This Hatoyama's for turning?

As the campaign has progressed, the DPJ has shown that it is willing to be flexible as far as its manifesto is concerned. While it has taken the work of building a manifesto that is the result of a consensus within the party — and which a DPJ government will give due consideration when formulating policy — the DPJ has adjusted its program in response to criticism.

Perhaps it has been a bit too willing to adjust.

On Tuesday, the party issued several amendments to its manifesto, which DPJ policy chief Naoshima Masayuki said were not policy changes, but "clarifications." The amendments — available here — largely conform with Naoshima's explanation. The party did not fill the vacuum in the manifesto as far as future of the Japanese economy is concerned, but now stresses that its various spending programs (child allowances, free high school, free highways, lifting the "temporary" gasoline surcharge) are intended to stimulate domestic consumption and so begin the long-term transformation of the Japanese economy. (Okada Katsuya stressed the importance of domestic consumption for growth in a meeting with Keidanren last week.) While I don't think these measures go far enough, they're at least a start, and the party has the right idea in mind.

What bothers me is the party's decision to soften its stance on an FTA with the US. Okada tried to spin the change as cosmetic; it changed the language from "conclude" to "begin" negotiations in recognition of the fact that negotiations depend on one's partner. The DPJ isn't in a position to promise the conclusion of an FTA. But if the edit didn't "change anything fundamental," why bother with editing the proposal? The reality is that by revising the proposal the DPJ gutted it, because it added a clause suggesting that an FTA won't happen unless domestic agricultural production can be safeguarded, with an eye towards increasing Japan's rate of self-sufficiency and the security and safety of the food supply. As Ozawa Ichiro argued in opposition to the revision, the change is solely about the power of Japan Agriculture (JA), the association of agricultural cooperatives. In other words, JA raised a fuss, and the DPJ altered its position accordingly. If there is one benefit to the DPJ's taking power, it should be a degree of independence from the interest groups that have traditionally sustained LDP rule. Ozawa further stressed that there is nothing contradictory between the party's proposal for income support for farmers and its proposal for an FTA with the US. He resisted the idea that free trade with the US will destroy Japanese agriculture, arguing that consumers care about more than price — meaning that an FTA with the US would mean more options for Japanese consumers, but not necessarily doom for Japanese farmers, who in any case would be supported by the DPJ's system that would kick in should the market price fall below production costs.

I can understand why the DPJ, afraid of the LDP's exploiting the FTA proposal to sow doubts among rural voters, would soften this position, but as Ozawa has shown, the original position is not indefensible. And public opinion polls suggest — see MTC's analysis here — that there is something more at work in rural Japan than approval or disapproval of party policies. Voters may be interested in "policy," but that can mean a lot of things, and by panicking the DPJ made its manifesto that much worse. The bottom seems to have fallen out of the LDP's traditional support, of which JA was a critical part. It may be the case that the DPJ is attributing power to the JA that it no longer has. By adding the line about not concluding a deal prejudicial to Japanese agriculture (or is that Japanese Agriculture), the DPJ will make it that much harder to begin negotiations in the first place. It should have limited its edits to "beginning negotiations" with the US, or changed nothing at all.

(As an aside, Ozawa's criticism of the change is another reminder of the Ozawa problem. The problem isn't that he disagrees with the changes — it is unreasonable to expect unanimity in any party — but that should Ozawa not join a DPJ-led cabinet and instead remain as a party leader, his comments about the cabinet's policy decisions will have the effect of widening the gap between cabinet and ruling party, undermining the DPJ's aim of creating transparent and accountable government. There will inevitably be points of disagreement: Ozawa simply has too many ideas about how things should be for there not to be. The point is that his disagreements should be aired as part of the policy process within the cabinet, not in the course of negotiations between cabinet and ruling party that play out in part in back rooms in Nagata-cho, in part on the pages of the nation's newspapers.)

But the agriculture dispute is a comparatively minor problem. I am more bothered by Hatoyama's changing position on the three non-nuclear principles. In a comparatively short period of time, Hatoyama has gone from publicly considering a revision of the non-nuclear principles to proposing that they be written into law. Speaking in Nagasaki to a group of atomic bomb survivors, Hatoyama suggested that in consideration of Japan's status as the only country attacked with nuclear weapons the non-nuclear principles should be written into law. Of course, five days earlier Hatoyama said precisely the opposite: that if the principles were written into law, there is a danger the law could be changed. Hatoyama muddied his position further Tuesday at a press conference for foreign journalists: "To the extent that a DPJ government continues, Japan will forever not possess nuclear weapons. We will stick to the three non-nuclear principles. I think that the three non-nuclear principles are national policy stronger than law." But will the party make the principles into law? "We want to investigate..."

In other words, Hatoyama has completely side-stepped the issue of what to do about the non-nuclear principles now that the "secret" treaty between the US and Japan allowing the introduction of US nukes into Japan is no longer secret.

This may be less a DPJ problem that a Hatoyama problem. Hatoyama is clearly prone to "foot in mouth" disease, and, being a weak leader, is susceptible from pressure from others, in this case the Social Democrats.

So what will the DPJ actually do about the non-nuclear principles? Well, before next year's upper house election, nothing. Like the incumbent government, it will continue to pretend that the three non-nuclear principles are completely sacrosanct, that the Japanese government has no knowledge of the introduction of US nuclear weapons into Japan. It can hardly do otherwise. It will not waste political capital on an issue that is important for the Social Democrats but risks dividing the DPJ. It will not request that the US remove nuclear weapons from its ships before entering Japanese harbors.

This episode highlights my two greatest concerns about a DPJ government: Hatoyama as prime minister and the Social Democrats as a coalition partner. Hopefully the DPJ can find ways to manage both.

I suppose it's too late to bring back Ozawa. Perhaps a Hatoyama-Ozawa cabinet wouldn't be so bad after all.

Who's afraid of the conservatives?

Yamasaki Taku, perhaps the leader of the LDP's remaining doves, spoke at a Genron NPO meeting Thursday afternoon at which he addressed Murata Ryohei's revelations of the secret deal between the US and Japan that permitted the US to "introduce" nuclear weapons to Japan. (Previously discussed in this post.)

"It is appropriate to approve this kind of action for US deterrent power," he said, in light of the nuclear standoff with North Korea, this kind of action being a revision of the non-nuclear principles to permit explicitly the introduction of US nuclear weapons into Japan as in the 1960 secret agreement.

Yamasaki is no pacifist, so this statement is not exactly a bombshell, but it does suggest that there is more to this debate than suggested in Armchair Asia's discussion of Murata's revelations. The anonymous author of Armchair Asia outlines Murata's conservative motives in this post, arguing, "In reality, it is part of a convoluted Rightist strategy to repeal Article 9 and create a military independent of the United States."

I do not disagree that Murata has a number of affiliations that strongly suggest his political leanings. The Shokun! article cited in the initial post — Shokun! obviously triggers various red flags — uses a number of conservative code words, "pride," "independent country," and the like. A subsequent post includes a translation of an op-ed by Okazaki Hisahiko, the notoriously hawkish Foreign Ministry OB who was once known as "Abe's brain," defending Murata's actions. (Available in Japanese here.)

But so what? Why should it matter that Murata is a conservative nationalist? And why should it matter why he decided to reveal the secret agreement (or why Okazaki has defended him)? After watching the Abe government blow up, it is hard to muster up the same concern about the influence of the conservatives. The author writes that of how Murata's remarks will be used by those "who want to use any means to repeal Article 9 and advance Japan's rearmament." Events seem to have taken care of both causes. As I have written previously, the economic crisis has greatly diminished the power of the conservatives even within the LDP, to the point that constitution revision might not even be included in the LDP's manifesto this year (if the LDP ever gets around to writing one).

Is Article 9 really at risk? Even in the best of times, it was unlikely that the conservatives would get what they wanted on Article 9. Oh sure, they could get the article revised, but the need to assemble two-thirds of the members of both houses plus fifty percent plus one of the Japanese public would guarantee that the article would be amended but not abandoned. Revision would likely shift the yardsticks, ratifying changes that have been made that appear to depart from the letter of the law, without removing all limitations on Japanese security policy. And, incidentally, I see no problems with revision of this sort. No document drafted by human hands is beyond revision. My problem is with those obsessed with revision, like Abe Shinzō, not revision itself.

In any case, with the LDP in its death throes, it bears mentioning that constitution revision is even less likely under a DPJ-led government in coalition with the SDPJ. A DPJ government is likely to take its cue from public opinion polls that show the percentage of respondents interested in constitution to be under five percent. Raising constitution revision would only serve to weaken the coalition and sow dissent within the LDP, while strengthening an opposition LDP.

The same goes for "rearmament," the second concern voiced by the author of Armchair Asia. The conservatives have been ascendant for roughly the same period that Japan has let its defense spending stagnate, which suggests, of course, that for all their rhetorical might their reach exceeds their grasp. Their reach will only decline further should the LDP lose power this year. They have allies in the DPJ, but if the DPJ is able to deliver on its plans for a government that unifies cabinet and party, conservatives like Maehara Seiji will find themselves straitjacketed by government service. And there is no chance that a DPJ government elected on a platform of Seikatsu dai-ichi would, upon taking power, proceed to channel significant sums of money into defense spending. Elected on a platform stressing butter, butter, butter and facing skyrocketing pensions costs, it is highly unlikely that the DPJ will decide to invest in guns once in office.

There may be more to rearmament than defense spending, but as with some limited form of constitution revision, what is the problem with Japan doing incrementally more without drastically increasing its spending?

To conclude a discussion that has run longer than I intended, the conservatives should be challenged but their strength and influence should not be exaggerated. And if Ambassador Okazaki wants an open debate, then someone in Japan ought to give him his debate.

Meanwhile, as I wrote in my original post on Murata, I think that whatever his motive, it is good that the Japanese government will be forced to address the role of nuclear weapons in the US-Japan relationship openly. It is entirely possible that the Japanese public — with a nuclear North Korea next door — will recognize a revision of the non-nuclear principles that explicitly permits the US to do what it has been doing all along will strengthen Japan's security. Despite the wishes of the conservatives, the public isn't exactly pressing for Japanese nuclear weapons as a substitute for US nuclear weapons.

It is encouraging that the two governments will hold a working-level meeting this month to discuss the nuclear umbrella, a discussion that is long overdue. One meeting will not resolve the paradox of Japan's trying to be the world's conscience on nuclear weapons while being defended by US nuclear weapons but it will at least help call attention to the paradox and force the Japanese public and their representatives to address it. The US should not be forced into a position where it would have to use nukes to defend Japan (at the behest of its elites) even as the Japanese public condemns the US. Explicitly permitting US nuclear weapons in Japan would certainly help make both countries responsible.

Amano's election deepens Japan's nuclear paradox

After a long stalemate to choose a successor for outgoing director-general Mohamed ElBaradei, the IAEA's board of governors elected Japanese diplomat Amano Yukiya to the position by a single vote over the requisite two-thirds majority.

The prolonged dispute was the result of a split between developed and developing countries, the latter of which preferred South African candidate Abdul Samad Minty, who would have prioritized reducing the arsenals of the extant nuclear powers over preventing nuclear proliferation. Amano, meanwhile, is seen as the candidate of the developed world.

This image of Amano precisely captures the ambiguity in Japan's nuclear posture, namely the paradox whereby Japan often speaks as a moral arbiter on nuclear affairs due to its status as the sole victim of the atomic bomb while being defended by the one of the world's nuclear powers (and the sole country to use the atomic bomb in wartime). It is particularly ironic that Amano's election immediately followed revelations by former administrative vice minister for foreign affairs Murata Ryohei about the existence of a "secret" pact between the US and Japan permitting the introduction of US nuclear weapons into Japan without prior consultation.

Murata spoke of a "single sheet of paper," passed from administrative vice minister to administrative vice minister, which permitted the US to introduce nuclear weapons to Japan without prior consultation with the Japanese government, as was supposed to happen under the terms of a 1960 agreement concluded at the same time as the US-Japan mutual security treaty. Although it was already an open secret that the US introduced nuclear weapons into Japan abroad its warships despite the official bilateral agreement and later three non-nuclear principles (promulgated after the agreement), Murata's comments mark the first such admission by an administrative vice-minister. (Murata's remarks were preceded by the remarks of other former administrative vice-ministers last month, who spoke anonymously to Kyodo. Murata is the first on the record.)

Nevertheless, as a testament to how important the Japanese government finds it to downplay Japan's nuclear paradox before the public, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kawamura Takeo denied the existence of the secret agreement. Kawamura's denial of reality prompted criticism from Kono Tarō, chairman of the lower house foreign affairs committee, who said that the government's position contradicted the evidence (and common sense) and suggested that his committee would look into investigating the matter.

Clearing the air on the precise nature of the US-Japan nuclear relationship in the past would be an important first step in debating that relationship going forward. Should Japan formalize the secret agreement and revise the three non-nuclear principles to 2.5 principles, as some have suggested? Would doing so reinforce the nuclear umbrella, or would Japanese elites still voice doubts about the soundness of the US commitment to defend Japan?

Of course, at the same time Amano's selection as IAEA director-general may rule out major changes in Japan's nuclear posture for the duration of his term. It seems to me that it would be difficult for Japan to have the nuclear weapons debate desired by conservatives with a Japanese official the face of the global non-proliferation regime. Pressures to have that debate will no dout continue as North Korea and China continue to bolster their arsenals, meaning that rather than resolving Japan's schizophrenic relationship with the atomic bomb, Amano's elevation will only intensify the gap between Japan's aspirations to serve as the world's conscience on nuclear weapons and the reality of the role of nuclear deterrence in the defense of Japan.

A nuclear Japan is not an option

Roy Berman calls attention to conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer's call for the US to negotiate with Japan over the acquisition of nuclear weapons.



Arming with Japan satisfies Krauthammer's desire for action, which he believes as superior to the multilateral efforts he considers a "humiliation." The target of a nuclear Japan, Krauthammer admits, would not be North Korea — it would be China. He argues that a nuclear Japan would force China to move to pressure North Korea.

Of course, this could have the opposite result of leading China to redirect whatever effort it has directed to impoverished North Korea's tiny and unsophisticated arsenal to the sophisticated arsenal that a nuclear Japan would deploy.

But aside from Krauthammer's dubious assertion that China will be bludgeoned into bludgeoning North Korea by the mere existence of a nuclear Japan, Berman calls attention to the not inconsiderable domestic obstacles in Japan that make Krauthammer's proposal fanciful. How can the US "unleash" Japan if the Japanese people and a significant portion of Japan's elite do not want to be unleashed in the first place? The Japanese government has made a clear commitment to the US-Japan alliance over autonomous defense capabilities. If anything, these preferences are even more applicable when it comes to nuclear weapons.

(It bears noting that Llewelyn Hughes ably made the case for why Japan will not go nuclear in International Security in 2007.)

There is no problem that will be solved by a Japanese nuclear arsenal — only the problem of how Japan's conservatives can leave behind the postwar regime. In effect, the implication of Krauthammer's proposal is that a Japanese nuclear arsenal is desirable because it is less predictable than the US nuclear arsenal. A nuclear Japan would be a wild card in the region. The US nuclear umbrella by contrast is stabilizing. As I wrote the other day, the task for the Obama administration is to do whatever necessary to reassure Japan that the nuclear umbrella remains in place. The administration will not help its cause by overstating the impact of North Korea's latest test. As Stephen Walt writes, "...The Obama administration should avoid making a lot of sweeping statements about how it will not 'tolerate' a North Korean nuclear capability. The fact is that we've tolerated it for some time now, and since we don't have good options for dealing with it, that's precisely what we will continue to do."

A study in powerlessness

With its second nuclear test in three years, North Korea continues to illustrate the limits of the power of the US, China, and the international community as a whole.

The underground test, conducted on Monday, appears to have been more successful than the October 2006 test — although it is unclear just how much of a success it was. As Geoffrey Forden wonders, this test could have been a failed test of a 20KT device or a successful test of a miniaturized 4KT device. Pyongyang will undoubtedly be glad to keep its neighbors guessing which is the case.

The response from Japan and other countries has been predictable. Prime Minister Aso Taro spoke of the gravity of this latest development for Japanese national security and stressed cooperation with the US and the international community at the UN Security Council. The House of Representatives moved swiftly to draft a resolution condemning North Korea that could pass as early as Tuesday. The LDP leadership called the test "outrageous." Okada Katsuya, the new DPJ secretary-general, echoed the government's sentiments. Japanese conservatives used the test to advance their argument for a more robust Japanese security posture. Abe Shinzo, continuing his comeback effort, demanded firmer sanctions against North Korea, especially against North Korean counterfeiting activities, called for preemptive strike capabilities, and was vaguely supportive of a debate about acquiring nuclear weapons ("A debate on matters of national security ought to be conducted freely"). Komori Yoshihisa said that the test illustrates the limits of the multilateral management of the North Korean problem and argued that Japan, doing whatever it needs to do defend itself, should reopen the debate on a nuclear deterrent. A Sankei "news" article informs readers that North Korea has the power of life and death over Japan, based strictly on the range of the missiles it possesses. In other words, much like last month's rocket launch, the responses of Japanese political actors to North Korea's second nuclear test have followed wholly predictable patterns — and show just how powerless Japan is to stop or reverse North Korea's nuclear program.

Of note is that Japan's conservatives once again have responded as if the US-Japan alliance and its nuclear umbrella does not exist. Indeed, it is remarkable how cavalier the conservatives are in their disregard for the nuclear umbrella. This is now the standard conservative argument: play up the North Korean threat, play down the US ability to meet that threat, and let a vicious cycle of fear and doubt take over. Do the vast deterrent capabilities of the US really count for nothing in the face of North Korea's piddling (and shrinking) arsenal? North Korea may be able to deter a first strike aimed at toppling the Kim regime, but is the US somehow incapable of deterring North Korea from launching a suicidal strike against Japan? Of course, back North Korea into a corner to the point where the regime has nothing to lose and then I too may question the ability of the US or anyone else to deter North Korea from doing something like firing a Rodong in Japan's direction.

Which is why the response of the conservatives is the height of folly. Threatening the very survival of the regime is a good way to make North Korea undeterrable. It's an unpleasant task, but North Korea's neighbors are responsible for talking (or buying) North Korea down from the ledge. To wit, criticism of the "talk over pressure" approach is equally foolish. If the goal of negotiations is to halt and reverse North Korea's nuclear program, then yes, it is an abject failure. But if the purpose of multilateral diplomacy is to keep talking North Korea down from the ledge and to buy time for its neighbors to plan for regime collapse and to push for gradual opening of the north (however halting), then "jaw-jaw" is essential and must continue, despite the nuclear test. I for one think there is no alternative to the latter.

Hence the distinction between capabilities and power. The US is unquestionably capable of deterring a nuclear strike against Japan, but it takes compellent power over North Korea's actions. Being unable to make a credible threat of regime change and visibly dependent on Beijing to pressure Pyongyang, Washington has little power other than its deterrent power. Japan, even with a nuclear arsenal of its own, would have even less power over North Korea. This is the unanswered question in the conservative response to every act of provocation by North Korea. If the US is unable to guarantee Japanese security through its immense nuclear arsenal — again, the unstated (or occasionally stated) basis of the argument for a Japanese arsenal — how would a Japanese deterrent be any more powerful? I understand that they could argue that the problem isn't US capabilities but US commitment, but I have yet to see a convincing demonstration that the US commitment to defend Japan from attack is flagging to the point that Japan would require its own nuclear weapons. I do not think the Japanese public is convinced either.

So given that North Korea has successfully deterred the US and others from initiating regime change, what choice do the participants in the six-party talks but to turn to the UN to condemn the test and then try once again to engage North Korea via the talks? Meanwhile, the governments of the region should continue to treat every day that Kim Jong-il lives as another day for them to plan for regime collapse.

And as for the ongoing effort by Japanese conservatives to undermine the nuclear umbrella? Mr. Roos, you have your work cut out for you.

The conservatives undaunted

Abe Shinzo, former prime minister and favorite of many alliance managers in Washington, was in Washington, D.C. this past week, meeting with Vice President Joe Biden and delivering addresses at the Brookings Institution and the Ocean Policy Research Foundation's US-Japan Seapower Dialogue.

Chris Nelson, eponymous author of The Nelson Report, concluded from Abe's visit that "he sure sounds like he intends to try and come back into power." In other words, consistent with how he became prime minister in the first place, Abe is beginning his comeback tour in a place where he may still enjoy some support.

His Brookings speech may seem like a response to the global financial crisis and a vehicle to soften his image, but Abe said little different from what the Aso government is trying to do, using the economic crisis to promote investment in technological innovation. Abe is still more focused on the distant future than on the dismal present: "However, statesmen also have an obligation to tackle tomorrow's problems. Statesmen have to build systems and projects that will allow their citizens to enjoy benefits over the long term and invest in those systems and projects." He talks about his "Innovation 25" program, but it is unclear what the Japanese government has been able to do to make Japan more innovative and productive. When Abe and others talk about fostering innovation, it strikes me as bordering on technofetishism, a belief that Japan's problems will vanish with technological innovation, which at the same time gives the impression of a certain degree of callousness to the Japanese people who are struggling in the present. Abe is still dreaming of his utsukushii Nihon to come, while the Japanese people continue to live in an increasingly kibishii Nihon.

Nelson noted that Abe came across as more internationalist in his Brookings address, which I guess is true, but for the most part I read it as the same old Abe. The same uneasy balance between a belief in the need for a "mutually-beneficial strategic relationship" with China while stressing the dangers of China's military modernization program. The same blindspot for South Korea, Japan's democratic neighbor. The same uncompromising position on North Korea and the emphasis on the abductees, although with the bizarre modification that the US can talk directly with North Korea as long as it continues to support Japan on the abductions issue. (This was, in a sense, precisely what the US was doing at the end of the Bush administration, pursuing a nuclear bargain in Beijing while the president and other officials assured Japan that it would not forget the abductees. And we saw how well that went over in certain circles in Japan.) He said nothing about constitution revision, although not for lack of belief in its importance.

He also did his part in the campaign to paint Ozawa Ichiro and the DPJ as dangerously irresponsible. Answering a question at Brookings, he said that only if Maehara Seiji becomes prime minister will a DPJ administration not undermine the alliance. As many of his fellow LDP members — and all too many people in Washington — have done, he singled out Ozawa Ichiro's remarks about the US presence in Japan as indicative of some sort of fundamental incoherence on the part of the DPJ, a point which I've previously argued overstates the case. Meanwhile, I find it a bit rich for an LDP politician to bemoan the diversity of opinions within the DPJ, given how consensus has eluded the LDP on numerous policy questions. One day some LDP politician criticizes the DPJ for being Ozawa's personal fiefdom; the next day another criticizes the DPJ for being too diverse in its opinions; the next day another criticizes the party as a reincarnation for the old Socialist Party. Which is it?

Earlier in his trip Abe met with Biden to talk about President Obama's plans for nuclear arms reductions, delivering a message from Prime Minister Aso stating his desire to cooperate with the Obama administration on arms reduction and non-proliferation, although, as Ralph Cossa argued recently, Japan may be less enthusiastic about nuclear arms reductions than meets the eye. To put an exclamation point on Cossa's argument, back in Japan Nakagawa Shoichi, another conservative exiled from power, was delivering a different message about nuclear weapons. Continuing the argument that he and other conservatives have made since North Korea's rocket launch earlier this month, Nakagawa stressed that the only answer for North Korea's nuclear weapons is for Japan to have its own nuclear weapons, an argument that Nakagawa says is "common sense" and not unconstitutional. The nuclear umbrella is apparently not porous, it's non-existent. Why else would Japan need its own nuclear weapons? Can Nakagawa conceive of a situation in which North Korea would strike Japan with nuclear weapons without the US being drawn into the conflict?

Presumably Nakagawa realizes that Japan's acquiring nuclear weapons would be a grave, if not mortal blow to the alliance, and yet he continues to make the argument — how is that somehow less detrimental to the alliance than anything Ozawa has said? There may be no quicker path to an independent Japanese security policy than the acquisition of nuclear weapons, as it is hard to see how the US could maintain the status quo arrangement were Japan wielding its own nukes. Nakagawa may be a disgraced former cabinet member, but he is not alone in making this argument, and the persistence with which conservatives make this argument make it more worrisome. They have a long-term project of making the case for a Japanese nuclear deterrent, and the more their argument goes unanswered, the more respectability it will acquire.

If Aso meant what he said to Obama, he ought to criticize Nakagawa and others publicly and unambiguously for their remarks. This isn't a matter of taboos — they should be able to say whatever they want — but their arguments should not go unanswered. They should be met not with an irrational outcry, but with cool, rational arguments that illustrate the many dangers associated with the policy they are advocating.

Is there no one in the Japanese establishment willing or able to take up Nakagawa's call for a debate on nuclear weapons and then proceed to destroy the idea?

As both Abe and Nakagawa illustrated last week, Japan's conservatives are undaunted in their quest to remake Japan. They continue to wield considerable power, their ideas go largely unchallenged in the public sphere, and they have no shortage of the will to power despite setbacks.

The LDP's loose lips

When Ozawa Ichiro suggested that at some unspecified point in the future the US forward-deployed forces in Japan might be reduced to the Seventh Fleet with Japan's taking greater responsibility for its own defense, he was greeted with opprobrium from LDP and government officials, who called him naive, unrealistic, and ignorant. Even Kevin Maher, the US consul general in Okinawa, weighed in, echoing LDP comments about Ozawa's ignorance of the complexities of the East Asia regional security environment. Judging by the response, it appeared as if Ozawa was a dangerous radical who, if elected, would single-handedly undermine the alliance and leave Japan defenseless in a dangerous neighborhood.

After watching the response from certain corners of the Japanese establishment to North Korea's rocket launch, when will Mr. Maher issue another warning to Japanese politicians for their dangerous rhetoric?

Over the past week, Japanese conservatives have used the fear roused by the North Korean launch to put one radical idea after another before the public, all of which amount to a giant vote of no-confidence in the US-Japan alliance. The same politicians who last month were condemning Ozawa for his naivete were rattling the saber at North Korea and in the process questioning whether the US is capable of defending Japan from its neighbors.

Some examples:

• Yamamoto Ichita and six other LDP members formed a study group for "thinking about strengthening deterrent capabilities against North Korea." The group wants the new National Defense Program Outline due at year's end to include some mention of possessing the capability to strike at bases in North Korea. The group also calls for lifting the restriction on collective self-defense, but the focus appears to be more on acquiring new capabilities than on bolstering the alliance. The other six members are Shimomura Hakubun (54), a four-term lower house member from Tokyo; Onodera Itsunori (48), a three-term member from Miyagi; Mizuno Kenichi (42), a four-term member from Chiba; Tsukada Ichiro (45), a first-term upper house member from Niigata; Suzuki Keisuke (32), a first-term PR member from Fukuoka; and Matsumoto Yohei (35), a first-term lower house member from Tokyo. There are certain points of commonality among these seven. Their study group memberships lie at the nexus of the Koizumian reformists and the Abe-Aso-Nakagawa (Shoichi) conservatives. Three belong to the "True Conservative Policy Research Group." The first-termers belong to the club of 83 or the conservative Tradition and Creation club. They occupy the younger half of the age spectrum, meaning they can look forward to inheriting the LDP. In Shimomura the group has a politician identified by Richard Samuels and Patrick Boyd as a future leader of the LDP. It may be a small group, but it is a significant group in terms of its membership, representative less of the views of the LDP at large than of the views of a group that is likely to lead the LDP in years to come. Their membership in this group is wholly consistent with what Samuels and Boyd found in their study of next-generation political leaders: "The twelve [future LDP leaders they identify]...are significantly more supportive of Japan’s right to preemptive attack in the face of imminent threat than the LDP overall or the larger midcareer generational cohort."
  

• I have already noted that prominent conservatives used the occasion of the launch to call for a debate on the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Hosoda Hiroyuki dismissed these remarks by saying that "I don't think that anyone is seriously saying this," while Kawamura Takeo, the chief cabinet secretary, reaffirmed the three non-nuclear principles. (These remarks were in response to LDP official Sakamoto Goji's remarks about acquiring nuclear weapons and withdrawing from the UN.)
  

• Koike Yuriko, whose quest to unseat Aso Taro ended just as soon as it began, stressed the need for a Japanese-style National Security Council — an idea that died with the Abe government — at a meeting of a subcommittee of the LDP Policy Research Council's defense policy division.

• Nakagawa Hidenao stated his concern that since the US ruled out intercepting the North Korean launch beforehand, it exposed a gap in the alliance.

Komori Yoshihisa, Sankei's man in Washington, more or less summed up the line of argument that encapsulates the views of these politicians in a front-page article in Sankei — more op-ed than reportage — in which he speaks of the present moment as a "moment of truth" for the alliance.

Komori argues that the US (and the effete and ineffectual Obama administration) failed to live up to the letter of the alliance by ruling out an intercept, that the Obama administration's emphasis on multilateral diplomacy did nothing to prevent the launch, and that Japan is learning the true face of the new administration when it comes to the alliance. The upshot is that Japan is coming to realize that in the face of the North Korean missile threat, it cannot necessarily depend on the United States.

This reasoning is considerably more threatening to the alliance than anything Ozawa said. In material terms the US security guarantee is no weaker today than it was before North Korea's rocket launch. Does a slightly less unsuccessful rocket launch make Japan so much more vulnerable to North Korea's missiles that the alliance as it exists is rendered irrelevant? Has enough changed in the past week to merit this discussion?

And yet by talking as if North Korea has struck a blow against the alliance, these leaders risk eroding public confidence in the alliance without offering anything in its place. After all, Defense Minister Hamada Yasukazu said "it is highly doubtful" that deterrent capabilities will be included in this year's NDPO or the mid-term defense program. Japan is still not prepared to even discuss nuclear weapons. (Yamasaki Taku offered the novel argument against a nuclear debate by saying that even by talking about nuclear weapons Japan would be voicing its acceptance of North Korea's nuclear weapons.) But the LDP is taking a hard line — Hosoda took the opportunity to criticize Condoleeza Rice and Christopher Hill by name for being "weak" on North Korea — without any indication that its rhetoric will accomplish anything but frightening the public and undermining the alliance. (Of course, if Japan actually acquired its own conventional deterrent capability, it would likely lead to conclusions similar to Ozawa's: if Japan had its own capabilities to strike at North Korea, presumably Japanese citizens would wonder why they were continuing to pay to base US airpower on Japanese soil.)

As Sam Roggeveen wrote in response to equally outrageous rhetoric from Newt Gingrich in the US, "There is no military solution to this dilemma — not missile defence, and certainly not air strikes or special forces. The reason lies in the geography of the Korean peninsula. The proximity of Seoul (and several other South Korean cities) to the border with the North means Pyongyang essentially holds that city hostage." Japan is in no more position to start a war with North Korea than the US is. Japan may be more insecure on account of geography, but geography makes Japan no more capable of "solving" the North Korean problem than any other country.

The US is, of course, paying the price for having swung from unremitting hostility towards North Korea to cooperation in the hope of containing the threat without ensuring that Japan shifted too. The US government, first under Bush and now under Obama, has only acknowledged the reality that the US has little power to change the unpleasant status quo and must therefore find a way to limit the threat posed by North Korea beyond mere deterrence. The Japanese government, by contrast, is locked in by past decisions to pursue a hard line on North Korea that put the abductees first and roused the public's fears so that the government lacks the ability to change course, even if it wanted to do so. And Japan's conservatives are using the situation to push an agenda that they would be advocating anyway — Kim Jong-il has simply made it easier for them to do so.

Conservative rhetoric is unlikely to change Japan's security policy in the near term, not with a 15 trillion yen stimulus package on the agenda. For the moment the public continues to prefer tough talk on North Korea to backing up talk with expensive weaponry. But too much tough talk will undermine the US-Japan relationship and make the US more eager to work with countries that will help it contain or solve the North Korea problem, not make it worse.

Perhaps it is time to send an ambassador to Tokyo.

Another August 6, the dilemma remains

Today is the sixty-second anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, an event that has perhaps more political significance than usual given the recent resignation of former Defense Minister Kyuma Fumio over comments in which he referred to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as "inevitable," as well as last autumn's debate (or non-debate, since it was one-sided) over having a debate on the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

As usual, the anniversary is being marked with a ceremony in Hiroshima and calls for the total abolition of nuclear weapons.

I find Yomiuri's editorial marking the occasion particularly useful, because it cuts to the heart of the nuclear "dilemma" for Japan. "We cannot approve the atomic bombings," says Yomiuri. "On the other, Japan has no choice but to depend on US nuclear deterrent power for our national security. This is the 'dilemma' that postwar Japan continues to shoulder." It is for this reason that it is not entirely appropriate for Japan to ask for an apology from the US. While it is not unreasonable for the US to express its remorse for its actions, however necessary they were or seemed at the time, it is inappropriate for Japan to demand an apology from the US at the same time that its security rests on US extended deterrence.

Raymond Aron's comments on this question are useful to consult. In The Imperial Republic (included in this recent anthology), Aron began from the recognition that "the decision to use both atomic bombs arose almost inevitably out of the circumstances." But he continues,

But that does not mean to say that American diplomacy was exemplary or rational. Five years later, the United States was asking Japan to take up again the arms it had made its vanquished enemy renounce forever. The United States had itself created the circumstances in which recourse to atomic bombs was almost inevitable: the demand for unconditional surrender; the decision to 'reform,' 'regenerate,' and democratize Japan; the timidity of some leaders, far-sighted though they might have been; the crusading language that made even secret negotiations no longer possible; and the hasty judgment of some of the government's military advisers who, thinking invasion was the only way of achieving US political purposes, had persuaded Roosevelt to ask for Soviet support and to pay for it with concessions made at China's expense.

This is an important reminder that even if the bombings were inevitable to save US and Japanese lives, even if they ended the war, Americans cannot, must not approach the bombings with a clean conscience. The Second World War will forever be a stain upon human history, and every nation that participated — Axis and Allies alike — emerged from the war with bloody hands. That is not to excuse the horrendous crimes of the Axis powers. Rather, it should serve as a cautionary lesson for those who believe that they are acting with the best of intentions: do good intentions (the defeat of Imperial Japan) justify any and all means (the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Japan, the fire bombings of Tokyo and other cities)? If so, where does that reasoning end? And who is the arbiter of good intentions? I don't think there are simple answers to these questions, and as the history becomes increasingly distant, the only appropriate stance should be humility and an emphasis on the constant need to remember.

Indeed, perhaps an appropriate step for the US to have taken after passing H.Res. 121 would be to send a representative to Hiroshima, suggesting that even the US has some thinking to do about the war.

Meanwhile, the persistence of Japan's nuclear dilemma points to an important reality of foreign policy change in Japan. The reason for the dilemma in the first place is that Japanese foreign policy has, since the Meiji Restoration, been driven by pragmatic conservative elites formulating Japanese foreign policy often in opposition to idealists of the conservative, liberal, or pacifist persuasion. Japan's reliance on the US nuclear umbrella is a product of the Yoshida doctrine, despite the pacifist left's outright rejection of nuclear arms and the ultra-nationalist right's desire for an independent nuclear deterrent, the latter two positions, of course, presenting solutions to Japan's nuclear cognitive dissonance.

But here we are, in 2007, and Japan still depends on the US nuclear deterrent — as reiterated by Condoleeza Rice on her visit to Tokyo last autumn. And, as convincingly argued by Llewelyn Hughes in the spring issue of International Security, there is little reason to think that Japan will choose to develop an independent deterrent anytime soon; in the absence of such a decision, it is wholly unlikely that Japan will reject the US umbrella with a nuclear or semi-nuclear North Korea next door.

The Yomiuri Shimbun weighs in

Having already written at length on the nuclear debate once today, I still feel the need to comment on the Yomiuri Shimbun's editorial today (in Japanese) -- 「議論すら封じるのはおかしい」 (roughly, "It is laughable to even try to stifle the discussion."

The Yomiuri argues, as I have elsewhere, that the debate is less about nuclear weapons and more about how Japan should contribute to international peace and security, and how it should respond to the growing North Korean threat. The editorial maintains that the three non-nuclear principles are outdated, a product of the cold war no longer appropriate given the evolving security environment in East Asia, and it concludes by saying that just as talk of constitutional reform was once taboo, such that any mention of which would result in a cabinet reshuffle, so must talk of nuclear weapons go from being taboo to being openly and earnestly debated.

Given that heads have yet to roll in this latest flap, clearly the power of nuclear taboo has been eroded, although it still retains some power.

Japan will not become a normal great power so long as restrictions remain upon even talking about radical changes to Japan's security policy. Japan has yet to make an unambiguous statement of how it will exercise its power and contribute to regional and a global security; while nuclear weapons will most likely not be a part of that role, it is still important that Japan has an open debate in which any and all options are discussed -- including acquiring nuclear weapons and distancing itself from the United States. It need not and should not embrace these options, of course, but so long as Japan remains bound by taboos and implicit restrictions, it will remain unable to contribute properly to global order.

The nuclear debate "fallout" continues to spread

Quite a bit has happened in the intervening days since Mr. Nikai called for restraint. As I expected, it seems that the "loose lips" of Mr. Aso and Mr. Nakagawa have led to greater outrage from other parties and more calls for prudence from LDP senior officials.

First, as this article in the Asahi Shimbun reports, the New Komeito Party, the LDP's coalition partner, has publicly aired its misgivings about calls for a debate about nuclear weapons. New Komeito, the political party founded by the Buddhist organization Soka Gakkai, is strongly opposed to nuclear weapons (and I should add, aggressive military force in general -- see its policy aims here [link in English]).

Accordingly, Asahi reports, Sasagawa Takashi, responsible for maintaining LDP party discipline, advised at a liaison group meeting of senior LDP officials that the party must "hasten to extinguish the fire" and ease the concerns of the New Komeito. LDP Secretary-General Nakagawa Hidenao echoed Mr. Sasagawa, insisting that this issue will not be discussed by the party, and that, even if the LDP and the Abe Cabinet were to consider revising Japan's three non-nuclear principles, which prohibit Japan from producing, possessing, or permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on its soil, it would have considerable difficulties in doing so, not least because of fears that doing so would undermine American support.

And what did Abe have to say? "The government's policy is already decided. There will be absolutely no changes."

Will this sustained assault by nearly all of the LDP's heavyweights silence Mr. Nakagawa (Mr. Aso has apparently decided not to mention nuclear weapons anymore)?

If not, perhaps the DPJ -- together with New Komeito -- will raise the pressure, resulting in the LDP's forcing its wayward leaders out. The Yomiuri Shimbun reported that the DPJ is doing just that; Secretary-General Hatoyama Yukio, in fact, said in a speech in Tokyo on Monday, "If Prime Minister Abe cannot dismiss Mr. Aso, then we will introduce a non-confidence motion against Mr. Aso." Mr. Nakagawa, the LDP secretary-general, replied by pointing out Mr. Hatoyama's hypocrisy, considering that Mr. Hatoyama is on record of having voiced his support in 1999 for a debate on nuclear weapons.

Mr. Nakagawa's reply may be effective at pointing out the DPJ's difficult political position (discussed here) but it doesn't change the fact that by not squelching this issue early, Mr. Abe may have stumbled into the first serious political crisis of his tenure. If the LDP's executives had come out immediately to denounce their colleagues for their indiscretions and reaffirm the LDP's and the government's commitment to the three non-nuclear principles, this incident might have reinforced the impression formed by his early trips to China and South Korea that Mr. Abe is in fact quite moderate and not eager to introduce radical revisions to Japan's security policy. By waiting to respond, however, Mr. Abe has tarnished his reputation, undermined the LDP's relationship with its coalition partner, given a gift to the opposition, and exposed cracks in the LDP.

If anything, the LDP's cracks may continue to grow, as the creation by former LDP secretary-general Kato Koichi of an LDP study group on Japanese foreign and security policy vis-a-vis Asia -- characterized as an "anti-Abe" study group by the Japan Times -- indicates. This issue, together with the nuclear weapons issue and the question of whether the LDP should readmit members ousted for their opposition to postal reform, shows that not only is the LDP riven with policy differences -- as a party geared to securing power instead of promoting an ideology, it's always been home to a variety of policy positions -- but the mechanisms it has used to manage disagreements have broken down. This is not a new development, but because Prime Minister Koizumi had a relatively clear sense of what he wanted to do and little fear of going after opponents within the LDP, the differences were less visible.

Mr. Koizumi, in fact, was the epitome of what Mr. Abe calls in the introduction to his 「美しい国へ」 (Toward a Beautiful Country) a "戦う政治家" (fighting politician) -- which Mr. Abe defines as 「批判を恐れず行動する政治家」, "a politician who acts without fear of criticism" (my translation).
Mr. Abe, however, has yet to show whether he has the same quality.

In the coming weeks, as the special session of the Diet draws to a close, expect Mr. Abe to go on the offensive in policy terms, to establish his reputation as a reformer and draw attention away from the nuclear question. He will likely begin with a serious push to pass the reform of the Fundamental Law on Education. Should he fail to recover from this first political blow to his cabinet, his tenure may well be short-lived.

Nuclear "indiscretion" causing problems for Abe?

The Yomiuri Shimbun reports today that Nikai Toshiro, head of the LDP's Diet Strategy Committee (国会対策委員会, kokkai taisaku iinkai, usually abbreviated as 国対, kokutai), publicly cautioned Foreign Minister Aso Taro and LDP Policy Affairs Research Council chief Nakagawa Shoichi to exercise "prudence" in their remarks on Japan's acquiring nuclear weapons.

The source of this comment is interesting. Mr. Nikai, as head of the LDP's kokutai, is responsible for managing the LDP's nemawashi -- behind-the-scenes consensus-building -- in the Diet, meeting with kokutai heads from other parties to smooth over disputes and formulate compromises. Accordingly, Mr. Nikai is not necessarily a policymaker. As Columbia University's Gerald Curtis wrote in his The Logic of Japanese Politics: "The role of the kokutai is not to negotiate the substance of policy, but to arrive at understandings about how to advance the parliamentary process. More than policy expertise, a successful kokutai chairman needs to have the ability to arrange political deals" (p. 119, but for an excellent account of how the Japanese political system has changed since the end of the cold war the entire book is highly recommended).

As such, while the Yomiuri reports that Mr. Nikai based his remarks on concerns that "the international community might misinterpret" Messrs. Nakagawa and Aso's calls for a national debate on whether Japan should acquire nuclear weapons, I believe that given Mr. Nikai's responsibility for ensuring orderly relations with other parties in the Diet, his comments have greater significance domestically.

The Yomiuri article tacitly confirms my suspicions, because it goes on to discuss how other parties have reacted to these remarks by Prime Minister Abe's senior advisors. The article notes that opposition parties have called for Mr. Abe to dismiss Mr. Aso (they're not really in a position to call for the dismissal of Mr. Nakagawa, who is merely a party official), suggesting that opposition pressure may have led Mr. Nikai to call on both officials to exercise restraint. The article quotes Mr. Tagaki Yoshiaki, the Democratic Party of Japan's kokutai chief, as saying, "The foreign minister's remarks go against national policy; they should not be ignored."

Mr. Nikai's remarks may be directed at Mr. Abe as much as at his impertinent advisors. Mr. Abe has tried to have it both ways, publicly declaring that Japan will not acquire nuclear weapons at this time and proclaiming that his cabinet will not debate the issue, while at the same time doing nothing to stop his advisors from calling for a debate on nuclear weapons. Mr. Nikai seems to be saying that Mr. Abe's strategy will not be without political consequences -- permitting these men to continue calling for a nuclear debate may upset relations with opposition parties (and the Komeito, the LDP's coalition partner), making it more difficult to move his agenda forward in the coming months. Moreover, should this issue continue to fester it could provide an angle from which the DPJ can attack Mr. Abe's leadership in the run-up to the 2007 Upper House election.

Mr. Nakagawa, meanwhile, continued his quest to mention the need for a nuclear debate in any and every possible setting yesterday in an appearance on Fuji TV. It may just be the case that Japan is not ready to have this debate now, and sooner or later he will have to accept that or else cause not inconsiderable harm to his party and its leader.