Is the government running out of options — or out of options already?

The political system is gearing up for a debate over the government's 15 trillion yen stimulus package that could decide the timing and the outcome of the next general election.

Kan Naoto has indicated that if the government is open to revising the plan, the DPJ will cooperate to smooth its passage. What choice does the DPJ have? Now that the LDP and the DPJ have swapped preferences regarding election timing — after years of demanding an immediate election, the DPJ has backed down due largely to Ozawa Ichiro's struggles, and the prime minister, enjoying what could be a temporary shift in his favor, is contemplating an election sooner rather than later — the DPJ has every reason to cooperate if it means depriving the government of an issue which it can use as justification for a snap election. Although there is some debate within the party about the right course of action, it seems likely that the DPJ will opt for this strategy, forcing Aso to decide whether he will live up to his oft-repeated commitment to putting policy and the resolution of the economic crisis before politics or whether he will opt to exploit what looks like a window of opportunity for a general election.

At the same time, the DPJ ought to engage in good-faith debate for reasons having nothing to do with its political standing. Given the amount of money the government is pledging to throw at Japan's crumbling economy, the leading opposition party and master of the upper house ought to be thoroughly reviewing the government's plan and questioning whether its components are intended to stimulate domestic demand or buy the votes of straying LDP constituencies (or throw money at the prime minister's hobby). The press coverage of the government's plan makes the mistake of treating it as wholly dedicated to fiscal countermeasures. As Ikeda Nobuo notes, emergency measures comprise 4.9 trillion yen, compared with 6.2 trillion yen for the government's "growth strategy." Ikeda, a libertarian economist, says that the growth strategy measures could be conceived as old-fashioned LDP pork-barrel spending, but they should also be understood as an effort to revive old-style MITI targeting — and which Ikeda rejects as inconsistent with the latest economics research and likely to do more harm than good. The DPJ ought to be raising questions about whether the government's spending plans have the slightest chance of nurturing new industries and reorganizing the Japanese economy. Hatoyama Yukio has already started on this line of argument, but the DPJ may have a hard time continuing in this vein given its own spending plans.

Nevertheless, there are plenty of questions about the government's proposal that can and should be asked. Looking at Prime Minister Aso's statement about the stimulus package, a number of questions came to mind.

The prime minister himself said, the goal of the government's proposal is "to prevent the bottom from falling out of the economy," meaning that the government's emergency measures have less to do with stimulating consumption than with minimizing the hardship suffered by laborers and small- and medium-sized businesses. To that end, the government has pledged more subsidies for businesses that have retained employees and greater support for retraining for laidoff employees, and greater access to credit from public financial organizations for small- and medium-sized businesses. (Jun Okumura notes the importance of this measure here.) Additionally, Aso pledged greater support for working single mothers, higher child allowances, scholarships and tuition reductions for private school students, and some 310 billion yen in subsidies for rural medical institutions.

The third part is the portion criticized by Ikeda, the government's medium-term growth strategy. Central to this plan is environmental technology, and thus Aso called for spending to promote greater use of solar panels in schools, homes, and businesses and the development of electric cars. The government will also ease the burden on local authorities for public works projects (i.e., greater central government spending), will promote the construction of a Tokyo ring road, and raise the level of subsidies to localities. He also alluded to medium-term tax reform that includes a consumption tax increase, prompting Nakagawa Hidenao to criticize the prime minister sharply for speaking of a tax increase as the economic outlook worsens. (Yosano Kaoru acknowledged in a TV appearance Saturday that as the government debates fundamental tax reform it needs to set a new target for balancing the budget now that 2011 is out of the question.)

The first thing that stands out is just how much Aso has lowered his sights since January. Recall that in January Aso insisted that he would make Japan the first country to escape the crisis. No longer. Now his government is merely trying to stave off complete collapse. Aso appears to have lost much of the optimism that characterized his response to the crisis earlier this year.

The question is whether this will be too much, too late, whether the fate of the economy rests in non-Japanese hands, making the government's plan a gambit to buy time in the hope of economic recovery elsewhere. It's an expensive gambit, and the DPJ should be concerned. If the government's salesmanship works, the massive stimulus package might be enough to convince the public that the LDP is steady and reliable in troubled times and deserves to be returned to office. And if the latest stimulus package fails, it will have the unintended consequence of leaving a new DPJ government facing an economy in freefall with its options even more limited on account of the additional debt the government will issue to pay for the stimulus package (which suggests that despite Yosano's desire for progress in the direction of tax reform, the LDP has every reason to wait until after an election to commit to a course of action — why should the LDP commit itself to a politically fraught policy when it could be the DPJ's problem in a matter of months?).

The uncomfortable question raised by this debate is whether the Japanese government is wholly powerless in the face of the worsening economy. Monetary tools? Limited. Fiscal policy? How many more stimulus packages can the government pass while waiting for recovery, ensuring that future generations of Japanese will bear an ever greater burden of paying for the current government's restless impotence?

Drowning in noise

While Japan waited anxiously Saturday to see whether North Korea would launch its rocket, the day ended up being notable for the defense ministry's mistakenly informing the public not once but twice that launch had occurred.

Yomiuri has the details on how the public came to be misinformed. The first mistake, which occurred around 10am Saturday, resulted from a computer glitch at the GSDF command center in Tokyo, which resulted in some 900 JSDF personnel receiving emails announcing that a launch had been detected, including one GSDF officer in Akita, who proceeded to inform local authorities of the launch. The second mistake, at around noon, was the result of a misunderstanding by the Air Self-Defense Forces officer responsible for missile defense, who thought that a report received from air defense command in Tokyo was based on information from US early warning satellites, when in fact it came from a J/FPS-5 radar station in Chiba that had detected "some kind of wake." The ASDF officer informed the Kantei's crisis management center, which then informed the media and some local governments via its M-net system.

Geoffrey Forden has more about the Chiba station and another station in Shimonoseki. As for the Chiba station, Yomiuri reports that its location poses some difficulty due to the Japan Alps lying between Chiba and North Korea. Due to geography, the radar is detecting with a 4-6 degree angle of elevation, which apparently prevented the station from tracking North Korea's 2006 missile launches, which were about 100 kilometers too low. But as Yomiuri notes, the mistake had less to do with the radar than with human error: neither the ASDF officer who received the report nor the defense ministry's central command post confirmed that the information had come from US spy satellites. They ought to have been suspicious, because reportedly an alarm would sound when data was received from the US — and beyond that, they could have checked on a US-Japan computer system for sharing information.

The result was confusion and alarm in localities throughout Japan. Apparently the public is paying more attention to the government's extensive and visible preparations than to its messages telling the public to remain calm and minimizing the danger of falling debris. To some degree, the confusion was the result of over-preparedness. In their desire to deliver information to the public has swiftly as possible, local governments have neglected safeguards that would check for accuracy before issuing announcements. The speed with which corrections were issued caused further confusion.

The government was quick to apologize for the mistakes, and continued to stress its readiness — and urged the Japanese people to carry on with their daily lives. But yesterday's follies will likely dog the government for weeks and months to come.

On Saturday afternoon, Hatoyama Yukio, DPJ secretary-general, criticized the government for needlessly alarming the public, sentiments echoed by the JCP, SDPJ, and PNP. The government also faced criticism from within the governing coalition. I have already mentioned Komeito's rapid-fire criticism, which was echoed by LDP members. As an unnamed LDP defense zoku with cabinet experience said: "As this has made Japan's troubles with its crisis management capabilities public, it's extremely unpleasant."

Yomiuri's anonymous zoku giin alludes to an important point, namely that both the Japanese government and the Japanese people are not prepared for this sort of thing, despite their experience with disaster preparedness. How often have the JSDF personnel responsible for handling and conveying information received from Japanese radar sites and US satellites drilled for a missile launch? And this is a situation in which North Korea has provided a launch window. Would the JSDF be ready in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula which resulted in missiles being launched at Japan unannounced? It is fortunate that the errors were on the side of overcaution, but, of course, there's always the danger that these mistakes will result in the "boy who cried wolf" syndrome.

In that sense, Japan should be thankful that North Korea is stress testing Japan's national emergency response system. Of course, the Aso government won't see it that way, as I suspect that in the aftermath of Saturday's fiasco the DPJ will use its control of the upper house to launch an inquiry into what precisely went wrong and perhaps the Aso government's handling of the launch more generally. The last thing the government had hoped for when going all out in its preparations for the launch would be comments from the public wondering how these mistakes happened "despite Japan's high technology." But I hope — and the Japanese people should hope — that a public inquiry into Saturday's events reveals precisely what went wrong in the JSDF and the defense ministry, and offers recommendations for improving Japan's ability to respond to national security emergencies. Hopefully Saturday's mistakes also reinvigorate the process of defense ministry reform, as the ministry has shown once again that its information handling skills are gravely deficient.

Undoubtedly the Aso government must be hoping that North Korea launches its rocket on Sunday, that information about the launch is received, processed, and disseminated seamlessly, and that no debris falls in Japan's direction. Saturday's mishaps may have been enough to halt the rally the Aso government has enjoyed lately; further mishaps could send Aso's approval ratings back into the single digits.

And in the midst of all the focus on North Korea, Ozawa Ichiro must be breathing a sigh of relief now that the media's gaze has shifted elsewhere. Suddenly there are more important concerns than whether Ozawa and his secretary knew that they were receiving dirty money from a construction company.

Jumping the gun

The weather is apparently clear in North Korea, and the Korean Central News Agency has announced that the DPRK will soon send its satellite into orbit.

Japan is on hair trigger alert. The defense ministry has indicated that it will announce its response to the rocket launch within minutes, using information from US early-warning satellites and the US and Japanese warships deployed around Japan. The Kantei's subterranean command center is active, ready to gather information that will then by conveyed simultaneously to Japan's localities and the news media, although Sankei, in one of its many reports on the impending launch, noted that Prime Minister Aso is not letting it interfere with his usual schedule. Not to be left out, even the DPJ has created a rapid-response office to articulate the party's position should North Korea carry out the launch.

The result of all this readiness? False alarms, naturally.

In Akita at 10:50am Saturday, a GSDF liaison officer in the Tohoku region informed firefighters and representatives of cities, town, and villages that the "missile had been launched at 10:48am," prompting the representatives to send word back to their municipalities. A couple hours the central government made a similar error, informing news organizations that the launch had occurred, only to rescind the message five minutes later.

I am curious to see the political impact of this spectacle. (As long as no one gets hurt, it is a spectacle.)

(Photo by the Sankei Shimbun)

North Korea has gotten the attention it craves, and the Aso government has been given an opportunity to show that Japan won't be surprised by North Korea a second time, that investments in missile defense haven't been in vain, and that the LDP-led government is committed to keeping the Japanese people safe from the villain from Central Casting next door.

All very theatrical.

Whether it remains theatrical will depend on whether debris plummets in Japan's direction and whether Japan feels compelled to fire at it, at which point everything becomes deadly serious.

UPDATE: Tottori prefecture also received mistaken reports of a launch from the central government at around noon.

Komeito has already said that the false alarms are "shameful."

If North Korea launches a satellite without Japan's having to fire at falling rocket components, the biggest story to come out of the launch may be the faulty warning system that the government had been so proud of during the buildup to the launch. The DPJ will surely have a field day with it.

Aso stumbles out of the gate

In Asahi's latest opinion poll, the Aso cabinet's approval rating fell seven points to 41%, and its disapproval rating rose six points to 42%. The skepticism of nonaligned voters about Aso Taro continues to grow, at least in this poll: the approval rating among nonaligned voters fell seven points to 24% and rose seven points to 48%. The DPJ also edged ahead in polling for lower house proportional representation voting.

Nakagawa Hidenao looked at this poll and concluded, "Stopping the trend of 'It's good to trust the DPJ with government one time' thinking among independents ought to be placed at the center of the LDP's strategy."

I'm not quite clear why Mr. Nakagawa thinks that this is a viable strategy — this was the closing line to his post, so until he elaborates, it's hard to know what he's thinking — but I doubt that this strategy will work. How does the LDP intend to demonstrate that the DPJ doesn't deserve even a single chance at governing, when the public is increasingly realizing that perhaps the LDP has had one too many chances at governing. Does Mr. Nakagawa really believe that the DPJ is so bad that it can't possibly be trusted with power? Really? Worse than the worst elements of the LDP, against whom the structural reformers have struggled and continue to struggle? If so, it's little wonder that there are few signs that the structural reformers are prepared to cut their ties with the LDP.

But given Mr. Aso's inability to crack the fifty percent ceiling, it is no surprise that the prospect of a snap election is receding into the distance. Mr. Aso emphasized in budget committee proceedings Monday that he is not thinking about an election at all, that economic stimulus takes precedence. The possibility of a dissolution and general election before the end of October appears nil. The Aso government, it seems, is fishing for an issue that it can use to rally the public to its standard. The DPJ has wisely decided that it will not block the government's supplementary budget containing its economic stimulus package. The bill will pass the lower house on Wednesday or Thursday before moving to the upper house, which may pass the bill by the end of next week. In doing so, the DPJ has deprived the LDP of the one issue that might have put the DPJ on the defensive. Based on opinion polls that showed considerable public interest in the economic stimulus plan, the DPJ would likely have been punished if it opposed the government's plan. At the same time, however, the government will not get all that much credit for doing what the public expects it to do.

In the meantime, the LDP still has to find an issue that will give it some momentum in an election campaign. What's left for the government? A unified consumer affairs agency? Not something that voters would oppose, but not exactly something they'll be excited about either. The MSDF refueling mission? Foreign policy will not win turn the tide for the LDP, not when the DPJ can criticize the LDP for its mishandling of pensions and health care. Expect to see more of Nagatsuma Akira, the DPJ's "Mr. Pensions," in the coming weeks and months. On Monday, Mr. Nagatsuma questioned Mr. Aso and Masuzoe Yoichi for seventy-five minutes, asking questions on the pensions problem for more than half the time. The 2007 pensions problem may be the gift that keeps on giving for the DPJ. The LDP can promise pro-growth policies, but it has little control over whether the economy will turn around before the next election (other than delaying the election as long as possible in the hope that growth returns before September 2009). While it is unclear what impact the deepening global financial crisis will have on the Japanese economy, it will likely have a psychological impact on the Japanese public, heightening feelings of economic insecurity. This can only help the DPJ.

Little wonder that Mr. Aso's numbers are trending downward. He is wholly unable to take control of the situation.

Aso aims for his base

It seems that in sweeping to office with the support of two thirds of the votes in the LDP presidential election, and with even more support among the party's rank-and-file supporters, Aso Taro has decided that the key to winning the next general election is...satisfying his electoral base?

Has Mr. Aso been talking with Karl Rove?

All of the initial polls showed that independents disapprove of the Aso cabinet more than they approve of it. Nakagawa Hidenao — no fan of Mr. Aso — provides a comprehensive look at the polls and concludes that nonaligned voters are suspicious of Mr. Aso and reminds readers that it will be nonaligned voters in urban Japan who will decide the outcome of the next general election.

And yet Mr. Aso decided that his first priority as prime minister was to fly to New York to give a speech at the United Nations on foreign policy. What exactly did Mr. Aso hope to accomplish? Judging from the content of his speech, it seemed that Mr. Aso was signaling to his conservative supporters that he intends to pick up right where the Abe cabinet left off in September 2007, except the Aso cabinet will be, if anything, more relentless, more ambitious, and even less hesitant than the Abe government in pursuing a global leadership role for Japan.

As press coverage of Mr. Aso's speech has uniformly noted, in a press conference after his speech Mr. Aso suggested that the constitutional interpretation on collective self-defense should be revised, a comment that will make his conservative supporters happy and make other Japanese citizens annoyed. He also signaled the return of the abductees to the top of Japan's agenda vis-a-vis North Korea, a shift that North Korea has abetted in its backsliding in the six-party talks. And of course he promised that Japan would continue to contribute to the war on terror in the form of its MSDF refueling mission. How Mr. Aso intends to get that one through the Diet, before or after a possible general election, is wholly beyond me.

I understand the symbolism of Mr. Aso's making a trip to New York virtually his first act upon taking office. I appreciate that he is at once signaling to the international community and the Japanese people that Japan under his watch will be dynamic again, especially considering that Japan's prime ministers have been absent from the UN's September summit for three years running. But I don't think either of his intended audiences will be particularly impressed by his symbolic gesture. There was nothing particularly offensive in his UN speech, but nothing memorable either. And unless Mr. Aso figures out how to fix the problems at home, and fast, he will be just another in a procession of Japanese prime ministers full of lofty words and short on the ability to follow through.

Fixing Japan's economy is, after all, Mr. Aso's primary task, right? I would think that Japanese voters would have been far more impressed by an initial symbolic gesture related to the health or pensions systems or the worsening economy — perhaps dredging up the social security plans he floated back in the March issue of Chuo Koron and declaring that he intends to make social security accountability and transparency the central issue of the election. (Okay, I don't know how that would work, but presumably anything related to the top three concerns of Japanese voters would have been politically wiser than jetting off to New York to give a soon-to-be-forgotten speech.)

I thought that Mr. Aso had learned the lesson of the Abe government. Recall again that article Mr. Aso wrote earlier this year, signaling what I called his reinvention in preparation for this very moment. In that article he pointedly criticized Mr. Abe, arguing:

I have previously placed my faith in the former Abe cabinet's pioneering of constitutional revision, education reform, and a resolute foreign and defense establishment — as it were, part of the work of reimagining the state as demanded by the age — and believe these constitute an important pillar [of the conservative revival]. But I think that if we do not embrace our former LDP mainstream's "politics of tolerance and patience," if we do not stop growing inequality, and if we do not work cooperatively for economic policy that unifies Japanese society, we will not become a conservatism that opens the way to the future.

(The full text is available in a PDF from Mr. Aso's website.)

Apparently Mr. Abe's problem was not inaction but rather a failure to talk enough about these problems. Or Mr. Aso simply didn't mean a word he wrote in this article and that he intended to govern like Mr. Abe all along, in which case it is unlikely that he will enjoy any more luck in governing than Mr. Abe did.

Your public waits, Mr. Aso, and it appears to be getting restless.

It's a bad sign for the new prime minister when his lowest poll numbers come from the newspaper most friendly to his agenda (recall that opinion poll results often track the editorial lines of the sponsoring papers). Sankei found that Mr. Aso's approval rating is a mere 44.6%. The respondents also seemed more favorably disposed to Mr. Ozawa, with only a ten-point gap separating him from Mr. Aso on the question of leadership ability. Sankei also found that respondents favor the DPJ over the LDP in proportional representation voting 39.3% to 36%, and when asked who they want to win the next election, they favored the DPJ to the LDP by a 48.5% to 40.7% margin. Not exactly a ringing endorsement of the new prime minister.

Meanwhile his efforts to get down to business at home will be hampered by Nakayama Nariaki's shitsugen, Koizumi Junichiro's surprise retirement, and persistent discussion of general election timing.

I cannot help but wonder if Mr. Aso is Japan's John McCain, known for being a conservative "maverick" — straight talk and all — who is capable of disagreeing with other conservatives from time to time but is also utterly clueless about economic matters and more interested in the glory of foreign policy leadership. As one article at JanJan wonders, does Mr. Aso have what it takes to deal with the worsening economy?

"I think that it clearly appeared in this LDP presidential election that Mr. Aso's understanding of the economy is overly optimistic and his knowledge lacking."

Thus far, Mr. Aso has done little to demonstrate otherwise.

If Mr. Aso doesn't recall his own post-mortem of the Abe cabinet, he won't even get the chance to continue the elements of the Abe agenda he finds so praiseworthy.

The Japanese public decides to wait and see on Aso

On Sunday, I suggested that Aso Taro would not enjoy the honeymoon enjoyed by his predecessors upon becoming prime minister.

Now that the first opinion polls are in, it is clear that the public is losing its tolerance for LDP inaction.

There was talk that the Aso cabinet might receive public approval in the sixties; isn't that why the LDP tapped Mr. Aso in the first place?

But it was not to be. In most of the major polls, he fell short of 50% approval, falling short of even Fukuda Yasuo's initial approval ratings. Nikkei recorded a 53% approval rating, matched by a 40% disapproval rating. It also recorded a three-point lead (36% to 33%) for the LDP in proportional representation voting in the next election. Asahi found 48% approval, 36% disapproval and recorded a 36% to 32% lead for the LDP in the PR race, Mainichi found 45% approval, 26% disapproval and a 41% to 37% lead for the LDP in which party respondents want to win the election, and Yomiuri recorded 49.5% approval and 33.4% disapproval.

I have to imagine that Mr. Aso and the LDP are unsettled by these numbers, seeing as how they're some of the lowest figures for a new government seen since Mori Yoshiro's cabinet. Moreover, the differentials between the disapproval and approval ratings in these polls are also some of the lowest since Mr. Mori.

The reality is that the public appears to have lost its patience with the LDP. The voters may like Mr. Aso personally — they still prefer him to Mr. Ozawa — but I'm guessing that most voters won't be casting their votes on the basis of who they like more. Presumably if that were the case the responses to the "who do you prefer as prime minister" question would better track the "who do you want to win the next election" question. All that will matter are results. Interestingly, Mainichi found that 68% of respondents want the supplementary budget to take precedence over a general election. It also found that 66% approve of the government's decision to put pro-growth policies before deficit cutting, and only 29% want "structural reform as promoted by former Prime Minister Koizumi" to continue, compared to 61% who don't. The interest in the supplemental budget suggests that the DPJ must tread carefully, because if it doesn't it could give the Aso government an issue around which to rally voters. Little surprise, meanwhile, that Koizumism is a non-starter to the public. Structural reform, it seems, is a luxury reserved for good times. What the Japanese people care about now is encapsulated in Yomiuri's poll: (1) economic stimulus (83%), the pensions problem (79%), food safety (79%), and eldercare (72%). Furthermore, 68% approve of the LDP-Komeito agreement to review the controversial eldercare system for citizens over 75.

It seems that most voters are now looking at which party will best protect them from hardship. And so the debt will continue to go, regardless of which party wins. And the day of reckoning for the Japanese economy will come, sooner or later.

But enough gloom. There is plenty of good news for the DPJ in these results. Mr. Aso's accesion to the Kantei turns out to have been less of a game changer than one might have thought. Mr. Aso is no less constrained than Mr. Fukuda. His henjin personality is neutralized by the fact that the public is hungry for results. The DPJ has to stand fast, remind the public of how the LDP led the country into the current mess in the first place, and point to Mr. Aso's cabinet as a sign of just how unserious Mr. Aso is about governing. The general election is still open.

(Speaking of unserious about governing, which would you say is worse? John McCain's selection of Sarah Palin to be his running mate, or Aso Taro's selection of Nakagawa Shoichi to be his finance minister? Probably the former, no contest.)

The best way to characterize this first round of polling is that the public has decided to wait and see before committing all out to supporting Mr. Aso. And given how high his disapproval ratings are already, they are skeptical about his ability to deliver results quickly.

The end is nigh

I have previously speculated on the consequences of Aso Taro's becoming prime minister for the future of the LDP.

In this post, for example, I wrote, "...If the conservatives retake control of the LDP under Mr. Aso and reunite with Mr. Hiranuma, that alliance could prove fatal for the LDP, as the readmission of Mr. Hiranuma and the other postal rebels could lead Mr. Koizumi and his followers out of the party, perhaps prompting liberals unconnected to Mr. Koizumi to leave too and drift towards the DPJ."

It seems that it may not even take Hiranuma Takeo's return into the party for Mr. Aso's election to be the catalyst for an exodus of reformers from the LDP.

The immediate catalyst instead is Koizumi Junichiro's decision to not run for reelection and let his 27-year-old (my near contemporary) son Shinjiro run in his stead.

As MTC notes, with Mr. Koizumi goes the last thread connecting his reformist followers with the party. Those reformists were undoubtedly aware that they had no place in Aso Taro's LDP; as Yamauchi Koichi wrote, Mr. Aso's new cabinet is purged of members of Nakagawa Hidenao's "rising tide" school. Instead there is an assortment of politicians looking to prime the pump a bit more, with Yosano Kaoru included in the mix to lend an air of responsibility to the proceedings. (I wonder why he is willing to participate in the farce, if he's serious about what he says about the need for fiscal retrenchment.)

The question now is whether Mr. Koizumi's followers leave before or after a general election. Why they would stay around to campaign under Mr. Aso's standard is beyond me. I do not expect them to join with Ozawa Ichiro's DPJ, which undoubtedly they see as little better (cf. Nakagawa Hidenao's posts on the DPJ). Will we see a three-way general election, with a Koizumian New Party the wild card?

Whatever the outcome, the LDP appears to be on the road to becoming a rump party comprised of an alliance between nationalist hawks and party stalwarts longing to break open the bank.

Even in his retirement, Mr. Koizumi retains his flare for the dramatic, in the process wrecking Mr. Aso's long-awaited opening night.

Aso's big weekend

The LDP's parliamentarians are gathering to vote for the next party president at this very moment, but the outcome is all but assured.

Thirty of forty-seven LDP prefectural chapters voted over the weekend, and those thirty gave all but six of their ninety votes to Mr. Aso.

Koike Yuriko received zero votes. Ishiba Shigeru received all three of his home prefecture's (Tottori) votes, plus one from neighboring Shimane prefecture. Yosano Kaoru and Ishihara Nobuteru received one apiece, from Tokushima and Nara respectively.

There is little doubting Mr. Aso's popularity among the LDP's rank-and-file members. There is no question that the parliamentary party will confirm the choice of party's chapters in this afternoon's voting, awarding Mr. Aso the presidency after the first round of voting.

Of course, Mr. Aso's landslide victory serves only to heighten the tension between the parliamentary party and the party's grassroots. Will the party's rival schools of thought — represented by Mr. Aso's rival candidates — be cowed by Mr. Aso's lopsided victory? Koizumism appears to have little place in the party's grassroots, even in Tokyo, in which Mr. Koizumi won an overwhelming victory in 2005.

Mr. Aso is moving quickly to consolidate his grip on the party. He has already indicated that he will ask Hosoda Hiroyuki, a six-term lower house member from the Machimura faction, to serve as LDP secretary-general. Mr. Hosoda served as Mr. Koizumi's chief cabinet secretary from 2004-2005 (he succeeded Fukuda Yasuo and preceded Abe Shinzo in that post) and had previously served in the Koizumi cabinet as minister without portfolio for technology policy and Okinawa and the Northern Territories policy. He shares Mr. Aso's interest in promoting high technology. His Wikipedia entry also notes that US policymakers are in awe of him: Former US Ambassador Howard Baker, meeting with him to discuss North Korea's nuclear program, thought he was a nuclear engineer; Condoleeza Rice, having negotiated with Mr. Hosoda while he was CCS, said "He's so smart."

One factor in Mr. Hosoda's appointment is undoubtedly his membership in the Machimura faction; Mr. Aso is obviously repaying his debt to Mori Yoshiro for his support of his candidacy. But will Mr. Hosoda be an asset on the campaign trail? One factor in his favor is that he represents the first district of sparsely populated, poor Shimane prefecture. Mr. Hosoda has had considerable electoral success, winning with nearly twice as many votes as his nearest rival in the four elections under the new electoral system. Whether he would be able to use that personal popularity in support of LDP candidates in similar districts remains to be seen.

Mr. Aso's cabinet has yet to take form, although it appears that Mr. Yosano and Mr. Ishiba will both accept Mr. Aso's offer to serve. I imagine that Mr. Aso will do as best as he can to form a unity cabinet. The question is whether his ideological rivals are prepared to commit to an Aso-led "populist" government.

UPDATE: The final vote total from the prefectural chapters is available here.