These are the hollow men

"Shape without form, shade without colour,/Paralysed force, gesture without motion" — T.S. Eliot, "The Hollow Men"

The belabored departure of Hatoyama Kunio — captured well with a quote from a more contemporary poet at Shisaku — and now the third straight defeat of an LDP candidate in a prominent mayoral election suggest that what little remained of the LDP's 2005 mandate is in tatters. Kumagai Toshihito, the thirty-one-year-old DPJ-backed candidate, won the Chiba City mayoral election Sunday, making him Japan's youngest mayor. Kawamura Takeo, the chief cabinet secretary, dismissed the election as having no influence on national politics, which may be true in a technical sense, but the DPJ's third straight mayoral campaign victory reinforces the image that the DPJ has recovered from the Ozawa scandal and that the LDP is in disarray and hemorrhaging electoral support.

Public opinion polls, after briefly recording an uptick in the LDP's fortunes, once again show that the public has grown weary of the Asō government and the LDP-Komeitō coalition. In a Mainichi poll conducted over the weekend, the cabinet's approval rating fell five points to 19%. When asked which party they want to win in this year's general election, respondents overwhelmingly favored the DPJ, 53% to 27%. And Hatoyama Yukio, while trailing "none of the above," which received 46% support, is the favored candidate for prime minister for 32% of respondents compared to Asō's 15%: the prime minister's support fell six points since last month.

The LDP is once again in full-blown panic mode — hence the Eliot quote above. As the LDP scrambles to respond to its latest setbacks while simultaneously preparing for a general election, "paralysed force" strikes me as a particularly apt description of the Asō LDP. Anti-Asō murmurings from within the LDP are growing louder, prompted by his mishandling of the Japan Post debate and Hatoyama's dismissal. (In the Mainichi poll, only 22% of respondents approved the government's dismissal of Hatoyama.) But in all the scrambling and the maneuvering against Asō, it is unclear how the LDP can present itself to the public in the months so to reverse the shift towards the DPJ. The LDP is struggling once again for the same reasons it has struggled throughout the four years since the last general election. As MTC argued in the post linked to above, the LDP has spent four years retreating from the Koizumi platform that helped the ruling coalition secure a record supermajority, with the result that the party's image is more muddled than usual. The fight over the reappointment of Nishikawa Yoshifumi as head of Japan Post is the natural consequence of the creation of a Koizumian reformist remnant within the LDP that has been marginalized within the party but retains considerable clout through its association with Koizumi, their ties with the media, and (for now) their numbers among the LDP's backbenchers. In forcing the prime minister to dismiss Hatoyama, the reformists scored a rare victory, but on the whole they have been in retreat for at least three years.

But it is not entirely clear what the reformists and the "old guard" are fighting over. Of course on paper they have two different visions for how the LDP should govern — although the old guard seems to put less on paper than the reformists, many of them being prolific bloggers and authors, wannabe public intellectuals of one sort or another. Nakagawa Hidenao, much like Koizumi, has no shortage of slogans about how to change Japan, but it is sometimes difficult to see how his slogans ("from government to the people," etc.) would translate into policies. For all the vitriol directed at the old LDP by Koizumi, Nakagawa, and others, the differences are less on policy and more on political style and tactics, the timing of reform, and the government's priorities. Few, after all, oppose "reform" outrightly. Indeed, there is no shortage of ideas in all issue areas and across the political spectrum. The problem is that plans and schemes are rarely matched by realistic approaches to implementation. To take one example, postal privatization obviously didn't end with the passage of legislation; it is a complicated process that has required more than sloganeering. Would the radical decentralization plans proposed by the leaders of both the LDP and the DPJ be any less tortuous in their implementation?

Structural reform may be necessary, but its advocates would do well to focus more on building stable, enduring coalition that can manage both the passage and the implementation of reforms than on devising clever slogans to rally support for their ideas while antagonizing other political actors. As Koizumi found, unrelenting war against the "opposition forces" was easier said than done: even he had to compromise with rivals within the LDP, and, more significantly, the finance ministry.

The result is that the LDP may be more amorphous than ever, saddled with Koizumi's legacy, torn between partisans of the Koizumi way and conservatives who want the minimal amount of change necessary to stay in power, and powerless to resolve these internal conflicts and consequently to make progress tackling the problems facing Japan. Yamamoto Ichita, one of the LDP's most outspoken reformists, has voiced his support for Asō, but it is half-hearted support, in that he supports Asō's leading the LDP into the general election because he thinks it would hurt the LDP to change leaders yet again. And it is telling that when he lists the government's accomplishments, he does not even attempt to spin Asō as a reformist, citing instead the economic stimulus packages and his foreign policy initiatives.

In other words, it is remarkable how little the LDP has to offer voters this year. Despite having the ultimate trump card in the form of the lower house supermajority, which ensured that it could overrule the DPJ-controlled upper house at will, the LDP and Komeitō have done remarkably little with their authority over the past three years. Work is proceeding on the party's manifesto, which promises to focus on the "livelihood of the people." (Sounds familiar, doesn't it?) But by following the DPJ in promising to listen to the economic insecurities of the public, doesn't the LDP raise the question of what it has been doing to ease economic insecurity since the 2005 election and before? And by questioning the DPJ's ability to govern, won't the LDP invite questions about its own ability to govern? The narrative of this year's election campaign appears to favor the DPJ, as the public may once again be asking what the LDP has done with its mandate, instead of asking whether the DPJ will be able to deliver on its promises if given a mandate.

In short, LDP rule appears set to end in cacaphonous turmoil, as the party's warring schools squabble over whether the party is for "reform," "public wellbeing," or, like the DPJ, some combination of the two. And it seems that delaying the general election will only ensure that the combatants have more time to battle for the soul of the party, ensuring electoral defeat.

Party A vs. Party B

Maehara Seiji, the former DPJ president who has been viewed as a possible defector from the DPJ, said in a TV appearance Thursday evening that "even if the DPJ loses the election, it will absolutely not break apart." I have long been skeptical of the willingness of Maehara and his fellow conservatives to defect from the DPJ, particularly when the DPJ has been ahead in public opinion polls. Maehara's remarks are yet another reminder that the DPJ — often criticized as being as divided as the LDP — is more unified than the party's critics acknowledge. Moreover, it suggests that a political realignment after the general election is far from inevitable.

Rather what we are witnessing is simply part of the evolution of a mostly two-party system. A post at The Economist's Democracy in America blog is useful on this point.

Questioning the importance of a coherent governing philosophy for either the Republican or the Democratic Party, the anonymous blogger notes:

The American political system all but guarantees dominance by two stable parties over time, but there's no sound reason to think that two basic ideological frameworks adequately represent the diversity of citizens' political views, even in a very rough sense. And, of course, the actual platforms of the two 'modern' parties—which is to say, the parties boasting the names 'Republican' and 'Democratic'—have fluctuated wildly over time. What if we dispensed with any pretense of ideological content and simply branded them 'Party A' and 'Party B'?

Party A and Party B? That actually sounds like a fairly good description of the Japanese political system. Indeed, given the ideological polarization within American politics it is a better account of Japanese politics than American politics.

The DPJ is often criticized for being "LDP-lite," but that implies the LDP has a stable identity to which the DPJ can be compared. The LDP may be the world's most successful big-tent party, having succeeded in preserving an ideologically diverse coalition for more than a half century. Perhaps the key to its success has been that the ratio of pragmatic moderates (i.e., pork-barrellers) to ideologues has long been skewed in favor of the former. Whether this is still the case is an open question, but the LDP has succeeded by being less ideological than its rivals. The DPJ, like the LDP, has its share of ideologues — of the left and the right — but like the LDP it will enjoy more success the more it is "Party B" to the LDP's "Party A." Of course, the more success the DPJ has had at selling itself as "Party B" the more imperative it has been for the LDP to sell itself as "Party A." Thus past elections saw both parties trumpeting "reform" on their campaign posters. (Indeed, back when I was doing campaign work I remember seeing posters for LDP and DPJ candidates side by side, each poster proclaiming the candidate's commitment to 改革. Alas, no picture.) And this election will see the two parties committing over which is more sensitive to the concerns of the average citizen, which is more opposed to the consequences of the Koizumi reforms, which party offers the kinder, gentler reform package. Both parties promise to punish the bureaucracy. Both parties have punted on tax reform.

Party A The LDP will no doubt respond to this situation by borrowing from Karl Rove's 2004 strategy for the re-election of George W. Bush, using swine flu and North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons tests to appeal to voters' fears of an uncertain world — and suggest that now is no time to trust an untested, immature party like the DPJ with power. The LDP flirted with this approach in the 2007 upper house election, but as that election was not a general election, the fear card did not have the same salience. Hatoyama Kunio, minister of internal affairs and communication and brother of DPJ leader Yukio (and possibly friend of a friend of terrorists), said after North Korea's nuclear test this week that under the DPJ "the country cannot be protected." To make this argument he continued to cite Ozawa Ichiro's February remarks about one day reducing the US presence in Japan to the Seventh Fleet. No doubt we'll be hearing those remarks cited out of context up until the general election.

The fact that LDP officials keep referencing Ozawa's remarks may be evidence of how little the LDP has to gone on in trying to argue that electing the DPJ would be risky in these dangerous times. In reality, the DPJ has given remarkably little ammunition to the LDP: it is no less enthusiastic about recovering the abductees than the LDP, it has balanced criticism of China with outreach to Beijing, especially under Ozawa, and it is open to autonomous defense capabilities and, as mentioned in this post, preemptive strikes against North Korea. Nevertheless, the LDP will try to paint the DPJ as irresponsible, irresolute, and pacifistic when it comes to the defense of Japan.

If fear is not enough to win the election for the LDP, it will ultimately come down to intangibles, with the DPJ's benefiting from being just different enough from the LDP to unseat it from power. (Party B! The choice of a new generation?)

Violating liberties to protect human rights

Aside from the party's defense of the privileges of the road tribe and their allies in rural Japan, unity within the LDP has been elusive.

The latest issue to divide the party's ranks is the Protection of Human Rights bill. The bill, originally submitted to the Diet in 2002 before being rejected in 2003, was equally divisive then — and the current debate seems to be occurring along the same lines.

The earlier bill called for a system for investigating cases of human rights violations, especially cases of discrimination, and punishing perpetrators, embodied in a Human Rights Commission, which would be an external bureau under the jurisdiction of the Justice Ministry. The Human Rights Commission would oversee a network of Human Rights Protection Commissions at the city, town, and village level. The commission, upon receiving complaints, would investigate and recommend appropriate measures, legal or otherwise. Controversially, Articles 42 and 43 of the bill contained "special relief procedures" that included provisions restricting what the press could publish about an individual's private life, leading the media to oppose the bill, seeing it as a potential threat to the freedom of the press and the freedom of expression.

The bill now under consideration is a resurrected version of the earlier rejected bill, although Hatoyama Kunio, the justice minister, claims that the government "wants to begin again from a blank paper."

Many of the critics of the bill — the so-called "cautious" faction — are conservative ideologues. According to the Hokkaido Shimbun, Nakagawa Shoichi, with the backing of Hiranuma Takeo (who was one of the leading "cautionaries" in the original battle), is at the vanguard of the opposition in the LDP's investigatory committee on human rights problems. Their objections are (mostly) reasonable: (1) The definition of "human rights violation" is vague; (2) the commission itself could lead to the misuse of government power, as it can issues summons and conduct investigations without court-issued warrants; (3) there is no provision banning foreigners from participating in the local Human Rights Protection Commissions.

The Mainichi Shimbun has also voiced its opposition in an editorial, pointing once again to potential restrictions on the exercise of the freedom of the press. The editorial concludes:

Why is it important for this bill to be passed? From now on we wish for the debate to return to this starting point. Above all else, it is essential that maximum priority be given to the question of how to relieve human rights violations by public authorities.

According to the Justice Ministry, in a 2006 investigation by regional legal affairs bureaus of human rights violations, among 21,000 cases, only nine were related to the press, while 2,289 cases were related to civil servants, indicating just how many human rights violations were committed by public authorities. However, excluding the pursuit of a quite small number of criminal cases, concerned people should recognize that in the status quo, no relief whatsoever is provided.

The concerns voiced by both LDP backbenchers and Mainichi are valid. This bill strikes me as a blatant attempt to curry favor with the public, to show the people that the government is doing something, even if that something is done shoddily. Citizens do need protection from human rights abuses by ostensibly "public" servants. They do need recourse to the law. But is it worth it to trample on civil liberties to protect "human rights"? The vagueness of the bill and the wide-reaching powers the commission would wield are worth questioning.

The dispute within the LDP appears to be between pragmatists — the party elders, concerned with holding power — and the idealists. I don't know how sincere Mr. Nakagawa and his comrades in their opposition to this bill. Frankly, their concerns about "foreigners" (i.e., North Koreans) serving on local commissions strike me as overblown. There is also apparently an abductions angle to this dispute, as Sakurai Yoshiko, Nishio Kanji, and other conservatives have opposed this measure because it will somehow obstruct resolution of the abductions issue.

Whatever their reasons, they're not alone in opposing this measure, which is also opposed by the media and the Japanese left (or what's left of it). The DPJ also submitted its own version of a human rights bill that sought to emphasize the independence of the commissions from the Justice Ministry and correct the perceived threat to the freedom of the press.

This is one instance in which I cannot agree with the LDP's pragmatists. The unintended consequences of this bill are fairly clear. No matter how good the intentions of this bill's proponents, they must reconsider their approach to this issue.

Bring on the family feud

Hatoyama Yukio, DPJ secretary-general and brother of justice minister Hatoyama Kunio, has responded to his brother's absurd comments about his "friend of a friend."

This is the kind of thing we wonks were waiting for when Mr. Abe brought Kunio into the cabinet in August. Sooner or later there would be something that would require Yukio going after his brother. (I just received Mayumi Itoh's account of the Hatoyama clan in the post today, luckily, and am now ever more eager to read it.)

In any case, Yukio responded by saying precisely what I said yesterday, arguing, "He probably wanted to say that Al Qaeda is near, but if that's the case, it is essential that he contact his friend to make inquiries about the situation and where this man is." Yukio was actually fairly tame in his criticism, using the word "thoughtless" as opposed to a number of other, stronger words that might be more appropriate in this situation.

I remained convinced that for once it would be entirely reasonable for the DPJ to push for Hatoyama Kunio's resignation.

Hatoyama Kunio's ridiculous argument

Prime Minister Fukuda and DPJ President Ozawa met this morning in advance of their debate in the Diet that is scheduled for Wednesday. The leaders, Asahi reports, were scheduled to discuss an extension of the Diet session to the end of November and the MSDF refueling mission, just as the MSDF refuels its last coalition warships (for the time being).

I wonder whether the discussion touched on the DPJ's growing list of potential targets for censure motions — now said to include Mr. Fukuda himself — and the more troubling matter of Justice Minister Hatoyama Kunio's perplexing admission that a friend of a friend is a member of Al Qaeda, who supposedly provided Mr. Hatoyama with a tip to avoid Bali in October 2002.

Mr. Hatoyama — once described in a Shukan Bunshun article as Mr. Fukuda's "loyal dog Hachiko" despite his close support of Mr. Aso — was trying to justify plans to implement a system for fingerprinting foreigners upon entering Japan by suggesting that such a system would prevent his friend's friend from entering Japan.

Is Mr. Hatoyama really so lacking in common sense as to fail to see why the example he used to support this dubious proposition is problematic (to say the least)?

Apparently he has some clue that it was probably the wrong thing to say, as Mr. Hatoyama has apologized for giving the impression that he knows a member of Al Qaeda, claiming that he can't trust his friend's information. But will an apology be enough to keep Mr. Hatoyama off the DPJ's little list? A censure motion against Mr. Hatoyama might actually be appropriate, given his incredible lack of judgment.

If his friend suggested that he knew a member of Al Qaeda, wouldn't a sitting member of the Diet feel strongly about finding out whether there was any truth to the idea and putting the resources of the Japanese state to work finding and apprehending this person? And if he inquired further and found there was no truth to it, but still said it aloud, doesn't that show him to have a lack of judgment rendering him unfit to serve as, of all things, minister of justice?