Stirrings in Heiligendamm

Prime Minister Abe and President Putin met on Thursday evening (Friday morning, Japan time) as planned and discussed what seems like every outstanding issue in Russo-Japanese relations: fishing rights, the Northern Territories, the development of Siberia's energy resources, and a Russo-Japanese peace treaty.

Few conclusions, however, were reached, and it seems that there will be no direct exchange of visits after all, with the next face-to-face being at the APEC meeting in Australia in September.

But, while the outcome of the meeting seems to be more modest than I expected, I still think there's reason to think that the months leading up to the next summit will be spent with both countries exploring options for a grand bargain on outstanding bilateral issues, not least the Northern Territories question.

Again, I think the strategic logic is unimpeachable; both, relatively friendless in the region, need more options. But the road to an agreement will be arduous, and based on the coverage of the Abe-Putin summit, it seems that Japan and Russia are starting from scratch.

Lavrov visits the Northern Territories

Interpret this as you will, but in advance of the Abe-Putin meeting on the sidelines of the G8 summit in Heiligendamm, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is touring the Kuril Islands (Northern Territories), the first visit by a Russian foreign minister since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

At a press conference in Sakhalin, Lavrov claimed that his inspection of the islands is not designed to find a solution to the territorial question, but rather a matter of finding a way for both countries to profit.

Whether Lavrov's remarks should be taken at face value are open to question; as I discussed here, the time may be right for Russia and Japan to forge an agreement on the heretofore irresolvable Northern Territories issue.

So again, watch the meeting between Putin and Abe this week.

Keep an eye on Russia

In recent days, Russia has announced plans to tighten sanctions on North Korea, with an emphasis on arms, spare parts, and luxury goods — this is the first concrete step Russia has taken in regard to sanctions since the aftermath of the October nuclear test.

While Russia has its own reasons to be irritated with North Korea, due to North Korea's outstanding debts to Russia from the Soviet period, I cannot help but wonder if this step has more to do with Russia's relations with other regional powers than with North Korea. I am thinking, of course, of Russo-Japanese relations.

With Abe and Putin due to meet soon on the sidelines of the G8 summit in Germany, Russia could very well be taking this step, which brings it closer to Japan's position, as a way of creating some momentum towards a grand bargain with Japan that resolves the Northern Territories issue, strengthens energy ties, and gives both Japan and Russia greater strategic flexibility in Northeast Asia. The logic of closer Russo-Japanese ties was spelled out during Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov's February visit to Japan, during which officials discussed creating "A Relationship Grounded in Shared Strategic Interests."

The time for Russo-Japanese rapprochement may be right. As noted by Asahi's Yoshibumi Wakamiya back in December, Russo-Japanese relations tend to move in fifty-year cycles, and the regional environment is such that both Moscow and Tokyo could see the value in overcoming the thorny and heretofore irresolvable Northern Territories issue for the sake of larger strategic interests. For Russia, greater cooperation with Japan reduces its dependence on China as a regional partner, whose growth, after all, is potentially harmful to Russian control of Siberia. (And it will also help raise the bidding price for its energy resources.) For Japan — for Abe — rapprochement with Russia will give Japan that much more strategic independence in the region, a move to greater strategic flexibility to match the similar shift underway in US Asia policy. (As a result, US tension with Russia may not have any impact on Tokyo's Russia policy.)

Securing a grand bargain with Russia may well become more appealing to Abe as his domestic political situation weakens, particularly if the Upper Elections go poorly. Like his grandfather Kishi, Abe has come to rely on trips abroad that show himself playing the statesman to raise his popular support and thus enable him to pursue other parts of his agenda. As George Packard wrote of Kishi, "Kishi tried to strengthen his power case through popular support, making trips to Southeast Asia, Washington, Europe, and Latin America, but he never succeeded in launching a 'Kishi boom' or even in developing a large popular following. Nor was he the type of politician who could play the 'strong-man role' that Yoshida had made famous." And for Abe, sensitive to his position as an LDP prince, the appeal of reaching an agreement that proved elusive to earlier generations of LDP leaders may prove irresistible. (Remember that his late father, Shintaro, was greatly interested in an agreement with Russia).

Accordingly, a compromise on the Northern Territories — which to date has been impossible, with Japan demanding the return of all the Kurils — may take shape. The contents of a compromise will have to be hammered out in the coming months, but look for a softening of Japan's public position on the islands in the aftermath of the Abe-Putin summit on the sidelines of the G8 meeting in Germany. (Asahi's Takahashi Kosuke surveyed options here.) Consider that MOFA's press secretary said, earlier this month, "Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wants to enrich the bilateral relationship; put a human face, if you like, on the bilateral relationship. But, beyond that, I cannot speculate on what actually Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is going to pick up as important issues to be discussed by the two nations." This suggests to me that any Russian initiative is being handled in the Kantei, and that the prime minister may have a surprise in store for Heiligendamm.

So in Germany, expect a road map to an agreement, with a more firm announcement about an exchange of visits, with Putin visiting Tokyo and Abe visiting Moscow before the year is out, with Putin perhaps making the first visit. Maybe Abe will even get Putin to voice his heartfelt understanding of the plight of Japan's abductees.

And then look for a complicated dance within and between Russia and Japan, as they figure out the contours of an agreement that will satisfy both.

Revolution from below

This article at Mainichi online, on ceremonies to commemorate Northern Territories Day, caught my eye for a couple reasons.

The first is that I can't help but wonder if a push to resolve longstanding territorial disputes with Russia is driven by rising fears of abandonment in the government of Japan. Outside the alliance with the US, after all, Japan is short on reliable friends, and perhaps Abe reasons that, with this irksome issue resolved, Russia might be open to cooperation on initiatives in East Asia, especially regarding China (don't forget about those Chinese migrants flooding into the Russian Far East). Russia, of course, is no substitute for the US in Japan's foreign relations, but better relations with Moscow would at least somewhat mitigate a sense of isolation.

I found, however, that more interesting than the strategic reasons behind this campaign is the language used by Abe to promote this effort.

The territorial issue is a matter of national concern, and it is important for each person to be interested in the problem to mobilize efforts.

There, in one sentence, can be found the reason why Japan's political system has proven so resistant to change, and points to the kind of change needed.

The Meiji Restoration looms large over the Japanese political system; both parties struggle to claim the mantle of the proper heir of the restoration's legacy. But the Meiji Restoration was a top-down revolution, and the modern state to which it gave birth has been indelibly marked by its origins at the hands of the Meiji elite. Even after the "second opening" that was the US occupation of Japan, the outlines of the state shaped during the Meiji era remain. All the US did was change the content of the state, infusing it with a touch of New-Deal liberalism without destroying the fundamental character of the Meiji state: change would be managed and directed from above, by bureaucrats and their politician allies.

Accordingly, overriding national goals have had considerable resonance in Japan in the past, as in the 1960s, when rapid economic growth was the great national project that moved all.

All of this was supposed to have changed in the 1990s, when confidence in the bureaucracy collapsed following the bursting of the economic bubble, the mismanagement of economic recovery, the woeful response to the Hanshin earthquake and Aum subway attack in 1995, and so on. In place of bureaucrats, power was supposed to shift to politicians -- and in some ways, it has. But that's precisely the problem. Substituting politicians for bureaucrats without changing the way Japanese society thinks about policy and governance simply substitutes a new class of corruptible leaders for the old (cue The Who).

Hence the title of this post. Politicians' appealing to the Meiji Restoration misses the point, which is that rather than have yet another top-down revolution, as Abe intends with his talk of dismantling the postwar regime, the Japanese people need to step up and claim the political system for themselves. Instead of talk of national goals about which "it is important for each person to be interested in the problem to mobilize efforts," it is time that the elite step back and let the people learn to speak for themselves.

Anything short of that will simply invite the same problems with corruption and stagnation that Japan has experienced in the recent past. Politicians of all stripes may talk about dynamism, but a truly dynamic Japan will only emerge if the system opens up to competition in policy and politics, as well as economics, if the Japanese people claim leadership of society.