Asia's shifting balance

The past week has brought a host of stories pointing to how the balance of power — both globally and in Asia — is shifting, suggesting that the assumptions made by each major regional power will have to change accordingly.

First, Taiwan's place as the most likely cause of war between China and the US (with or without Japan) may well be shifting, due to growing appreciation on the part of the US that as the potential costs of war with China have risen, the costs of providing a security "blank check" to Taiwan have risen in parallel. It is not surprising, therefore, that Stephen Young, head of the American Institute in Taiwan (the de facto embassy), has called upon Taiwan to pass a budget that provides funding for US-provided weaponry. Is this a last-ditch effort by the US to urge the Chen administration to focus more on trying to correct the cross-strait balance and less on provoking China with moves toward de jure independence?

At the same time, Taiwan has selected Joseph Wu, a member of Chen's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), as its representative in Washington; Wu acknowledges that in the face of deepening US-China ties, Taiwan will increasingly have to struggle to earn Washington's support, not to mention its attention. Meanwhile, it seems that some in Taiwan — most notably Ma Ying-jeou, the KMT's newly selected candidate for next year's presidential elections — recognize that Taiwan's future is increasingly across the strait, at least economically. Ma has called for removing restrictions on Taiwanese economic activities in mainland China, which raises the obvious question of whether a diplomatically isolated Taiwan that is increasingly economically dependent on China will be able to retain de facto independence for long.

In other words, strategic ambiguity is becoming ever more ambiguous, which undoubtedly is important for the US-Japan alliance (and may even explain why Taiwan was absent from the most recent SCC statement).

But fluctuation in the regional balance is not limited to Taiwan. Indeed, perhaps the more serious changes involve Japan, which is learning to look outside of the alliance for friends and partners. For all the talk about the strength of the alliance — Richard Armitage echoed the rhetoric emanating from last week's bilateral meetings in Washington in an interview in Mainichi — the US-Japan relationship is, oddly enough, much healthier in security cooperation between the US Military and JSDF than in political cooperation between the two governments. As the Economist reports this week, Abe's visit to the Middle East this past week is largely a product of Japanese realpolitik, with the Abe Cabinet looking out for Japan's security interests independent of other concerns. Similar thinking can be found in the growing trend in favor of a Russo-Japanese rapprochement, with Foreign Minister Aso, on a visit to Moscow, agreeing to schedule a summit between Abe and Putin at next month's G8 meeting in Germany.

And so the new regional balance of power comes into view. It is not an old-fashioned military balance of power, because the US presence in the region, with the help of its alliance with Japan, means that the US will continue to be primus inter pares as far as military power is concerned. In the shadow of the US military primacy, however, competition for energy, for trade, for commodities, and for the future of political and economic development in the region is burgeoning. Thus Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's advice to President Bush cannot be taken lightly: the US and Japan must become more flexible politically, even as they deepens military ties. But without political coordination and communication — clear explanations of the reasoning behind their respective independent initiatives — US-Japan security cooperation will be unsustainable over the long term.

After all, can the alliance survive without a clearly defined purpose, which is, in effect, the meaning of the "globalization" of the US-Japan alliance? Or will it flounder, just as NATO has floundered as it has tried to become more global in its vocation?

Perfect storm over Taiwan?

At the talk I heard last week by Randall Schriver (discussed here), he referred to the possibility of a "perfect storm" in the dispute between China and Taiwan as 2008 approaches, 2008 being the year in which the US and Taiwan elect new presidents and China hosts its long-desired Olympic Games. He suggested that the storm has begun forming already, as candidates in both countries begin campaigning.

I was somewhat incredulous about the "perfect storm" idea, but over the past couple of days several stories have led me to wonder if the danger might be real.

First, China tells a visiting John Negroponte that the US should halt plans to sell missiles to Taiwan, at the same time that China announced a major increase in defense spending. Now, Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian, at a campaign rally for presidential candidates from his Democratic People's Party, has apparently hinted at Taiwanese independence. (The Financial Times suggests that the verb he used could be "understood as 'will,' 'wants,' 'must' or 'should,' but regardless of the interpretation his statement -- "Taiwan wants independence, Taiwan wants name rectification, Taiwan wants a new constitution" -- is potentially provocative.) The brinkmanship will undoubtedly continue as what looks to be a hard-fought election heats up.

There is indeed real potential for a perfect storm.

Pulling the rug from under Chen

Forty-eight hours after Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan's embattled president, spoke of drafting a new constitution, he finds his presidency in danger of being cut short by a vote in parliament in light of corruption charges that have implicated his wife and further tarnished his damaged reputation.

It seems that Taiwan's constitution won't be frozen and replaced after all.

If Mr. Chen were removed from office, it may be for the best. His election in 2000, which made him the first non-Kuomintang president in Taiwan's history as the Republic of China, was an encouraging sign of the maturation of Taiwan's democracy and democracy in region on the whole. But his administration has been unsteady, and threats to move towards formal independence made the situation in the Taiwan Straits ever more unstable.

One would expect that Mr. Chen will be succeeded by a Kuomintang candidate, which would make a return to more stable cross-straits relations, because the Kuomintang -- China's last non-communist ruling party -- has little interest in renouncing the Republic of China's claim to govern all of China and not just a handful of islands off the coast, which would necessarily result from a formal Taiwanese declaration of independence.

Beijing is surely watching the developments in Taipei with great interest (and, no doubt, considerable glee). But China won't breathe easy until Mr. Chen is gone, whether in the weeks to come or after the March 2008 elections.

Chen plays with fire

The FT reports that Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian wants to "freeze" its constitution and replace it with a new one.

Given recent difficulties faced by Chen over corruption in his pan-green coalition and his low approval ratings, it seems unlikely, as the FT notes, that his plan will secure the requisite support in parliament and among the population at large.

Indeed, Chen is playing a very dangerous game -- the Bush administration has hardly been the most outspoken defender of Taiwan, and surely after the parliament rejected consideration of a US arms package the US will be less patient with any Taiwanese action that might provoke China.

Nothing may come of Chen's plan, but it is a reminder in the midst of apparently effective US-Chinese cooperation on North Korea that the Taiwan issue remains the sole issue that could result in war between the US and China. The Bush administration has been careful to remind Chen not to tamper needlessly with the status quo, and it should continue to do so.

De facto independence may be less desirable than de jure independence, but it is independence just the same.