The emergence of Middle Power Asia

Over the past week, we have seen more signs of the shape that international relations in East Asia will take over the coming decades.

I've written before about the role that middle powers — most notably Japan, Australia, South Korea, ASEAN acting as a bloc, and to a lesser extent India — will play in the East Asia balance, maneuvering between the US and China, the region's two giants as they attempt to enmesh China in regional institutions and profit economically from its rise while cooperating with the US to hedge against a violent turn in China's rise and to ensure that they have strategic flexibility more generally.

Prime Minister Aso Taro visited China to meet Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, renewing their commitment to building a "strategic, reciprocal relationship" and discussing a number of urgent problems, most notably the global spread of swine flu, the ongoing global economic crisis, and North Korea's latest turn to intransigence. The deep freeze of the Koizumi years is increasingly distant, and these Sino-Japanese summits are becoming so routine in their agendas as to be boring. But in this relationship, boring is positive. Despite Chinese anxiety about the gift sent by Aso to Yasukuni Shrine for the Spring Festival prior to his trip to China (and the expected Chinese netizen protests about welcoming Aso to China after his gift), Wen and Hu mentioned the history problem but did not harp on it, just as Aso expressed his hope for Chinese participation in nuclear disarmament. Both sides seem content to accentuate the positive in their meetings, and — aside from Wen's cautionary note — the Basil Fawlty line remains in effect: don't mention the war.

In fact, looking at the post in which I first mentioned the Basil Fawlty line, Aso has proved me wrong. Last May I wrote, "Mr. Aso and his comrades will most likely not embrace the Fawlty line." However, it appears that the structural factors that draw Japan and China to one another have tamed another Japanese conservative politician. In fact, in a speech in Beijing Thursday, Aso alluded to the possibility of an economic partnership agreement between Japan and China; the obstacles to such an agreement are high, certainly as high or higher than the obstacles facing an EPA or trade agreement between Japan and the US, but as symbolism goes it is significant that Aso mentioned the possibility of institutionalizing the Sino-Japanese economic relationship. In the meantime, Japan and China outlined the three pillars of their relationship going forward: economic cooperation (Japan will host a senior-level economic dialogue in June); environmental and technology cooperation; and cultural and educational exchanges. The beginnings of perpetual peace? Hardly: there is still much work to do, whether on the Senkakus, North Korea, the history problem (how sustainable is the Fawlty line after all?), or Chinese military transparency. But by acknowledging that there are areas on which they can cooperate and that there is value to meeting even without perfect harmony in their positions, Japan and China are making Northeast Asia ever so slightly more stable.

At the same time, even as Aso parlayed with China's senior leaders in Beijing, Hamada Yasukazu, his defense minister, prepared for a Golden Week visit to Washington where he would be meeting with Robert Gates, his US counterpart. Gates and Hamada met Friday morning, and central to the discussion was Hamada's practically begging Gates for the right to purchase F-22s from the US as Japan considers its next-generation fighter. "Even just a few," Hamada said. Of course, it is not in Gates's power to permit Japan to buy the F-22; as mentioned in this post, its sale abroad is prohibited by the Obey Amendment, meaning that the Japanese government should be making its case to Congress. (I am certain that if it isn't doing so already, the Japanese government will be lobbying representatives and senators from the forty-four states involved in the production of the F-22. Sakurai Yoshiko tellingly included this detail in the articles mentioned in this post.) No word on how Gates received Hamada's petition, but the Gates-Hamada meeting reveals the other side of Middle Power Asia. With one hand, Japan is reaching out to China, with the other it is balancing by constantly working to strengthen the US-Japan alliance. Gates and Hamada discussed coordinating as the US prepares its next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Japan prepares its next National Defense Program Outline for later this year. They also talked about further strengthening missile defense cooperation and devoting sufficient attention to the realignment of US forces in Japan.

Australia, as I've written before, faces the same strategic imperatives, a fact thrown into relief by events this week. As it was characterized in the Economist's Banyan column this week, "On the one hand, Australia’s crackerjack fit with the Chinese economy is reshaping Australia’s trade and investment flows, drawing the country into a China-centred Asian orbit. On the other, Australia’s security hangs on America’s continued presence in the western Pacific." One can easily substitute Japan for Australia without skipping a beat. This week Australia has been feeling the tension growing out of its economic relationship, due to an investment bid by Chinalco in Rio Tinto. In a speech at the Lowy Institute, Malcolm Turnbull, leader of the opposition, called on the government to reject the bid, which, regardless of the outcome of the bid, has brought concerns about the Sino-Australian relationship to the fore — anticipating, in a sense, the Rudd government's defense white paper.

Much as Japan is looking to hedge against China, so too is Australia: reports suggest that the white paper will lavish Australia's navy with new resources.

Rory Medcalf at the Interpreter writes that Japanese and South Korean analysts look favorably upon Australia's plans, although he suggests that the Rudd government's plans could spark a spate of middle power arms building. But regardless of what other middle powers do, the Rudd program and Japan's desperate pursuit of the F-22 suggest that the middle powers will not feel secure simply by pursuing external balancing (tighter alliances with the US and other countries in the region). Particularly as the US looks to deepen its cooperation with China across a range of issues — whether or not it is appropriate to refer to Sino-US cooperation as a G2 — the middle powers will likely rely more on internal balancing, concluding that while their alliances with the US are fine, perhaps an additional guarantee of security is worth the investment. They may look to each other for security too, although as I argued when Australia and Japan issued a joint security declaration, it is unclear what Japan and Australia can do for each other.

In any case, there are limits to how far the middle powers can and will go in their hedging against China. They will continue to work on their economic relationships with China, they will continue to look for opportunities to bind China through regional institutions, and, especially in the case of Japan, they will face fiscal constraints in maintaining capabilities adequate to defend themselves without the US. Despite concerns about the Gates defense budget, the US is not going anywhere — and it is as imperative for the middle powers to ensure that that remains the case as it is for them to ensure that the US does not go overboard with containing China. For the foreseeable future, this is the delicate balance facing the middle powers.

Rudd's vision

Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, arriving in Japan Sunday for a four-day visit, delivered a foreign policy address on Wednesday of last week that has sparked a major debate in Australia about the future of Asian multilateralism.

In the speech, Mr. Rudd laid out his vision for an Asia-centered Australian foreign policy that sounds remarkably like post-cold war foreign policy thinking Japan. His three pillars for Australian foreign policy — the US-Australia alliance, global multilateralism, and regional multilateralism — are quite similar to Prime Minister Fukuda's recent foreign policy address, which reaffirmed the US-Japan alliance but sought to embed it in a cooperative regional framework. Indeed, substitute "Japan" for "Australia" in this speech, especially at the beginning when Mr. Rudd discusses domestic changes that must be made to ensure that Australia remains competitive in the region, and this is a more than adequate policy speech to put in the mouth of a Japanese official — making my point that Australia and Japan find themselves in a similar position today.

In any case, the crux of the speech was the third pillar, cooperation in Asia. Mr. Rudd opened this section of his remarks with the now familiar litany illustrating the growing importance of Asia and the attendant challenges (changing demographics, growing resource and energy demand, lingering security flashpoints). He is right to emphasize the need for effective multilateral mechanisms: bilateral relationships and mini-lateral groups that include only democracies (and only a handful of democracies at that) will not be able to solve the region's challenges. Accordingly, he called for a "Asia Pacific Community," a new organization that includes all the region's power (i.e., an East Asian Summit that includes the US) and covers the whole range of political, security, and economic issues facing the region in the coming decades. Perhaps consciously borrowing from Fukuda Yasuo, Mr. Rudd spoke of an "open" Asia-Pacific region.

He might be on to something. His APC would likely be bigger than the EAS but smaller than APEC, meaning that it would include the US — still a "resident" Asian power, as argued by Robert Gates in Singapore last week — but would be less unwieldly than APEC, which still has yet to prove itself an effective organization for addressing Asian challenges. (Paul Keating, the Australian prime minister who worked hard to create the APEC leaders' meeting, defended his creation in The Australian in response to Mr. Rudd's speech, in the process demolishing the straw man of a sovereignty-pooling Asia Pacific Union similar to the European Union, a model explicitly rejected by Mr. Rudd in his speech. Meanwhile, I would be more impressed with Mr. Keating's defense of APEC if it were written by someone other than the man who pushed for the creation of its most significant feature.) But, then again, Asia might be best served by multiple smaller organizations. How will an APC solve Northeast Asia's problems? Might not Northeast Asia be best served by a standing forum growing out of the six-party talks, as desired by Chris Hill and others? Won't Asia be best served by overlapping multilateral circles, ASEAN + 3 for economic issues that span Northeast and Southeast Asia, EAS (or APC) for transregional issues, and APEC for transpacific discussions, with a smattering of functional organizations to address environmental, security, and other problems? No single effective organization can meet all of the region's needs; an alphabet soup of multilateral mechanisms is unavoidable. But that's not necessarily a bad thing, as it may increase the odds of the region's powers actually solving problems. (Allan Gyngell, executive director of the Lowy Institute, made a similar point here, calling himself a "deconstructionst" on Asia-Pacific multilateral institutions.)

Meanwhile, looking ahead to this week's meetings in Japan, Mr. Rudd emphasized the importance of Australia's relationship with Japan — but in contrast to his predecessor (and Mr. Fukuda's predecessor, for that matter), Mr. Rudd focused on cooperation on global problems, especially climate change, development, and non-proliferation, and bilateral economic cooperation. In case there were any doubt, the "quad" is dead. Australia under Kevin Rudd will not be party to an Asian NATO designed to contain China.

In short, Mr. Rudd and Mr. Fukuda should have a lot to discuss this week. Both are looking to shift their countries' foreign policies from centering on their alliances with the US to new approaches that embed the alliances in their Asia policy, lessening the tension between the ties with their biggest security partners and their most significant economic partner(s).

I suspected in November when Mr. Rudd took over for John Howard just after Mr. Fukuda replaced Abe Shinzo, it would be a new beginning for the Australia-Japan relationship and for the region as a whole. It is still too early to tell whether this is the beginning of a shift — both leaders will have to convince their successors to commit to their visions, and it is unclear what the US and China, among others, think of their ideas — but it may yet prove to be a fortunate coincidence that Mr. Rudd and Mr. Fukuda are in office at the same time.

(For more commentary on Mr. Rudd's speech, definitely check out The Interpreter, the Lowy Institute's excellent group blog.)

Australia and Japan in the same boat

After being criticized at home (and, supposedly, in Tokyo) for failing to visit Japan on a swing through Asia in March, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd will be in Tokyo this week for meetings with Prime Minister Fukuda.

Andrew Shearer, a fellow at Australia's Lowy Institute for International Policy, has an excellent op-ed in The Australian (H/T to JG) putting Mr. Rudd's visit in perspective and proposing a framework for Australian foreign policy that balances relations with China and Japan.

Without denying the importance of the Sino-Australian relationship, Shearer argues that a strong relationship with Japan — Australia's largest export market — is an indispensable asset for Australian foreign policy. He gets at the important point that Australia and Japan share concerns. Both have deepening economic ties with China, but at the same time they fear China's growing heft and want the US — each country's most important ally — to remain engaged in the region. But "engaged" is not a code word for containing China. As Shearer argues, "It doesn't mean Australia and the US should not pursue realistic, constructive relations with China. Calm dealings between Washington and Beijing, in particular, are important for Japan's deep relationship with China and for vital Australian strategic and economic interests."

The challenge for not only Japan and Australia but for India, South Korea, and China's neighbors in Southeast Asia is balancing their ever more important economic relationships with China with their security relationships with the US, a US that is unfortunately prone to militarized overreaction that could undermine economic relationships with China. (To be fair, US bluster is matched by a China that is rapidly modernizing its military and looking to bolster its power projection capabilities). The countries on China's periphery, especially Australia and Japan, clearly value the US hedge against a belligerent China. The challenge for all of these countries clustered between the US and China is to moderate the behavior of both powers; these mid-sized players must ensure that the US is around and engaged but not overly aggressive or prone to crusading, and that China is a "responsible stakeholder" and force for stability in the region.

Accordingly, the value of cooperation between India, Australia, and Japan is not as a democratic ring around China but as a force for restraint acting on both China and the US.

In light of Mr. Fukuda's recent remarks on Japanese foreign policy, I think that the prime minister would be sympathetic to this vision of the region. Is Mr. Rudd capable of achieving this balance in Australian foreign policy?

I'm optimistic that he will. The need to balance the economic relationship with China and the security relationship with the US is bound to push Canberra in the direction of closer relations with other countries in the region that share this predicament.

New wind in Asia?

Is it me, or in a few short months has the mood in Asia changed?

Remember Sydney in early September? A bedraggled Prime Minister Abe, fresh from proclaiming a new era of cooperation among Asian democracies in India, went to Sydney for APEC, where he met with President Bush and Australia's John Howard. It was at that meeting, days before his resignation, that Prime Minister Abe promised that Japan would not withdraw from the Indian Ocean, a promise of support for his fellow democrats.

Now, in November, the second of the three leaders at that summit has left office, this time directly at the hands of his voters in a shining example for the region of the workings of democracy. John Howard, Australia's prime minister for eleven years, has lost to the Labour Party's Kevin Rudd in a landslide.

With Fukuda Yasuo replacing Mr. Abe, and the Mandarin-speaking Mr. Rudd replacing Mr. Howard, the "deputy sheriff," the "quad" may be no more. Both Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Rudd seem to believe that their power is best spent promoting cooperation in Asia, not deepening security cooperation among democracies conveniently located on all sides of China.

But how to build on this happy coincidence of leaders interested in an Asia without walls, an Asia of which I saw hints at the September APEC meeting? For the moment, the Bush administration will be absent from Asia as it prepares to launch yet another initiative in pursuit of peace between Israel and Palestinians. But should this latest effort fail — as seems to be universally anticipated — perhaps the presence of Messrs. Rudd and Fukuda will present Mr. Bush with another possibility to leave some sort of positive legacy.

Asia needs an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Asia. China's integration into the regional security environment has lagged behind its integration into the regional and global trading systems. Accordingly, there is a grave need for an organization that will promote military transparency, arms control, and conflict resolution in a region that combines territorial disputes and burgeoning defense budgets. Critics will no doubt argue that such an effort is futile, that China (and the PLA) cannot be trusted to participate in such an effort in good faith. Maybe, but the region's powers should at least give Beijing the opportunity to refuse. Even US Pacific Command seems to think that efforts to cultivate more open security relations between the US and China are worthwhile.

That said, without US engagement — sustained engagement — this sort of initiative would be doomed to fail. Perhaps this is an opportunity for two US Asian allies, which have periodically chafed at their dependence on the US, to carve out new political roles in the region by pulling the US and China to the table to discuss building a new Asia-Pacific security architecture. There might never be a better opportunity to construct a durable framework for security cooperation in Asia: the US, distracted in the Middle East, is increasingly interested in regional stability and cooperation with China, at the same time that changes of government in two of its major allies in the region have brought to power prime ministers interested in better relations with Beijing.

It will take persistence from Canberra and Tokyo — and it is probably overly optimistic to expect progress before January 2009 — but now is the time to start urging the US to reengage in Asia in a big way. The more concerted the effort the better.

Australia plays the game

A day after reports that Australia is set to join the US and Japan in researching missile defense — an agreement reached at the first Australia-Japan 2 + 2 meeting — Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer has, in the words of The Australian, "defend[ed] China's military build-up."

Readers can probably imagine that I have no problem with Mr. Downer's "defense." Some could accuse me of doing the same as Mr. Downer.

There is good sense in not exaggerating China's defense modernization, which is still overwhelming concerned with Taiwan, and even as China looks further afield for a defense role, there is no guarantee that a great regional security role for China will necessarily be hostile to the US and its allies.

This idea is, of course, controversial in certain circles in Washington and Tokyo (just ask Mr. Downer's Japanese counterpart). But Australia is not in a position to join a grand coalition to contain China, and thus Australia's involvement in missile defense research seems to come with major caveats, bearing in mind Australia's relationship with China. Does the Japanese government really think it can afford to act differently?

So I must raise the same objections I raised back in March, when commentators burdened the Australia-Japan security declaration with meaning that it was not designed to bear. Rather Australia, like its ASEAN neighbors, is playing — and ought to play — the great game, maneuvering among the region's great powers to maximize its advantage.

Japan's second "ally"

As planned, Japan and Australia -- at a meeting between Prime Ministers Abe and Howard -- agreed to the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation.

The agreement, available at MOFA's website here, is as modest as the initial news reports have suggested. The concrete elements are all well within the prevailing constraints of Japanese security policy, and the agreement bears no resemblance to the US-Japan alliance, with its open-ended commitment on the part of the US to defend Japan.

But the value of the agreement is in its modesty. In particular, Japan needs to develop the habits of cooperating with partners other than the US. Australia, as a regional power with (limited) global reach, can help enhance Japan's ability to contribute to the missions outlined in the agreement, including maritime security, PKO, and humanitarian relief -- without the baggage that comes with security cooperation with the US, not to mention the thorny issues surrounding US bases in Japan.

At the same time, though, as I mentioned in this post, it is important not to overestimate the importance of this agreement. Paul Kelly, writing at the website of The Australian, provides one example of letting rhetoric run away from reality. Japan is normalizing, yes, but it is hardly a linear process -- nor is it clear to exactly the ends to which Japan's "normalization" is aimed. He wrote, "Japan is in the process of becoming one of Australia’s closest security partners. Nobody should have any illusions about the consequences. To believe this new agreement is a minor matter is to miss its import entirely."

But to accept Kelly's argument means accepting that hidden in the terms of this agreement is the core of a trilateral maritime alliance between Japan, Australia, and the US -- and accepting that Australia has chosen Japan over China. To the first point, I wonder if Kelly has watched the tortuous process of reforming the US-Japan alliance, which is strewn with seemingly ambitious agreements that proved hollow. And to the second, has Australia actually chosen Japan over China?

Kelly answers his own question: "...Australia is being sucked into the politics of a more complex Asia."

In other words, this agreement -- while perhaps an important milestone in the process of Japan's becoming a "normal" country -- is but another detail complicating the Asian balance of power, rather than clarifying it.

Trilateral alliance or limited hedge?

With Australian Prime Minister John Howard set to arrive in Japan today for a four-day visit, Australia and Japan have reportedly agreed to a new security declaration that will likely (I say likely because it hasn't been released to the public yet) enhance bilateral cooperation on a range of defense issues, including intelligence sharing, PKO, and humanitarian relief. Prime Ministers Abe and Howard will meet on Tuesday.

It is probably a mistake -- for both Beijing and Washington -- to overestimate the value of this agreement, because Australia is especially trapped between the prospect of an antagonistic China and a cooperative China.

On the one hand, relations between China and Australia have enjoyed something of a renaissance in recent years (see this speech from 2004 by Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer). The economic relationship has been particularly strong, with China hungrily importing a range of primary products and services from Australia, as this overview of the relationship provided by the Australian government as background to a China-Australia FTA attests.

At the same time though, under Prime Minister Howard, Australia has strengthened its alliance with the US, acting as the third partner in a kind of global Anglosphere posse (the activities of which are, to say the least, distinctly at odds with China's vision of the global order).

Howard captured Australia's unenviable position in this mealy-mouthed comment in a joint press conference with Vice President Cheney during the latter's recent visit to Australia:

In relation to China, Australia, as you know, has striven over the last decade to build a very close relationship with China. But we've always done it against a background of being realistic about the nature of political society in that country. We have no illusions that China remains an authoritarian country. We have sought to emphasize in our relations with China those practical things that we have in common. And we do, I hope, with appropriate modesty regard it as one of the foreign policy successes of this country over the last decade that we have simultaneously become ever closer in our relationship with our great ally the United States, but at the same time built a very constructive, understandable relationship with China.

But we always look at these things from a practical standpoint. We have no false illusions about the nature of China's society. But we see positive signs in the way in which China and the United States have worked together, particularly in relation to North Korea. And nothing is more important to the stability of our own region at the present time than resolving the North Korean nuclear situation. And I think the way in which China and the United States have worked together on that is wholly positive and is obviously to the credit of both of those countries.

So to view this agreement -- together with last year's US-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue -- as anything more than a slight hedging option in the midst of very real cooperation between all three countries and China is overblown. Each is trapped in its own way by mutual interdependence with China.

As overblown responses go, that includes China's, which, according to The Australian, has voiced reservations of the Australia-Japan declaration. If Australia, Japan, and the US are bolstering their hedge against Chinese belligerence, it's because China has given them enough reason for concern: hedging by these countries is a sign of Chinese policy failure, not belligerence on the part of the trilateral partners. If China were to sound slightly more conciliatory and look slightly less like a country eager for regional hegemony buttressed by military power, each party to the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue would be less likely to push for a hard hedge.

I can't help but wonder what post-Howard Australia will look like in terms of its Asia-Pacific policy. Will Australia, in some sense like post-Koizumi Japan, compensate for Howard's emphasis on strong ties with Washington by reorienting to continental Asia and placing less emphasis on the nascent tripartite maritime hedge?