Stirrings in Heiligendamm

Prime Minister Abe and President Putin met on Thursday evening (Friday morning, Japan time) as planned and discussed what seems like every outstanding issue in Russo-Japanese relations: fishing rights, the Northern Territories, the development of Siberia's energy resources, and a Russo-Japanese peace treaty.

Few conclusions, however, were reached, and it seems that there will be no direct exchange of visits after all, with the next face-to-face being at the APEC meeting in Australia in September.

But, while the outcome of the meeting seems to be more modest than I expected, I still think there's reason to think that the months leading up to the next summit will be spent with both countries exploring options for a grand bargain on outstanding bilateral issues, not least the Northern Territories question.

Again, I think the strategic logic is unimpeachable; both, relatively friendless in the region, need more options. But the road to an agreement will be arduous, and based on the coverage of the Abe-Putin summit, it seems that Japan and Russia are starting from scratch.

George and Shinzo, together again

So old chums George and Shinzo have gotten together again, this time in Heiligendamm on the sidelines of the G8 summit, to chat about their mounting unpopularity abductions (surprise! Bush still supports Abe's position) and climate change.

I wish, I wish, I wish I could rouse up some interest in what's happening in Germany, aside from the scheduled meeting between Abe and Putin, but I fail to see why the G8 matters. Seriously, when was the last time a G8 meeting had a practical impact on global governance? 1987, when the Louvre Accord helped push Japan's asset bubble to new heights of excess? The past twenty years have seen a dramatic decline in the relevance of the organization, as suggested by this op-ed by former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, one of the founding heads of state. Giscard wonders whether the current composition — the US, Canada, France, Germany, the UK, Italy, Japan, and Russia — has significant clout to see its conclusions implemented.

I wonder if that's but one problem, and not even the most significant. The expansion — and growing level of abstraction — of G8 agendas, with the agenda becoming a catch-all for whatever issues the member nations find important to them. There seems to be little acknowledgment of the limits of the resources and will of the countries involved. But the world is too complex, and power too diffuse, to pretend that the G8, no matter how wealthy or militarily capable its members, has the ability to solve even a fraction of the problems that the leaders gather to discuss. (Does anyone really think that more European involvement in the North Korea crisis will bring it any closer to a satisfactory outcome for Japan?)

So the media will continue to cover the summits, because the interaction between world leaders makes for interesting drama — and as for the Japanese media, they love to report on the G8, because it shows Japan as a world leader (hence the ongoing coverage of next year's summit, to be hosted by Japan) — but as far as I'm concerned, the G8 is just another antiquated global forum.

Keep an eye on Russia

In recent days, Russia has announced plans to tighten sanctions on North Korea, with an emphasis on arms, spare parts, and luxury goods — this is the first concrete step Russia has taken in regard to sanctions since the aftermath of the October nuclear test.

While Russia has its own reasons to be irritated with North Korea, due to North Korea's outstanding debts to Russia from the Soviet period, I cannot help but wonder if this step has more to do with Russia's relations with other regional powers than with North Korea. I am thinking, of course, of Russo-Japanese relations.

With Abe and Putin due to meet soon on the sidelines of the G8 summit in Germany, Russia could very well be taking this step, which brings it closer to Japan's position, as a way of creating some momentum towards a grand bargain with Japan that resolves the Northern Territories issue, strengthens energy ties, and gives both Japan and Russia greater strategic flexibility in Northeast Asia. The logic of closer Russo-Japanese ties was spelled out during Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov's February visit to Japan, during which officials discussed creating "A Relationship Grounded in Shared Strategic Interests."

The time for Russo-Japanese rapprochement may be right. As noted by Asahi's Yoshibumi Wakamiya back in December, Russo-Japanese relations tend to move in fifty-year cycles, and the regional environment is such that both Moscow and Tokyo could see the value in overcoming the thorny and heretofore irresolvable Northern Territories issue for the sake of larger strategic interests. For Russia, greater cooperation with Japan reduces its dependence on China as a regional partner, whose growth, after all, is potentially harmful to Russian control of Siberia. (And it will also help raise the bidding price for its energy resources.) For Japan — for Abe — rapprochement with Russia will give Japan that much more strategic independence in the region, a move to greater strategic flexibility to match the similar shift underway in US Asia policy. (As a result, US tension with Russia may not have any impact on Tokyo's Russia policy.)

Securing a grand bargain with Russia may well become more appealing to Abe as his domestic political situation weakens, particularly if the Upper Elections go poorly. Like his grandfather Kishi, Abe has come to rely on trips abroad that show himself playing the statesman to raise his popular support and thus enable him to pursue other parts of his agenda. As George Packard wrote of Kishi, "Kishi tried to strengthen his power case through popular support, making trips to Southeast Asia, Washington, Europe, and Latin America, but he never succeeded in launching a 'Kishi boom' or even in developing a large popular following. Nor was he the type of politician who could play the 'strong-man role' that Yoshida had made famous." And for Abe, sensitive to his position as an LDP prince, the appeal of reaching an agreement that proved elusive to earlier generations of LDP leaders may prove irresistible. (Remember that his late father, Shintaro, was greatly interested in an agreement with Russia).

Accordingly, a compromise on the Northern Territories — which to date has been impossible, with Japan demanding the return of all the Kurils — may take shape. The contents of a compromise will have to be hammered out in the coming months, but look for a softening of Japan's public position on the islands in the aftermath of the Abe-Putin summit on the sidelines of the G8 meeting in Germany. (Asahi's Takahashi Kosuke surveyed options here.) Consider that MOFA's press secretary said, earlier this month, "Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wants to enrich the bilateral relationship; put a human face, if you like, on the bilateral relationship. But, beyond that, I cannot speculate on what actually Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is going to pick up as important issues to be discussed by the two nations." This suggests to me that any Russian initiative is being handled in the Kantei, and that the prime minister may have a surprise in store for Heiligendamm.

So in Germany, expect a road map to an agreement, with a more firm announcement about an exchange of visits, with Putin visiting Tokyo and Abe visiting Moscow before the year is out, with Putin perhaps making the first visit. Maybe Abe will even get Putin to voice his heartfelt understanding of the plight of Japan's abductees.

And then look for a complicated dance within and between Russia and Japan, as they figure out the contours of an agreement that will satisfy both.