the problem and calls for greater balance and a longer-term view in US foreign policy and strategy. Also encouraging is that, as Armitage pointed out in his remarks introducing the report, a younger generation of foreign policy thinkers played a major role in its drafting, including onetime Clinton administration Pentagon wunderkind Kurt Campbell and the Bush administration's onetime director for Asian affairs at the NSC Michael Green, both of whom will no doubt playing leading Asia policy roles in future administrations of both parties.

According, as the 2008 presidential election heats up, considering that the winner could be president for most of the way to 2020, I am more interested in knowing where the candidates stand on the views outlined in this report than in knowing which type of withdrawal from Iraq they favor, given the long-term implications of the shift to Asia as the "center of gravity" in international politics. (Besides, sooner or later it will be Asian powers looking to sort out the Middle East's problems as they grow ever more dependent on it for energy, a point made by, among others, Tom Barnett.)

I have a lot more to say on this report, so I am going to break up my analysis into two subsequent posts, the first on the report's ideas about the changing shape of the Asia-Pacific region and the second on the report's ideas about how the US-Japan alliance needs to change as the region changes.

The Second Armitage-Nye Report

Published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the report can be downloaded here. The event launching the report can be viewed or listened to at the same site.

I have only scanned the report, but compared to the initial 2000 report, it is much more focused on shaping the region (hence the subtitle, "Getting Asia Right through 2020").

More soon...

What a difference a year makes

A year ago I was throwing myself into work on my M.Phil dissertation, which analyzed change in the US-Japan alliance since the end of the cold war. Those changes continued right up through the moment of submission (North Korea's missile test was the week before the deadline).

The alliance seemed like it was bounding from strength to strength. Military cooperation, including and especially missile defense, was reaching unprecedented levels. Alliance managers reached a deal on realigning the US military presence in Okinawa and mainland Japan after years of frustration. Above all, the solid rapport between President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi ensured that the bureaucrats working on strengthening alliance cooperation had the blessings of the heads of both governments (and disputes, such as that over the Japanese ban of US beef imports, were papered over thanks in part to the crooning of Koizumi).

Those days seem long gone.

The problem is not at the military-military level, where enhanced cooperation continues unabated, but rather at the political level, where Abe has been surprisingly lackadaisical about putting in the work necessary to ensure a political foundation for deepening functional cooperation. The biggest piece of evidence often used to illustrate Abe's lack of attentiveness is, of course, his putting trips to Beijing, Seoul, and Europe before visiting Washington to meet with President Bush. But the lack of response from Abe to comments by his foreign and defense ministers about the wisdom of certain US foreign policy decisions -- regardless of the rightness of their comments -- suggests that his apparent indifference to the alliance is a principled position and not the result of his poor administrative skills. In other words, as this piece spells out (although mislabeling Abe's foreign policy stance as "neoconservatism"), Abe is something of a Gaullist nationalist actively seeking to carve out a more independent foreign policy.

It seems, however, that Abe may be getting his wish of a more independent Japan sooner than he expected, as the six-party talks have yielded a tentative agreement that is clearly not in Japan's interest. That was always the risk with the six-party talks. As long as the US and Japan were closely linked politically, the six-party talks were an excellent vehicle for ensuring that Japan's interests were respected and that Japan wasn't completely friendless in the region. But the other possibility -- arguably the outcome that has been achieved in Beijing -- is that the US would be fed up with the situation and would reach a modus vivendi with China over Japan's head. This has been a longtime fear of Japanese governments, but together with a US administration desperate for a victory, Abe, with his inattentiveness to the political management of the alliance, seems to have achieved that feat.

This judgement may be premature -- and it's certainly reversible (the alliance has weathered worse before). But Abe dispatching his public relations man to the US will not be enough to sort out the mess. Suddenly Cheney's impending visit to Japan takes on considerably more significance then when it was originally scheduled; a disastrous meeting could deepen the freeze and convince Tokyo to start looking for friends elsewhere, while a productive, frank discussion could signal the beginning of a new era for the alliance marked by more prominent and independent Japanese role.

And then there's the second Armitage Report, due to be published sometime today...

Japan repeats its "dissent"

Steven Clemons, Japan expert and fellow at the New America Foundation, calls attention on his blog to comments by Foreign Minister Aso reiterating Defense Minister Kyuma's criticism of the invasion of Iraq, which drew a response from the State Department (previously discussed here).

It seems like a 2 + 2 meeting, between both countries' state and defense ministers, which had originally been arranged to convene in January, is indefinitely postponed -- and that the alliance is suffering from serious drift at the political level.

As such, I have to disagree respectfully with AEI research associate Chris Griffin, who wrote here about deepening military ties between the US and Japan. I'm not disagreeing with the picture he paints of cooperation between the US military and the JSDF, and the way that cooperation is changing in the face of the changing East Asian threat environment.

What's missing, however, is sustained political leadership to guide the process. Sooner or later -- and sooner is best -- the two governments are going to have to discuss alliance decision making, the global reach of the alliance (if any), crisis response, and joint planning; meanwhile, Japan has yet to overcome the prohibition on collective self-defense, which remains a firm barrier to a true alliance.

With official Washington focused on Iraq to the exclusion of everything else, and with the Abe Cabinet mired in a host of domestic disputes, it seems that the political and bureaucratic leadership that was critical to pushing the process of reforming the alliance forward at critical junctures since the end of the cold war is totally absent. The alliance appears to be in a trough similar to that of 1998-2000, when the Clinton administration was distracted by impeachment and focused on the Middle East and Japan's governments were obsessed with the worsening financial crisis -- meaning that despite outlining new guidelines for alliance cooperation in 1997, little was done to build on that agreement.

The alliance emerged from that nadir with the start of the Bush administration, but with East Asia changing rapidly, can the US and Japan really wait until January 2009 to rejuvenate political cooperation? Perhaps the new Armitage Report that is supposedly in the works will be able to outline the way forward.