The LDP on the brink of disaster

The general election campaign is heading into its final days. Despite another two days of campaigning, the LDP and DPJ are mostly battling for seats on the margins — the LDP to keep from falling below 100 seats, the DPJ to reach the magic number of 320, the number required for a supermajority. As the campaign has developed, the LDP's position has only slipped, both in polls and other measurements, such as weakening support from the organizations that have long been part of the LDP's vote-gathering machine. The latest slippage is from the Japanese Medical Association, which does not approve of everything in the DPJ's manifesto but expressed its support for several of the party's proposals, concluding that "the DPJ wrote too much in its manifesto, the LDP wrote too little." There seems to be little doubt which direction the JMA would prefer the parties to err.

After all, the latest round of polls making predictions for seat distributions matched the first round of polls, which astoundingly suggested that the DPJ could win around 300 seats. Asahi's latest poll suggests the possibility of 321 seats for the DPJ and 103 for the LDP. I still suspect something closer to 300, plus or minus twenty seats. But it will be a major victory for the DPJ regardless. (Asahi reports that the DPJ might not have named enough candidates to its PR list in the Kinki and Kyushu blocks, where all but two candidates are running simultaneously as SMD and PR candidates.) Similarly, Mainichi's final poll before the election records the DPJ doubling the LDP in nearly every category: party support, voting intentions in single-member districts, PR voting, although Mainichi notes that it is difficult to project how these figures — different from the party's survey of electoral districts that produced the 320 seat prediction recently — will play out in SMDs.

But unless we're about to witness what would surely be the greatest polling error in a developed democracy, the LDP is less than three days away from suffering a crushing, perhaps even mortal blow in this year's general election.

Not surprisingly the closer the LDP gets the defeat, the more desperate and bizarre the pronouncements of the party's leaders. MTC has already noted Yosano Kaoru's absurd warning of the dangers of one party dictatorship, which probably wins as the single worst justification for LDP rule made during the campaign.

But the remarkable thing about the past month of campaigning is that the LDP is no closer to offering a clear reason why it deserves another mandate than it was when Prime Minister Aso Taro dissolved the Diet last month. The one consistent strain in the party's message has been fear. While the LDP has tried to paint a "positive" message of itself as the "conservative party" — the party which protects that which should be protected (begging the obvious response of "The LDP: the party that will protect everything except your pension") — it has spent more time talking about how the DPJ will, through its flip-flopping and its blurring, make things worse.



And so in Osaka Thursday Aso wheeled out the punning critique he made of the DPJ back in June, although this time he removed the qualifier and said "if there is regime change, there will be a recession." (In Japanese the words for regime change and recession are homophones.) And not only will a DPJ government prompt a recession, but its advent will also be accompanied by "chaos." Aso has apparently also stopped apologizing for his party's poor performance, although it's probably just as well — why would anyone vote for a party whose leader opens by apologizing for the party's performance in office and then proceeds to ask for a new mandate?

Not surprisingly given his engrained optimism, Aso continues to throw all of his energy into the campaign, even as those around him in the party leadership freely admit the difficulties facing the LDP. After all, it won't be their names in the history books associated with the defeat that finally broke LDP rule. But even Aso's resolve may be cracking. In response to a query regarding the fading prospects of meeting the goal of retaining a majority between the LDP and Komeito, he could do nothing more than lamely stress that "compared with before, there are more young people (at campaign speeches), and the response isn't bad." He even paused to diagnose the LDP-Komeito coalition's problems, chalking it up the government parties' failure to "clearly state the appeal held by conservatism" before returning to the party's emphasis on defending that which should be defended. (Funny, I thought a major contributing factor to the LDP's decline since Koizumi Junichiro was Abe Shinzo's desire to explain the appeal of conservatism to the public when all they wanted to hear was that their pension records were safe.)

The question now is what happens to the LDP in the aftermath of the coming disaster. Echoing a point I made in this post, a Shukan Bunshun article suggests that the LDP's factions may be the feature of the LDP to go in the wake of the election, with next month's party presidential election being a truly post-factional contest. With five of eight factions potentially headless, the stage may be set for the factions to break and reorganize into two or three distinct ideological groups, the two most prominent being an "Abe faction" and a "Nakagawa [Hidenao] faction." (As both Abe and Nakagawa are currently in the Machimura faction, naturally the ideological split would begin, as I've argued before, in the Machimura faction, the faction that has controlled the LDP for the past decade.) At the same time, there is still a push to make Masuzoe Yoichi, the minister of health, labor, and welfare and the most popular politician in Japan (and the LDP politician I've seen on "two-shot" posters), Aso's successor. Yamasaki Taku, one of the embattled faction heads, said Tuesday that Masuzoe is the strongest candidate to rebuild the LDP. Of course, it is telling that Yamasaki spoke in favor of Masuzoe seeing as how Yamasaki, one of a handful of LDP liberals, would fit comfortably neither in the Nakagawa group nor the Abe group — not unlike Masuzoe, who is in the upper house, does not belong to a faction, and is relentlessly independent in his thinking. Masuzoe would indeed make a good leader, although I'm not sure why as bright as Masuzoe would want to take on the herculean task of cleaning up the LDP after this election. And I wonder how Masuzoe would fare in an election campaign split along the aforementioned ideological lines.

Ultimately it is difficult to say anything for certain until the votes are counted, until we know which ideological camp lost more seats in the general election.

But it is no longer in doubt that the LDP is about to suffer mightily at the hands of the Japanese people.

The LDP fiddles while its kingdom burns

As LDP members increasingly come to terms with what looks to be certain defeat in this year's general election — described in graphic terms by MTC as the LDP's "thrashing about and coughing up blood" — the party's leaders continue to struggle in vain for some way to avoid destruction.

As I mentioned in a discussion with Ken Worsley and Garrett DeOrio when I recorded my latest appearance on their podcast Seijigiri, the LDP looks like an animal caught in a trap: the more it tries to escape, the worse the pain, for both the party and those who have to watch it struggle.

One manifestation of this struggle is, as MTC noted, the party's foolish discussion of making Diet reform a prominent plank in its election platform. The LDP is considering both a cut in the number of lower house seats and a proposal to eliminate the upper house. MTC lays the former proposal at Komeito's feet, but there appears to be no shortage of enthusiasm for both ideas among the ranks of LDP Diet members. But MTC is right to note that this is an absurd waste of time considering that Japan's economy is in freefall.

But the LDP seems incapable of doing anything other than busying itself with distractions in the hope that one of them triggers a bout of irrationality on the part of Japanese voters that leads them to return the LDP to power later this year. (Yes, irrationality: each day makes it harder to describe voting for the LDP as anything but irrational.)

Hence the irrepresible talk of replacing Aso Taro with yet another party leader and prime minister. The ubiquitous Tahara Soichiro wins the prize for perhaps the worst suggestion for a replacement in a field full of contenders: he suggests that Tanigaki Sadakazu, former finance minister and perennial contender for the party leadership, is the right man for the job. He barely explains why, tucking the suggestion in the final line of an article discussing the political situation more broadly. What can Mr. Tanigaki possibly offer the LDP now that he couldn't offer the party before?

But substitute any name for Mr. Tanigaki's, and the answer is the same. The LDP will not be saved by a new leader, because the LDP's problems are beyond the ability of any one man or woman to fix. The LDP is overwhelmed by the ever-growing mountain of problems facing Japan today. And rather than work on setting priorities, the LDP's leaders are distracted by trivia (Diet reform) or irrelevant factional matters.

In this latter category falls the battle for leadership of the Machimura faction, which has been settled in Mori Yoshiro's favor. The triumvirate that had governed the faction will be replaced, as Machimura Nobutaka will once again become the titular head of the faction, with Mr. Nakagawa staying in place in what will now be a lesser position along with upper house member Tanigawa Shuzen, the third member of the triumvirate. Having been effectively demoted in the faction, will Mr. Nakagawa now go back on his declaration of loyalty to prime minister and party? Not likely. Not surprisingly, Yamamoto Ichita and other younger members of the faction are opposed to the demotion, complaining that a faction member shouldn't be punished for stating policy positions different from certain leaders. The reformists will complain, but ultimately they will stay put, at least until a general election.

At the same time as the turmoil within the party's largest faction, Mr. Aso is in talks with Koga Makoto, head of the Kochikai, the party's third largest faction, with an eye to merging the Aso faction to restore the Kochikai to its old borders and make it the second largest faction. But to what end? What possible difference could it make? It is already clear that the factions have little power over how their members think or how their members vote in leadership elections. Will Mr. Aso's position be any more secure for having the support of the second largest faction, or the largest faction for that matter? Will LDP members grumble any less about the prime minister?

The same goes for that other favorite tool of LDP leaders, the cabinet reshuffle. Other than putting someone competent at the head of the finance ministry, what difference will a cabinet reshuffle make in shoring up public support for the government?

Despite its claims to be the "responsible" party, the LDP is no more responsible or focused on good policymaking than the DPJ. The problem, of course, is that the LDP leads the government.

The elusive Nakagawa Hidenao

Will the Machimura faction live to fight the next election after all?

Nakagawa Hidenao, a member of the triumvirate that leads the faction and a leading critic of Mr. Aso, was defiant in the face of criticism from Mori Yoshiro, don of the faction, seeing no reason for stepping down from the triumvirate. He denied claims that he was "rebelling" against the prime minister, and insisted on unity in faction and party before the forthcoming election.

Despite signs of moving to an irreparable break, however, it seems that the Machimura faction has decided to postpone the debate over the faction's leadership, for fear of damage to government and party.

Yamamoto Ichita, a member of the faction, claims that a majority of the faction's are not loyal to one side or the other but are perfectly capable of accepting different leaders simultaneously. He then reports that the media is to blame for stirring up talk of a split in the faction.

Maybe so, but perhaps the faction really is just a microcosm of the LDP. Just as potential LDP defectors are determined to stay put until a general election is held, so too might the breakup of the Machimura faction be on hold until after a general election. Given the number of seats the party expects to lose, it is not inconceivable that the party's internal balance of power could be completely redrawn by the distribution of losing seats.

For his part, Mr. Nakagawa appears prepared to stay and fight for mastery of the LDP, even after the election. He may be trying to put on a convincing act to justify his staying in the party through an election, which as MTC noted enables him to pocket his share of public political subsidies (and ensures that he would not face an LDP "assassin" in the election). But I wonder whether he might be serious about staying in the LDP when he writes something like this post, in which he claims that he "wants to raise the flag of a new LDP from within the LDP." The LDP, he says, should be remade as the party of "honest politics," compared to the DPJ, honest in its presentation of policies that serve the people, reluctant to engage in the party politics practiced by the DPJ.

While Mr. Nakagawa presents himself as the standard-bearer of economic and political reform, my impression of him is that he is a more committed partisan than he lets on. He did his best to cast the Abe government and its prime minister, under whom he worked as LDP secretary-general, as the natural heir of the Koizumi revolution, its efforts to reform challenged by the Bureaucrats and their allies throughout Japanese society. Similarly, he wrote of Fukuda Yasuo's "silent" reforms, doing his best to present the beleaguered former prime minister as a silent partner of the Koizumi revolution.

At the same time, few LDP members — as far as I can tell — write with as much vitriol about the DPJ as Mr. Nakagawa. His blog is an ongoing litany of the DPJ's faults. One recent post asks whether a DPJ government would be an anti-American government (because it would conduct alliance policy differently from the LDP). Another says that "we have heard nothing about how the DPJ will govern" (the DPJ may have more work to do, but nothing?). In directing his attention to the DPJ's faults, Mr. Nakagawa is in effect making excuses for the LDP. Does he not see the LDP's own faults? Or are its faults largely the faults of the bureaucrats and their allies within the LDP, which will be fixed once Mr. Nakagawa gets control of the party?

None of this inspires hope in me that Mr. Nakagawa is the man to engineer a political realignment and lead Japan to the next wave of great reforms. Maybe his public commitments to the LDP are just an act. But inside the LDP or out, the man will remain the same. And as far as I can tell, the man is a choleric bulldog, more interested attacking enemies than in doing the hard work of governing.

UPDATE: MTC notes that Jun Okumura deserves credit for the theory that the desire to get a cut of the first quarter of FY2009 political funds is keeping LDP members from defecting. Sorry Jun.

Mori wants Nakagawa out

I have chronicled divisions in the Machimura faction since May of last year, and I have written on several occasions of what I think is the impending destruction of the LDP's biggest faction, paraphrasing Monty Python last month to conclude that the faction is in fact an ex-faction.

The destruction of the Machimura faction proceeds apace.

In an interview with the Asahi Shimbun Wednesday, Mori Yoshiro, former prime minister and Machimura faction don, described criticism of the Aso government by Nakagawa Hidenao, a titular head of the faction, as a "total rebellion" and said he wants to see Mr. Nakagawa step down from his leadership post. He also said it doesn't matter whether Mr. Nakagawa leaves the faction. His job, Mori said, "is to protect Aso-san." As the self-appointed defender of the Aso government, Mr. Mori also offered his opinions on the timing of a general election (September if possible, but probably after the passage of the budget), whether Mr. Aso should be replaced before a general election (absolutely not), and the key to Mr. Aso's recovery (cabinet reshuffle). There's also a somewhat resigned tone, as Mr. Mori spoke of the possibility of Mr. Aso's being the LDP's last president.

The Mainichi Shimbun, meanwhile, has reported on the "gradual isolation" of Mr. Nakagawa within the faction. By isolation, I assume Mainichi means his isolation from the faction's leaders, because if they opt to drive Mr. Nakagawa opt, I suspect that he will take a good portion of the faction with him. Mainichi quotes Mr. Mori as accusing Mr. Nakagawa of sabotage, conduct unbecoming a faction chief.

This is an ex-faction.

This is an ex-faction!

Speaking of predictions, the destruction of the Machimura faction is proceeding apace.

Before the LDP's September election, I asked whether anyone thinks that "the Machimura faction, that 89-member monster of a faction that sits at the intersection of the LDP's divisions between 'neo-liberal' reformers, party leaders, and ideological conservatives, will survive this party election."

Events appear to confirm that the Machimura faction is on its last legs, if it is not already dead.

Yomiuri reports that in connection with Nakagawa Hidenao's perceived "anti-Aso" efforts, the rift between Mr. Nakagawa and party and faction elders Mori Yoshiro and Machimura Nobutaka — already pronounced before Aso Taro's ascendance — has widened. Mr. Machimura, along with fellow faction member Abe Shinzo, has emerged as a prominent critic of the prime minister's critics, including Mr. Nakagawa.

Is it reasonable to speak of the Machimura faction as a single faction? Is membership in the faction the most meaningful affiliation for its members, as opposed to membership in study groups and other organizations?

How long before the faction officially splinters? And if the Machimura faction cannot hold, can the LDP, of which the Machimura faction is a microcosm, endure?

Fault lines

Does anyone think that the Machimura faction, that 89-member monster of a faction that sits at the intersection of the LDP's divisions between "neo-liberal" reformers, party leaders, and ideological conservatives, will survive this party election?

Following up on both his previous dismissal of Koike Yuriko's prospects and his endorsement of Aso Taro, Mori Yoshiro said of Nakagawa Hidenao's promotion — he being one of the faction's three titular leaders — of Ms. Koike, "The position of the daihyo sewanin [Mr. Nakagawa's difficult-to-translate title] of pushing (Ms. Koike) to the fore is a bit of a problem."

"He says 'a candidate must stand on behalf of the reformists,' but is not Secretary-General Aso a reformist?"

Whatever you want to call Mr. Aso — I agree with Jun Okumura that it is far too simplistic to dismiss Mr. Aso with the word "conservative," not because he isn't, but because the label conceals more than it reveals — the LDP's reform school clearly does not view him as one of their own and is desperate for an alternative. Indeed, their desperation can be seen in the fears of the Koizumi kids, as they sense that Fukuda Yasuo's resignation and the chaos it has engendered can only hurt them in the eyes of the public. For the Koizumi kids, this party leadership election may represent one last chance to pick a leader who will enable them to go before their constituents and declare that reform lives.

But the reform school is not the only LDP group desperately seeking an anyone-but-Aso candidate.

Yamasaki Taku, Kato Koichi, and Koga Makoto, three doyens of the LDP's once-dominant mainstream conservatism (which in the contemporary context makes them the LDP's liberals, in Mr. Kato's own reckoning), met Wednesday to discuss an anti-Aso candidate. It is worth noting that despite Messrs. Yamasaki and Koga being faction heads, the article notes that they spoke as individuals, implying that they were not speaking on behalf of their factions.

It seems that we are witnessing a post-faction LDP presidential election, less than a year after the Fukuda election in which conventional wisdom proclaimed that the factions were back in control. This campaign is already breaking down along ideological lines, not factional lines. As I've argued previously, the relevant groupings are not the factions but the ideological study groups and associations that cross factional lines. Mr. Aso's campaign rests not on his twenty-member faction — which conveniently has enough members to nominate him as a candidate — but on the party-wide network of conservatives that backed his candidacy last year in defiance of their faction heads and who subsequently organized (in part) under the aegis of Nakagawa Shoichi's "True Conservative Policy Research Group." Similarly, Mr. Nakagawa's Koizumians, while clustered within the Machimura faction, can also be found in other factions and among the party's independent members. The liberals, such as they exist, are also found in more than one faction.

Seeing how this LDP presidential election campaign is unfolding, I think it is safe to assume that the recommendations of faction heads will have little or no role in determining how the LDP's parliamentarians vote on Sept. 22. Ideology, not faction will determine who the LDP chooses.

I still think Mr. Aso will emerge at the top based both on his support at the grassroots and the strength of the conservatives in the contemporary LDP — who are hungry to reclaim what they lost when Abe Shinzo resigned, but the LDP that emerges on Sept. 22 will not be the same LDP that existed at the moment of Mr. Fukuda's resignation.

UPDATE: I should add that in addition to the three major ideological groupings there is the cautious bulk of the LDP parliamentary party, which will give its allegiance to no camp but the one that appears to be the most beneficial for their electoral prospects. I think Mr. Mori, with his mission of preserving LDP dominance, best speaks for this segment, which is why I think Mr. Aso will prevail. Mr. Aso may be the less risky choice — at least for the average LDP member — come the next general election.

Koike prepares

The LDP is finalizing the schedule for its election: September 22, the day following the DPJ's reelection of Ozawa Ichiro.

While it still looks as if Aso Taro will claim the prize, it appears that his election will not go nearly as smoothly as Mr. Ozawa's.

Mainichi reports that Koike Yuriko has expressed her desire to run, and has begun making preparations for a campaign, running as the candidate of Koizumi and Nakagawa (Hidenao).

Given the latter's increasing isolation within the LDP, I wonder whether Ms. Koike's prospects are realistic.

Mr. Aso simply has to build upon his strong showing last September to win; Ms. Koike has to build a national organization to compete with Mr. Aso from scratch. Recall that Mr. Aso managed to win 197 votes of a total 529 votes in last year's election, putting him 68 short of victory. He won 65 of 141 prefectural chapter votes, a number he will likely increase as a result of his travels around the country. He surprisingly received 132 Diet member votes last year — surprising because it showed the extent to which faction members bucked their leaders. A similar trend could redound to Ms. Koike's favor this year, but it is unlikely that there are enough Koizumians to push Ms. Koike over the top. Ms. Koike also lacks the support of the Mori Yoshiro, the punative head of her own faction, the Machimura faction. Mr. Mori will undoubtedly lean heavily on faction members to support Mr. Aso, if they aren't already doing so.

But if Mr. Nakagawa backs Ms. Koike anyway, this election campaign will likely mean the end of the Machimura faction.

Surely Mr. Nakagawa is aware of the aforementioned figures about Mr. Aso's performance. Surely he knows how difficult it will be to upset Mr. Aso, who has used the past year to prepare systematically for this coming election.

Perhaps Ms. Koike's campaign is intended as a pretext for the departure of Mr. Nakagawa and his followers from the LDP entirely, a last stand before bolting. Mr. Aso will win, only to find his party shrinking beneath his feet.

Far-fetched perhaps, but less and less far-fetched every day.

Aso's the one for Mori

After months of appearing immune to Aso Taro's relentless courting of his support, Mori Yoshiro said on a TV Asahi program Sunday that he supports Mr. Aso as Prime Minister Fukuda's successor: "Aso's popularity must be used greatly for our party. Many within the party have the 'Aso is next' mood. I too think that."

He does not, however, appear to support replacing Mr. Fukuda with Mr. Aso before the next election.

Rather, it seems that Mr. Mori believes that the best use of Mr. Aso is to have him serve as the face of the party in his capacity as LDP secretary-general during a general election campaign and then ride in to save the party in the aftermath of what could be a disaster for the LDP.

The timing of the leadership election will make all the difference in whether we see an LDP president (and Prime Minister) Aso.

Naturally if LDP malcontents manage to maneuver Mr. Fukuda into resigning before a general election, Mr. Aso will likely have no problem winning the prize. Mr. Mori's endorsement may settle the question of who the Machimura faction will back. The faction, which has been home to the past four prime ministers, has been unable to decide who from its ranks should receive the party's backing. Former LDP secretary-general Nakagawa Hidenao backs faction member Koike Yuriko; former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo backs Mr. Aso; Machimura Nobutaka, the chief cabinet secretary, has been able to garner little enthusiasm for a bid for the leadership. With Mr. Mori's backing, however, Mr. Aso could be the faction's choice, giving him the votes of the LDP's largest faction. The Machimura faction may yet break, particularly if someone like Ms. Koike were to run an insurgent campaign for the leadership, but other things being equal, the support of Mr. Mori is a major coup for Mr. Aso.

But after a general election, especially one in which the LDP suffers a catastrophic loss? Will the LDP — or what's left of it — be eager to hand over the reins to one who led the party into the campaign? In short, it's difficult to predict what an LDP leadership race following the next general election because it's difficult to predict what the LDP will look like following the next general election.

So Mr. Aso, don't break out the champagne yet.

Cracks in the Machimura faction?

Will the Machimura faction, the LDP's largest with eighty-eight members in the two houses of the Diet, be the victim of its own success?

Mainichi reported over the weekend that the Machimura faction — still unclear on who it should support as Fukuda Yasuo's successor, may be on the brink of splitting. The reason? As a result of having been the home of the past four prime ministers, the faction has too many power brokers jostling for control of the faction, with each preferring a different successor for Mr. Fukuda.

As noted previously, the Machimura faction is in some sense a microcosm of the LDP, divided among Koizumian structural reformers, cautious old-guard conservatives, HANA conservatives, and, as represented by Mr. Fukuda, pragmatic "quiet" reformers. Each group's power broker in the faction supports a different candidate for the leadership. Nakagawa Hidenao, who has claimed the mantle of the LDP's leading advocate for structural reform since stepping down as LDP secretary-general after Abe Shinzo reshuffled his cabinet in August 2008, has boosted Koike Yuriko, a member of the Machimura faction, and may be a contender in his own right (although his sordid past may still haunt him). Mori Yoshiro, the leading old-guard conservative and defender of Mr. Fukuda, has not only ridiculed Ms. Koike's prospects but tried — with little success — to stifle speculation about the post-Fukuda era. Mr. Abe, meanwhile, is happy to look outside the faction for a leader, and is Aso Taro's leading supporter in the Machimura faction.

On top of this, there's the question of Machimura Nobutaka, currently serving as chief cabinet secretary. Mainichi reports that there are concerns within the faction that if Mr. Machimura leaves the goernment after a reshuffle, he will be free to cause trouble within the faction and do battle with Mr. Nakagawa for control, competition that may force the faction to split as Mr. Nakagawa could leave to form his own faction. If Mr. Nakagawa were to leave the faction to form his own, it would be another indication that the (policy) content-free factions are giving way to new, more ideological and policy-oriented groupings that will jostle for control not just of the LDP's levers of power, but of its identity as a party.

The idea of the Machimura faction's crumbling under the weight of its heavyweights is intriguing. Are the limits of growth for LDP factions not the total number of members, but the number of members with experience in senior party and cabinet posts who can claim considerable personal followings independent on the faction?

And if the Machimura faction cannot keep its disparate pieces together, what does that say for the LDP as a whole?

The post-Fukuda landscape remains open — for now

Aso Taro, who has presumably been vying for the LDP presidency since losing it to Fukuda Yasuo in September 2007, was asked about his intentions at a speech on Monday. Like his potential rival, Yosano Kaoru, Mr. Aso demurred, declining to declare what has been openly acknowledged for months.

I suppose it would be inappropriate for Mr. Aso to start measuring Mr. Fukuda's coffin overtly, especially when he can let the media (and other members of the LDP) do it for him. But no one should take his humility at face value.

As noted previously, Mr. Aso's assumed candidacy has already upset the resurrection of the Kochikai, the onetime mainstream faction that was most notably home to dovish, liberal internationalist prime ministers Ikeda Hayato and Miyazawa Kiichi. An article in AERA, a weekly magazine, illustrates why the rebirth of the Kochikai does not mean the resurrection of the liberal internationalists as a major force within the LDP. The party, the article, notes has moved rightward in the years since the faction split in the aftermath of Kato Koichi's abortive rebellion against then-prime minister Mori Yoshiro in 2000. Not surprisingly, the resurrected faction is a diminished version of the faction that existed in 2000. The difference? The Aso faction, which in 2000 was the Kono (Yohei) group, did not reunite with the Koga and Tanigaki factions, largely because Mr. Aso's policy perspective is vastly different from the policy positions of leaders of the Kochikai.

Mr. Aso's candidacy poses a threat to factional discipline in all LDP factions, the Kochikai included, thanks to Mr. Aso's popularity among younger, reformist LDP members who are distributed throughout the party. Thanks to his "insurgents," Mr. Aso's showing in September 2007 was surprisingly strong considering that he was opposed by all factions but his own. It seems that Mr. Aso has learned his lesson, however: rather than tempt his supporters to buck their faction leaders, he appears to be using the fact of his cross-factional support to make appeals directly to faction chiefs. Two days after the Kochikai's first party, Mr. Aso met with Koga Makoto in an effort to heal a longstanding personal rift — presumably in the hope that Mr. Koga will swing the faction behind Mr. Aso's candidacy (which, as noted previously, would risk alienating his partner, Tanigaki Sadakazu).

Meanwhile the Machimura faction's failure to back a post-Fukuda candidate thus far is now an established fact. Mainichi, reporting on the occasion of the faction's party Monday night (which was attended by approximately 5000 guests), notes that the faction's chiefs are divided on whether to support a candidate from within the faction who if elected would be the fifth consecutive LDP president from the faction. Nakagawa Hidenao spoke of a "hero or heroine," presumably suggesting that he is continuing to back Koike Yuriko, despite Mori Yoshiro's openly dismissing her prospects. Mainichi rules out both Mr. Nakagawa and Machimura Nobutaka, the chief cabinet secretary and titular faction head. No word on Mr. Mori's thinking. Mainichi suggests that the faction leadership wants to nominate someone from within the faction for fear of forfeiting the faction's position, but there is no obvious contender — and the worst outcome of all (for the faction) would be for the faction to nominate one of its own over the opposition of a significant minority, prompting that minority to vote for another candidate.

Division within the Machimura faction is probably good news for both Mr. Aso and Mr. Yosano, as it raises the possibility that either might receive the support of the largest LDP faction should it prove unable to resolve its deadlock.

Indeed, it seems conceivable to me that Mr. Aso might offer a "Tanakasone" arrangement to Mr. Mori and the other leaders of the Machimura faction, agreeing to pack his cabinet with members of the Machimura faction in exchange for its support in the party election.

The post-Fukuda era looms

Asahi conducted a poll of LDP and DPJ prefectural chapters asking about support for the current party leaders.

In the DPJ, Ozawa Ichiro's relationship with the prefectural chapters is secure: forty-four of forty-seven want him to remain as party head to lead the DPJ into the next general election.

The news for Fukuda Yasuo, however, is bleak. Twelve chapters want Mr. Fukuda to lead the LDP into the next general election; twenty-two want a new leader (no indication what the other thirteen said). Interestingly, there is little correlation between how a prefecture voted in the September 2007 leadership election and its support for Mr. Fukuda today. The reasons given for discontent with Mr. Fukuda are typical: low public support numbers, poor leadership skills, an inability to make progress on the many pressing policy issues facing the Fukuda government. Asked how they think is an appropriate replacement for Mr. Fukuda, only seven chapters answered with a name (as opposed to qualities desired in a leader), and all seven provided the same name: Aso Taro.

The news from the prefectures contributes to a growing sense in Tokyo that Mr. Fukuda is running out of time, a sense that has grown in the weeks since the LDP's defeat in the Yamaguchi-2 by-election as the party has studied its defeat. There is growing talk in the media of the post-Fukuda era, as the media probes the two leading post-Fukuda candidates, Mr. Aso and Yosano Kaoru, the leading anyone-but-Aso candidate for the LDP presidency. (A Google News search finds ninety-eight uses of the term "post-Fukuda" over the past week.) As expected, Mr. Yosano's failure to say yes or no to questions about his ambitions has only fed media speculation about his designs on Mr. Fukuda's job, and now Mr. Aso and Mr. Yosano are spoken of in the same breath as having barely concealed intentions to hasten the arrival of the post-Fukuda era. Indeed, both men have articles in the June issue of Bungei Shunju discussing their plans for saving Japan.

Mr. Aso is at the point where he can no longer deny his intentions. At a press conference Friday, Mr. Yosano was asked whether he intends to aim for the premiership. His response skirted the question: "I am a person who takes pride in his work, and if I have a task, I perform it with all my might. I have no awareness of my individual ambition — I want to do good work." Not quite "I'm in. And I'm in to win." But it is consistent with his overall media approach in recent months: Mr. Yosano has emphasized his desire to do what needs to be done to save Japan (raising the consumption tax rate, for example), regardless of what the polls say.

It is still unclear who has the edge in the post-Fukuda horse race. By dint of his having the support of the LDP's conservative ideologues concentrated in the True Conservative Policy Research Group, his following among prefectural chapters and the public at large, and his tireless efforts to proclaim his understanding of the insecurities of the Japanese people, Mr. Aso probably remains the front runner.

He may also be poised to claim the support of the newly reunited Kochikai, which officially reemerged on Tuesday and with sixty-one members is the third largest faction in the LDP. At its launch the new old faction is already troubled; the phrase that has been used in the press is "setting to sea in the same bed with different dreams." The reason for tension is that there are hints that some faction members are open to supporting Mr. Aso's bid for the party presidency, despite Tanigaki Sadakazu, perennial candidate for the leadership (and likely candidate in the next leadership election), being the faction's number two. Mr. Tanigaki assumed that the new faction would be a major platform for his next bid for the leadership and has reportedly threatened to leave the faction if it fails to support him.

That said, the all-important Machimura faction (i.e., Mori Yoshiro) has yet to signal which way it is leaning, despite Mr. Aso's active courting of Mr. Mori and other Machimura faction chiefs. The post-Fukuda non-campaign campaign is in full swing, the candidates are emerging, and the LDP barons are starting to choose sides — with Mr. Fukuda helpless in the midst of the open campaigning for his job.

Koike fever?

Within days of Mori Yoshiro's calling the prospect of Korike Yuriko, former defense minister, a "joke," Sankei writes that "Koike fever" is taking hold — even though Ms. Koike claims to share Mr. Mori's assessment of a Koike candidacy.

The basis for this "fever" is unclear to me.

The examples cited by Sankei? A long speech to a meeting of the LDP young turks, Nakagawa Hidenao's calling her "a new leader who will be responsible for Japan's future" on a visit to China in March, her participation in Mr. Koizumi's new study group, and Koizumian political instincts.

All well and good, but this strikes me as a thin foundation for declaring that Ms. Koike is in a position to seize the LDP leadership. Does she in fact have any of the support that would make her a viable candidate in a post-Fukuda party race? Being an able politician is not necessarily a criterion for being elected as head of the LDP, and Ms. Koike's "flexibility," which led her to migrate from party to party over the course of the 1990s before ending up in the LDP and Mr. Koizumi's cabinet, surely is less of an asset when it comes to vying for the LDP leadership.

Does she have the support of the party's prefectural chapters, which gave not inconsiderable support to Aso Taro in September 2007 — and which Mr. Aso has courted assiduously since the last LDP leadership election?

Does she have the support of any LDP faction, not least the biggest one, and the LDP's kingpins more generally? The "endorsement" of Nakagawa Hidenao is undoubtedly helpful, but surely Mr. Mori's put-down outweighs his Machimura faction comrade's praise (stunning considering that Ms. Koike is a member of the Machimura faction). Meanwhile, the manner in which she was chased out of the Defense Ministry as the party's leaders closed ranks to defend Moriya Takemasa suggests that she is short on allies in the highest councils of the LDP, not least because she's a woman.

I would welcome her candidacy; she would certainly be an improvement (and a better choice than Mr. Aso). But I must (sadly) agree with Mr. Mori: her prospects are a joke. She will not be elected as head of the LDP as it exists today. She might find a way to the premiership if Mr. Koizumi leads his followers out of the LDP and pushes Ms. Koike forward as his new party's candidate, but for now I feel confident saying that she will not be Mr. Fukuda's successor as LDP president and prime minister.

Three weeks and counting

Aso Taro continues to position himself as the LDP's savior in a rapidly approaching post-Fukuda period — in MTC's extended (and excellent) Fukuda-as-currency analogy, Mr. Aso is hoping that he is the best store of value in a chaotic environment.

His latest move is to come out on behalf of the restoration of the temporary tax on gasoline, using the environmental logic to make the case for the tax (and perhaps to present himself as a kinder, gentler Aso Taro.) Appearing at an event in Yamaguchi prefecture with Abe Shinzo in advance of the April 27 by-election in Yamaguchi-2, Mr. Aso said, "Since the gasoline tax is cheaper, it invites the consumption of more gasoline; for Japan, which is hosting an environment summit, this is an extremely bad state of affairs." Mr. Abe used the somewhat contradictory road construction logic, placing road construction above the environment, odd given his new environmental policy responsibilities: "I think that the consumers had a good feeling about the fall in the gasoline price, roads cannot be built and maintained. The LDP has a great responsibility to resolve this situation immediately."

I think that while Mr. Aso (and his fellow conservatives) believe that the tax should be reinstated irrespective of the politics of the matter, Mr. Aso also figures that supporting it strengthens his political position. In the event of a new leadership election, it hardly matters that his position is antithetical to the vast majority of Japanese. It does matter that his position is consistent with forty-one LDP prefectural chapters, according to an Asahi survey of LDP and DPJ prefectural chapters. His views on the tax are also consistent with the bulk of the LDP's parliamentary membership, although as noted by Yamamoto Ichita, it remains uncertain whether Mr. Fukuda will be able to muster the necessary two-thirds majority to pass the temporary tax at the end of April. Mr. Yamamoto reports that nearly 200 LDP representatives support passing it again, leaving the government 120 votes short. Even if the government manages to corral Komeito members and the majority of the remaining LDP members, it will take a mere sixteen votes to scuttle the tax bill.

Would the LDP be willing to exile the sixteen (or more), in the process tossing away its supermajority? The potential dissenters, whoever they are, are incredibly powerful at this moment in time — their actions, aside from determining whether Japanese citizens have to pay more for gasoline, could be decisive in toppling the Fukuda government, breaking up the LDP, triggering a realignment, forcing a general election, or all of the above. It's safe to assume that Mr. Ozawa will be working hard to get them to defect to the DPJ, just as the LDP's elders will be doing the best they can to buy their allegiance (and/or threaten them with political oblivion).

As for the DPJ, based on the Asahi survey, the DPJ has its own problems with its prefectural chapters, which are split nearly evenly on the question of absorbing gasoline tax revenue into the general fund, with a slight majority (23-20) in favor of it. Oddly enough, forty-six of forty-seven chapters support Mr. Ozawa's response to the LDP's plan; forty-six (all except Tochigi) also oppose the extension of the temporary tax. In short, nearly half the DPJ's prefectural chapters support the continuation of the road construction special fund, just with less revenue due to the end of the temporary tax.

The DPJ can do little more but hold the line, try to tempt LDP defectors, and watch as the LDP continues to tear itself apart on this issue.

And Mr. Aso? He may yet get his chance to lead. As before, the deciding vote will be cast by the Machimura faction's elders, Mori Yoshiro, Machimura Nobutaka, and Nakagawa Hidenao. For the moment, Mr. Fukuda still has their confidence, but how long before they begin looking for a safer investment? And does Mr. Aso stand a chance of earning it?

It's probably safe to say that the revote on the tax bill will make or break Mr. Fukuda. If he can somehow muster the supermajority, he will likely survive until the G8 summit, if not longer. If he can't, his government will be finished.

Abe's — and the LDP's — dilemma

Former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo has been back in the headlines this week, first for his return to the Machimura faction, which he left when he became prime minister, second for the announcement that he will chair an LDP study group related to the implementation of his "Cool Earth 50" initiative. The latter prompted Asahi to ask whether this is the beginning of Mr. Abe's "re-challenge," referring to another of Mr. Abe's initiatives.

Mr. Abe's return to the Machimura faction makes him its sixtieth member from the House of Representatives.

I find the former of greater interest than the latter, because the Machimura faction increasingly appears to be a microcosm of the party at large.

Consider that the faction contains a moderate dove like Prime Minister Fukuda, risk-averse senior politicians like Mori Yoshiro, Nakagawa Hidenao, and Machimura Nobutaka, "true" conservative Abe Shinzo, and a healthy cohort (27) of first- and second-term members of the House of Representatives, many of them Koizumi Kids. With the Machimura faction having made the Kantei its private property over the course of this decade, its complexion matters considerably in the future of LDP governance.

The selection of Mr. Fukuda as prime minister, thanks in large part due to his own faction's support, illustrates this point — and illustrates that the party is, for the moment, in the hands of the cautious, reactionary Mr. Mori.

Will Mr. Abe's return make a difference? I suspect not. The very idea of an Abe comeback strikes me as laughable, and I expect that few of his conservative allies long for his return. (At least one of them doesn't.)

The next LDP presidential election, meanwhile, will likely test the Machimura faction's power. If it comes after the next general election — as I expect it will — it may find its numerical clout diminished somewhat as some of its one- and two-term members in vulnerable urban and suburban districts go down to defeat. The test will likely come from Nakagawa Shoichi's "True Conservative Policy Research Group" [The HANA group], or at least the movement symbolized by the HANA group. Unless the Machimura faction decides to take a chance on Mr. Aso this time around, which would defuse the situation, the next LDP election will ask certain LDP members to choose between their values and their faction, and perhaps ultimately, their values and their party. This dynamic was present in the September election, as evidenced by the subterranean support for Mr. Aso — and the formalization of a conservative anti-mainstream in the form of the HANA group only exacerbates the tension.

Mr. Abe will be no less immune to this dilemma than his less prominent colleagues. Indeed, his return, according to Mainichi, is the result of Mr. Mori's anger at Mr. Nakagawa's group. As noted previously, one of the first steps in Mr. Abe's political rehabilitation was his joining the HANA group last month. Writes Mainichi: "Mr. Mori, who frowned at this, urged Mr. Abe to return to the faction."

Mr. Abe will be serving as a counselor to the faction, a position offered perhaps in part to cement his loyalty.

The Machimura faction grows

Seki Yoshihiro, an LDP member of the House of Representatives representing Hyogo-3, has announced that he is joining the Machimura faction, making him the eighty-fifth member of the party's largest faction.

Mr. Seki, a "Koizumi kid" as indicated by his membership in the "Group of 83" (AKA, the Koizumi Kids Klub), is neither the first member of the class of 2005 to join a faction nor the first to join the Machimura faction. Indeed, fifteen Koizumi Kids have joined the faction that has produced the last four prime ministers.

Considering that factions are increasingly unable to deliver anything tangible to members other than sponsorship for junior political appointments, and that the bigger the faction the more competition for those appointments (and thus diminishing marginal returns to the most recent member of a faction), I wonder what Mr. Seki gains from this move. A guarantee that he won't have his seat taken from him by party election strategists?

Alternatively, it could be a function of the changing nature of the factions, with the Machimura faction — already the descendant of the LDP's hawkish anti-mainstream tendency — becoming more explicitly ideological, the home of ideologues of both Koizumi and Abe colors. (The two approaches undoubtedly share much in common on constitutional and defense issues, but those who belong to the latter appear to have little or no interest in economic reform.)

Of course, if that's the case, it raises the question of how long politicians like Fukuda Yasuo will be tolerated within its ranks.

The Machimura faction tries to untwist the Diet

The Machimura faction, which just gained a new member to solidify its position as the LDP's largest, has delivered a proposal to Prime Minister Fukuda that calls for the drafting of new rules for Diet management in light of the divided Diet. The proposal, according to Asahi, points to a "structural deficiency in the constitution," in that it mandates different methods for dealing with the budget and budget-related bills. As such, it demands that Mr. Fukuda push through rules that provide for the passage of the budget and budget-related bills at approximately the same time.

As usual for LDP and conservative complaints about the post-July political situation, the proposal bemoans how the divided Diet makes it difficult to address Japan's national interests, in this case fixing the country's abysmal fiscal situation. (No mention, of course, as to how that situation came about in the first place.)

May I make the modest proposal that perhaps more democracy is in Japan's national interest, no matter what the impact on public policy (and no matter how insufferable Mr. Ozawa and the DPJ can be at times)?

The rule changes demanded by the Machimura faction are nothing short of anti-democratic, in that they would limit the HC's ability to exercise its constitutional duty to act on a certain type of legislation. The Japanese people voted last year to give control of the House of Councillors to different parties than that controlling the House of Representatives. Just because it has made governing more difficult does not give the LDP the right to manipulate the political process to reverse the consequences of the election.

Fortunately Mr. Fukuda disagrees with the opinion of his faction. He replied by emphasizing that he intends to "take every opportunity to appeal to the opposition parties" for cooperation. And so it should be: as we learned this month, the government and opposition are perfectly capable of cooperating on legislation, despite the media-driven impression of gridlock. The constitution mandated roles for each house, and the LDP should not opportunistically undermine one house just because it's now become a hindrance to LDP rule.

(Incidentally, this is why Japan needs regular alternation of ruling parties: a ruling party aware that it could easily end up in the opposition would perhaps be less blithe about proposing rule changes to handicap the opposition.)