Separated by a common enemy

Already under consideration before North Korea's nuclear test last week, the LDP's push to include plans for an indigenous capability to strike North Korea to preempt an attack on Japan has picked up speed over the past week. On May 26th, Prime Minister Aso Taro reminded reporters that since 1955 preemptive self-defense has been considered legal. The same day a subcommittee of the defense division of the LDP's Policy Research Council approved a draft of proposals to include in this year's National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) that calls for preemptive strike capabilities, especially sea-launched cruise missiles. On the 28th, the prime minister once again asserted the legality of preemptive strikes, this time in proceedings in the Upper House Budget Committee.

In the midst of this debate, Mainichi called for a less passionate debate that acknowledges the risks associated with this step, including the feasibility of preemptive strikes against North Korea, the consequences for the US-Japan alliance, and the dangers of arms racing and security dilemmas in East Asia. I second Mainichi's concerns: there are a number of questions that advocates of preemptive strike capabilities have yet to answer, most notably the question of what independent Japanese strike capabilities add to US capabilities.

It now appears that the US government may be contributing to the debate over Japanese preemptive strike capabilities.

Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on Saturday, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates delivered a message to Japanese and South Korean elites worried about the sturdiness of the US commitment to its East Asian allies:

The Republic of Korea and Japan have since become economic powerhouses with modern, well-trained and equipped armed forces. They are more willing and able to take responsibility for their own defense and assume responsibility for collective security beyond their shores. As a result, we are making adjustments in each country to maintain a posture that is more appropriate to that of a partner, as opposed to a patron. Still, though, a partner fully prepared and able to carry out all – I repeat, all – of our alliance obligations.

This message is ambiguous, welcoming greater allied contributions while reaffirming the US role in defending its allies, especially via extended nuclear deterrence, but Sankei's Komori Yoshisa believes that there is more to the story. The Obama administration, he writes in an ecstatic post at his blog (if two exclamation points are any indication), has signed off on preemptive strike capabilities. His evidence is derived from interviews of Gates and Wallace Gregson, assistant secretary of defense for Asian-Pacific affairs by Asahi's Washington correspondent Kato Yoichi in which both officials appear to accept Japan's having the ability to strike at threats outside its borders. Gates's statement is vague, premised on the notion of "If Japan decides" to acquire more offensive capabilities, i.e. practicing what he has preached about the US being a partner instead of a patron. Gregson, while also reluctant to comment on what is a domestic matter for Japan, was open to a new division of labor between the US and Japan.

I appreciate that the US officials are refraining from overt interference in Japan's internal political discussions, but I think that the US has reasons to be concerned about this shift. (I also think that Komori is fishing for US support for his position. But a pair of quotes in an Asahi article do not a new policy make.)

Apart from the aforementioned reasons for skepticism about Japan's acquiring autonomous strike capabilities, there is another reason why the US should be concerned about this debate in Japan.

Arguably one reason for the difference in US and Japanese approaches to North Korea — apart from geography, the abductees, and domestic politics — is the US alliance with South Korea. Japan's North Korea policy can be conceived solely in terms of Japanese national interests, defending Japanese lives and property from the rogue state next door. The US approach to North Korea is broader. Not only is the US concerned about the threat posed to the US by the possibility of the transfer of nuclear materials, but it is worried to a lesser extent about the durability of the global non-proliferation regime. And it is not only concerned about the threat to Japanese security, but South Korean security as well.

The conflicting demands of the US-South Korea and US-Japan alliances are a source of turbulence in the US-Japan alliance. The US, legally committed to the defense of South Korea, has to think carefully about its words and actions vis-à-vis North Korea — indeed, the US is deterred from launching a preventive and perhaps a preemptive war against North Korea due to the threat posed by North Korean conventional capabilities to Seoul. This lends an air of restraint to US pronouncements on North Korea. As Sam Roggeveen writes, it is possible to read Gates's speech in Singapore as outlining a containment policy in recognition of the considerable obstacles in the way of denuclearization. It also bears recalling the decision by the US government ruling out in advance an attempt to shoot down North Korea's test rocket. That decision has been interpreted by Japanese elites as evidence of the shakiness of the US defense commitment. Maybe so, but it may be more appropriate to view the US not as lacking commitment to Japan's defense but having concerns greater than Japan's defense.

Which is why the US (and South Korea) should be concerned about Japan's acquiring independent preemptive strike capabilities. Japan, not having any alliance relationship with South Korea, will have no reason to take South Korea's security into consideration in confronting North Korea. If the Japanese government detects an imminent launch — with the autonomous surveillance capabilities that conservatives also wanted included in the NDPG — it will be able to act solely on the basis of the direct threat posed by North Korea's missiles to the Japanese homeland. It will not have to consider whether launching a preemptive strike will lead North Korea, fearing a mortal threat to the DPRK regime or perhaps not being able to identify the source of an attack, to lash out against South Korea. Unconstrained by broader regional commitments, Japan could use its new capabilities for "offensive defense" and in the process trigger a broader regional crisis — not out of a lust for conquest, but simply out of a desire to defend itself from an external threat.

This may be an unlikely scenario: after all, it is not clear that the NDPG will include plans for preemptive capabilities, and even if strike capabilities make their way into Japan's defense plans, they may amount to nothing more than a token force. And Japan may not be able to gather the necessary intelligence for attacks against North Korea's mobile launchers.

However unlikely, South Korea ought to reach out to Japan in order to close the gap, in effect forcing Japan to think about broader regional security when it considers the threat posed by North Korea. In other words, it is necessary for South Korea (and the US) to undo the damage done when the Japanese government decided to make recovering the abductees the central goal of Japan's North Korea policy. That decision produced a Japan solipsistic in its approach to North Korea, inclined to view North Korea through its distinct lens, barely considering the perspectives from which other countries have struggled to manage North Korea.

It is encouraging that the US, Japan, and South Korea had their first ever defense ministerial meeting in Singapore Friday. If Japan is to acquire its own strike capabilities, it has to be prepared to wield them responsibly, considering the consequences that saber rattling, to say nothing of preemptive strikes could have for other countries in the region. Regional security and stability is a Japanese national interest, even without formal alliance commitments in East Asia. Realizing that, perhaps Japan's leaders will become more appreciative of US efforts to uphold regional security — especially the defense of South Korea —and less unnerved by US restraint, in turn lessening the need for independent capabilities.

A Korean admires Koizumi

This op-ed from the Chosun Ilbo by Tokyo correspondent Jong Son-U -- entitled "We Can Learn Much From Japanese Patriotism" -- provides yet another reminder of why it is unfair to view Japanese nationalism as a unique threat to the region.

Jong writes of a visit to Yasukuni by Koizumi last year:

I felt strangely envious at the Yasukuni Shrine that day. People criticize Japan leaders' visits to the shrine as irresponsible, but that's not how I was feeling at that moment. Instead I wondered if our own president could attract a thousand young Koreans to the National Cemetery in Seoul. I shook my head. Clearly we can't compare Yasukuni with the National Cemetery; I use the analogy only to discuss the matter of encouraging patriotism in young people, whether it is right or wrong. In his inimitable way, Koizumi was able to use his innate gift for showmanship to further a state effort: a bill in Japan requiring the teaching of patriotism was passed into law this year.

In Asia, everyone's (more than) a little bit nationalist. It's just interesting to see a Korean journalist look to Japanese nationalism with envy instead of rage.

Perhaps that explains why, after initially reading this article over coffee this morning, I was unable to access it again to write about it until now. (I suspect there was some tinkering, but I can't tell what has changed, if anything.)

In any case, it's a good reminder that Japanese, Chinese, and Korean nationalists are not all that different: each is interested in interpreting history to show their nation in the best possible light, each seeks to assert the broadest possible claims on national territory, and each feels more than a little uneasy about the activities of nationalists in neighboring countries.

It seems that the nationalism problem in East Asia may get a lot worse before it gets better, but this is hardly surprising, as the region's powers are reaching their maturity as modern nation-states, just as Europe's nation-states slouch into the post-national retirement home that is the European Union.

Dissecting the second Armitage-Nye Report, part 2

Continuing from my previous post, this post will focus on the second Armitage-Nye Report's vision of Asia. My thoughts on the report's recommendations for the US-Japan alliance can be read here. (The report can be downloaded from CSIS here.)

All of the report's predictions and policy recommendations stem from a principle stated on its first page: "Getting Asia right in this regard does not mean the imposition of U.S. values on the region, but rather encouraging an environment in which the region’s leaders define their own national success in terms that are consonant with U.S. political and economic objectives."

As the center of gravity shifts to Asia, as Asia emerges as a region with three major powers (China, Japan, and India) existing side-by-side for the first time in modern history, the above principle serves as a concession to this immutable reality of twenty-first century Asia. For better or worse, we are entering an age of "Asia for Asians," during which Asian powers -- including, to the chagrin of certain leaders, Australia and New Zealand -- will largely shape the future of the region. As the report's authors acknowledge, even as the US retains considerable power and influence in the region, it will increasingly be unable to impose outcomes, necessarily entailing that the US step into a less visible, supporting role.

On the whole, then, this report is typical of the "new pragmatism" that seems to be taking hold in Washington in the waning years of the Bush administration. (This is one prominent example.) The Bush administration's post-9/11 revolutionary zeal apparently having burned out, the revolutionaries isolated or out of office, the US foreign policy establishment is in problem-solving mode, this being one example (and the recent six-party agreement being another, as this IHT article suggests).

The biggest "problem" in the region facing Washington is, of course, the rise of China, although problem isn't the best word to use. What China will look like in 2020 is unknown, and, at this point in time, unknowable. The report phrases it thusly:

Even factoring in the possibility of disruption, China will continue to be an engine of regional growth and global dynamism. China’s growing comprehensive national power is already well reflected in its assertive diplomacy aimed at shaping the strategic environment around its borders. One key question for the United States, Japan, and all of Asia is: how will China use its newfound capabilities and resources as it matures as an economic and military power? (p. 3)

Accordingly, as they discuss the strategic triangle of the US, Japan, and China, much of their attention focuses on the goal of encouraging China to channel its power in the region to constructive ends. The authors believe that this goal is achievable, because Beijing, preoccupied with the instability it has unleashed internally by opting for liberalization, is ill-prepared to pursue a revolutionary foreign policy in its near abroad. As the report notes, at some length (worth quoting, because I find it to be a rather succinct expression of my own thoughts on China's rise):

China will grow, but its growth will not necessarily be a linear “rise” without complications. China has massive internal challenges that include an aging society, a weak social safety net, large and growing disparities in development, and systemic corruption—all of which have resulted in social unease. China’s leaders also are faced with growing labor unrest, a weak banking and financial system, lingering ethnic disputes, environmental problems almost unimaginable to Westerners, and vulnerability to epidemic disease. Together, these challenges have caused Chinese leaders to focus internally, thereby putting a premium on external stability. China seeks a stable, peaceful international environment in which to develop its comprehensive national power. China needs to avoid any disruption of its access to national resources (particularly oil and gas) and foreign investment, and it can ill afford major diversions of resources to causes unrelated to the objectives of economic growth and public welfare (p. 3).

The idea of some in the Pentagon and the commentariat that China is spoiling for a fight is wholly fallacious, and harmful to America's long-term interests in the Asia-Pacific region. According to the authors of the report, the US and China share a fundamental interest, namely in "stability": "Our interest is in stability, to which the United States, Japan, China, and all countries in East Asia can play a supportive role. In particular, stability in East Asia will rest on a triangle of U.S.- Japan-China relations, which should be fostered in addition to our strong alliance with Japan" (p. 26).

The report belies the paramount importance of stability to some extent, as the authors emphasize the need to encourage the spread of liberty, which can often undermine stability; this means that the second Armitage-Nye Report embraces somewhat contradictory goals, seeking the spread of values that will undermine a status quo that encourages non-interference by states in the internal affairs of their neighbors at the same time as trying to maintain stability in East Asian international relations. Nevertheless, stability in East Asia has been the most prominent US policy aim in the region since the end of the cold war, when the cold war's predictability gave way to the "uncertainty" (a popular word in strategy documents from the 1990s) of East Asian "minipolarity." If anything, it is even more important to the US now than ever before, as the region's map changes to accommodate the rise of two massive powers.

As such, the authors also focus on India, and its potential as a possible anchor for democratic values in the region. But they are right to point out that India will not be a mere cat's paw for the US, Japan, or any other power. As they wrote:

Washington and Tokyo have both qualitatively improved their respective strategic relationships with India. However, both should move forward based on the assumption that India will not act as either Japan’s or the United States’ counterweight against Beijing, mindful that India has its own synergies with China. New Delhi is cautious with respect to Beijing and is not interested in raising tensions with China. That being said, New Delhi’s Look East Policy is particularly appealing to Asia, and its growing economic, political, and cultural ties to East Asia will make it a larger part of the region’s strategic equation (p. 6).

India remains as much a question mark as China. Will India be seduced by great power and embrace a kind of realpolitik, or will it trumpet its position as the world's most populous democracy as an example to rival China (the Bangalore Consensus versus the Beijing Consensus)? How India answers that question will play a major role in determining what Asia looks like in 2020 and beyond.

While the report also touches on the roles to be played by Southeast Asia, Russia, and regional integration in shaping the region, I am going to withhold comment and instead conclude this already long post by talking about the report's notes on the Korean Peninsula. The authors note that it is essential for both the US and Japan to patch up relations with the Republic of Korea, because, despite Seoul's increasingly continental orientation, the three countries still have shared values that can serve as the basis for enhanced cooperation. However, as acknowledged in the report, the obstacles standing in the way of an re-invigorated US-Japan-South Korea triangle are many, including generational change within South Korea, shared interests in Seoul and Beijing, and the weight of history. These obstacles suggest that while functional cooperation on matters of shared concern (i.e., North Korea) are possible, South Korea will not be an especially enthusiastic partner of the US, Japan, and the region's other democracies in pushing hard for the spread of liberal values -- at least that's not what I expect.

I will return tomorrow with comments on the remaining bulk of the report, the sections focused on the US-Japan alliance.

The annual foreign policy survey, pt. 1

Nikkei reports today on the results of the Japanese government's annual survey of public opinion on Japan's foreign relations. The results are not particularly surprising. Nikkei leads by reporting that the ratio of respondents (57%) who thought that Japanese-South Korean relations were bad was the highest since the survey began in 1986 -- this likely reflecting the influence of the "Kenkanryu" (the hate-Korea wave).

Nikkei also notes that the survey found a big jump in the percentage of respondents who thought Japan's relations with Russia were bad (eleven percentage points, to 68.2%), attributed by Nikkei to Russia's shooting of Japanese crab fishermen earlier this year. The survey also found that the ratio of respondents who thought Japan's relations with China were good remained low, hovering around 20%.

What surprises me, however, is that when asked about North Korea, respondents said they were more concerned about the abduction of Japanese citizens (86.7%) than the nuclear problem (79.5%) or the missile problem (71.5%), this despite the survey's being conducted from 5th to 15th October, as North Korea tested a nuclear weapon and the international community weighed the best response. I find this number shocking. I knew that the Japanese people felt strongly about North Korea's abduction of Japanese citizens during the 1970s and 1980s, but to feel more concerned about that -- which is a question of righting past wrongs -- than about a very clear and very present danger is mildly unsettling.

This probably reflects efforts by Abe Shinzo during his time as chief cabinet secretary to call attention to the kidnapping issue, but perhaps Gerald Curtis was right: maybe the government needs to back down slightly on this issue and focus the public's attention on more current problems with North Korea. Naturally the survey shows that the public is concerned about North Korea's burgeoning arsenal, but that should be the foremost concern, not the abductions issue, which is a relatively minor symptom of the major problem that is the DPRK.

In any case, the government survey is quite substantial, so I will provide more analysis as I make my way through it.