The protests (and apologies) continue

The situation in Okinawa continues to worsen. Staff Sergeant Tyrone Hadnott, the Marine accused of raping a 14-year-old Okinawan girl, is now in Japanese custody. Japanese officials at all levels of government have expressed their outrage at the US.

On Wednesday morning, Onodera Itsunori, parliamentary vice foreign minister, arrived in Okinawa to meet with US military and local government officials. The latter demanded resolute action in response to the incident, with Tomon Mitsuko, mayor of Okinawa City (and a former Socialist HR member), suggesting that a reduction in the USMC presence in Okinawa is the only response. The assemblies of both Okinawa City and Chatan-cho have passed resolutions that criticize the US government and the US military's preventive measures to prevent the recurrence of these incidents, and call on the Japanese government to take responsibility for the situation. Nakaima Hirokazu, governor of Okinawa, also expressed his anger in a special session of the Okinawa assembly. These legislative actions follow a day of protests in Okinawa at the gates of US military facilities.

Prime Minister Fukuda has also taken up the cudgel, declaring his intention to raise the issue in talks with US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice at the end of February.

Christopher Hill, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, conveyed his regrets to Kato Ryozo, Japan's ambassador to Washington, on Tuesday (local time), following apologies by Kevin Maher, US consul-general in Okinawa, and Lieutenant General Richard C. Zilmer (III MEF), both of whom met with Governor Nakaima and discussed how the US can strengthen safeguards to prevent these incidents.

Will it make any difference in the long term? Talk of the Iwakuni election's strengthening the realignment process has undoubtedly been drowned out by the public outcry in Okinawa. US officials and military officers will be apologizing at every occasion for months to come, just as their Japanese counterparts will be using those occasions to highlight the need for safeguards. That doesn't sound like a recipe for progress to me.

The US has already conceded in the 2006 US-Japan realignment roadmap that the USMC does not have a long-term future in Okinawa, seeing as how the roadmap envisions the relocation of most of the III Marine Expeditionary Force to Guam, totaling approximately 8,000 Marines (and 9,000 dependents). The question is whether the US can afford to wait until the conditions for the relocation — progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab and Japanese financial contributions to construction work on Guam — are satisfied. The continuing presence of the USMC jeopardizes US air and sea assets, assets that bolster US deterrent strength and enable the US Navy to play a stabilizing role in the region.

The next US administration should strongly consider renegotiating the May 2006 agreement, perhaps giving ground on demands for Japanese contributions to Guam construction in exchange for progress on the FRF — and shortening the time line for the departure of USMC personnel from Okinawa.

The latter measure will require a crash building program, because Guam, lacking housing, infrastructure, and training facilities, is not even remotely ready to handle the massive influx of USMC personnel. This will require the exertion of political will on the part of the next president. While former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was eager to transform the US global military deployments and thus pushed hard for a realignment agreement with Japan, both the US and Japanese governments have failed to follow through on the May 2006 plan. Washington has been distracted; Tokyo has been slow (and heavy-handed) in efforts to overcome local resistance to the roadmap.

If the US is sincere in its desire to reduce and consolidate its presence in Okinawa, it needs to consider steps to hasten the process, starting with measures to ready Guam to serve as the US Military's hub in the Western Pacific sooner than expected.

Learning to be self-reliant?

If I could draw, I would have drawn something exactly like this cartoon in today's Yomiuri:


The caption on this cartoon reads, "Troubles at home, worries in America," Abe's dual American "worries" being the looming comfort women resolution and Christopher Hill's nuclear bargaining.

It didn't need to be this way, did it? As I wrote last week, the confluence of the North Korea nuclear question and the comfort women issue is largely a product of the blundering of the Japanese government, which has failed to appreciate how the mood in Washington has changed and act accordingly. Instead, at every juncture Shinzo has relied upon his buddy George's promises, without asking what those promises are worth when Foggy Bottom is running North Korea policy and the Congress — riled by Japanese revisionism on comfort women — does not share the president's sanguine views of Abe's empathy (and I'm sure it doesn't appreciate being called a tool of China).

The Abe government is right that the practical impact of this resolution will be limited; the foundation of the relationship is sound, and, as noted Tuesday, both the American public and American elites are content with the relationship. It's nothing short of amazing that even with a report emanating from the Bank of International Settlements noting that the yen's decline is "anomalous," Congress is more concerned about comfort women, and on monetary matters has directed its ire at China.

The importance of this episode is, rather, in the intangible impact on thinking in Japan. Relations between states, like relations between people, is a learning process. States learn what to expect from others, especially allies, and begin to build upon these expectations. Japan has come to expect a US that will refrain from criticizing its most important partner "bar none." It has relied upon a network of friends to ensure that this understanding remained in place, particularly after Japan was subject to all manner of American criticism in the early 1990s. (Robert Angel's 1996 introduction to the Japan lobby remains especially useful in illustrating how this works.) But now, with Congress's digging into Japan's past and the administration bereft of friends, the old understanding seems to be under threat.

How will Japan respond? Defensively, with alarm that it is being betrayed and abandoned by its supposed "ally"? That is how Amaki Naoto views recent events in US-Japan relations. He connects the comfort women resolution, Christopher Hill's recent statement about a peaceful framework among four countries, Japan excluded, and — citing a question asked by my boss in the Upper House foreign relations committee — Admiral Keating's remarks about aircraft carriers while in China in May to suggest that the US is not Japan's ally. He writes: "As the above-mentioned sequence of events makes clear, the US will never see Japan as an equal ally...Conservatives, nationalists, left-wing ideologues, and pacifists, as well as the people as a whole, are beginning to find further subordination to the US unfavorable. The problem is that after achieving autonomy and independence from the US, how will Japan ensure its security?"

The question is the extent to which this kind of thinking has taken hold among Japanese elites and the Japanese people — and the extent to which it could take hold in the midst of the aforementioned "betrayals." I cannot answer that, but I suspect it is more prevalent than perhaps Washington realizes.

So here we are: because Japan is incapable of dealing with criticism, and because the US does not particularly care that Japan is incapable of dealing with criticism, the future of the US-Japan relationship is murky, and will only get murkier as Japanese elites begin to assume that the US is not especially concerned about Japan's interests.

Brave new alliance?

Korea's Chosun Ilbo reports that the US government — both Congress and the White House — are not pleased by the ad published in the Washington Post signed by Japanese legislators that lays out "the facts" of the comfort women issue (previously discussed here). While the Chosun Ilbo relies on an unnamed source in Washington for this story, which means that it could be a leak designed to embarrass both the US and the Japanese governments, if there is truth to this story, it is a significant example of where the US-Japan alliance stands in the final years of the Bush administration.

Namely, the Japan handlers are gone. There is no one left in the administration to coddle Japan, to protect it from critics; if Japanese legislators want to argue with Congress in the pages of America's newspapers, they will not be shielded from their detractors by the White House. If anything, it seems that with the departure of members of the chinichi-ha (the "know Japan faction") the Bush administration simply has lost patience with the foot-dragging, excuse-making Japanese government, particularly concerning provocative statements by prominent Japanese figures (both public and private) on history issues, which complicate Washington's efforts to maintain stability in the region.

As Robert Dujarric argues in an op-ed in today's Asahi, the end of dependence on Washington Japan handlers can only be a good thing. For Japan, becoming a "normal" country ought to mean not being shielded from the consequences of its words and deeds — but it should also mean that public disagreements are normal, part of the ebb and flow of alliance relations and not a sign that the end of the alliance is nigh. (And it should also mean a Japan less wedded to the Republican Party.)

If the White House is actually unhappy with the ad in the Washington Post, this might be a good test for the new, post-chinichi ha alliance, the beginning of a period of benign neglect in which Japan is treated like — and acts like — other major US allies. As Dujarric writes, "Japan should recognize its own importance for the US, and not worry over every change in personnel. Can anyone imagine the British Foreign Office worrying about a change of deputy secretary of state or National Security Council staffer?"

In other words, not a divorce, just a new sense of maturity in the alliance. Every dispute need not be a crisis, every disagreement need not cause alarm over a growing rift in the Pacific. The US seems ready (or readier) for this kind of relationship; for all the talk about independence, is Japan ready?

Benign neglect for the alliance?

Upon further reflection, I wonder if the Asia team that the Bush administration has assembled — which I previously discussed here — for its final years in office might be a good thing for the US-Japan alliance.

For too long, the alliance has been a cozy love fest. Even in rough patches, the alliance has been characterized by each ally stroking the other's ego, providing constant reassurance that the alliance is secure.

When I was doing research on my master's dissertation, I spoke with Carl Ford, who was at the State Department early in the current administration and was deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia-Pacific affairs during the administration of George HW Bush. Speaking of the differences in alliance management during the Clinton administration and the twelve years of Republican administrations that preceded it, Ford said, "The Republican Asia team pampered Japan. They regularly told Japan how important it was – the US-Japan relationship is very high maintenance. When the Clinton administration came in, things changed – not dramatically so, but noticeably so. There was less pampering of Japan."

So at what point does pampering Japan and providing it with constant reassurance stop being a good thing and become an obstacle to forming a genuine alliance, in which the allies are comfortable airing grievances or questioning the direction and extent of cooperation?

Maybe a couple years dealing with an Asia team whose attention is directed elsewhere will be good for Japan. Perhaps a couple years of not hearing how important and special Japan is for the US will help Japan get used to the idea of being a more independent, flexible actor in changing Asia. If the alliance is as healthy as both countries' leaders insist, this should not be so hard to manage. (Although there will be more pressure on US officers and diplomats in Japan and James Shinn's team at the Pentagon to push the 2006 realignment plan forward, which will perhaps be more difficult without an experienced Japan hand at the White House.)

Besides, with a new Korean administration in the offing, maybe it is best that the US give priority to patching up the bruised relationship with South Korea?

The Bush administration has left the building (in Asia, anyway)

South Korea's Dong-A Ilbo reports that the Asia team for the denouement of the Bush administration is complete...

Daniel Drezner could not have been more right when he said that the Bush administration is looking for "September call-ups" for its foreign policy team.

Look at the roster provided by Dong-A. While some, including Dr. Paul Heer and James Shinn, have publication records, suggesting that they have experience in and knowledge about the region, others show just how hard the administration had to work to find staff to fill positions.

Victor Cha's successor holding the Korea and Japan brief at the National Security Council is Katrin Fraser, indicated by Dong-A as a "professional diplomat" but in fact assistant to Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Kristin Silverberg (who is herself a former political adviser to Candidate Bush, not to mention an adviser to CPA viceroy Paul Bremer until October 2003). The only newsworthy bits about Fraser seem to be that she taught English in Korea as a Fulbright a few years ago, and that she wrote an article criticizing the Bush administration for insensitivity to Korea.

From Victor Cha, an accomplished expert on the region to a woman who only very recently taught English in Korea? I am sure that the Japanese government is thrilled with this choice.

Yep, this is the Asia policy team that will handle the continuation of the six-party talks, turbulent relations with China as the 2008 Olympics approach, and a Japan that is grappling with fundamental questions about its position in the region and the world. For nearly the next two years, this is the team that will handle Asia's becoming the global center of gravity.

Who to believe?

Earlier this week I noted that Condi Rice had told Japan that the resolution of the abductions issue was no longer an obstacle to the removal of North Korea from the US State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Indicating just how serious this issue is to Tokyo, Yomiuri (article not online) reported yesterday that Abe had a twenty-minute phone call with President Bush on the evening of the 14th to clarify US support on the abductions — and, of course, George told his buddy Shinzo that he still enjoys the president's support.

The State Department's deputy spokesman reiterated US support as well.

So what does the leaked suggestion of US willingness to shift ever further away from Japan's position mean? Is there any substance to it, despite US denials, or is it just another leak in an administration that is sinking fast? I guess we won't know until North Korea dangles some bait, because until that point the US can claim unconditional support for Japan all it wants without having to do anything to prove it.

Alternatively, perhaps this leak was a calculated move to entice North Korea to stay on the wagon, so to speak.

Whatever the reason, I remain unconvinced that the US is with Japan all the way on abductions.

Is the Bush administration thinking about the China relationship?

With the Bush administration's recent move to press a suit against Chinese violations of intellectual property in the WTO sparking fears of a full-blown Sino-American trade war, I must ask the same questionI asked when the US Commerce Department announced tariffs on Chinese glossy paper: is this administration pursuing a coherent strategy in Asia, or is it just making things up as it goes along? Does the US really expect that friction on trade will not have consequences for Sino-American cooperation in other areas, most notably in the six-party talks?

The US, of course, should not hesitate to press China on matters of concern, but it must choose its battles wisely; with Congress breathing down the administration's neck on the economic relationship with China, I fear that prudence is becoming an altogether rare quality in US China policy. Moreover, I do not think the administration has made an effort to counter the public scapegoating of China and explain to the American public the substantial benefits of the relationship. That is a point made by the authors of a new Council on Foreign Relations study on the relationship with China. As co-author Carla Hills said at a press conference announcing the report, "We recommended that the president describe to the American public the various benefits that we derive from that relationship and that we state that our interests are furthered by a responsible and cooperative China that adheres to international norms, a prosperous and peaceful China that fuels global growth, and an equitable China that is accountable and cares about issues like the environment."

Whether this will happen is any one's guess, but I doubt that President Bush is particularly eager to defend China publicly.

Maintaining the US-China relationship requires work, and it requires vision. Neither country can afford to wait until January 2009 for either.

Feeling the chill

The chill to which I'm referring, of course, is the chill that has set in between Tokyo and Washington.

Without looking particularly hard, I found two very clear signs of a growing appreciation among Japanese opinion makers that the US-Japan alliance is experiencing a bit of turbulence.

On the front page of today's Yomiuri, in an article published as part of an ongoing series of page one articles about the North Korean nuclear threat, Yomiuri reports on tensions just below the surface in bilateral negotiations surrounding the tentative agreement in the latest round of six-party talks. (This article does not seem to have been posted online yet.) The article reports, almost with surprise, at the swift turnaround in the US position, from clear unity with Japan following the missile and nuclear tests of 2006, to going so far as to indicate that the US might be willing to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, which in 2004 George Bush insisted North Korea was, in part because of its kidnappings of Japanese citizens.

The article seems to be searching for an answer to the question, "what changed?" It's not all too difficult to explain. With Congress in Democratic hands after November and with Iraq still in shambles, the range of ways Bush could ensure a legacy narrowed considerably. Domestic avenues are more or less blocked due to the Democratic victory. The Middle East is no path to a quick victory. Reaching an accord via the six-party talks was all that was left: it enabled President Bush to show himself as willing to use patient diplomacy with other great powers in pursuit of peace -- a la Ronald Reagan's missile diplomacy with Gorbachev. Surely MOFA's American experts have some idea how presidential thinking changes as an administration winds down. It seems that the GOJ got caught up in the rhetoric that proclaimed US-Japan relations to be the best ever, and forgot that good relations can only be maintained with hard work from alliance managers in both governments -- and, in Japan in particular, with hard work by the political leadership to ensure that Japan remains at the forefront of US considerations in Asia.

But, as this op-ed in the Japan Times by former Japanese Ambassador to the US Okawara Yoshio points out, Abe has been too lax in his handling of US-Japan relations, with the result being that as a six-party agreement became possible, the US government quickly pushed Japanese concerns to the side.

The Yomiuri article ends on a doubtful note regarding Cheney's visit from the 20th to the 22nd (the following is my translation):

On the 20th, US Vice President Cheney comes to Japan. On this trip, Japan and Australia are the first priority, as he will not visit China and South Korea. This itinerary provides a "signal that Japan and Australia are America's most important allies."

To achieve a comprehensive solution to the nuclear, missile, and abduction problems, close US-Japan cooperation cannot be lacking. On Vice President Cheney's trip to Japan, can both countries close the gap on North Korea policy? The fundamentals of the alliance relationship are being questioned.

Tokyo may well be in a position to benefit from fissures within the Bush administration, as I expect that Cheney's position on the tentative agreement is not all that different from former US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton's. But I wonder if Cheney -- without his longtime ally at the Pentagon, without Scooter Libby, his beleaguered erstwhile advisor (who apparently has quite the interest in Japan), and without John Bolton -- would be able to undermine the six-party agreement fatally. Still, if he can successfully reassure Japan that the administration is not abandoning Japan while giving the Abe Cabinet a wake up call that it cannot ignore the US, his trip will have served its purpose.

Finally!

It seems that someone in Washington is finally calling attention to the US government's dangerous fixation on the Middle East -- as freelance writer and onetime NYT correspondent Richard Halloran writes at RealClearPolitics, the Congressional Research Service has produced a report (available for downloaded here) warning that insufficient attention is being paid to the Asia-Pacific region.

For a country that's supposedly a global superpower, the US has paid relatively scant attention in recent years to the requirement of a region that is changing rapidly. Halloran quotes two senior Asian specialists to that effect:

James Kelly, the assistant secretary who had headed the East Asia division of the State Department during President George W. Bush's first term, said: "There is an insufficient realization that Asia has become the center of gravity," meaning the focal point of political, economic and military power. "Policy and strategy toward East Asia," he said, "are not easy to discern."

Similarly, Stephen Bosworth, former U.S. ambassador to the Philippines and South Korea, asserted: "The administration can't deal with more than one or two issues at a time." He said that, by 2009 when the next president takes office, power in Asia "will have shifted while we were not paying attention." [my emphasis]

Obviously Iraq is a serious problem, but if a presidential administration can't walk and chew gum at the same time, then the unipolar "era" will crash to a halt -- oh, wait. (Tom Barnett more or else makes the same point in this post on Putin's remarks in Munich.)

The obsession with the Middle East predates, at least to some extent, 9-11, which arguably created a shift in degree of the attention given to the region, rather than a shift in quality. Of course, energy does much to explain this, but in the process of securing a stable supply of oil from the region, the US has become entrapped in pathologies of the Middle East (the messy distribution of nations across state borders, the Shia-Sunni divide, the Israel wars, etc.) and has found it impossible to extricate itself, with many within the US and abroad urging the US to stay engaged in the Israel-Palestinian question in particular, which seems like encouraging an alcoholic to have one more bender before starting AA. (A good argument for why this encouragement is silly can be found here.)

As soon as entirely possible, the US needs a period of benign neglect vis-a-vis the Middle East, and turn its focus to Asia, where the political map is changing rapidly.

My vote in 2008 will most likely be for the candidate most aware of how the Asia-Pacific is changing (and with it the US position in the region).