General Rice criticizes the Japanese media (implicitly)

Your humble blogger was invited to attend a media roundtable with Lieutenant General Edward Rice, United States Air Force, the commander of US Forces Japan (previously discussed here), the sole "new media" representative sitting around a table with wire service correspondents and reporters from the major Japanese newspapers and TV networks.

The meeting wasn't General Rice's first with the press: he emphasized his desire to maintain an open channel of communication, especially with the vernacular media.

In his brief opening statement, the general expressed his belief in the strength of the US-Japan alliance, reiterated remarks by President Bush on the alliance's being the cornerstone of US foreign and security policy in Northeast Asia, and thanked Japan's coast guard and National Police Agency for the help they provided in guarding US bases before and during the G8 summit. He then shifted gears and provided an update on USFJ's efforts to combat crime by US service personnel stationed in Japan. He emphasized that USFJ takes crimes by US personnel extremely seriously, and is continuously looking to strengthen measures to prevent serious crimes and hold perpetrators accountable for their actions. But he also made a point similar to an argument made previously by Jun Okumura. US personnel in Japan, General Rice said, have half the crime rate of the crime rate for the Japanese general public. He stressed that there is no way to prevent crime entirely, but noted that US safeguards have been tremendously successful. He noted that the US has prosecuted service personnel for crimes in instances when Japanese courts would not have prosecuted. US service men and women are here to serve the alliance, he said, and the vast majority of them adhere to the high standards of the US military.

It is hard to read this as anything but a message to Japanese media to tone down sensationalist coverage of crimes by US military personnel and put said crimes in perspective, perspective both in the sense of the overall crime levels in Japan and in the sense of the benefits to Japan from having US forces forward deployed in Japan (namely the savings to Japan in terms of not having to spend as much on defense as it would have to otherwise). This impression was reinforced in General Rice's answers to questions about crime.

Will they get the message?

Meanwhile, I asked the general about the progress on realignment and his thoughts on the DPJ's latest "Okinawa Vision" paper. The DPJ released its latest statement on Okinawa policy last week, in which the DPJ provided a far more detailed and comprehensive statement on Okinawa than its previous vision paper (discussed here). The position on the realignment of US forces in Okinawa — and by extension US forces in Japan — can be found starting from p. 3, in the section covering the DPJ's policies in four areas. Realignment is the first area.

The DPJ once again emphasizes the need to reduce the US presence in Okinawa as much as entirely possible. Once again the DPJ wants to remove US forces first from Okinawa, and then from Japan, although it adds a proviso stipulating that this process will "be based on changes in the strategic environment." But the document proceeds to explain DPJ policies in eight areas related to the alliance that would mark a significant break from the LDP approach. Tellingly, the document does not mention the 2006 roadmap on realignment, suggesting that a DPJ-led government would look to start from scratch and cut the US presence in Okinawa even more drastically than under the terms of the 2006 agreement.

First, the DPJ wants to revise the Status of Forces agreement with the US, and together with the SDPJ and the PNP submitted a proposal to the government earlier this year (which the government dismissed). This plan would have the US military submit a plan on base usage every eight years, hold the US responsible for providing restitution for environment damage caused by US military activities, prohibit low-altitude flights, have only the lowest necessary level of air-traffic control at US bases, have service personnel living off-base register as resident aliens, and give Japanese authorities primary jurisdiction for off-base crimes and use Japanese facilities to intern suspects, and make the US 100% responsible for providing restitution for crimes committed by US service personnel, US military employees, or their families.

Second, the plan calls for the return of more US facilities in Okinawa — especially logistics and communications facilities in urban areas and unusued land — to Japan. The DPJ wants to hasten the suspension of flights from Futenma in the interest of reducing the danger to citizens of surrounding communities.

Third, the DPJ reiterated the concerns about how Japan's host-nation support (HNS) is used by the US military, concerns that led the DPJ to allow HNS to lapse for one month at the start of the current fiscal year. It calls for a more accountability and transparency in how Japanese money is used.

Other demands include provisions related to the redevelopment of Okinawa following the reversion of bases, greater participation by prefectural and local authorities in talks on the bases, the elimination of US military noise pollution, and the use of Okinawa as a headquarters for peace and stability operations by international organizations.

Missing from these proposals is any indication of how a DPJ government would convince the US to accept these demands. Despite the use of the word "vision," there is little vision in this document, at least in terms of how realignment will (and should) impact the US-Japan alliance. Few if any of these changes can be implemented unilaterally. It will depend on negotiation with US military and diplomatic officials. Is the DPJ prepared for that? Do they have an idea of how they would get what they want in negotiations? Much of this report has to be classified as electioneering by the DPJ — making a less than reliable guide to how a DPJ government might act once in power — but it is still the best indication we have of what the DPJ will do with the 2006 agreement.

General Rice gave no sign that USFJ is reaching out to the DPJ and looking to open a channel of communication in the hope of forestalling an antagonistic relationship if and when the DPJ forms a government. He said, "We will work with the Government of Japan as it exists today. It is not helpful to speculate." He was optimistic about the implementation of the 2006 roadmap, stating that he expected it to be implemented on schedule, with the Marines in Okinawa leaving for Guamn in 2013 as planned.

I hope that USFJ will reconsider its attitude towards the DPJ. Obviously it shouldn't shift policy now in anticipation of a DPJ victory that might never come, but it is important that the military deepen its ties with the DPJ in the hopes of preventing the DPJ from running against the US military. By the same measure, if the DPJ is serious about governing Japan, it should be looking to develop its own ties with USFJ. US forces are part of the political environment in Japan, like it or not, and the DPJ must be prepared to negotiate in good faith should it have the opportunity to form a government.

I'm not convinced that the latest Okinawa vision is a demonstration of the DPJ's good faith.

How "sympathetic" should Japan be?

As expected, the governing coalition passed a three-year extension of the sympathy budget in the House of Representatives Wednesday. The House of Councillors now has one month to deliberate on it before it comes into law automatically.

And deliberate it will. In the lower house, the DPJ already questioned the use of the sympathy budget to employ "entertainment" employees — golf course workers for example — and will undoubtedly continue to hammer on this point in the HC. But who knows what other egregious misuses of taxpayer money are lurking in the sympathy budget.

The government is emphasizing the importance of the sympathy budget to the alliance and therefore the region. In questioning in the HR Foreign Affairs committee, Prime Minister Fukuda said, "Since America's presence is linked to the security of our country and of the whole Asian region, it [the special agreement on the sympathy budget] must continue."

In other words, if Japan doesn't keep providing golf course attendants, the Chinese will win.

Both Yomiuri and Sankei have echoed the government's line, emphasizing the importance of unquestioning financial support for the US presence in Japan as necessary for Japan's security. In fact, the arguments used in both newspapers' editorials are nearly identical, and they conclude on the exact same note: Yomiuri asks whether the DPJ is serious about its call for a "US-Japan alliance grounded in mutual trust," Sankei asks whether the DPJ is serious about its call for a "true US-Japan alliance."

Both also call attention to the contrast between Japan's payments to the US and Japan's restricted defense budget. As Yomiuri wrote, "In US Defense Department statistics, Japan is responsible for 75% of the costs of US forces in Japan, the most among 26 major countries. On the other hand, with Japan's defense expenditures less than one percent as a ratio of GDP, it is the lowest rank — 26th — and 20th in personnel dispatches to international peacekeeping operations." In other words, Japan is not in a position to complain about paying for US forces until it spends more on defense and plays a greater global role.

With that attitude, the relationship will remain unchanged for years to come.

It's healthy that the DPJ is asking questions that LDP-led governments haven't asked, at least publicly. Doing so brings much needed oversight to Japanese policy making, and with luck it will spark a broader discussion about the alliance, Japan's security policy, and the distributions of burdens and risks.

Pace Yomiuri, Sankei, and Mr. Fukuda, the alliance — and regional security — will be enhanced by greater transparency, which will clarify the terms of the relationship and air festering grievances that have been muffled by both governments.

Accountability comes to the alliance?

Chalk up another first for the Japanese political system.

For the first time since it was created in 1978, the "sympathy budget" by which Japan subsidizes the presence of US forces in Japan will not be passed before the end of the fiscal year, due to demands from the DPJ for more thorough deliberation. The bill, a three-year extension of the current host-nation support arrangement, will pass the HR at the beginning of April, but since the DPJ is expected to use HC deliberations to question the bill, it will most likely not take effect until the beginning of May.

The material impact of this delay is negligible. The US will have to take responsibility for paying civilian laborers and utility bills. The relocation of US aerial exercises from Okinawa to the mainland, scheduled to be paid for by Japan, will likely be delayed until May.

The political significance of the delay, however, is enormous. I wrote last week that the Japanese contribution to construction on Guam could be a cause for delay in the project as a result of the DPJ's desire for oversight. Consider this a preview. The DPJ has made no secret of its eagerness to scrutinize how every taxpayer yen is spent in relation to the alliance — and it will take every opportunity to do so. Every bill related to the alliance that comes before the Diet will be an opportunity for the DPJ to search for and expose fraud, waste, and abuse.

The government is worried about the impact DPJ scrutiny will have on the alliance. Foreign Minister Komura said, "I have no doubt that US confidence (in Japan) is diminishing. I am worried that the US-Japan alliance's deterrent power is weakening."

On the contrary, I hope that DPJ oversight is the beginning of a more robust and equitable alliance relationship, one in which Japan raises its voice in alliance deliberations. In this sense, last year's fight over the MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean was the DPJ's first broadside in a long-term struggle to introduce accountability into the alliance. For too long the relationship has gone unquestioned outside the editorial pages of Akahata. But questions need to be asked. Who owes who what? What are the obligations of each ally? Should this arrangement change? Hopefully DPJ members will raise these questions in the next month of HC deliberations on this bill.