The LDP and DPJ cooperate on space

The House of Councillors has, as expected, passed a new space basic law on the back of cooperation between the LDP, Komeito, and the DPJ.

As noted previously, the law ends the 1969 ban on the use of space for military purposes, permitting the government to deploy high-resolution spy satellites. The law also calls for the creation of a cabinet-level space agency.

This effort was backed by an alliance of LDP boei zoku, industrial concerns, and defense ministry bureaucrats interested in promoting a "space vision for the national defense."

I wonder what the US government makes of Japan's pursuit of higher quality spy satellites and a more active space posture, in light of Ambassador Schieffer's remarks this week. Does this program meet the ambassador's approval? As this Mainichi article notes, there are fears among Japan's defense establishment that in the event of a crisis it would take too long to get information on missile launches from the US. It seems reasonable to me that Japan would want more autonomous intelligence-gathering capabilities. I suspect that this aspect of the basic law helped bring the DPJ on board, considering that the DPJ's hawks tend to emphasize more independence from the US than their LDP counterparts.

While the law's advocates stressed the importance of military satellites to aide the JSDF's expeditionary capabilities, this is basic law is about defending the Japanese homeland. This is a prime example of Japan's pursuit of a "hedgehog" defense policy. As Machimura Nobutaka said at a press conference Wednesday, the idea of Japan using this law for aggressive ends is absurd.

As Ross pointed out here, the US must recognize that "a more capable Japan is a more independent Japan."

Bowling against democracy

When not bowling together, former prime ministers Koizumi Junichiro and Mori Yoshiro apparently spend their time scheming against Japanese democracy.

Both have signed on as advisers — along with Abe Shinzo, another former prime minister from the Machimura faction — to a new LDP study group called the "Diet members league to integrate both houses of the Diet and establish a new unicameral 'People's Diet.'"

I have to concur with Yamauchi Koichi, an LDP HR member representing Kanagawa-9: this is an extremely radical group.

The league, founded by Eto Seishiro, Ota Seiichi, and other LDP Diet members, argues that if Japan were to implement a unicameral system, it would be in line with the majority of the world's countries, nearly three quarters of which have unicameral legislatures. Mr. Yamauchi retorts by noting that no member of the G7 has a unicameral system.

Mr. Yamauchi goes on to describe this proposal as "possibly giving an unfair impression" since it is being introduced after the opposition took control of the House of Councillors. I would say that "unfair" is a woeful understatement. How about anti-democratic? This desire to undermine the DPJ's control of the upper house appears to be all too common in the LDP (and Komeito), especially among senior members of both parties. Faced with its first institutional check on its power, the LDP's response has been to complain about how "useless" the HC is, how irresponsible the DPJ is, and how important it is for the LDP to be able to do whatever it feels necessary to save Japan, despite the voters having decided last year that they're not particularly pleased with the job the LDP has done to this point. Some LDP members, including the current prime minister, have taken the opposition of the public to heart and talk of the need to listen to the people; others, however, including the members of this new league, have decided that it is not the LDP but the system that's broken.

I've said it before and I'll say it again: before any specific economic or social reforms, what Japan needs is transparency and accountability in its political system, mechanisms for checking the power of the government and monitoring its policy execution. DPJ control of the upper house is a great experiment in checks and balances.

The league's proposal is not a particularly realistic one, as it would require a constitutional amendment, which would require approval of the upper house, which would in all likelihood not vote itself out of existence. (The head of the LDP's HC caucus has already voiced his opposition to this idea.)

The significance of this league is in what it says about attitudes within the LDP towards increased political competition. Some LDP members claim to want a "two big-party system" but I cannot help but wonder whether what they really want is just another one-and-a-half party system in which the opposition provides democratic window-dressing for an LDP that does whatever it wants — all in the name of "the people," of course.

Public discontent, in numbers

Sankei has published the fourth part of its analysis of recent public opinion polls (parts one through three discussed here).

The questions dissected here are related to the government's use of its two-thirds majority to pass the gasoline tax and MSDF refueling mission authorization bills a second time in the HR, and cooperation between the LDP and DPJ in response to the "twisted" Diet.

Sankei observes that while a majority of respondents in April poll stated that they opposed the reinstatement of the gasoline tax in a second HR vote, a majority of the public approved the use of the supermajority to pass the extension of the refueling mission in a November poll. Another poll conducted in January following the HR's second passage of the refueling mission bill, however, found that the public had turned against the use of the supermajority.

I don't see what the mystery is. In the gasoline tax debate, the public undoubtedly opposed the use of the supermajority to reinstate the temporary tax because...the public overwhelmingly opposed the measure. In the refueling mission debate, the public likely turned against the government's insistence on using the supermajority to send MSDF ships back to the Indian Ocean because it rejected the government's focus on it even while the pensions debacle continued (for example).

The point is, as noted previously, that the public is unhappy with the current political situation. To drive the point home, Sankei concluded by citing two more polls that showed sizable majorities in favor of LDP-DPJ policy coordination and the meetings between Messrs. Ozawa and Fukuda last autumn. Another poll, however, showed that the public has no more idea than the politicians about how to break the deadlock: in a poll conducted last November 41.3% wanted a quick general election, while another 41.3% wanted more cooperation between government and opposition.

No word if the public is still divided after watching the rapid decay of the Fukuda government.

Nearing a climax?

Japan's political air is once again full of election talk as the end of April approaches, bringing the first by-election of the Fukuda era and the end of the sixty-day period after which the HR can vote again on the tax bill containing the temporary gasoline tax.

Ibuki Bunmei, LDP secretary-general, hinted in remarks in Nara-ken Saturday that the election will likely be held before the expiration of the term in September 2009, perhaps as early as this autumn. Mr. Ibuki suggested that Mr. Fukuda might act if he gets a tailwind so as to minimize the blow to the LDP in the general election that everyone knows is coming.

Asahi builds upon Mr. Ibuki's remarks, noting that he added that the party is encouraged by its strong favorable ratings in public opinion polls, many of which have consistently shown the LDP receiving more support than the DPJ.

Koga Makoto, the LDP's chief election strategist, who has been one of the leading advocates in the LDP for delaying until September 2009, has also changed his tune to echo Mr. Ibuki's line.

Mr. Ibuki's emphasis on the party's popularity, however, suggests a certain distancing from the increasingly unpopular Mr. Fukuda. I suspect that the earlier the general election, the greater the chance that it will not be Mr. Fukuda who leads the party into it, especially once the G8 summit has passed. Now that Mr. Fukuda has admitted that he underwent surgery for stomach cancer nearly a decade ago, there's even a convenient excuse for his stepping down, something like "health concerns brought on from the intense stress of the premiership."

But regardless of whether Mr. Fukuda will be at the helm for the next election, it is worth asking whether the LDP is right to feel confident about its electoral prospects based on opinion polls showing greater support than for the DPJ. Do the party support numbers recorded in polls actually have any meaning for how people will vote? Are the LDP and Komeito really willing to bet their two-thirds majority — which Mr. Ibuki admitted will likely not be retained — on the basis of there being some significance to the polls? I have a hunch that the polls fail to capture the extent of the public's discontent. I'm not convinced that the public is any less discontent than it was last summer when the LDP was trounced in the HC election. Will the public really be inclined to punish the DPJ more than the LDP?

The DPJ may not be able to win a majority outright, but anything close will be more than enough to topple the sitting premier, whether Mr. Fukuda or a successor, and possibly break the LDP as its contending sects battle for control of the party.

It is with this in mind that we head into the final weeks of the battle of the temporary tax and road construction. Ozawa Ichiro is still threatening a censure motion should the HR pass the tax bill again, although he has hedged on his threat by suggesting that the final decision will be for the party's HC members to make. Whether a censure motion will have any meaning depends, of course, on the government's response.

If the LDP's leaders are convinced that its popularity will win the day in a general election, perhaps they will call Mr. Ozawa's bluff.

And then?

Observing Japan in the Wall Street Journal Asia

My (optimistic) assessment of the current political situation is in today's issue of The Wall Street Journal Asia.

You can read it here.

Low posture to blame for Fukuda's problems?

In Japanese postwar political history, the phrase "low posture" — 低姿勢, teishisei — is most associated with Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato (1960-1964). No mere slogan, the phrase signaled an end to the Kishi era, which ended in violence in the streets of Tokyo.

The Ikeda era would be one of "tolerance and patience," of working with the opposition to formulate policy.

The phrase subsequently became associated with the LDP mainstream as embodied by the Kochikai — indeed, it became part of the furniture of LDP rule under the 1955 system. Even Fukuda Takeo, the current prime minister's father, who was associated with the anti-mainstream Kishi faction, declared his commitment to a "low posture" in Diet proceedings in August 1977: "As for Diet management, for my government and the LDP, in facing other parties we must have a low posture...So, concerning important policy, before the government decides we want to ask for everyone's opinions as much as possible."

Of course, the flip side of the declared commitment to a low posture was the inevitable criticism from opposition parties when the government reportedly failed to adhere to this stance. Prime Minister Ikeda was not immune, as in the later years of his government, Socialist Diet members regularly claimed that his low posture was just a political maneuver to placate the public before elections.

Fukuda Yasuo is but the latest adherent of the LDP's low posture school to serve as prime minister — and according to Sankei, the Fukuda cabinet's troubles illustrate the "bankruptcy" of the low posture and the need for a firmer line with the DPJ. In an article that sounds suspiciously editorial-like, the newspaper suggests that there are "omens" that Mr. Fukuda is set to abandon the cooperative posture he adopted upon taking office.

It seems that Mr. Fukuda's — and the LDP's — problem is that its posture hasn't nearly been low enough. While the government has been sparing in its use of its HR supermajority, it has acted as if the supermajority gives it the ability to dictate terms to the DPJ and the HC. Prior consultation? Genuine deference to the DPJ's positions? The government has preferred to submit its proposals and then attempt to hammer out a compromise after the fact. MTC ably demonstrates how the government's poor time management is indicative of the Fukuda government's attitude towards the DPJ. In the months since being denied its grand coalition with the DPJ, the LDP has preferred to gripe about the DPJ's failure to be a "responsible" opposition party than to forge realistic and working cooperation as necessary with the HC's largest party. If any government deserves to be criticized for announcing a "low posture" as a political ploy, the Fukuda government is it.

The government still has not come to terms with the idea that unless it wants to govern solely by Article 59 and leave important posts unfilled, it has no choice but to work with the DPJ. And so the BOJ governorship is occupied by an interim governor (has the sky fallen yet?) and the Japanese people are about to get a nice tax cut come April 1.

Bank chaos

The fight between the LDP-Komeito governing coalition and the DPJ over the leadership of the Bank of Japan shows no sign of abating.

On Wednesday, of course, the DPJ-led House of Councillors formally rejected the government's nomination of Muto Toshiro to be the new president of the BOJ. The government has resubmitted Mr. Muto's nomination in response. In his daily press conference Wednesday, Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura Nobutaka professed an inability to understand the DPJ's reasoning and once again highlighted the urgency of a smooth transition to a new BOJ president given prevailing financial conditions.

I must agree with MTC: the DPJ does not bear the blame for this "crisis" alone. For all of Mr. Fukuda's willingness to cooperate with the opposition, his party and his government have failed to come to terms with new masters of the Upper House. They have refused to accept that they actually have to consult with the DPJ, instead of presenting them with proposals as faits accompli (as they did in the case of Mr. Muto). Not surprisingly, Kitagawa Kazuo, Komeito secretary-general, used this occasion to complain about the constitutional defect of the HC's role in personnel appointments, illustrating the disdain with which the government still views the opposition's control of the HC.

If the government is so concerned about a vacancy at the bank, it should have been both (a) making the case for Mr. Muto persistently and loudly starting months ago and (b) exploring alternatives with the DPJ. The LDP is always talking about urgent national problems and yet now, when faced with one, it seems that the government has no plan B. It's Muto or nothing. Is there really only one man qualified to serve as BOJ president? If so, Japan must be in even worse shape than I thought.

So the HR will pass the Muto nomination again this afternoon, daring the HC to once again reject it. If it does, will the government nominate Mr. Muto a third time? And will the DPJ suffer political consequences as a result of holding fast in its opposition to Mr. Muto?

The DPJ keeps pushing

With the Fukuda cabinet's popularity in free fall thanks to the fallout from the Atago incident, the DPJ's stance on the government's nomination of Muto Toshiro to be the next BOJ president has become decidedly less ambiguous. The DPJ has indicated that there is no chance of its consenting to Mr. Muto's nomination.

In response, Ibuki Bunmei, LDP secretary-general, has criticized the DPJ for "playing politics" with the nomination. Playing politics. As if the DPJ is in the wrong for exercising its prerogatives as the largest party in the House of Councillors and forcing the LDP to respect the opposition.

Mr. Ibuki, the game has changed. Through a series of accidents, the DPJ is once again in a position to criticize the government for its poor handling of just about every issue it faces. This is the approach emphasized by Ozawa Ichiro, who spoke of the government's breach of trust in the relationship between LDP and DPJ, and Yamaoka Kenji, who suggested that if there is a vacancy at the BOJ, it will be the government, not the DPJ that bears the blame. The government, the DPJ reasons, will be the anger of the global markets for failing to do whatever necessary to placate the DPJ and ensure a smooth transition at the BOJ.

The DPJ may be right, because, after all, among those whose voice actually matters when it comes to forming governments, I imagine that the LDP's claims that the DPJ is "playing politics" with the BOJ transition will stick less than the opposition's claims that the government has mishandled every issue it has confronted and can't even tackle corruption and malfeasance within the bureaucracy.

Another turn may be waiting in the wings, but it looks like the DPJ has played this issue right: from the start it focused on the process of HR-HC "dual-key" nominations rather than specific nominations, preserving its options to cooperate or resist depending on the public mood. The government, so certain that it would get its man, only now seems to be preparing alternative nominees (Yamaguchi Yutaka, a former BOJ vice president, has been suggested) that might placate the DPJ.

Welcome to the divided Diet, Mr. Fukuda (and Mr. Bunmei, et al).

The limits of Japan's bipartisan moment

With diminishing prospects for a general election before July and no signs of another attempt to form an LDP-DPJ grand coalition, Japanese politics appear to have entered a bipartisan phase.

The most prominent symbol of this moment is the Sentaku movement, which, according to Yomiuri, may ultimately include between fifty and sixty members of the HR and HC, in addition to prefectural and local officials. Another sign is the bipartisan Diet reform group mentioned in this post.

Will Japan's new bipartisanship (or tri-partisanship, with the participation of Komeito) produce any tangible results, or is it the product of frustrations with the nejire kokkai that will fizzle out once a general election nears and both the LDP and the DPJ return to full-time campaigning?

This moment is a natural response to the divided Diet: cooperation short of a coalition government, as policy entrepreneurs in both parties search for allies in an attempt to move their issues (Diet reform, decentralization) to the forefront of political discussion.

I'm skeptical that a small cadre of Diet members and their allies in prefectural governments will be able to halt the emergence of a two-party system. The movement might be able to shift the agenda somewhat, not least because it is unclear exactly what agenda the Fukuda government will pursue in the second half of the current Diet session. Beyond that, however, they will run firmly into the twin walls that are the DPJ's imperative to oppose the government and differentiate itself from the LDP, and the LDP's imperative to shore up its support in rural Japan in advance of a general election.

On that point, I have a hard time seeing how the LDP could give its full support to Sentaku's decentralization proposals. Fiscal centralization has been a pillar of LDP rule — it has helped elect LDP officials in local and prefectural elections, as they would have better access to the LDP-controlled trough in Tokyo. Radical decentralization would likely be the final blow against LDP rule, breaking the pipeline between the parliamentary and prefectural LDPs and introducing more political competition into local politics. In that event, the DPJ's small breakthrough in last April's local elections would be the beginning of a major shift in local governance, which would in turn strengthen its position in national politics.

Accordingly, the impact of the new bipartisanship will be marginal at best.

If the Sentaku movement is the germ of a new party, its significance might be greater, but in becoming a new party, it faces an entirely different set of obstacles. As Ito Atsuo, a veteran of the political upheaval of the 1990s, writes in the March issue of Chuo Koron, new parties face considerable barriers, starting with the collection of members and money. However, one advantage that Sentaku would have as a party is that unlike many of the new parties that formed during the 1990s, it would be comprised of more than just Diet member defectors from other parties — it would be able to draw on support at the prefectural and local levels, giving it a more formidable presence. That said, as is the case with Hiranuma Takeo's mooted "true" conservative party, I don't expect a new partisan realignment until after a general election, if then.

And besides, should a desire to find a "nonpartisan" agenda on the part of some LDP and DPJ Diet members be interpreted as a sign of their willingness to defect?

The LDP and DPJ discuss personnel

Among the tasks facing the Diet in the first half of the regular session is the selection of a new heads for the Bank of Japan, the Board of Audit, the National Personnel Authority, and the Fair Trade Commission. Selecting personnel for these posts is done by a "dual key" system: both houses — in other words, both the LDP and the DPJ — must agree on the candidates for these positions.

A vacancy at the helm of the Bank of Japan now, in the midst of a growing global crisis, would be particularly unwelcome.

I have to imagine that this has something to do with the DPJ's willingness to work with the LDP on the "regularization of regulations for election" to these posts. To that end, Oshima Tadamori and Yamaoka Kenji, Diet strategy chairmen for the LDP and the DPJ respectively, met Thursday at the Diet. The DPJ's proposal calls for private hearings with candidates in the Rules and Administration committees of both houses. The LDP is giving this proposal due consideration.

For its part, the government has announced that its candidate is Mutoh Toshiro, BOJ vice president. This is indicative of the approach favored by Machimura Nobutaka, chief cabinet secretary, which calls for the government's choosing a candidate, who would then face questioning by the Diet. The DPJ would prefer to question multiple candidates and have the final decision truly be the result of bipartisan cooperation. If DPJ opposition to Mr. Mutoh is as firm as some suggest, the government may be forced to find a new candidate.

Nevertheless, with more than a month before Mr. Fukui's term expires, I am confident that the LDP and DPJ will agree both on a process for choosing new personnel and find candidates acceptable to both parties. This is one sign that fears of gridlock are overblown. Both parties have incentives to work with together on issues like this, when not cooperating carries greater risks than rewards. As far as personnel choices are concerned, there is no single best choice. There is certainly more room for compromise than in other areas.

The Machimura faction tries to untwist the Diet

The Machimura faction, which just gained a new member to solidify its position as the LDP's largest, has delivered a proposal to Prime Minister Fukuda that calls for the drafting of new rules for Diet management in light of the divided Diet. The proposal, according to Asahi, points to a "structural deficiency in the constitution," in that it mandates different methods for dealing with the budget and budget-related bills. As such, it demands that Mr. Fukuda push through rules that provide for the passage of the budget and budget-related bills at approximately the same time.

As usual for LDP and conservative complaints about the post-July political situation, the proposal bemoans how the divided Diet makes it difficult to address Japan's national interests, in this case fixing the country's abysmal fiscal situation. (No mention, of course, as to how that situation came about in the first place.)

May I make the modest proposal that perhaps more democracy is in Japan's national interest, no matter what the impact on public policy (and no matter how insufferable Mr. Ozawa and the DPJ can be at times)?

The rule changes demanded by the Machimura faction are nothing short of anti-democratic, in that they would limit the HC's ability to exercise its constitutional duty to act on a certain type of legislation. The Japanese people voted last year to give control of the House of Councillors to different parties than that controlling the House of Representatives. Just because it has made governing more difficult does not give the LDP the right to manipulate the political process to reverse the consequences of the election.

Fortunately Mr. Fukuda disagrees with the opinion of his faction. He replied by emphasizing that he intends to "take every opportunity to appeal to the opposition parties" for cooperation. And so it should be: as we learned this month, the government and opposition are perfectly capable of cooperating on legislation, despite the media-driven impression of gridlock. The constitution mandated roles for each house, and the LDP should not opportunistically undermine one house just because it's now become a hindrance to LDP rule.

(Incidentally, this is why Japan needs regular alternation of ruling parties: a ruling party aware that it could easily end up in the opposition would perhaps be less blithe about proposing rule changes to handicap the opposition.)

Is the Mainichi poll right?

Considerable discussion has surrounded a new Mainichi Shimbun poll showing that 46% of respondents desire a DPJ victory in a general election, compared with only 33% for the LDP.

The same poll also showed that respondents would overwhelmingly (51%) vote on the basis of "policy," which may very well mean "pensions." Only 3% say they would vote on the basis of "image."

In light of this finding, I wonder what to make of the thinking of Tahara Soichiro, eminence grise of television political analysis.

In the January issue of Voice, Tahara has an article whose title pretty much says it all: "The DPJ will not take the government." The reason? Ozawa Ichiro. (Like must monthly magazine articles, this article is not online.)

Tahara believes that Mr. Ozawa's qualities as a leader make him entirely unfit to lead the DPJ to an election victory. Uncharitable to his enemies (unlike his mentors), maladroit at communicating a message to the public, and unwilling to consult others, Tahara is convinced that Mr. Ozawa will lead the DPJ to disaster — or at the very least, not to victory in a general election. He is especially critical of Mr. Ozawa's scheming on a grand coalition with the LDP, given the LDP's record of devouring parties that have joined it in coalitions. He pointed to the uproar over the mooted grand coalition as typical of Mr. Ozawa's operating style: decided in secret, on the basis of reasons entirely his own. As Jun Okumura notes in this post, citing a Yomiuri article that broke down the DPJ's factions, "The house, it seems, can still be divided, and Mr. Ozawa’s personality and old-school ways have little other to offer to party unity besides elective success."

And what if success in a general election is not forthcoming?

Tahara thinks — and I am inclined to agree with him — that in the absence of a DPJ (or perhaps more accurately, opposition) victory, the much-vaunted political realignment will come to pass to resolve the nejire kokkai. He does not foresee the DPJ surviving in its current form if Mr. Ozawa cannot deliver his party into government by way of electoral victory (not a corrupt bargain with the LDP).

But if the Mainichi poll is right, and the voters are actually inclined to vote on the basis of policy over personality, then the DPJ might once again be in a position to profit from the LDP's ongoing failures, only this time of course, the prize is the government. Given Mr. Ozawa's negative image among Japanese voters — as illustrated in a Keio University study discussed in a different Yomiuri article from last week — the DPJ better hope that this is the case.

I'm with Mr. Koga

Koga Makoto, head of the LDP's election strategy committee, has once again come out with remarks that suggest that the government is trying to deescalate tension in the political system that has resulted in a situation in which the press parses every comment by LDP and DPJ leaders in search of its significance in suggesting the timing of an election.

Addressing (ok, indirectly) a question that I asked in this post, Mr. Koga said, "By no means must the prime minister resign and the Lower House dissolve in the event of an Upper House censure resolution." He also reiterated that the LDP is in no hurry to surrender its supermajority in the House of Representatives.

I expect that the government will take this line should the DPJ use one of the few weapons that comes with control of the House of Councillors. And why not? There is no precedent of a non-binding censure motion taking down a government. Why would Mr. Fukuda want to set one? He could and should shrug off such a motion as an abuse of the powers of the Upper House, and press on with his agenda.

Looking back at my response to Mr. Koga's earlier remarks about delaying a general election, I'm inclined to think that this is another way to reiterate that contrary to appearances, the LDP still has the upper hand in the current political situation: the government will not be tricked or forced into calling an election it doesn't want.

The elusive rules of the game

Prime Minister Fukuda held another meeting with Ozawa Ichiro and the heads of the other opposition parties on Thursday.

Unlike the last meeting, nothing of note occurred — perhaps the other leaders were there to forestall a "corrupt bargain" between Messrs. Fukuda and Ozawa — and the LDP and the DPJ appear to be no closer to establishing the rules of the game for a divided Diet.

The editorials of the major dailies blame Mr. Ozawa for standing in the way of compromises on, "many things that should be done." (Believe it or not, that's in the headline of Asahi's editorial, not Yomiuri's.) Mainichi, while recognizing that both sides need to work together to make policy on behalf of Japan, singled out Mr. Ozawa for not taking a position amenable to cooperation on the new decision making rules, calling it "regrettable."

Yomiuri, not surprisingly, has the most strident tone in criticizing the DPJ: "Under the divided Diet, the DPJ, as the largest party in the House of Councillors, bears great responsibility in driving the political situation...However, on the DPJ's side, one cannot see them bearing this responsibility." The editorial goes on to criticize the party's irresponsibility at length for opposing the anti-terror law without passing alternate legislation, and raises the prospect of a "a debate on the uselessness of the House of Councillors."

Sankei largely echoes Yomiuri and Mainichi, and Asahi devotes most of its attention to the LDP and its agenda, but the common thread running through these editorials is dissatisfaction with gridlock.

I do think that the blame falls on the DPJ's shoulders. Had the party — and Mr. Ozawa — been more flexible on foreign policy questions, upon which the political debate is now focused, the DPJ could have pressured the LDP to approve all or most of the DPJ's domestic plans in exchange for the DPJ's assent to the MSDF refueling mission. But Mr. Ozawa has refused to give on anything, instead staking out a hardline position and hoping that the LDP will bend to his will. When push comes to shove, Mr. Fukuda and the LDP control a supermajority in the Lower House, and should public dissatisfaction (or, perhaps more accurately, media dissatisfaction masked as public dissatisfaction) grow, the DPJ will lose. The fact remains that the DPJ needs the LDP more than vice versa. I think the DPJ has completely mishandled the current Diet session. Even while compromising with the government on the anti-terror law, the DPJ could have criticized the LDP for ignoring the concerns of the public — which are overwhelmingly domestic, "lifestyle" issues — and for serving as the tool of the Bush administration. By holding its nose and supporting the MSDF mission, the DPJ could have refocused discussion on domestic policy issues, to its advantage, I think.

Now, in the wake of the meeting, it seems that talk is growing both of yet another Diet extension and a snap election. The former step will be necessary if, as I suspected (as in this post), the DPJ uses its control of the Upper House to delay action on the anti-terror law. Remember that according to the constitution, if the Upper House takes no action within sixty days — not counting days out of session — the bill is considered rejected, giving the Lower House the opportunity to pass it again. Should the bill be passed in this manner, however, a snap election could be unavoidable; Mainichi suggests that an Upper House censure motion would follow Lower House "re-passage" of the bill, leading to a general election. (I still disagree with the assumption that an Upper House censure motion against the government will necessarily lead to a snap election, but I recognize that it is a plausible outcome.)

Whatever the difficulties ahead for Mr. Fukuda as the debate over the MSDF mission reaches a climax, whatever the problems associated with corruption at the Defense Ministry, the DPJ has squandered its advantages — and, for the moment anyway, the prime minister may be enjoying a slight boost thanks to two successful foreign trips. It is not at all clear how this Diet session will wrap up, but as MTC suggests, Mr. Fukuda has not faltered in the face of adversity.

What does Osaka tell us?

In the first major election since Mr. Fukuda took office as prime minister, the DPJ-backed candidate for mayor in Osaka bested the LDP-Komeito-backed candidate by some 50,000 votes. Mr. Hatoyama, the DPJ secretary-general, was quick to proclaim the significance of the victory: "This election is symbolic for national politics. This is proof that the people of Osaka do not approve of the Fukuda cabinet." DPJ leaders also were quick to point out that the party need not fear consequences of the turmoil surrounding Mr. Ozawa's "resignation."

The LDP response is more confused, with some dismissing the significance of the municipal election and others suggesting that this is a continuation of a trend that began with the LDP defeat in July.

It is important to keep things in perspective. Yes, the government lost a municipal election in a city in which the LDP and Komeito combined to win eighteen seats in the 2005 general election. But that was twice as many seats as the two governing parties won in Osaka-fu in the 2003 general election. In other words, the DPJ would have been well-placed to succeed in Osaka regardless of the quality of the party's leadership or the occupant of the Kantei. It should be no surprise that the LDP will face an uphill battle in places like Osaka and Tokyo, where its vote totals were inflated to abnormal, unsustainable levels.

The critical factor when looking to the outcome of a general election remains the countryside. A repeat of July 2007, and the LDP could be in serious trouble. This election tells us nothing about the LDP's prospects in rural Japan. It does tell us that Mr. Fukuda still has a lot of work to do if he's going to pick up where Mr. Koizumi left off in the project to turn the LDP into a modern, urban-based party.

The DPJ should not take this occasion to gloat. As Mainchi reports, the DPJ's legislative agenda is at "a do-or-die moment," as the fate of bills passed by the DPJ in the Upper House remains uncertain. In other words, the DPJ is facing the reality of the post-July Diet: it needs the LDP's assent to do anything constructive. It could, of course, pin its hopes on public backlash against LDP obstructionism, but there are few guarantees that the public will react exactly how the party hopes it will.

The result may be a quid-pro-quo, with the DPJ's backing down on the anti-terror law in exchange for the LDP's assent to laws passed in the Upper House relating to pension funds and agricultural subsidies (although I have a hard time seeing how the DPJ can back away from a position on which Mr. Ozawa seems to have staked his reputation, and which has conveniently united most of the DPJ). Nevertheless, with Mr. Ozawa and Mr. Fukuda set to meet once again time this Thursday, a bargain of this sort could be in the making.

Nothing may come of this next meeting — at least, nothing like what happened in the wake of the last meeting between the two party leaders. But the underlying challenge of establishing the rules of the game for the divided Diet remains, regardless of the latest election returns.

Early election? Maybe not

Answering a question on election timing during a visit to Akita prefecture, Koga Makoto, the LDP's election strategy chairman, said, "It's good if done slowly. The term of office has another two years. We cannot possibly attain two-thirds of the seats. By this way of thinking, the end of the term is good."

This is, of course, no different from what most observers of Japanese politics have been saying for months now, since rumors of a snap election began proliferating in Nagata-cho last spring.

I do not think, however, that Mr. Koga's will be the last words on this subject. It may be what Mr. Koga, Mr. Fukuda, and other LDP leaders hope for — if I were an LDP backbencher, especially a first-term LDP backbencher, I would be angry if this isn't what they're thinking — but the LDP and the DPJ are engaged in a bit of parry and thrust on the subject of a snap election. The DPJ, vacillating between despondency about its electoral prospects and eagerness for a snap election, has dropped hints of a censure motion in the Upper House in the hopes that it will force Mr. Fukuda to call an election and effectively give up his government's supermajority. The government, meanwhile, has dropped hints of an early election, perhaps out of a desire to lure the DPJ into taking a more confrontational stance, potentially angering voters.

Where does Mr. Koga's statement fit in this scheme? A way to coax the DPJ to cooperate? An honest statement of the LDP executive's thinking? Mr. Koga and the Fukuda government may be trying to calm the political situation, draining some of the tension out of the nejire kokkai by reminding the DPJ, the media, and the public that the government can wait nearly two years before calling an election, and therefore it's necessary to think practically about how to formulate policy in the meantime.