The end of values diplomacy

Prime Minister Aso Taro is a firm believer in "values-oriented diplomacy," the use of Japan's foreign policy tools to promote the spread of "universal values" like democracy and human rights.

As foreign minister under Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, he spoke of Japan's role in creating an "arc of freedom and prosperity," a belt of what he saw as nascent democracies on the edge of the Eurasian continent that Japan could take under its wings and nurture to maturity. In his 2006 speech at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Aso argued that Japan had a long record of actions in support of democracy promotion, insisting that the Abe government was doing "nothing more than giving a name to the diplomatic achievements" that had characterized Japanese foreign policy since the end of the cold war and "giving it a new positioning within our overall diplomacy." Aso envisioned cooperation with NATO, the EU, and Asian democracies on behalf of the goal of promoting democracy.

The arc of freedom and prosperity resurfaced in Aso's January address at the opening of the current ordinary session of the Diet, using it to frame Japanese ODA in Africa, Japan's participation in the war on terrorism the overseas contingency operation in Afghanistan, its environmental, energy, and natural resource diplomacy, and, the most recent addition, its anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia. A short while later, in his address to the World Economic Forum in Davos Aso stressed his belief in "Peace and Happiness through Economic Prosperity and Democracy" and reiterated the importance of Japan's efforts to build the arc.

After Aso was chased out of Thailand this week — along with the other leaders of the member countries of the East Asia summit — it is difficult to see the value of "values-oriented diplomacy" as the central concept for Japanese foreign policy.

Aso hurried out of Thailand when demonstrations by supporters of former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra forced the Thai government to cancel ASEAN and EAS meetings. The demonstrations marked the latest step backwards for Thailand, which until the 2006 coup that ousted Shinawatra had been making considerable progress towards more stable democracy since the promulgation of the 1997 constitution. As Tim Meisburger of The Asia Foundation explains, steps in the direction of democracy have been undermined by a political struggle that pits traditional elites against the urban and rural poor mobilized by Shinawatra, resulting in the back-and-forth battles among Yellows and Reds in recent years. As Colum Murphy of Far Eastern Economic Review argues, there are a number of steps that the government of Abhisit Vejjajiva needs to take if Thailand is to reverse its slide into disorder. Whether the Thai government will do so appears uncertain.

The upshot is that despite the Bush administration's emphasis on democracy building in Southeast Asia (see this review of the administration's "accomplishments") and despite Aso's "values-oriented diplomacy," Southeast Asia is less democratic today than it was a decade ago. Neither country has been able to halt Thailand's slide away from democracy. Neither country has been able to advance the cause of democracy in Burma. While Indonesia has just had a parliamentary election that shows that it is "strengthening of the processes of orderly, healthy competition within the Indonesian political system" — prompting the Economist to note that Indonesia "has a fair claim to be South-East Asia’s only fully functioning democracy" — it is doubtful that US or Japanese efforts to promote democracy would rank high on a list of reasons for Indonesia's democratic consolidation.

After Aso's abrupt departure from Thailand, it is time for the prime minister to jettison the promotion of univeral values as the primary goal of Japan's foreign policy. The US has already done so — recall Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's speech to the Asia Society in February, in which she not only did not mention democracy, but actually passed the values agenda off to Southeast Asia, saying "we look forward to working with our other partners and friends in the regions, allies like Thailand and the Philippines, along with Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam, to ensure that ASEAN can live up to its charter, to demonstrate the region’s capacity for leadership on economic, political, human rights, and social issues." Should democracy promotion remain a priority for the US and Japan in the region? Yes, but only one among several, and certainly not the most important.

What should take the place of values-oriented diplomacy? I think Fukuda Yasuo pointed the way last summer in his outline of what would amount to a new middle-power role for Japan in Asia. The new Fukuda doctrine may yet survive its progenitor. What other options are available to the Japanese government?

A future for values diplomacy?

Daniel Twining, currently a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund and formerly an Asia policy staffer at the State Department's policy planning staff and an adviser to John McCain, offers his recommendations to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at Shadow Government, a new blog at Foreign Policy featuring the writing of conservative and Republican foreign policy analysts.

Twining is a dedicated believer in the idea of "values diplomacy," that catch phrase of the Abe government — with Aso Taro as foreign minister — that placed "universal values," at the center of Japan's foreign policy, at least rhetorically.

The US, Japan, and other democracies of East Asia, according to this view (common in neoconservative circles in Washington, see this post for example), must cooperate to promote the spread of democracy in the region. Accordingly, for Twining the first two goals for US strategy in Asia must be "Accelerate the rise of democratic great powers in Asia that are increasingly willing to help police the region" and "Encourage strategic cooperation among Asia-Pacific democracies." Democracy reappears in point eight, "Promote democracy." The contrast with Secretary Clinton's vision of US East Asia strategy could not be more pronounced. Recall that in her first statement on Asia policy, Mrs. Clinton barely mentioned cooperation among democracies and democracy promotion as important US goals in the region.

And yet Twining thinks that no goal is more important than binding the region's democracies closer together. Twining celebrates what he sees as a "trend" of "Asian nations...leading the effort to form democratic security concerts, a trend Washington should enthusiastically nurture."

There are several problems with Twining's proposal.

First, it is not clear that the trend he sees is actually a trend. He cites the "quad," the strategic partnership among the US, Australia, Japan, and India, as a leading example of this trend. Except that it appears that the quad barely survived the Abe government that spearheaded its creation. Similarly, while the Australia-Japan and India-Japan security agreements are unprecedented in Japanese foreign policy, it is still unclear what substance lies behind the agreements. The democracies may be talking to each other more, but it is too early to declare that Asian democracies have deepened their strategic cooperation in any substantial way to the point of promoting "regional peace and prosperity."

However, if we grant that Twining's assessment of the state of cooperation among Asian democracies is correct, he still makes what I think is an overly optimistic assessment of the gains from said cooperation. Twining concludes that strong, democratic states on the Asian littoral — the same democratic states who he believes are deepening cooperation amongst themselves — "could deter Chinese adventurism and help ensure its peaceful rise."

Does Twining really believe that, that China will somehow be so impressed by the strength of its neighbors that it will simply accept what is tantamount to encirclement, cease enhancing its military power, and trust the US and the other democracies on its periphery to keep the sea lines carrying vital resources to China open at all times? If China is, in Twining's words, "a prickly, insecure giant," why would it feel any less insecure in these circumstances? It does not take a considerable leap of imagination to wonder whether this view might be a bit fanciful. Why is Twining so sure that deepening security ties among democracies (and non- or semi-democracies, in the case of Vietnam and Singapore) arrayed around China's borders while trigger such a benign response from China? This isn't simply a matter of Chinese paranoia. Is there a country in the world that would respond benignly to the formation of ever closer security ties among surrounding countries that also stress the illegitimacy of the surrounded country's government?

In short, the policy proposed by Twining here and by US and Japanese officials at various points in time would amount to encirclement, whether intentionally or not. As Joseph Nye has said, "If we treat China as an enemy now, we’re guaranteeing an enemy for the future."

But it is unlikely that this scenario will come to pass, for another reason ignored by Twining. Even if the Asian democracies are talking more with each other, they are also talking more with China, because, much like the US, none of them can afford to let relations with China deteriorate. South Korea, a strong Asian democracy that barely figures in the flurry of strategic cooperation mentioned by Twining except in regard to NATO-South Korea ties, is often written off as destined for the Chinese sphere of influence if and when reunification occurs. Australia has worked to avoid giving the impression that new security talks with Japan are aimed at China. India certainly looks warily across the Himalayas and now out into the Indian Ocean at China, but that does not make India a reliable junior partner for the US in a league of Asian democracies.

As I've argued before, to understand the future of East Asia it is essential to look at the role of middle powers, the powers forced to maneuver between China and the US, working to minimize antagonism while preventing the two from reaching agreements prejudicial to their interests. The firm ties rooted in shared values envisioned by Twining make it more difficult to pursue the flexible diplomacy required by life as a middle power, and I do not expect we'll see substantial progress in security cooperation among the democracies qua democracies. Twining comes close to recognizing this: "They are less likely to fall under the sway of their giant neighbors when they have options for partnership with a benign, distant partner. America's staying power at a time of dramatic strategic change gives smaller Asian countries geopolitical options they would not otherwise have." But while small (and not-so-small) Asian countries are in no hurry to see the US leave Asia, they also do not want the kind of universal relationships envisioned by Twining. They want the US as an option: a hedge against Chinese expansionism, a market for their goods, and perhaps as a source for investment. But that does not mean that they support active containment of China or making democracy a top priority for the region. The desire of middle powers for an active US presence in the region is an asset for the US only insofar as the US doesn't overreach in its zeal to promote democracy and bend regional institutions to its ends.

Twining further calls for fostering a "pluralistic regional order" in East Asia but the reality is that East Asia is already pluralistic, checkered with a growing array of bilateral, mini-lateral, regional, and trans-Pacific organizations, in addition to the network of US bilateral alliances. These organizations are based not on shared values, as they feature ties between democracies and non-democracies, but shared interests, and one interest in particular: stability in East Asia. The US should be engaged as much as possible in these organizations, but it should also be willing to accept that there is not a seat for the US at every table, at least not if the US wants to dominate the discussion and, as Mrs. Clinton said Friday referring to past US governments, act "reflexively before considering available facts and evidence, or hearing the perspectives of others." While he recognizes the importance of "talking economics," it seems for the most part US engagement in the region would involve more talking — about democracy and security — than listening.

Meanwhile, given the existence of a pluralistic regional order, the US should not fear the creation of what Michael Green calls institutions based on "preserving Asian exceptionalism." Asian exceptionalism sounds like another way of saying, Asian countries working together to solve Asian problems without the US at the table. Is that such a terrible thing? If there are, as Twining says, so many burgeoning and established democracies in the region, why should the US fear organizations from which it is absent?

Finally, on the very question of democracy promotion, Twining includes it as a goal but does nothing to explain how to go about it except to say that democracy is on the march in the region and China is on the wrong side of history. (Sounds awfully Marxist, doesn't it?) How does Twining propose to make China (or Vietnam or Burma or North Korea) democratic? How does Twining propose for the US and other regional democracies to keep existing democracies from lapsing, as in the case of Thailand?

Meanwhile, there is also a bit of irony in Twining's enthusiasm for democracy promotion, in that the more developed the democracy, the greater the popular ambivalence regarding the country's ties with the US. For example, while Japan's leaders talk of the strength of the alliance — perhaps for want of anything else to say — the Japanese public is increasingly doubtful about the alliance after years of an approach to the alliance that dovetailed with Twining's vision. Skepticism regarding ties with the US in countries like Japan and Australia does not necessarily mean that the Japanese and Australian peoples are more trusting of China, it means they are moving in the direction of a middle-power foreign policy that looks at both regional powers with a certain degree of distrust, wary of Chinese intentions while concerned about US overzealousness that would entrap their countries in wars not of their choosing.

In sum, the emphasis on democracy is misguided, not just because there is little the US can do — and little US allies want to do — to promote democracy in the region, but because it assumes that the region can be neatly divided into democracies and non-democracies, which in turn risks alienating China and sending it down a more assertive and unilateralist path, the very future Twining says he wants to prevent.

Changing terms

Following the discussion in this post from earlier this week, I found this article at the Economist website of interest.
It opens by exploring the evolving terms used to describe Europe, but then shifts into a discussion of democracy, and suggests, "ban the word 'democracy', which has been worn smooth by misuse." It proposes as alternatives "law-governed," "free," and "public-spirited," with Karl Popper's "open society" serving as useful short hand for societies with these qualities.

As per my previous comments on this, the problem with democracy promotion is often one of language, because democracy means different things to different people. Like "empire" or "imperialism," the term has been overused to the point of analytical uselessness. For a government to proclaim itself in favor of spreading democracy almost ensures disappointment, both for transmitters and receivers, as the reality never quite matches what either had imagined. Replacing democracy with more concrete terms, such as those mentioned by the Economist, would provide for more concrete targets — and thus more realizable visions for what the developed democracies can actually achieve in helping other countries develop politically.

The democracy question

In light of the quashing of the "Saffron Revolution" in Burma and the Japanese government's feeble response to the violence, which took the life of a Japanese citizen, it is probably safe to declare MOFA's "value oriented diplomacy" to create an "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" dead.

But with Japan's following behind Washington in backtracking on democracy promotion, it is worth asking whether there is a danger of going too far in the other direction. Should the developed democracies be in the business of bolstering nascent democracies and goading authoritarian states to democratize? If so, how can they deliver concrete results?

To the former, Stanley Fish writes in the New York Times about participating the making of a BBC program called "Why Democracy," for which he answered ten questions about democracy in the contemporary world. Some of the questions Fish rightly dismisses as fatuous, but there are several questions that get to the heart of the problem when considering whether developed democracies can help others along the same path. Indeed, Fish wonders whether Fukuyama's "End of History" democratic teleology is accurate, and wonders whether perhaps other peoples might value other things above democracy. In other words, it's not that some nations are anti-democratic but rather that they simply value other things more (religiously ordered society, traditional ways of living, etc.). I think this is an appropriate question in light of Japan's own democratic experience. Do the Japanese people value democracy more than the range of "myths" that constitute modern Japanese nationhood?

(This, of course, transforms that perennial topic of bulletin board discussions about Japan — is Japan a democracy? — into a different matter entirely. Democracy isn't a matter of steps on a ladder but shades along a gradient.)

Accordingly, if democratization means not pulling a people up a ladder in the direction of "democracy" but something messier, more rooted in culture and tradition, what can be done about the fifty-eight and forty-five countries classified by Freedom House in 2007 as partly free and not free respectively? Presumably Iraq has, for the moment, discredited the idea of armed democratization — "The End of History" on horseback — although, as Tony Judt notes, the "liberal hawks" of 2003 are finding their voice again and their colleagues on the right are probably only slightly chastened by the Iraq disaster. But are there policy tools short of outright war capable of instigating a transition to democracy?

I'm personally partial to initiatives like those managed by the semi-public US National Endowment for Democracies (NED) and partner organizations, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI) (the latter two are loosely affiliated with the Democratic and Republican parties). These organizations are focused on capacity-building for democracies, training participants (mainly but not only parties) in how to function in a democracy and helping to strengthen public and private institutions necessary for a liberal democracy. Their approach is less visible than high-profile official initiatives and more cognizant of the challenges associated with democratization, acknowledging the time it takes for a society to democratize, the need for robust civil society institutions, and the necessity of adapting institutions to local conditions. It also recognizes that democracy has to come from within; the citizens of a country have to want it themselves. Democracy cannot be a gift given from abroad, but material and intellectual support for those who want to democratize can.

The key may be, as Noah Feldman argues in the New York Times (apologies for this NYT-heavy post), toning down the rhetoric of democratization — used heavily by the Bush administration — that exposes the US to charges of hypocrisy or impotence for failing to live up to its rhetorical commitments, but not abandoning the cause of democratization. Like Feldman, I think there is value to developed democracies using their wealth and power to support democratization, which, as he notes, is unique for great powers: "Empires inevitably fall, and when they do, history judges them for the legacies they leave behind. It would be both sacrilegious and ahistorical to believe that our power will last for eternity. If liberty and self-government are among our legacies, then our strength will not have been squandered."

But the developed democracies need to be aware of their own limits, both material and strategic, and not let their rhetoric run ahead of those limits. There can be no hard and fast rules for when to lean on authoritarian governments and when to cooperate with them — it will take prudence and wisdom on the part of developed governments, coupled with long-term, low-level support for the forces of democratization in non-democratic states.

To return to Japan's "value diplomacy," Tokyo might, in fact, be quite good at this quieter, more patient democratization. Perhaps the DPJ should set up its own version of the National Democratic Institute and expose the hollowness of the government's rhetoric.

Asia's future seen in Sydney

At the OPEC APEC summit in Sydney, the leaders of APEC's twenty-one member states have been holding bilateral talks in the run-up to the final summit this weekend. I don't put much stock in APEC as an organization that will be able to deliver concrete results — it's simply too big and too diverse — but as a forum for the region's leaders to sit down in the same room and talk about Asia (for the most part) for the better part of a week, it's irreplaceable.

President Bush, taking a break from Iraq, spoke at length about freedom and democracy in Asia, but at the same time, in reiterating the importance of the US security commitment to the region, made clear the limits of US power to deliver political change:

Today, our alliances with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines, and our defense relationships with Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, and others in the region form the bedrock of America's engagement in the Asia Pacific. These security relationships have helped keep the peace in this vital part of the world. They've created conditions that have allowed freedom to expand and markets to grow, and commerce to flow, and young democracies to gain in confidence. America is committed to the security of the Asia Pacific region, and that commitment is unshakable.

This is a fairly accurate description of what the US presence in Asia over the past sixty years has achieved. The US could do nothing more than give its allies the space to change domestically, but as South Koreans, Filipinos, Taiwanese, Indonesians, and others can attest to, the US by no means guaranteed the democratization of their countries, and in fact stood in the way of democratization for most of the cold war. The US role was and is providing the public goods of peace and security that have made it easier for the region's countries to liberalize. (This post at The Marmot's Hole, which wonders about the relevance of American power in Asia, misses this point completely.)

The US will continue to play this background role, enabling a dense web of connections between all the region's countries — even among those presumed to have confrontational relationships. And so talk of a community of Asian democracies is not only irresponsible, creating the impression of ideological battle lines in Asia, but it also ignores the reality of life in twenty-first century Asia.

The Pacific democracies cannot solve the region's problems without China, and they better get used to that fact. President Bush recognizes this on some level, based on the expansiveness of the agenda for his talks with President Hu. Australia, too, is aware that there is no avoiding China, agreeing to convene annual security talks with China from next year. Undoutedly, if Kevin Rudd becomes Australia's next premier, Australia will be even more careful to avoid the impression that it is part of a de facto alliance to contain China — as MTC notes, Rudd, fluent in Mandarin and well versed in Chinese affairs, would hardly be an enthusiastic participant in the democratic community.

Indeed, political change in Australia, the US, and Japan could make the "Asian spirit" more apparent. Mr. Ozawa and the DPJ are obviously not enthusiastic proponents of "values diplomacy," and would presumably highlight political cooperation with China (Mr. Ozawa's trip to China in December will be interesting to watch). In the US, it is difficult to imagine Mr. Bush's successor being as heavy on the rhetoric of democracy, even if a Democratic president might feel pressured to lean on China economically.

The Pacific rim and the Asian littoral is, in fact, much more peaceful than many observers admit (or want to admit). There is always the potential for misunderstandings, of course, but prudent, far-sighted leadership, not least by the US, could do much to diminish the potential for conflict.

Who is missing from this group?

In Abe's Magical Democracy tour, there was lots of talk about cooperation between Japan, India, the US, and Australia — glorious Pacific-spanning cooperation among democracies.

But what about South Korea, which last time I checked was a vibrant democracy whose people struggled to achieve it after decades of authoritarian rule?

It seems that any organization of democracies in Asia would be incomplete without a democracy that also happens to be a significant economic power. Is South Korea's inclusion implied in any such organization? Or was Mr. Abe signaling that he expects that if given a choice, South Korea is bound to choose China (and its northern brother) over its fellow democracies, so why even bother extending a hand?

Now, granted, South Korea could do a better job trying to bridge the divide with its Japanese neighbor (like, for example, not arms racing with it). But to me this strikes me as just another sign that no one should take Mr. Abe's proposal all that seriously — as MTC wisely suggests in his "Magical Democracy Tour" post, the community of Asian democracies is more about Mr. Abe's personal and political needs than a serious effort to reorganize the regional security environment.

For Abe, it's still February 2003

Gordan Chang, the anti-China polemicist writing at Commentary's Contentions blog, has a very different take than I on Mr. Abe's dangerously irresponsible community of Asian democracies.

Abe's proposal, Chang thinks, is simply grand: "Is Tokyo becoming the leading proponent of a free world? Since July of last year, Japan, among the democracies ringing the Pacific Ocean, has adopted the most resolute foreign policy positions on Asia. For instance, the United Nations Security Council’s resolutions on North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapons programs were unsatisfactory, but they would have been weaker still if Tokyo had not persuaded Washington to adopt a stiffer attitude. Now, Abe is pushing a grand coalition that Washington should have proposed."

Abe is "the most interesting leader in the free world."

To Chang, the Bush administration has been cowardly, sucking up to China and Russia in an effort to, I don't know, keep the peace. Instead it seems that the US should be needling those enemies, ensuring that they have even less interest in maintaining some semblance of order in the region, and bravo to Shinzo for doing what Washington has lacked the courage to do.

For Chang — and his admirer Ampontan, it seems — it is still early 2003 and the US and allies can do anything they please when it comes to promoting the spread of democracy abroad. Remember what President Bush said at the American Enterprise Institute in February 2003:

Much is asked of America in this year 2003. The work ahead is demanding. It will be difficult to help freedom take hold in a country that has known three decades of dictatorship, secret police, internal divisions, and war. It will be difficult to cultivate liberty and peace in the Middle East, after so many generations of strife. Yet, the security of our nation and the hope of millions depend on us, and Americans do not turn away from duties because they are hard. We have met great tests in other times, and we will meet the tests of our time.

We go forward with confidence, because we trust in the power of human freedom to change lives and nations. By the resolve and purpose of America, and of our friends and allies, we will make this an age of progress and liberty. Free people will set the course of history, and free people will keep the peace of the world.

Democracy promotion is a luxury from a more carefree age. After four years of learning just how limited American power is as a transformative force, returning to such rhetoric is dangerously naive. Mr. Bush may want to, but with the shift in the balance of power in his administration — at least as far as Asia policy is concerned — the US is less apt to rely on the heady rhetoric of liberty and democracy for all in East Asia. The US has more urgent interests at stake.

Mr. Abe, however, never got the memo about scaling back the democracy rhetoric, outlining how too much rhetoric coupled with too little action (or even worse, wholly counterproductive action) actually diminishes a country's influence and ultimately its security.

The (most interesting) leader of the free world? More like the most dangerously naive leader in the free world. At a time when the shifting international environment — especially in Asia — demands nimble foxes, Mr. Abe is a stubborn hedgehog, a relic from a time when the developed democracies thought they could do whatever they wanted without having to sully themselves in dealings with unsavory regimes.