Lest we forget

The US-Japan alliance turned fifty this week, and the allies celebrated by steering the conversation away from Futenma and releasing a 2 + 2 joint statement that reiterated why the alliance matters in the first place.

Kurt Campbell, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, also gave a press conference Tuesday that makes for interesting reading when it comes to thinking about the challenges the alliance faces going forward.

Campbell stressed that 2010 will be year for discussions within and between the two governments on the future of the alliance. He voiced a greater degree of understanding that the DPJ's early initiatives within the context of the US-Japan relationship are understandable given democratic politics than I think the Obama administration had done previously.

But while Campbell discussed areas of cooperation and the importance of deeper security cooperation, he did not say the US government hopes the outcome of bilateral consultations on security over the coming year will produce. To a certain extent, the US position is the same as it has been for decades and can be summarized in a single word: more. As a superpower that is facing burdens and challenges that will increasingly overwhelm its capabilities, the US needs allies like Japan to share the load now more than yesterday, and tomorrow more than today. More can be greater military spending or new military capabilities, constitution revision or reinterpretation, higher levels of foreign aid, or greater involvement in peacekeeping.

The problem, however, is that, as Brad Glosserman and Robert Madsen note in a Pacific Forum CSIS paper (not yet online), Japan may not be able to provide much more for years to come, if ever. Without substantial economic reform Japan may not be able to commit the material resources the US would prefer — and without serious economic reform the Japanese people will continue to have little or no interest in constitution revision.

In other words, despite the desire on the part of US officials from both parties to "strengthen" the alliance, the Yoshida consensus may continue to hold, in that Japan will continue to provide less security cooperation than the US prefers because its government is focused almost exclusively on economic challenges at home. The difference, however, will be that Japan's economic resources will likely continue to decline; withholding resources from the SDF today is for the sake of directing them into social security (above all) instead of using them to promote economic development as in the 1950s and 1960s. The question is whether the US will be able to live with a Japan that is, as Glosserman and Madsen note, more dependent on the US even as it is able to provide relatively less towards both its own defense and alliance cooperation.

As I've already written, fiscal constraints at home will not be the only factors preventing the realization of an "ever closer" US-Japan alliance. Whatever the latest headlines are concerning China's behavior, the lesson of the Koizumi years is that the Japanese people do not support a policy of unremittingly cold political relations with Beijing — and the lack of support for more military spending suggests that there is little stomach for an arms race. Japan is going to learn to live with a stronger, more confident China, and it will do so in part through closer relations with other countries in Asia.

Finally, while I am confident that the alliance will continue to exist in some form, it is worth considering ("lest we forget") how difficult it is to preserve an alliance aimed at an external enemy to an alliance that is, in Campbell's words, "basically aimed at no specific or particular nation." While some would off record that it is aimed at China, that would entail a discussion of what it means for an alliance to be "aimed" at a country. Given that we do not even know what Japan would do in the event of a war over Taiwan, it is hard to say that US-Japan alliance is "aimed" at China. Instead the alliance is chasing monsters of a smaller, more amorphous nature. Is there an alliance in history that has successfully transitioned from being aimed at some country or coalition to being aimed at "uncertainty" or instead of being against an enemy being for public goods? That's not to say it's impossible, but the Obama and Hatoyama governments have a difficult year ahead of them.

Here's hoping that the two governments approach the task realistically, acknowledge the limits of each country's commitment, and shape their future expectations accordingly. Perhaps it is fitting that the year began with Japan's ordering its refueling ships home from the Indian Ocean, an appropriate reminder of the continuing political and economic limits on Japan's contributions.

Okada diplomacy

Not even a week into the Hatoyama government, it is clear that Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya will be a force to be reckoned with in the new cabinet.

Even before the government formed, Okada raised the alarm that the new national strategy bureau would encroach on his turf in foreign policy making — prompting Hatoyama Yukio to stress that the bureau's primary task will be budgeting (i.e., it will not follow Okada's lead on foreign policy, if it plays any foreign policy role at all).

In the days since the government formed, Okada has become the sole voice on the DPJ-led government's approach to the world, which for the moment means the U.S.-Japan relationship.

The point is not that the policy content of Okada's diplomacy is markedly different from the party as a whole. Rather, Okada has made clear in his public remarks that he will be the voice of the government on foreign policy, not a bad thing seeing that he is perhaps the most articulate member of the government when it comes to explaining why the DPJ wants a more equal partnership with the US, what that will mean in practice, and why Asia should be at the center of Japan's foreign policy — and why that is a good thing for the US. (See his interview in the FT here.) And he has shown on multiple occasions that he has a knack for showing why efforts to paint the DPJ's foreign policy beliefs as anti-American are mistaken.

Meanwhile, it seems clear from Okada's remarks that the DPJ will try to get everything it wants on the alliance. I thought it possible that if the Obama administration continued to say no to any discussion of Futenma, that the Hatoyama government — having softened its language on negotiations — might sound a retreat so as not to have a dispute with the US harming its position in advance of the 2010 upper house election. But Okada has said that the government wants to come to a decision with the US on Futenma within the year, or "100 days," as he told the FT.

Okada said that the reason for the rush is to ensure necessary outlays are included in next year's budget, but it also looks that from a political standpoint, scoring a quick and substantial diplomatic victory — and showing that under a DPJ government Japan can be allied with the US while still disagreeing over the details of bilateral cooperation — could neutralize foreign policy as an issue in the 2010 upper house election. It is not that voters are all that concerned about whether there needs to be a new realignment agreement, but that voters may be looking for reasons to question the DPJ's capabilities and cast a protest vote for the LDP next year. Recall that the LDP polled substantially better than the DPJ when it came to which party respondents felt more confident in on foreign and security policy. But if the DPJ's push for renegotiation results in another round of protracted, working-level discussions, its gambit could fail or at least do little to win the government recognition for boldness in foreign policy.

For its part, the Obama administration appears more pliant than it did last week, when talk was of Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell's encouraging Japan to continue the refueling mission, not long after Morrell's State Department counterpart completely ruled out renegotiating the agreement on realignment. While in Tokyo, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell stressed that while the administration wants to stick with the current agreement, "We can’t dictate. We have to listen, and clearly the new government has committed to some reviews in terms of certain aspect of our alliance." Hardly a guarantee of renegotiation, but a marked change of tone from earlier remarks from spokesmen. Elsewhere, Derek Mitchell, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian-Pacific affairs, said that the administration is not alarmed over DPJ questions over how Japanese government contributions will be spent in Guam.

At the same time, the Obama administration may also not be particularly eager to rush to forge a new agreement before the end of the year. I expect that Okada may press for a new agreement to be ready when President Barack Obama visits Japan in November, but that strikes me a wildly optimistic.

At least Okada is aware that, in advance of his and Hatoyama's trip to the US this week, Japan cannot only say no and expect the US to be cooperative. Okada did rule out sending the JSDF to Afghanistan in an appearance on TV Asahi Sunday, but that comes as no surprise. But Prime Minister Hatoyama hopes to secure approval in New York for Japan's broadening its support for stabilizing the Afghan economy and society.

While Hatoyama will be the one speaking in New York, Okada has already made clear that he will be the man to listen to on the Hatoyama government's foreign policy. Okada, no less committed to the DPJ's foreign policy agenda, is clearly more realistic when it comes to his understanding of the give-and-take of the alliance relationship.

The Obama administration wastes no time

Responding to yesterday's election, President Barack Obama has issued an innocuous statement congratulating Japan on its "historic election," but the Obama administration appears that it will waste no time in establishing the terms of the relationship with the Hatoyama government.

Yomiuri reports that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates will be visiting Japan in mid-October for discussions with the new government on alliance issues in advance of the president's trip to Japan scheduled for November. And before Gates arrives, Kurt Campbell, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, will come around 16 September, around the time the new government is expected to form. I think Gates's visit may be well timed, but Campbell's strikes me as a bit too soon. Then again, if Hatoyama wants to meet with Obama while in the US for the opening of the UN General Assembly, perhaps a visit sooner rather than later is advisable.

On the face of it, I think this is a meaningful gesture on the part of the Obama administration, provided that Campbell and Gates listen as much as they speak when they visit Tokyo. The US-Japan alliance, as much an institution of LDP rule as other, more familiar institutions, will not be unaffected by the transition to the Hatoyama government, and the sooner the two governments find a way to manage the transition the better it will be for the relationship.

At the same time, the early visits by the two officials will put pressure on the DPJ to have its act together by the time Campbell arrives.

Obama's Asia team takes shape

The Japanese establishment is undoubtedly breathing a sigh of relief following the announcement of the Obama administration's prospective Asia policy team, including the ambassador to Japan.

Not surprisingly, Kurt Campbell, reportedly close to Hillary Clinton, will succeed Christopher Hill as the assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific. Marine General Wallace Gregson (ret.), who retired as the commander of US Marines in the Pacific, will succeed James Shinn for Asia affairs at the Pentagon. Jeffrey Bader, a China specialist at the Brookings Institution and a foreign policy adviser for the Obama campaign, will be senior director for Asia at the National Security Council. And in perhaps the most noteworthy pick, Harvard Professor Joseph Nye will head to Tokyo to serve as ambassador.

Worried Japanese elites can take comfort in this lineup. Change, it seems, is for matters other than Asia policy.

While some press reports have called attention to Professor Nye's ideas about soft power, it is worth asking whether the Joseph Nye being sent to Tokyo is the "soft power" Joseph Nye or the Joseph Nye who was the architect of the 1996 version of the US-Japan alliance, the prime mover in the Democratic Party in the shift to remake the alliance into a more robust security partnership. Dr. Campbell, his deputy in the 1990s, may be an even more enthusiastic proponent of the Armitage-Nye vision of the alliance than Professor Nye himself. (Dr. Campbell and Michael Green, onetime colleagues at CSIS, have for a time been something of a bipartisan duo on the alliance.) As Dr. Campbell told me when I interviewed him for my master's thesis (2006), "What we’ve had over the past five years is a high level of engagement between the US and Japan that is unprecedented: a high level of engagement on a set of strategic issues in terms of bases, out of area activities and the like that is truly unprecedented, and extraordinarily impressive and it will be hard to match in the future."

So the Campbell-Nye team — with Professor Nye reporting to Dr. Campbell this time around — will undoubtedly reassure Japan's elites that their voices will still be heard in Washington. General Gregson, meanwhile, as commander of Marines in Okinawa and then the Pacific as a whole, is intimately familiar with issues related to the realignment of US forces in Japan and will ensure active leadership on the issue from the Pentagon.

I wonder, however, whether this team will be capable of moving the alliance in the direction I think it should go. Both Professor Nye and Dr. Campbell may ultimately be too connected with the status quo to push for a dramatic departure from the Bush administration's approach.

That said, I'm not completely without hope. I think even from Tokyo Professor Nye will be the central player in the debate over the alliance's future. While he played a leading role in building the 1996 alliance, his views are far more subtle than the China hawks who have made use of the framework he developed in the mid-1990s. Professor Nye — with Robert Keohane a major proponent of the idea of mutual interdependence — argued that the alliance could not simply be about containing China, that while strengthening the alliance was part of the equation, the decisions made by the allies would influence the character of China's rise. That is even more true today. As ambassador, Professor Nye could be instrumental in moving towards a bilateral approach to China that transcends security matters. He is trusted in Tokyo, and if he learns to listen more than his predecessor, his appointment could be a critical turning point for the alliance.

Given the likelihood that Professor Nye could be dealing with a DPJ-led government from early in his ambassadorship, I hope his first goal is building a new relationship with the leading opposition party. Jun Okumura suggests that the Obama administration will put pressure on the DPJ to change what he calls its "fantasy of a foreign and national security policy." I think Okumura is being a bit unfair to the DPJ. I have criticized Ozawa Ichiro in the past for his loopy foreign policy ideas (see this post), but I also think that one can go too far in criticizing the DPJ based on the outlandish statements of one DPJ politician or another. Insofar as we can tell, a DPJ government's foreign policy would involve a bit more assertiveness on the realignment question — the DPJ has indicated that it wants to revise the 2006 roadmap and the DPJ is reluctant to commit Japanese funds to Guam construction, certainly not without more assurances that Japanese money will be used properly — and greater focus on working with China and other Asian powers on regional cooperation. A DPJ-led government may be reluctant to commit the JSDF to combat missions abroad, suggesting a retreat from the globalization of the alliance during the "golden age." But is this such a bad thing? Have Japan's symbolic contributions abroad done anything more than provide cover for the Bush administration, while antagonizing segments of the Japanese public (as seen in Mr. Morita's book)? The US needs to work on rebuilding the alliance so that it rests on more than a narrow partnership between Washington and Tokyo elites. Not acting imperious to the DPJ is a good way to start building the new partnership. (For more on the DPJ's foreign policy, see this post.)

To sum up, I think there are reasons to hope that the Obama Asia team will introduce some change to an alliance badly in need of it. They are certainly familiar enough with Japanese concerns, but hopefully their familiarity will enable them to work forthrightly with Japanese officials of whatever party to find new avenues of cooperation that recognize Japan's limitations instead issuing demands to Japan's government. After the Bush administration sided with Japanese elites while alienating the Japanese public, the Obama administration has an opportunity to repair the damage and build a new relationship.

UPDATE: I may be premature in considering Professor Nye as ambassador. However, perhaps this post makes the case for why he should take the job.