Was the coalition doomed from the start?

On Friday, Fukushima Mizuho, the head of the Social Democratic Party of Japan, refused to bow to the prime minister's decision to accept a modified version of the 2006 realignment agreement, forcing the prime minister to dismiss her from her position as minister responsible for consumer affairs.

Not surprisingly, on Sunday the SDPJ decided that it would leave the coalition, although it suggested that electoral cooperation in the upcoming upper house election is still possible. The DPJ still holds a slim majority in the upper house with the PNP — perhaps thanks to the work of the "devil" — and will undoubtedly press harder to get its legislation passed without having to extend the current Diet session.

Jun Okumura questions whether electoral cooperation is the wisest decision for its survival "as an anti-business, anti-Japan-US alliance protest party." In this statement, of course, one sees the problem with the coalition between the DPJ and the SDPJ. With 308 seats — including 221 of 300 single-member districts — in the House of Representatives, electoral dynamics suggest that the DPJ would drift to the center once in power, as it needs to maintain pluralities in as many districts as possible. In this sense, perhaps the only surprising thing about the Hatoyama government's embrace of the old agreement is that it tried so hard and so long to find an alternative to accommodation. Some might say that the DPJ is becoming the old LDP, although I don't think that's a particularly meaningful assessment: Futenma, and Ozawa's courtship of old LDP interest groups notwithstanding, the DPJ's priorities and identity remain distinct. If the LDP and the DPJ increasingly resemble each other (and if the LDP survives), it is because survival in a political system dominated by nonaligned voters will produces moves to the center in order to satisfy as many floating voters as possible, combined with rhetorical and symbolical gestures to distinguish one from the other.

The SDPJ is in wholly different circumstances. The party has only seven seats in the lower house, four from proportional blocs and three from single-member districts. One of those three — Teruya Kantoku — is from Okinawa's second district. As a marginal party, the SDPJ's survival depends on offering something unique to a narrow slice of core supporters, in this case left-wing ideologues who share its commitment to reducing the US presence in Japan, resisting revision of the constitution, and resisting growing inequality. While on paper there appears to be some basis for cooperation between the SDPJ and the DPJ, the reality is that for the DPJ compromise is indispensable (for large parties, manifestos, one might say, are made to be broken), while for the SDPJ its survival depends on rigid adherence to its principles and promises. Had the LDP not fallen into such disarray, the coalition might have survived a bit longer in mutual resistance to a convenient enemy, but the electoral dynamics of the coalition seem to have doomed the partnership in advance.

Electoral dynamics were compounded by the SDPJ's history. The old Socialist Party virtually broke itself by compromising its principles on the security alliance and the SDF to form a coalition with the LDP in 1994. That choice may have been the result of the party's failure to recognize that the JSP was becoming a marginal ideological party even before electoral reform: in 1993, the party actually lost 66 seats, most of them to the LDP splinter parties that would form the non-LDP coalition after the election. In other words, having betrayed its core supporters on the alliance once before, it was extremely unlikely that Fukushima would act differently than she did.

In short, Fukushima had to reject the prime minister's compromise on account of the past, present, and future of the SDPJ. The party's future is still precarious — it is not immediately clear which party gains more from electoral cooperation without cooperation in government — but having stood on principle, the SDPJ should have an easier time maintaining its electoral base.

Preparing to retreat?

As the Hatoyama government approaches the end of its first 100 days in office, the air is thick with condemnation of the DPJ-led government's handling of the relationship with the United States, particularly the ongoing dispute over the future of Futenma air station and the US presence in Okinawa.

Smelling blood in the water, the LDP and its allies in the conservative commentariat have gone on the offensive against the government. On Thursday Tanigaki Sadakazu, the leader of the LDP, said that the government was acting irresponsibly when it came to the hopes of the Okinawan people and harming relations with the US. Compared to what others were saying, Tanigaki was being charitable. Conservative journalist Sakurai Yoshiko, speaking in Kyushu at a forum sponsored by the Sankei-affiliated journal Seiron, said the Hatoyama government was effectively giving comfort to China by taking on the US on Futenma. (Sakurai also criticized the Hatoyama government for neglecting the military to spend money on child allowances, and insisted that Japan is on the path to becoming a dependency of China.) Sankei's prose is no less purple than Sakurai's. In an editorial published Thursday, Sankei accused the Hatoyama government of creating a crisis in the US-Japan alliance, and says that Hatoyama has committed an act of betrayal towards President Obama by prioritizing the stability of his government over his country's security.

Richard Armitage, visiting Tokyo earlier this week along with Michael Green, added his criticism of the Hatoyama government in a meeting with Tanigaki, questioning the government's ability to lead.

It is hard not to conclude that the Hatoyama government has miscalculated, in part I think because Hatoyama assumed that he could resolve the problem by speaking frankly with Obama (which would explain the prime minister's desire to summit with Obama on the sidelines in Copenhagen). In effect, Hatoyama seems to have desired the mirror image of Koizumi Junichiro's relationship with George W. Bush: where the Bush-Koizumi relationship deepened Japan's dependence on the US and led Japan to support US wars abroad, his relationship with Obama would based on mutual trust and would result in the creation of an "equal" US-Japan relationship that would focus on cooperation in non-security fields.

To build this relationship Hatoyama seems to have decided to take a calculated risk. If the two countries could tackle Futenma quickly — an issue which has been a millstone around the alliance for years — the way would be open to the kind of relationship Hatoyama purports to desire. By addressing this issue in the first months of its tenure, his government could signal a break with past practices in the alliance and demonstrate its ability to follow through on its promises and its deftness in foreign policy.

Instead the Hatoyama government faces its worst-case scenario: it has painted itself into a corner, having systematically eliminated alternatives to the current agreement, while appearing incompetent in its handling of foreign policy, deepening the mistrust of US officials (many of whom were already skeptical about the DPJ) in the process. Also, by dangling the possibility of a new agreement that could remove Marines from Okinawa entirely, the Hatoyama government raised the hopes of the Okinawan people, perhaps to unreasonable heights.

I am hesitant to declare this situation a crisis for the alliance because the Hatoyama government may already be moving in the direction of accommodation: Hatoyama has said that all options are on the table (including the agreement on hand), and has indicated that his government's plan will be forthcoming as early as next week. Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya has concluded that relocating Futenma's operations to Kadena is not an option. After visiting Guam, Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi — perhaps the leading defender of the status quo in the cabinet — concluded that relocating Futenma to Guam is not doable. The Hatoyama government is running out of alternatives to the 2006 agreement. Even the Social Democrats may be coming around: a senior member of her own party criticized SDPJ leader Fukushima Mizuho for suggesting that she could pull her party out of the government over the Futenma issue.

If it ends up embracing the 2006 agreement, it will be hard to conclude that the Hatoyama government did not injure itself by dragging out the process only to maintain the status quo. I do not think that it will be a mortal blow to the government because ultimately Futenma is a low-stakes issue domestically. It does reinforce the image that the DPJ is inexperienced on foreign policy, but then the Japanese public already believed that last summer before the general election and still voted the DPJ into power. More significantly, it calls into question Hatoyama's ability to lead his cabinet.

I am more sanguine than most when it comes to the significance of disagreements among cabinet ministers — I do think that the DPJ's model is a prime minister who is first among equals. That being said, on the Futenma issue Hatoyama has not been first at all, despite his periodic interjections to remind the public and the US that the final decision will be his and his alone. Given the sensitivities of this issue, Hatoyama needed to use a heavier hand to guide the deliberations of his ministers. Someone needed to take control of the process of reviewing the agreement. Okada tried, but apparently failed. It needed to be the prime minister. Hatoyama may be trying to correct that now, but the damage has been done.

What have we learned from this dispute?

First, my earlier misgivings about Hatoyama's ability to lead are justified. Hatoyama seems to have some idea of where he wants to take Japan, but he seems to have little idea how to go about it. Hatoyama strikes me as too much of a dreamer and not enough of a strategist. This tendency would be less of a problem if Hatoyama had a Machiavelli in his cabinet, but it is not yet clear to me who in the government will fill this role, if anyone. (For all we know it may be Ozawa Ichiro after all, although I am not convinced of this just yet.)

Second, as noted above, I think the lasting damage from this dispute will be limited, especially if it works out in Washington's favor. Having been burned on this issue and facing an general election upper house election (I hope writing general election where I meant upper house election doesn't prove prescient) and a fight over the budget in the new year, we will be hearing less from the Hatoyama government on foreign policy in the months to come, perhaps clearing the air for a proper discussion of the future of the alliance and the future of US forces in Japan (what Hatoyama, Ozawa, and others are most interested in anyway). This discussion needs to happen, the sooner the better, and Futenma and Okinawa are sideshows to the bigger question of where the DPJ sees the alliance in its Asia-centered foreign policy and what is the minimum level of commitment the US will expect from Japan if the alliance indeed narrows its focus to the defense of Japan. Someone, if not Hatoyama, needs to start signaling how the Japanese government plans to translate its foreign policy ideals into concrete policy.

Third, the DPJ may hold the upper hand in its relationship with the SDPJ. The SDPJ does have the nuclear option of pulling out of the government and reducing it to a minority in the upper house, but it is a one-shot weapon. Once the SDPJ uses it, it's done and who is to say how the SDPJ would fare in a snap election triggered by its pulling out of the government. What would the SDPJ have to gain from pulling out of the government? With Fukushima in the cabinet it has a seat at the table, giving it more influence over policy now than it could expect to have in opposition (just ask the LDP) or as a silent partner in the Diet. While the SDPJ's hand — and, for that matter, the PNP's hand — looks impressive given that it holds the balance in the upper house, its position is weaker than meets the eye.

The Hatoyama government misplayed the Futenma dispute. But it is possible that the prime minister and his ministers will learn from the experience and be a bit savvier the next time around.

Hatoyama delivers an impressive cabinet

The votes are being counted in the House of Representatives, after which the House of Councillors will vote for the new prime minister. Hatoyama Yukio's election as the next prime minister is assured.

On the eve of his election by the Diet, Hatoyama decided the presumptive lineup of his cabinet — but he did not share it with the press Tuesday, warning that if appointments "are leaked, they will be changed." (Hatoyama actually deserves credit for his handling of the press regarding cabinet appointments during the past two weeks: he said he would hold off on making announcements, and he has stuck to it, offering little to the press when questioned. Undoubtedly he has made few friends among the media as a result.)

But the list itself, now public, is impressive. In addition to already-known appointments of Kan Naoto (deputy prime minister and head of the national strategy bureau), Okada Katsuya (foreign minister), Fujii Hirohisa (finance minister), and Hirano Hirofumi (chief cabinet secretary), the Hatoyama cabinet includes as host of senior DPJ politicians balanced among the party's different groups. The balance led Yomiuri to refer to it as a "safe driving" cabinet, as if safe driving is a bad thing after Aso Taro's reckless driving (how else to refer to his appointment of Nakagawa Shoichi as finance minister during a severe global financial crisis, after all?). Appointing ministers from across the party is a good way of ensuring that there will be lively debates in the cabinet and that there will be few senior politicians left in the party to cause trouble for Ozawa Ichiro and the cabinet. (Noda Yoshihiko, an "anti-mainstream" leader, was denied a cabinet post and has reportedly complained about it, but he has relatively little company.)

In addition to the aforementioned names, the cabinet will tentatively include the following:

Haraguchi Kazuhiro, a five-term member from Saga prefecture, will serve as minister of internal affairs and communications. Haraguchi is exceptional in that he actually held the same portfolio in the DPJ's shadow cabinet. In fact, he has held the postal reform portfolio in previous shadow cabinets, suggesting not inconsiderable familiarity with his brief. At fifty years old, he will be the third youngest member of the cabinet.

The justice minister will be Chiba Keiko, an upper-house member from Kanagawa who is unusual in that she is one of a tiny number of DPJ members who did not leave the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) until well after the party's ill-fated coalition with the LDP. Chiba is liberal on history and social issues, and has served as the shadow justice minister and the shadow minister for gender equality and human rights under various party leaders (including Maehara).

Kawabata Tatsuo, one of the party's vice presidents and an eight-term Diet member (first elected from the Democratic Socialist Party), will take the lengthy title of minister of education, culture, sports, science, and technology. Befitting his long service, Kawabata has held a number of party leadership positions, including chairman of the party's board of governors.

In a somewhat surprising move, Nagatsuma Akira, "Mister Nenkin," scourge of the Social Insurance Agency, will be Masuzoe Yoichi's successor as minister of health, labor, and welfare. At forty-nine he will be the second-youngest cabinet member. I think giving Nagatsuma a proper ministry is a brilliant stroke, ensuring that a problematic ministry will get an energetic minister strongly committed to the party's administrative reform program (and reforming social security) at its head, and giving Nagatsuma experience that will raise his national profile further. His popularity will no doubt be a boost for the cabinet.

The ministry of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries — perhaps the most problematic ministry — will go to Akamatsu Hirotaka, a seven-term Diet member who began his career in the Socialist Party and has been in the DPJ since its first iteration. He will have his work cut out for him.

Naoshima Masayuki and Maehara Seiji (at forty-seven the youngest cabinet member) received the economy, trade, and industry, and land, infrastructure, transport, and tourism portfolios respectively. Maehara will also hold portfolios for disaster relief, and Okinawan and Northern Territories affairs. (Perhaps the latter briefs are a way to give Maehara a voice in foreign policy discussions through the back door? Presumably any cabinet committee discussion of either issue will include Maehara.)

The environment ministry goes to Ozawa Sakihito, along with Hirano Hirofumi a close ally of Hatoyama's. A member of Sakigake and an original member of the DPJ, Ozawa's appointment may reflect the prime minister's interest in emissions controls.

After worries that the defense ministry would go to the PNP's Kamei Shizuka, the post will go to Kitazawa Toshimi, along with Maehara and Kawabata a party vice president. Kitazawa is also one of four upper house members in the cabinet. Coming from Nagano, it is not surprising that Kitazawa has long been close to former Prime Minister Hata Tsutomu, once Ozawa's co-conspirator in splitting from the LDP in 1993 and one of the participants in the creation of the new DPJ in 1998. He recently served as chair of the upper house foreign and defense policy committee.

Nakai Hitoshi, who first joined the DPJ in 2003 in the merger with the Liberal Party, will serve as head of the Public Safety Commission, and Ozawa critic Sengoku Yoshito will head the new Administrative Renovation council.

Also joining the cabinet will be SDPJ head Fukushima Mizuho, whose portfolio will include consumer affairs and the aging society problem, and PNP head Kamei Shizuka, whose portfolio will include the Financial Services Agency (FSA) and the postal issue. Kamei is pleased to have received this post, describing the appointment as "perfect." It is not clear, however, what role Kamei will play in dealing with Japan Post, as the ministry of internal affairs will continue to take the lead in managing postal affairs. The portfolio may simply assure Kamei a seat at the table without any attendant administrative responsibilities. Mainichi reports some unease from investors regarding Kamei's position as head of the FSA due to his opposition to "structural reform," although Kamei will likely have little independence regarding finance and investment. (And, incidentally, it was Kamei who reassured the Obama administration that Nakagawa Masaharu's remarks about Japan's buying only Samurai bonds under the DPJ was not an official statement.)

Ikeda Nobuo sees Kamei's participation in the cabinet as an ill omen for the Hatoyama government, citing shady dealings of Kamei's from the 1980s. I cannot speak to these rumors, but Ikeda makes one claim regarding Kamei's participation in the cabinet that I disagree with: Ikeda argues that Hatoyama will have a difficult time controlling Kamei and suggests that he could become a "bomb that destroys Japan's economy." I think that both Kamei and Fukushima will end up being marginal figures in the new government. Neither has an important portfolio, and with the DPJ aiming to move away from unanimous decision making in the cabinet, they will have little power to stop cabinet decisions. Their parties obviously have the ability to stop legislation in the upper house, but if they are included in the decision-making process from the beginning it should simplify management of the upper house. As MTC argues, the DPJ may need the two small parties beyond July 2010, and it makes good sense to include both leaders in the cabinet to streamline the policymaking process. Undoubtedly Kamei and Fukushima are simply happy to be in the cabinet. The DPJ has given up very little to secure their participation. I think worries about the two are, for now, overblown.

I think that Hatoyama did an extraordinary job picking his cabinet, for which he deserves credit. He has shown that he has no problem delegating authority to politicians who may have more policy expertise than him or independent standing within the DPJ. Few politicians in the cabinet are dependent on Hatoyama for his patronage. He will be surrounded by ministers who will have no problem disagreeing with the prime minister. But he also chosen talented ministers who by and large have been in the DPJ for most if not all of its existence, are committed to its policy programs (especially administrative reform), and are independent from Ozawa Ichiro. As I told Yuka Hayashi of the Wall Street Journal, Hatoyama as prime minister will be "more of a committee chairman than a president." He will have to manage debates among his ministers, intervening when appropriate, closing debates, and setting the policy agenda. But he will not be in a position to dictate policies to his cabinet and demand that the ministers follow along.

When it comes to cabinet personnel, Hatoyama has put his government in a position to succeed.

The Hatoyama system takes shape

The coalition with the SDPJ and the PNP cemented, the DPJ is getting to work filling in the rest of the cabinet.

One question is what posts the SDPJ's Fukushima Mizuho and PNP's Kamei Shizuka will fill. The SDPJ has requested either the ministry of health, labor, and welfare or, it seems, the environment portfolio. Despite an earlier report that suggested Kamei would enter the cabinet as a minister without portfolio, it seems that the PNP now wants the ministry of internal affairs and communications, not surprisingly given that the PNP's issue is reversing postal privatization. It is unlikely that the DPJ will give the post to Kamei.

Hatoyama Yukio has set 15 September, the day before the Diet will elect the new prime minister, as the target for finalizing cabinet appointments. Nothing, it seems, will be decided before then.

But the names of likely cabinet ministers are emerging. In addition to Fukushima and Kamei — and before them Okada Katsuya, Hirano Hirofumi, Fujii Hirohisa, and Kan Naoto — DPJ members under consideration are Nagatsuma Akira ("Mr. Nenkin"), Maehara Seiji, Sengoku Yoshito, and Naoshima Masayuki. Maehara, despite (or because of) his reputation as a hawkish defense specialist, is rumored to be under consideration for the ministry of land, infrastructure, transport, and tourism. Sengoku is being considered for the justice and health, labor, and welfare, while Naoshima, currently the DPJ's policy affairs research council chairman, may end up as the METI minister.

That leaves at least seven more names to be included in the new cabinet, which could be more depending on how many "special mission" posts the Hatoyama cabinet decides to create.

What seems clear, however, is that with Maehara and Sengoku likely to receive important posts in the cabinet, it will be difficult to speak of the Hatoyama cabinet as an "Ohato" cabinet. It is possible that Ozawa's favorites could fill out the remainder of the cabinet, but with Sengoku and Maehara — Sengoku was close to running against Ozawa last year, and both were against Ozawa's continuing as party leader as the Nishimatsu scandal unfolded — in the cabinet, the idea that Hatoyama's cabinet will simply be under Ozawa's thumb is unlikely.

Indeed, it is possible that the DPJ has solved its Ozawa dilemma. Ozawa will still wield tremendous power, but his power will be more directed at the party's now numerous backbenchers. He could use those backbenchers against the cabinet, but that assumes that their loyalty to Ozawa is so strong as to lead them to rebel against their party's leadership in cabinet. I will believe in the existence of an Ozawa faction when I see some evidence for it beyond speculation rooted in Ozawa's past as a lieutenant of Tanaka Kakuei linked to his work on behalf of DPJ candidates across Japan.

Walter Bagehot provides an appropriate metaphor for thinking about Ozawa's role in the new government: "A cabinet is a combining committee, — a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens, the legislative part of the state to the executive part of the state. In its origin it belongs to the one, in its functions it belongs to the other." In the case of the Hatoyama government, Ozawa will be the hyphen that joins the DPJ-led cabinet to the DPJ's parliamentary majority. His voice will carry weight — I have a hard time seeing him stay completely quiet on policy affairs — but his influence on policymaking may be less than feared.

Indeed, in this role Ozawa could be indispensable to moving Japan away from LDP's cumbersome policymaking process into an era in which politicians in cabinet are capable of making decisions, enacting policies, and leading. Ozawa has long lamented the role that bureaucrats (and the United States) have played in limiting the ability of Japan's political leaders to direct the country. The question now is whether Ozawa can accept other political leaders' directing the country. With enough Ozawa skeptics in the cabinet, he may have no choice but to accept their lead.

Assembling the new coalition government

The DPJ has been in intense negotiations with the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) and the People's New Party (PNP) to finalize the terms of their coalition government.

The DPJ's goal in negotiations is naturally to minimize the disruptiveness from having two parties (and their internal politics) interfere with the DPJ's plans for a streamlined policymaking process in which the cabinet will control the ruling party, and through its control of the ruling party, the Diet. In order to ensure that the same process works for the upper house, the cabinet will have to represent the will of the ruling parties — Hatoyama, in a conversation with SDPJ leader Fukushima Mizuho, stressed the importance of the government's policies reflecting the SDPJ's positions. Naturally the best way to have the ruling parties represented is by having their leaders take up positions in the cabinet. Indeed, the three parties — with Kan, the likely minister responsible for the national strategy bureau sitting in for Hatoyama, representing the DPJ — will form a committee within the cabinet to coordinate policies, the "Basic Policy Cabinet Committee," perhaps the first instance of a DPJ commitment to form a cabinet committee. (In his report on the British system of government and his article in Chuo Koron, Kan was particularly impressed by Britain's cabinet committees as a means of overcoming unanimous decision-making and stovepiping within the government, but until now it has been unclear just how the DPJ will use cabinet committees, if at all.)

As of Tuesday, the parties had agreed that leaders would join the cabinet, but were still negotiating joint positions in foreign policy, not surprisingly the area not included in the joint manifesto produced by the three parties during the campaign (which this Sankei editorial called "irresponsible"). The sticking point appears to be text related to the coalition's position on how to deal with opposition to the bilateral agreement on realignment as it pertains to a Futenma replacement facility: the DPJ and PNP have accepted a statement that stresses a bilateral solution without identifying the particular grievances (i.e., actually naming Futenma), while the SDPJ wants the statement to include specific details. The SDPJ also wants a commitment to involve only the Coast Guard in anti-piracy activities off the Horn of Africa.

Nevertheless, the parties are still trying to reach an agreement Wednesday. There appear to be few difficulties with the PNP: PNP leader Kamei Shizuka will join the cabinet as a minister without portfolio. The problem for the DPJ is, will probably continue to be, the SDPJ. The SDPJ wants to take a harder line than the DPJ is prepared to take, and given that its votes are needed in the upper house, it has power far disproportionate to its seven lower house and five upper house members. The difference is not necessarily a matter of policy preferences, but of tactics and emphasis. The DPJ appears to recognize that it can only push the US so far before it causes real damage to the alliance. I hope the Obama administration recognizes the difference between the DPJ and the SDPJ when it comes to the bilateral issues the new government wants to address — and that Washington finds some consolation prize to help the DPJ save face in lieu of full-blown renegotiation.

Managing the DPJ's relationship with the SDPJ will be much more troublesome than managing the left wing of the party, not least because the DPJ — with some credit going to Ozawa Ichiro — has forged a working consensus on foreign policy that is probably more acceptable to the left of the party than the right. (Revealingly, Yokomichi Takahiro, the unofficial leader of the party's left and an Ozawa ally, has been tapped to serve as the speaker of the House of Representatives after serving for four years as deputy speaker.)

Accordingly, even as the three parties were negotiating the terms of the coalition, Ozawa was meeting with Rengo, the labor organization, to ask for its support in next year's upper house election — stressing that the DPJ "must win a majority in next year's upper house election by any means necessary."

UPDATE: The three parties have finalized their agreement, which reportedly reflects the DPJ's softer line. Jiji's report adds that the DPJ can now accelerate the process of filling in the remainder of the cabinet.