Was the coalition doomed from the start?

On Friday, Fukushima Mizuho, the head of the Social Democratic Party of Japan, refused to bow to the prime minister's decision to accept a modified version of the 2006 realignment agreement, forcing the prime minister to dismiss her from her position as minister responsible for consumer affairs.

Not surprisingly, on Sunday the SDPJ decided that it would leave the coalition, although it suggested that electoral cooperation in the upcoming upper house election is still possible. The DPJ still holds a slim majority in the upper house with the PNP — perhaps thanks to the work of the "devil" — and will undoubtedly press harder to get its legislation passed without having to extend the current Diet session.

Jun Okumura questions whether electoral cooperation is the wisest decision for its survival "as an anti-business, anti-Japan-US alliance protest party." In this statement, of course, one sees the problem with the coalition between the DPJ and the SDPJ. With 308 seats — including 221 of 300 single-member districts — in the House of Representatives, electoral dynamics suggest that the DPJ would drift to the center once in power, as it needs to maintain pluralities in as many districts as possible. In this sense, perhaps the only surprising thing about the Hatoyama government's embrace of the old agreement is that it tried so hard and so long to find an alternative to accommodation. Some might say that the DPJ is becoming the old LDP, although I don't think that's a particularly meaningful assessment: Futenma, and Ozawa's courtship of old LDP interest groups notwithstanding, the DPJ's priorities and identity remain distinct. If the LDP and the DPJ increasingly resemble each other (and if the LDP survives), it is because survival in a political system dominated by nonaligned voters will produces moves to the center in order to satisfy as many floating voters as possible, combined with rhetorical and symbolical gestures to distinguish one from the other.

The SDPJ is in wholly different circumstances. The party has only seven seats in the lower house, four from proportional blocs and three from single-member districts. One of those three — Teruya Kantoku — is from Okinawa's second district. As a marginal party, the SDPJ's survival depends on offering something unique to a narrow slice of core supporters, in this case left-wing ideologues who share its commitment to reducing the US presence in Japan, resisting revision of the constitution, and resisting growing inequality. While on paper there appears to be some basis for cooperation between the SDPJ and the DPJ, the reality is that for the DPJ compromise is indispensable (for large parties, manifestos, one might say, are made to be broken), while for the SDPJ its survival depends on rigid adherence to its principles and promises. Had the LDP not fallen into such disarray, the coalition might have survived a bit longer in mutual resistance to a convenient enemy, but the electoral dynamics of the coalition seem to have doomed the partnership in advance.

Electoral dynamics were compounded by the SDPJ's history. The old Socialist Party virtually broke itself by compromising its principles on the security alliance and the SDF to form a coalition with the LDP in 1994. That choice may have been the result of the party's failure to recognize that the JSP was becoming a marginal ideological party even before electoral reform: in 1993, the party actually lost 66 seats, most of them to the LDP splinter parties that would form the non-LDP coalition after the election. In other words, having betrayed its core supporters on the alliance once before, it was extremely unlikely that Fukushima would act differently than she did.

In short, Fukushima had to reject the prime minister's compromise on account of the past, present, and future of the SDPJ. The party's future is still precarious — it is not immediately clear which party gains more from electoral cooperation without cooperation in government — but having stood on principle, the SDPJ should have an easier time maintaining its electoral base.

Preparing to retreat?

As the Hatoyama government approaches the end of its first 100 days in office, the air is thick with condemnation of the DPJ-led government's handling of the relationship with the United States, particularly the ongoing dispute over the future of Futenma air station and the US presence in Okinawa.

Smelling blood in the water, the LDP and its allies in the conservative commentariat have gone on the offensive against the government. On Thursday Tanigaki Sadakazu, the leader of the LDP, said that the government was acting irresponsibly when it came to the hopes of the Okinawan people and harming relations with the US. Compared to what others were saying, Tanigaki was being charitable. Conservative journalist Sakurai Yoshiko, speaking in Kyushu at a forum sponsored by the Sankei-affiliated journal Seiron, said the Hatoyama government was effectively giving comfort to China by taking on the US on Futenma. (Sakurai also criticized the Hatoyama government for neglecting the military to spend money on child allowances, and insisted that Japan is on the path to becoming a dependency of China.) Sankei's prose is no less purple than Sakurai's. In an editorial published Thursday, Sankei accused the Hatoyama government of creating a crisis in the US-Japan alliance, and says that Hatoyama has committed an act of betrayal towards President Obama by prioritizing the stability of his government over his country's security.

Richard Armitage, visiting Tokyo earlier this week along with Michael Green, added his criticism of the Hatoyama government in a meeting with Tanigaki, questioning the government's ability to lead.

It is hard not to conclude that the Hatoyama government has miscalculated, in part I think because Hatoyama assumed that he could resolve the problem by speaking frankly with Obama (which would explain the prime minister's desire to summit with Obama on the sidelines in Copenhagen). In effect, Hatoyama seems to have desired the mirror image of Koizumi Junichiro's relationship with George W. Bush: where the Bush-Koizumi relationship deepened Japan's dependence on the US and led Japan to support US wars abroad, his relationship with Obama would based on mutual trust and would result in the creation of an "equal" US-Japan relationship that would focus on cooperation in non-security fields.

To build this relationship Hatoyama seems to have decided to take a calculated risk. If the two countries could tackle Futenma quickly — an issue which has been a millstone around the alliance for years — the way would be open to the kind of relationship Hatoyama purports to desire. By addressing this issue in the first months of its tenure, his government could signal a break with past practices in the alliance and demonstrate its ability to follow through on its promises and its deftness in foreign policy.

Instead the Hatoyama government faces its worst-case scenario: it has painted itself into a corner, having systematically eliminated alternatives to the current agreement, while appearing incompetent in its handling of foreign policy, deepening the mistrust of US officials (many of whom were already skeptical about the DPJ) in the process. Also, by dangling the possibility of a new agreement that could remove Marines from Okinawa entirely, the Hatoyama government raised the hopes of the Okinawan people, perhaps to unreasonable heights.

I am hesitant to declare this situation a crisis for the alliance because the Hatoyama government may already be moving in the direction of accommodation: Hatoyama has said that all options are on the table (including the agreement on hand), and has indicated that his government's plan will be forthcoming as early as next week. Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya has concluded that relocating Futenma's operations to Kadena is not an option. After visiting Guam, Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi — perhaps the leading defender of the status quo in the cabinet — concluded that relocating Futenma to Guam is not doable. The Hatoyama government is running out of alternatives to the 2006 agreement. Even the Social Democrats may be coming around: a senior member of her own party criticized SDPJ leader Fukushima Mizuho for suggesting that she could pull her party out of the government over the Futenma issue.

If it ends up embracing the 2006 agreement, it will be hard to conclude that the Hatoyama government did not injure itself by dragging out the process only to maintain the status quo. I do not think that it will be a mortal blow to the government because ultimately Futenma is a low-stakes issue domestically. It does reinforce the image that the DPJ is inexperienced on foreign policy, but then the Japanese public already believed that last summer before the general election and still voted the DPJ into power. More significantly, it calls into question Hatoyama's ability to lead his cabinet.

I am more sanguine than most when it comes to the significance of disagreements among cabinet ministers — I do think that the DPJ's model is a prime minister who is first among equals. That being said, on the Futenma issue Hatoyama has not been first at all, despite his periodic interjections to remind the public and the US that the final decision will be his and his alone. Given the sensitivities of this issue, Hatoyama needed to use a heavier hand to guide the deliberations of his ministers. Someone needed to take control of the process of reviewing the agreement. Okada tried, but apparently failed. It needed to be the prime minister. Hatoyama may be trying to correct that now, but the damage has been done.

What have we learned from this dispute?

First, my earlier misgivings about Hatoyama's ability to lead are justified. Hatoyama seems to have some idea of where he wants to take Japan, but he seems to have little idea how to go about it. Hatoyama strikes me as too much of a dreamer and not enough of a strategist. This tendency would be less of a problem if Hatoyama had a Machiavelli in his cabinet, but it is not yet clear to me who in the government will fill this role, if anyone. (For all we know it may be Ozawa Ichiro after all, although I am not convinced of this just yet.)

Second, as noted above, I think the lasting damage from this dispute will be limited, especially if it works out in Washington's favor. Having been burned on this issue and facing an general election upper house election (I hope writing general election where I meant upper house election doesn't prove prescient) and a fight over the budget in the new year, we will be hearing less from the Hatoyama government on foreign policy in the months to come, perhaps clearing the air for a proper discussion of the future of the alliance and the future of US forces in Japan (what Hatoyama, Ozawa, and others are most interested in anyway). This discussion needs to happen, the sooner the better, and Futenma and Okinawa are sideshows to the bigger question of where the DPJ sees the alliance in its Asia-centered foreign policy and what is the minimum level of commitment the US will expect from Japan if the alliance indeed narrows its focus to the defense of Japan. Someone, if not Hatoyama, needs to start signaling how the Japanese government plans to translate its foreign policy ideals into concrete policy.

Third, the DPJ may hold the upper hand in its relationship with the SDPJ. The SDPJ does have the nuclear option of pulling out of the government and reducing it to a minority in the upper house, but it is a one-shot weapon. Once the SDPJ uses it, it's done and who is to say how the SDPJ would fare in a snap election triggered by its pulling out of the government. What would the SDPJ have to gain from pulling out of the government? With Fukushima in the cabinet it has a seat at the table, giving it more influence over policy now than it could expect to have in opposition (just ask the LDP) or as a silent partner in the Diet. While the SDPJ's hand — and, for that matter, the PNP's hand — looks impressive given that it holds the balance in the upper house, its position is weaker than meets the eye.

The Hatoyama government misplayed the Futenma dispute. But it is possible that the prime minister and his ministers will learn from the experience and be a bit savvier the next time around.

Ozawa whips the DPJ and the Diet into shape

Speaking at a convention of the Osaka branch of the DPJ, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano Hirofumi spoke succinctly of the role of the DPJ's backbenchers in the new government. Hirano said that not only is it unnecessary for DPJ backbenchers to ask questions in Diet proceedings, but also the DPJ's many first-term Diet members should be focused on consolidating their support bases in their districts.

Welcome to life in Japan's emerging Westminster system, in which the job of backbenchers is — contrary to the argument made by Paul Scalise and Devin Stewart that a major problem with Japanese politics is backbenchers lacking policymaking resources (discussed here) — to show up and vote as the party, acting at the behest of the cabinet, requests.

Hirano's remarks dovetail with Ozawa Ichiro's unfolding plans to reform the mechanics of the Diet. Upon his return from Britain last month, Ozawa outlined plans to revise the Diet law to, among other things, prohibit testimony by bureaucrats so to strengthen debate among legislators. (This ban would also prevent officials of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau — a longtime Ozawa target — from appearing as witnesses in the Diet.) Ozawa also wants to trim the number of Diet committee members so that Diet members can focus on a specific policy area instead of dividing their time between multiple committees — and he wants cabinet and sub-cabinet officials to participate in committee deliberations so to clarify government policies for legislators.

Ozawa met with the secretaries general of the SDPJ and the PNP, the DPJ's coalition partners last week to discuss his plans for revising the Diet law, although the SDPJ is skeptical of the need to revise the law and it seems unlikely that revising the law will figure highly on the Diet agenda for the forthcoming extraordinary session after Hirano met with Yamaoka Kenji, the DPJ's Diet affairs chair, and suggested that the bill should be delayed until next year's ordinary session.

Ozawa is otherwise working to consolidate control of the DPJ caucus and to exclude the ruling parties from the policymaking process. Concerns about Ozawa's forging a dominant Ozawa faction out of the so-called "Ozawa children" seem to be giving way to complaints that Ozawa is consolidating his control of the DPJ and the Diet through more conventional means. Ozawa has announced the lineup of the new party executive, and is being criticized for streamlining the party leadership by folding up a number of deputy leadership posts and concentrating party in his hands and in the hands of Koshiishi Azuma, an upper house member who is not a longtime Ozawa loyalist but who has reportedly moved closer to Ozawa in recent years. (It is less than clear who is doing the criticizing: the conservative press or DPJ malcontents who would prefer to remain anonymous.) There is a greater number of upper house members among party members tapped for leadership posts, which may simply reflect the importance of the upper house for moving the government's agenda. According to Mainichi, six of ten members of the party executive are upper house members. Ozawa was also less concerned about preserving balance among the DPJ's different groups, and did not include party members from groups that have opposed him in the past, most notably Edano Yukio, a senior party member who was given neither a cabinet post nor a party leadership post.

Far from wanting to forge first-termers into a force capable of controlling the policy agenda, Ozawa does not want to see first-term DPJ members in Nagata-cho: Ozawa's group for first-term members has been suspended, and Ozawa has commanded first-termers to focus on political activities in their own districts, telling them "the work of a freshman member is to win the next election."

It is not only first-term DPJ members who have to fear Ozawa. At the meeting with his SDPJ and PNP counterparts last week, Ozawa flatly rejected an SDPJ request to convene a regular meeting among the governing parties to coordinate coalition parties, saying that it was for precisely that reason that the SDPJ's Fukushima Mizuho and the PNP's Kamei Shizuka were included the cabinet, rendering an extra-governmental meeting of secretaries general at best irrelevant and at worst harmful to cabinet government.

For all the concerns that surrounded Ozawa's appointment as DPJ secretary-general, one month into the Hatoyama government it appears that many of them were overblown. As was becoming clear even before the government took power, Ozawa sees his job as ensuring that the ruling party and the Diet are not obstacles to the cabinet's implementing its policy agenda. Ozawa has been largely silent — at least publicly — on policy questions and at every opportunity has stressed the importance of enhancing the cabinet's ability to govern. Far from dictating terms to the government, Ozawa has thus far been nothing but loyal to the Hatoyama government. There is plenty of time for that to change, but sooner or later Ozawa critics who argued that Ozawa's "army" of youngsters would be a DPJ version of the Tanaka faction will have to admit that they were mistaken about Ozawa's intentions.

Ozawa's role as the buckle linking cabinet to ruling party and Diet is critical, but ultimately he is working to strengthen the cabinet, not to undermine its power.

The Hatoyama system takes shape

The coalition with the SDPJ and the PNP cemented, the DPJ is getting to work filling in the rest of the cabinet.

One question is what posts the SDPJ's Fukushima Mizuho and PNP's Kamei Shizuka will fill. The SDPJ has requested either the ministry of health, labor, and welfare or, it seems, the environment portfolio. Despite an earlier report that suggested Kamei would enter the cabinet as a minister without portfolio, it seems that the PNP now wants the ministry of internal affairs and communications, not surprisingly given that the PNP's issue is reversing postal privatization. It is unlikely that the DPJ will give the post to Kamei.

Hatoyama Yukio has set 15 September, the day before the Diet will elect the new prime minister, as the target for finalizing cabinet appointments. Nothing, it seems, will be decided before then.

But the names of likely cabinet ministers are emerging. In addition to Fukushima and Kamei — and before them Okada Katsuya, Hirano Hirofumi, Fujii Hirohisa, and Kan Naoto — DPJ members under consideration are Nagatsuma Akira ("Mr. Nenkin"), Maehara Seiji, Sengoku Yoshito, and Naoshima Masayuki. Maehara, despite (or because of) his reputation as a hawkish defense specialist, is rumored to be under consideration for the ministry of land, infrastructure, transport, and tourism. Sengoku is being considered for the justice and health, labor, and welfare, while Naoshima, currently the DPJ's policy affairs research council chairman, may end up as the METI minister.

That leaves at least seven more names to be included in the new cabinet, which could be more depending on how many "special mission" posts the Hatoyama cabinet decides to create.

What seems clear, however, is that with Maehara and Sengoku likely to receive important posts in the cabinet, it will be difficult to speak of the Hatoyama cabinet as an "Ohato" cabinet. It is possible that Ozawa's favorites could fill out the remainder of the cabinet, but with Sengoku and Maehara — Sengoku was close to running against Ozawa last year, and both were against Ozawa's continuing as party leader as the Nishimatsu scandal unfolded — in the cabinet, the idea that Hatoyama's cabinet will simply be under Ozawa's thumb is unlikely.

Indeed, it is possible that the DPJ has solved its Ozawa dilemma. Ozawa will still wield tremendous power, but his power will be more directed at the party's now numerous backbenchers. He could use those backbenchers against the cabinet, but that assumes that their loyalty to Ozawa is so strong as to lead them to rebel against their party's leadership in cabinet. I will believe in the existence of an Ozawa faction when I see some evidence for it beyond speculation rooted in Ozawa's past as a lieutenant of Tanaka Kakuei linked to his work on behalf of DPJ candidates across Japan.

Walter Bagehot provides an appropriate metaphor for thinking about Ozawa's role in the new government: "A cabinet is a combining committee, — a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens, the legislative part of the state to the executive part of the state. In its origin it belongs to the one, in its functions it belongs to the other." In the case of the Hatoyama government, Ozawa will be the hyphen that joins the DPJ-led cabinet to the DPJ's parliamentary majority. His voice will carry weight — I have a hard time seeing him stay completely quiet on policy affairs — but his influence on policymaking may be less than feared.

Indeed, in this role Ozawa could be indispensable to moving Japan away from LDP's cumbersome policymaking process into an era in which politicians in cabinet are capable of making decisions, enacting policies, and leading. Ozawa has long lamented the role that bureaucrats (and the United States) have played in limiting the ability of Japan's political leaders to direct the country. The question now is whether Ozawa can accept other political leaders' directing the country. With enough Ozawa skeptics in the cabinet, he may have no choice but to accept their lead.

Assembling the new coalition government

The DPJ has been in intense negotiations with the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) and the People's New Party (PNP) to finalize the terms of their coalition government.

The DPJ's goal in negotiations is naturally to minimize the disruptiveness from having two parties (and their internal politics) interfere with the DPJ's plans for a streamlined policymaking process in which the cabinet will control the ruling party, and through its control of the ruling party, the Diet. In order to ensure that the same process works for the upper house, the cabinet will have to represent the will of the ruling parties — Hatoyama, in a conversation with SDPJ leader Fukushima Mizuho, stressed the importance of the government's policies reflecting the SDPJ's positions. Naturally the best way to have the ruling parties represented is by having their leaders take up positions in the cabinet. Indeed, the three parties — with Kan, the likely minister responsible for the national strategy bureau sitting in for Hatoyama, representing the DPJ — will form a committee within the cabinet to coordinate policies, the "Basic Policy Cabinet Committee," perhaps the first instance of a DPJ commitment to form a cabinet committee. (In his report on the British system of government and his article in Chuo Koron, Kan was particularly impressed by Britain's cabinet committees as a means of overcoming unanimous decision-making and stovepiping within the government, but until now it has been unclear just how the DPJ will use cabinet committees, if at all.)

As of Tuesday, the parties had agreed that leaders would join the cabinet, but were still negotiating joint positions in foreign policy, not surprisingly the area not included in the joint manifesto produced by the three parties during the campaign (which this Sankei editorial called "irresponsible"). The sticking point appears to be text related to the coalition's position on how to deal with opposition to the bilateral agreement on realignment as it pertains to a Futenma replacement facility: the DPJ and PNP have accepted a statement that stresses a bilateral solution without identifying the particular grievances (i.e., actually naming Futenma), while the SDPJ wants the statement to include specific details. The SDPJ also wants a commitment to involve only the Coast Guard in anti-piracy activities off the Horn of Africa.

Nevertheless, the parties are still trying to reach an agreement Wednesday. There appear to be few difficulties with the PNP: PNP leader Kamei Shizuka will join the cabinet as a minister without portfolio. The problem for the DPJ is, will probably continue to be, the SDPJ. The SDPJ wants to take a harder line than the DPJ is prepared to take, and given that its votes are needed in the upper house, it has power far disproportionate to its seven lower house and five upper house members. The difference is not necessarily a matter of policy preferences, but of tactics and emphasis. The DPJ appears to recognize that it can only push the US so far before it causes real damage to the alliance. I hope the Obama administration recognizes the difference between the DPJ and the SDPJ when it comes to the bilateral issues the new government wants to address — and that Washington finds some consolation prize to help the DPJ save face in lieu of full-blown renegotiation.

Managing the DPJ's relationship with the SDPJ will be much more troublesome than managing the left wing of the party, not least because the DPJ — with some credit going to Ozawa Ichiro — has forged a working consensus on foreign policy that is probably more acceptable to the left of the party than the right. (Revealingly, Yokomichi Takahiro, the unofficial leader of the party's left and an Ozawa ally, has been tapped to serve as the speaker of the House of Representatives after serving for four years as deputy speaker.)

Accordingly, even as the three parties were negotiating the terms of the coalition, Ozawa was meeting with Rengo, the labor organization, to ask for its support in next year's upper house election — stressing that the DPJ "must win a majority in next year's upper house election by any means necessary."

UPDATE: The three parties have finalized their agreement, which reportedly reflects the DPJ's softer line. Jiji's report adds that the DPJ can now accelerate the process of filling in the remainder of the cabinet.

The final numbers

The DPJ finished with 308 seats (221 SMDs, 87 PR), the LDP with 119 seats (64 and 55), Komeito with 21 (all PR), the JCP with 9 (all PR), the SDPJ with 7 (3 and 4), PNP with 3 (all SMD), YP with 5 (2 and 3), NPJ with 1 (SMD), Suzuki Muneo's micro-party won 1 PR seat in Hokkaido, and 6 independents won SMDs.

The DPJ does control a supermajority with the help of its likely coalition partners, but that won't matter much.

The DPJ swept eight prefectures, but not Hokkaido as I reported while live-blogging last night: Iwate, Fukushima, Yamanashi, Niigata, Nagano, Aichi, Shiga and Nagasaki.

The DPJ can win a majority — but what will it mean?

Having tabulated the predictions made over the course of my election handbook, I think it's appropriate that I return and answer my initial question.

Can the DPJ win an absolute majority?

Based on my district-by-district predictions, I think the DPJ could win 279 seats, the LDP 159 seats, Komeito fifteen seats, the JCP and PNP seven seats each, the SDPJ five seats, Your Party three seats, LDP-affiliated independents three seats, and small parties (affiliated with the DPJ) two seats.



In other words, the DPJ would gain 167 seats, the LDP would lose 144 seats, Komeito would lose sixteen seats, the JCP would lose two seats, the SDPJ would lose two seats, the PNP would gain two seats, and the number of independents and representatives from small parties would fall by two.

Before I go into the implications of the DPJ's winning so substantially, it was worth recalling the words of the great philosopher Yogi Berra (or, alternatively Niels Bohr — what a pair): "It's tough to make predictions, especially about the future." The number 279 is not in and of itself important. I suspect that my figure is probably the upper bound of a range in which the DPJ will likely win, and there is still time for the LDP to retake seats on the margins. What I think my survey suggests is simply that by looking at the race from the bottom up, it does seem likely that the DPJ will exceed the 240 seats needed for an absolute majority.

Given that the DPJ is already committed to a coalition government, however, the symbolic importance of a DPJ victory may be more important than its importance for a DPJ-led coalition, although the DPJ would presumably have more bargaining power with its coalition partners having a majority of its own. If the DPJ wins as decisively as my estimate suggests, it will truly mark the end of the LDP's permanent rule. Unlike in 1993, there will be no doubts about the public's having voted for "change." The DPJ will have a mandate. What that mandate means may, as I previously suggested, be unclear, but the DPJ will have the power to act, forcing its rivals to reconsider how best to oppose a ruling party with this level of support.

At the same time, however, the public will expect the government to act. Having an absolute majority will likely mean higher expectations for a DPJ government, its lack of a majority in the upper house notwithstanding. Of course, the higher expectations that will accompany a DPJ majority will make the July 2010 upper house elections even more important to the government.

In short, a DPJ majority could be both a blessing and a curse: public affirmation that the DPJ has arrived as a ruling party, accompanied by expectations that the DPJ do something with its mandate. Indeed, arguably at least one factor in the LDP's likely defeat will be that it squandered the mandate it received in 2005. That should be a warning for the DPJ.

What, meanwhile, would this outcome mean for the LDP? Naturally it will mean a certain amount of disarray, with faction chiefs and other party leaders losing their seats. The factions have already seen a precipitous decline in their influence within the party in matters other than the selection of sub-cabinet officials. Would a landslide defeat that includes losses by several faction leaders be the final blow to the influence of factions, as the LDP's survivors reorganize themselves along more ideological lines? After a general election the fight in the LDP will be to determine who should be nominated to run in the next general election, presumably a fight between traditionalists in places like Kyushu and Shikoku who think that the party needs to return to its roots and Nakagawa Hidenao and survivors from urban districts who think that the defeat shows why the party has to focus on winning in places other than Kyushu and Shikoku. Does anyone think that the factions would play the leading role in determining who will get the LDP's endorsement in single-member districts?

In the nearer term, the same question goes for the campaign for the party's leadership, which will be held in the weeks following the election? Especially given the breakdown in recent party elections, does anyone think that the forthcoming LDP presidential election will be decided along factional lines?

If the LDP indeed loses as badly as it appears it will, the fight within the LDP for the soul for the party will be brutal and protracted. Ozawa may not need to do anything to help the LDP tear itself to pieces. It will likely emerge stronger from defeat, but it will not be the same LDP. In the end, the LDP may find itself looking for candidates like the DPJ's this year: younger, a bit more female, and perhaps some bureaucratic experience (but not too much) or else backgrounds in finance or the media. It will certainly have no problem saying no to a DPJ government.

Kyushu, a conservative bastion

This is the eleventh and final installment in my general election guide. For an explanation of my purpose in making this guide, see here. For previous installments, see here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.

The Kyushu regional block contains thirty-eight single-member districts spread over eight prefectures: Fukuoka, Saga, Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Oita, Miyazaki, Kagoshima, and Okinawa. The block elects an additional twenty-one representatives through proportional representation, for a total of fifty-nine seats.

The region's major population center is Fukuoka, which constitutes roughly a third of the region's population, with the rest of the region's prefectures being roughly equal in population. The region's economic profile is mixed, including agricultural production suiting that region's sub-tropical climate and heavy industry in northern Kyushu. It was once a major mining center, home to Aso Mining, the family business of Prime Minister Aso Taro.

Along with Shikoku and Chugoku it has been a historically important electoral base for the LDP.

In 2005, opposition parties won seven SMDs, four of those being won by DPJ candidates. Meanwhile the LDP won twenty-five seats and Komeito won six. In PR voting, the LDP won nine, the DPJ seven, Komeito three, and the SDPJ and JCP one each. In 2003, the LDP won twenty-six seats, Komeito one, and the opposition parties eleven, with the DPJ winning eight.

However, opposition parties in five of the region's single-member upper house districts in 2007, suggesting the possibility of DPJ gains in the region.

Fukuoka

In Fukuoka in 2005, the LDP won nine seats and Komeito and the DPJ one each.

The DPJ's Matsumoto Ryu (first district) should easily win the district in which he has won every election since the first election under the new system in 1996.

Meanwhile LDP candidates are likely safe in two districts: Aso Taro (eighth district) and Takeda Ryota (eleventh district). Given that Aso is acting as if his seat is vulnerable — he is declined to run simultaneously as a PR candidate — perhaps I should not list his seat as safe, but I think that Aso will not join John Howard as a leader who loses his government and his constituency in the same election. DPJ candidate Yamamoto Gosei may put pressure on the prime minister — he'll be helped by the absence of a JCP candidate — but I expect Aso will win. If he doesn't, perhaps these predictions are the lower bound for the DPJ's performance on 30 August.

Takeda, who after three attempts finally won a seat in 2003 as a conservative independent who joined the LDP in 2004 only to leave it in 2005 as a postal rebel and win the district as an independent once more, will run as the LDP's candidate this year. He faces the SDPJ's Yamaguchi Haruna and JCP candidate Yamashita Tomiko. The fight will be over the 78,000 votes received by Yamamoto Kozo, the LDP candidate in 2005. Takeda will likely win.

But otherwise LDP candidates across Fukuoka are vulnerable. In the second district, Yamasaki Taku, an LDP faction leader, has profited from divided fields in 2003 and 2005 to win reelection. In 2000, the last time the field included only a DPJ candidate and a JCP candidate (as it does this year) Yamasaki lost by 10,000 votes. Yamasaki is high on the list of LDP heavyweights likely to go down to defeat, bested by DPJ newcomer Inatomi Shuji.

Ota Seiichi in the third district may be even more vulnerable than Yamasaki: in 2005 Ota defeated Fujita Kazue, this year's DPJ candidate and winner of the district in 2003. Fujita will likely win again.

In the fourth district the DPJ may benefit from the absence of a JCP candidate, as JCP candidates received around 15,000 votes in the past several elections, turning what would have been close races into comfortable victories for LDP incumbent Watanabe Tomoyoshi. This time DPJ candidate Koga Takaaki has the field to himself, and could emerge as the winner as a result.

Similarly, in the fifth district DPJ candidate Kusuda Daizo will try for the third time to unseat LDP incumbent Harada Yoshiaki. Harada won by 35,000 votes in 2005, 25,000 in 2003, when Kusuda won a PR seat. But in 2003 Harada shared the field with candidates from the JCP and the SDPJ, who combined for 30,000 votes, enough to swing the election to Harada. This time Harada won't have help from other opposition parties.

Also vulnerable is Hatoyama Kunio, DPJ leader Yukio's brother, who parachuted into the sixth district in 2005 and defeated DPJ incumbent Koga Issei. Koga lost by 22,000 votes and won a PR seat, with a JCP candidate taking 11,000 votes. The absence of a JCP candidate should help Koga, but for his part he is publicly skeptical of his chances, citing the press Hatoyama received due to his departure from the Aso cabinet. Hatoyama may hold on to win.

A third LDP faction leader — besides Yamasaki and Aso — is up for reelection in Fukuoka, Koga Makoto in the seventh district. Like Aso, Koga has declined to run simultaneously as an SMD and PR candidate. Koga faces the DPJ's Noda Kuniyoshi, who previously served as mayor of Yameshi city — and no other candidates. The JCP, for example, took nearly 20,000 votes in 2005, which made little difference in 2005 but could be decisive this year, especially since Koga's vote total has fallen gradually since 2000. Like Yamasaki, I think Koga will lose.

The DPJ may have an even easier time in the ninth district, which until 2005 had been represented by Kitahashi Kenji, first elected in 1996 as an NFP candidate and reelected in 2000 and 2003 as a DPJ candidate. He lost by 15,000 votes in 2005 and won a PR seat, but resigned to run for and win the mayoralty of Kita Kyushu city. In his place the DPJ is running Ogata Rintaro, a former foreign ministry official. Given the DPJ's history in the district, I suspect Ogata will win against LDP incumbent Mihara Asahiko.

Finally, in the tenth district LDP incumbent Nishikawa Kyoko faces the DPJ's Kii Takashi, who first ran in 2003 and finished 12,000 votes behind the LDP's Jimi Shozaburo. Jimi left the party as a postal rebel in 2005 and finished second behind Nishikawa with 65,000 votes, 5,000 votes ahead of Kii. The JCP is running a candidate again, but the SDPJ, which received 10,000 votes in 2005, is not. If Kii can take the bulk of the votes received by Jimi in 2005, he should win the seat.

The DPJ should do very well in Fukuoka, winning at least eight of eleven seats.

Saga

In 2005, postal rebels won two of three seats, with the LDP winning the third. As the postal rebels have returned to the LDP, the LDP is defending all three seats in the prefecture.

In the first district, DPJ candidate Haraguchi Kazuhiro has run in each of the four elections since 1996, winning in 1996 as an NFP candidate and 2003 as a DPJ candidate, and losing in 2000 and 2005 as a DPJ candidate but returning as a PR representative. In this race he faces Fukuoka Takamoro, the victorious LDP candidate from 2005 who Haraguchi defeated in 2003. Haraguchi should return as the SMD representative.

In the second district, 2005 postal rebel Imamura Masahiro returns as the LDP candidate facing Oogushi Hiroshi, the DPJ candidate from 2005 who lost by 15,000 votes and won a PR seat. The question in the second district is what will happen to the 35,000 voters who supported LDP candidate Dokai Chiaki in 2005: do they vote for the party or for the policy line, and if so, which policy line? Imamura could hold on to his seat.

The third district features, in addition to the LDP's Hori Kosuke — another postal rebel — and the DPJ-backed SDPJ candidate Yanase Eiji, candidates from the JCP and Watanabe's YP. Hori should retain the seat.

The DPJ will win at least one of three seats in Saga.

Nagasaki

In Nagasaki's four districts in 2005, the LDP won three and the DPJ one.

The DPJ Takaki Yoshiaki (first district), who has represented the district since 2000, should win reelection comfortably.

In the second district, Kyuma Fumio, Japan's first ever defense minister, faces Fukuda Eriko, the twenty-eight-year-old leader of the Kyushu group of victims of Hepatitis-tainted blood transfusions, handpicked by Ozawa to run against Kyuma. Kyuma is clearly worried after having years of being reelected comfortably. Like Koga Makoto in Fukuoka, Kyuma's vote shares have gradually declined in recent elections. Kyuma may also suffer from memories of the remarks regarding the Nagasaki bombing in 2007 that led to his resignation as defense minister. With the DPJ focused on defeating Kyuma, Fukuda might win the upset.

Tanigawa Yaichi, the LDP's incumbent in the third district, has fought close elections with the DPJ's Yamada Masahiko in the past two elections, winning by 6,000 votes in 2003 and 9,000 votes in 2005. Yamada won PR seats in both elections. Reporting suggests that Tanigawa is confident that he can retain his seat on the back of Komeito support in the district, as is the LDP's Kitamura Seigo in the fourth district, who faces DPJ candidate Miyajima Daisuke. Miyajima won a by-election in the district in 1998 as an LDP candidate but lost to Kitamura by 30,000 votes in 2005.

The result could be a split in Nagasaki.

Kumamoto

In Kumamoto in 2005 the LDP won four seats and the DPJ won one.

The DPJ's Matsumoto Yorihisa (first district) will win the seat he first won in 2000.

In the second district the LDP's Hayashida Takeshi, running again in the SMD after alternating with Noda Takeshi in a Costa Rica arrangement, faces DPJ newcomer Fukushima Kenichiro and should win the district.

The third district was won by the late Matsuoka Toshikatsu in 2005, and was won by independent Sakamoto Tetsushi in the by-election following Matsuoka's suicide. Sakamoto has since joined the LDP, and faces the DPJ's Goto Hidetomo and former LDP member Miura Issui, running as an independent. It seems, however, that Sakamoto and Miura may divide the support of groups that have traditionally supported the LDP. Nevertheless, the DPJ has never done well in the district, and the winner will be either Sakamoto or Miura. Miura may edge out Sakamoto, who did the same to Matsuoka running as an independent in 2003.

In the fourth district LDP incumbent Sonoda Hiroyuki should win reelection easily, as should Kaneko Yasushi in the fifth district.

The LDP will win three, the DPJ one, and an independent conservative one.


Oita

The LDP took two seats and the DPJ one in Oita in 2005.

The DPJ's Kira Shuji (first district), who first won as an independent in 2003 and won reelection in 2005, should win the seat again.

In the second district, the SDPJ may be poised to pick up a seat, as Shigeno Yasumasa runs for the third time against LDP incumbent Eto Seishiro. Shigeno lost by 21,000 votes in 2005, closing the gap from 2003 and earning Shigeno a PR seat. With no JCP candidate running this time — the JCP received nearly 15,000 votes in 2005 — Shigeno could unseat Eto.

In the third district, the DPJ's Yokomitsu Katsuhiko will try for the third time to unseat LDP incumbent Iwaya Takeshi. Yokomitsu, losing by 12,000 votes in 2003 and 15,000 votes in 2005, won PR seats both times. The election will be close, and may ultimately depend on the ability of Yokomitsu to bring out SDPJ voters — Yokomitsu ran in 2003 as an SDPJ candidate before switching to the DPJ, and the two parties had a bitter dispute over who should run in Oita in the 2007 upper house election, resulting in both parties' fielding candidates and the LDP's winning the Oita single-member district.

Iwaya could hold on, with the result that the DPJ wins one, the LDP one, and the SDPJ one.

Miyazaki

Miyazaki is odd: LDP-affiliated candidates won all three seats in 2005, although at the time two of three were running as independent postal rebels (and both had first won in 2003 by running as independents, joining the LDP after the election). The postal rebels have returned to the LDP, but meanwhile, Nakayama Nariaki (first district), the one LDP member who did win in 2005 and is now known for resigning three days after taking office as Aso's transport minister due to comments about Nikkyoso, initially announced that he would retire but changed his mind and is now running as an independent, albeit as an independent with the support of senior LDP leaders like Machimura Nobutaka.

In the first district, the field includes, in addition to Nakayama, LDP-related independent Uesugi Mitsuhiro, a former upper house member who ran as the LDP candidate in the second district in 2005 and lost, Kawamura Hidesaburo, a former MAFF official running as an independent with DPJ, SDPJ, and PNP backing, and a JCP candidate. I suspect that Nakayama will win reelection.

Eto Taku, a postal rebel who returned to the LDP, is seeking another term in the second district, facing the DPJ's Dokyu Seichiro and an independent. Eto will likely win reelection.

In the third district, Furukawa Yoshihisa should win reelection easily.

With Nakayama likely to return to the LDP after the election, the LDP will presumably win three seats in Miyazaki.

Kagoshima

Although the LDP did not win all five seats in 2005, it is now defending all five seats in Kagoshima.

The DPJ's best chance of picking up a seat is in the first district, where LDP incumbent Yasuoka Okiharu faces the DPJ's Kawauchi Hiroshi, who has lost to Yasuoka by roughly 20,000 votes the past two elections and 9,000 votes in 2000, winning PR seats each time. The JCP is fielding a candidate and independent Yamashita Junichi is running, but Kawauchi may manage to win the district this time.

The LDP candidate in the second district, Tokuda Takeshi, was elected as an independent in 2005 but migrated to the LDP and now faces DPJ candidate Uchikoshi Akashi, a former prefectural assemblyman. As the DPJ has never fielded a candidate in the district, it is unclear how the DPJ brand will do. Uchikoshi ran as an independent in 2005 and received nearly 45,000 votes, but Tokuda and the LDP candidate combined for nearly 160,000 votes. Tokuda will probably be reelected.

In the third district, the PNP may be poised to pick up a seat as the joint PNP-DPJ candidate, Matsushita Tadahiro, finished second in 2005 to the LDP's Miyaji Kazuaki, but the DPJ vote combined with Matsushita's votes would have bested Miyaji.

The DPJ candidate in the fourth district is former Rengo Kagoshima vice president Minayoshi Inao, who faces LDP incumbent Ozato Yasuhiro. Ozato has consistently beaten opposition candidate by 40,000 votes and should win again.

Moriyama Hiroshi, the LDP's former postal rebel incumbent in the fifth district, won by 55,000 votes of an LDP "assassin" in 2005 and in 2003 defeated the DPJ's candidate by nearly 100,000 votes. He will be reelected.

The LDP will win three seats, the DPJ one, and the PNP one.

Okinawa

In Okinawa in 2005 the LDP won two seats, the SDPJ won one, and a DPJ-backed independent who has since joined the PNP won one.

In the first district, PNP incumbent Shimoji Mikio should win reelection, as should the SDPJ's Teruya Kantoku in the second district.

The LDP's incumbent in the third district, Kakazu Chiken, won in 2005 because both the DPJ and the SDPJ fielded candidates, Tamaki Deni and Tomon Mitsuko respectively. Once again the two opposition parties will be fielding these candidates, despite their combined vote in 2005 being enough to defeat Kakazu. All that may change this year is that Tamaki finishes second instead of Tomon.

Finally, in the fourth district the LDP's Nishime Kosaburo faces DPJ newcomer Zukeran Chobin. Nishime also won due to a divided field, with the DPJ, JCP, and PNP dividing up 72,000 votes that would have been sufficient to beat Nishime. Zukeran, having the field to himself, may win the district for the DPJ.

The result in Okinawa will be one for the DPJ, one for the LDP, one for the SDPJ, and one for the PNP.

Proportional representation

It is unlikely that the DPJ will run as strong in the Kyushu regional block as it will elsewhere, especially because Komeito will run stronger in Kyushu than it will elsewhere. In 2005, for example, Komeito received nearly 16% of the vote and won three PR seats. The likely PR outcome is for the LDP and the DPJ to reverse their totals, and perhaps the PNP winning a seat instead of the SDPJ, leaving the distribution at nine for the DPJ, seven for the LDP, three for Komeito, one for the JCP, and one for the PNP.

If these predictions, the DPJ will win twenty-four seats, the LDP twenty-five, the PNP three, Komeito three, the SDPJ two, the JCP one, and an independent conservative will win the last seat.

Shikoku, the LDP on the defensive

This is the tenth installment in my general election guide. For an explanation of my purpose in making this guide, see here. For previous installments, see here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.

The Shikoku regional block includes Tokushima, Kagawa, Ehime and Kochi prefectures. Combined, they elect thirteen representatives from single-member districts and another six through proportional representation, making Shikoku the smallest block, one seat behind Hokkaido's twenty.

It is also, of course, a region in which the LDP has been historically strong and like elsewhere, a region where its grip may be weakening. The LDP won eleven of thirteen SMDs in 2005, with the DPJ and an independent postal rebel splitting the remaining two seats. The PR breakdown was three seats for the LDP, two for the DPJ, and one for Komeito. 2003 was similar, except that the LDP won twelve seats and the DPJ one. The PR results were the same in 2003 as they were in 2005.

However, one of the surprises from the 2007 upper house election was the opposition's winning all four seats in Shikoku. (Each prefecture is a single-member district in the upper house.) Indeed, for me one of the most revealing moments in the campaign was when the LDP's Tamura Kohei, fighting what was ultimately a losing campaign for reelection in Kochi, publicly questioned then-Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's "beautiful country" rhetoric, basically saying that instead of sending words, the government should send money to his constituents.

Between 2007's results in Shikoku and this recent Sankei poll that suggests that the DPJ is polling 56% in the proportional representation race in Shikoku, a ten-point increase over 2005's PR results in the block, the DPJ should at least gain some ground in Shikoku.

Tokushima

In Tokushima in 2005 the LDP and the DPJ each took one seat, with the third going to an independent.

The DPJ's Sengoku Yoshito (first district) should be easily reelected over the LDP's Okamoto Yoshiro, who lost by 14,000 votes in 2005 but won a PR seat.

The second district features LDP incumbent Yamaguchi Shunichi, who won the seat in 2005 as independent after he left the party as a postal rebel. He rejoined the LDP in 2006 along with other repentant rebels. This year he faces the DPJ's Takai Miho who has contested the seat for the DPJ in each election since 2000. In 2003 she lost by 10,000 votes and won a PR seat. She belated received a PR seat in 2005 when the DPJ candidate ranked above her was forced to resign. She should win this time around.

Finally, in the third district the LDP's Gotoda Masazumi, the great-nephew of notable former Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotoda Masaharu, has won his seat comfortably since his first election in 2000. This year he faces Niki Hirobumi, who was the DPJ candidate in 2003 and 2005. Niki received 10,000 more votes in 2005 than he received in 2003, but he still lost by more than 38,000 votes. Gotoda should win reelection.

Nevertheless, the DPJ should win two of three seats in Tokushima.

Kagawa

The LDP won all three of Kagawa's SMDs in 2005.

It is vulnerable, however, in the first district, where incumbent Hirai Takuya faces the DPJ's Ogawa Junya for the third time. Ogawa, a former internal affairs ministry official, lost by 12,000 votes in 2005 and won a PR seat. This time around Ogawa will likely win the district outright.

The DPJ is also fielding a former bureaucrat in the second district: Tamaki Yuichiro, a former budget examiner in the finance ministry, is running for the second consecutive election against the LDP's Kimura Yoshio. Kimura won by 30,000 votes in 2005, but Tamaki will make it a close race this time. Kimura is probably safe, but Tamaki should win a PR seat.

The LDP's Ono Yoshinori (third district) has won easily in the past and faces a divided field — SDPJ (and DPJ-backed) candidate Maida Haruhiko, JCP candidate Chikaishi Michiko, and independent Manabe Takeshi, son of Manabe Kenji, an LDP upper house member who voted against postal privatization and was defeated in 2007 — suggesting that Ono will win comfortably again.

The DPJ will likely win one of three seats in Kagawa, with a decent chance of winning a second.

Ehime

Ehime, the biggest prefecture in Shikoku with four SMDs, awarded them all to the LDP in 2005.

In the first district, Shiozaki Yasuhisa, chief cabinet secretary under former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, is considered one of the LDP's marked men, despite having been reelected by large margins in the past. He faces the DPJ's Nagae Takako, who for fifteen years was an announcer on Nankai Broadcasting's popular Sunday afternoon news program, dubbed a "female assassin" by the media. Despite the enthusiasm for Nagae, she still has an uphill battle. In the past three elections Shiozaki has not won by less than 50,000 votes, and the JCP, fielding candidate Tanaka Katsuhiko, could make the difference in a close race as the JCP has received more than 10,000 votes in the past three elections. Shiozaki will probably hold on to win.

The LDP is safer in the second district, where incumbent Murakami Seiichiro faces SDPJ candidate Okahira Tomoko, who should benefit from the JCP's not fielding a candidate but not enough to unseat Murakami.

In the third district the DPJ may have a chance to win the seat being vacated by a retiring Ono Shinya, a five-term Diet member. In his place the LDP is fielding prefectural assembly member Shiraishi Toru against DPJ candidate Shiraishi Yoichi (seriously: Shiraishi versus Shiraishi). Unlike in the past, the DPJ is fielding the sole opposition candidate — in 2003 Ono won by 30,000 votes, but when the DPJ candidate's 41,000 votes are combined with the nearly 12,000 votes received by the SDPJ candidate, the nearly 11,000 received by the JCP's candidate, and the 8,000 received by an independent, Ono's victory in 2003 looks less impressive. The field was not divided in 2005, but Ono obviously had help from the national tailwind enjoyed by the LDP. Shiraishi Yoichi could pick up this seat for the DPJ.

In the fourth district, five-time LDP incumbent Yamamoto Koichi, who has won by exceedingly large margins in every election since 1996, should cruise to reelection against DPJ candidate Takahashi Hideyuki, who shares the field with independent Sakurauchi Fumiki, a more serious independent candidate than most in that he has an elite pedigree: Todai law faculty, finance ministry, Master's in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School, Ph.D. from the University of Malaya, and a long list of think tank and advisory positions. He won't win, but he will make it that much harder for Takahashi to win. Sakurai has the backing of Watanabe Yoshimi's Your Party.

The DPJ will likely win one of four seats in the prefecture.

Kochi

Kochi has three seats, all of which were won by the LDP in 2005.

The DPJ stands a strong chance of winning the first district, where LDP incumbent Fukui Teru won by only 4,000 votes over the DPJ's Goto Masanori. This district is one district where the presence of a JCP candidate decided the election: the JCP's Haruna Naoaki received 22,000 votes, more than enough to throw the election to Fukui. Running in Goto's place this year is Tamura Kumiko, who was previously the DPJ's candidate in Kochi's second district. Tamura, however, shares the field with Haruna and the wild card, Hashimoto Daijiro, brother of the late Hashimoto Ryutaro and former governor of Kochi. In a straight LDP-DPJ race Tamura might have won easily, but with Haruna and Hashimoto in the race, Fukui could survive. Of course, it's possible that Hashimoto, who in July 2008 announced grand plans for a new party that have amounted to very little, will be crushed by the power of Duverger's law. Indeed, this district should provide a good test of the trend to a two-party system. If party identification matters above all else in this election, then both Hashimoto's personal popularity and the JCP's support should surmounted by a tide of support for the DPJ. I'm betting on Duverger's law: Tamura wins the seat.

In the second district, LDP incumbent Nakatani Gen, a former chief of the Japan Defense Agency, faces DPJ newcomer Kusumoto Kiyo and JCP candidate Yamanaka Masahiro. Nakatani should win easily.

Finally, six-time LDP incumbent Yamamoto Yuji (third district) should be reelected comfortably over DPJ challenger Nakayama Tomoi, running for the second time, and JCP candidate Murakami Nobuo. (Incidentally, Kochi's third district is the most overrepresented district in Japan, with 212,376 voters, whose votes are worth 2.3 times the votes of the 489,437 voters of Chiba's fourth district.)

The DPJ can pick up one seat in Kochi prefecture.

Proportional representation

Once again using the d'Hondt method simulator, Yomiuri's latest polling data, and turnout data from 2005, it is possible for the DPJ to win four of six seats, leaving the remaining two for the LDP. If the Sankei poll mentioned above is correct, it is possible for the DPJ to win five to the LDP's one, but it seems unlikely that the DPJ will score 56% of the vote.

Assuming the DPJ wins four seats in the PR voting, the DPJ can win nine seats in Shikoku, compared with ten seats for the LDP. Considering the DPJ's lack of success in Shikoku in the past, trailing the LDP by only one seat would be a victory for the DPJ.

Kinki, the metropolitan west

This is the eighth installment in my general election guide. For an explanation of my purpose in making this guide, see here. For previous installments, see here, here, here, here, here, here and here.

The Kinki regional block, which includes Shiga prefecture, Kyoto, Osaka, and Hyogo, Nara, and Wakayama prefectures, elects forty-eight representatives from single-member districts and twenty-nine more through proportional representation, for a total of seventy-seven representatives.

The third major metropolitan area along with the Tokyo and Nagoya areas, it is another area where the DPJ can expect to make major gains over its 2005 returns. In 2005 the LDP-Komeito and the opposition parties were nearly even in PR voting: the government parties won fifteen, the opposition parties fourteen, with the LDP's winning eleven to the DPJ's nine. But the DPJ did poorly in SMDs, winning only eight of the forty-eight SMDs. In 2003, however, the DPJ won twenty SMDs to the LDP's nineteen, and in the PR voting the balance was fifteen to fourteen in favor of the opposition parties.

Shiga

The DPJ is in a position to win at least three of Shiga's four seats — and stands a strong chance in the fourth.

The DPJ's candidate in the first district, Kawabata Tatsuo, is a DPJ vice president and has been elected to the Diet seven times. He was forced to settle for a PR seat in 2005, losing to LDP incumbent Ueno Kenichiro, but should easily retake the seat this year. The DPJ's Tajima Issei (second district) won in 2003 and in 2005, and should defeat the LDP's Fujii Yuji for the second consecutive election. In the third district, DPJ incumbent Mikazuki Taizo, who first won the seat in 2003, was reelected by fewer than 300 votes over LDP candidate Uno Osamu. Mikazuki should have an easier time in this year's rematch.

The fourth district, created in the 2002 redistricting, has been won by the LDP's Iwanaga Mineichi in both elections since its creation. Iwanaga, however, has retired, meaning that Omura Tenzo, the DPJ candidate he defeated in 2003 and 2005 (by only 5,000 votes in 2003), stands a strong chance of defeating LDP newcomer Muto Takaya, a former policy staffer for the LDP's caucus in the Shiga prefectural assembly. In the past the JCP vote has roughly equaled or exceeded Iwanaga's margin of victory, but while the JCP is fielding a candidate, Omura should win comfortably.

Kyoto

Kyoto, with six districts, has been split between the LDP and the DPJ in the past two elections.

Former DPJ leader Maehara Seiji (second district), Izumi Kenta (third district), and Yamanoi Kazunori (sixth district) should all be reelected easily. (Maehara will face SDPJ candidate Fujita Takakage in addition to JCP candidate Hara Toshifumi, but given Maehara's "neo-conservatism," Fujita probably hurts Hara more than he hurts Maehara.)

One factor that will determine whether the DPJ can pick up more seats in Kyoto is the JCP, which has done extraordinarily well in Kyoto in the past.

In the first district, LDP incumbent Ibuki Bunmei, education minister the Abe cabinet and LDP secretary-general and finance minister (briefly) under Fukuda Yasuo, may win reelection largely by dint of the JCP's running Kokuta Keiji, its Diet strategy chairman, in the district. In 2000, Kokuta received 68,000 votes, with the DPJ candidate's finishing a distant third. In 2003 his vote total fell to 50,000 votes, resulting in a third-place finish, but more than enough votes to throw the election to Ibuki. The 2005 was similar to 2003, except that unlike in 2003 only Kokuta received a PR seat — DPJ candidate Tamaki Kazuya did not. This year's outcome should resemble 2003's, with new DPJ candidate Taira Tomoyuki's finishing second to Ibuki and Kokuta's finishing third, both with enough votes to win PR seats.

In the fourth district, which until 2003 was represented by the LDP's Nonaka Hiromu, the race features three of four candidates from 2005: LDP incumbent Nakagawa Yasuhiro, DPJ candidate Kitagami Keiro, and independent (LDP postal rebel) Tanaka Hideo. The JCP is fielding candidate Yoshida Koichi. Kitagami will likely win this time around: he was 3,000 votes behind Nakagawa and won a PR seat in 2005, while Tanaka finished roughly 160 votes behind Nakagawa. Kitagami will presumably win by drawing votes away from the other three candidates.

The LDP should be safe in the fifth district, where incumbent Tanigaki Sadakazu, who has won by large margins since 1996, faces a new DPJ challenger, Ohara Mai, and the same JCP challenger, Yoshida Sayumi, from the past two elections. Until 2005, no DPJ candidate had exceeded 40,000 votes — and while the DPJ received 49,000 votes in 2005, that was still almost 60,000 less than Tanigaki's votes.

The DPJ should win four of six seats in Kyoto.

Osaka

Osaka, the biggest jurisdiction in the block, sends nineteen representatives to the Diet. In 2005, the LDP won thirteen, Komeito won four — and the DPJ won only two seats, a marked change from 2003 when the DPJ won nine, the LDP six, and Komeito four. In other words, there are seven seats that the DPJ won in 2003 and should be able to win again. The DPJ should also be helped by the support of Osaka governor Hashimoto Toru.

Hirano Hirofumi (eleventh district) and Nagayasu Takashi (nineteenth district), the DPJ's incumbents from 2005, should win reelection comfortably.

In the fourth district, the DPJ's Yoshida Osamu will try to retake the seat he won in 2003 from the LDP's Nakayama Yasuhide. Yoshida, who has been elected to the Diet three times, bested Nakayama, the son of former Diet member Nakayama Masaaki, the nephew of former foreign minister Nakayama Taro, and the grandson of Nakayama Masa, Japan's first female cabinet minister, in 2003, although Nakayama won a PR seat. While the JCP has won at least 25,000 votes in the past two elections, Yoshida should be able to take the seat back from Nakayama.

In the seventh district, LDP incumbent Toshiaki Naomi will try to defend her seat from the DPJ's Fujimura Osamu, who represented the district first as a New Frontier member in 1996 and as a DPJ member in 2000 and 2003. Fujimura will win comfortably.

Similarly, the DPJ's candidate in the eighth district, Nakano Kansei, first won the district in 1996 under the NFP banner and then again in 2000 and 2003 as a DPJ candidate. The LDP's Otsuka Takashi will likely go down to defeat.

Otani Nobumori, the DPJ's candidate in the ninth district, won the seat in 2000 and 2003 before losing in 2005 to Nishida Takeshi, the LDP member he defeated in 2000. However, Nishida died in 2006, prompting a by-election that was the first following the transition from Koizumi to Abe. Harada Kenji, the son of a former LDP cabinet minister, won the by-election, with help no doubt from Abe's popularity. Otani should win easily.

Tarutoko Jinji, the DPJ's candidate in the twelfth district, first won the seat in 1996 as an NFP candidate, and was reelected in 2000 and 2003 as a DPJ candidate. His victory in 2003 was narrow — fewer than 1000 votes — over LDP candidate Kitagawa Tomokatsu, who won the district in 2005 by nearly 30,000 votes. Tarutoko should win the seat back for the DPJ.

In the seventeenth district, the DPJ will be fielding Tsuji Megumu, who ran losing campaigns in the third district in 2003 and 2005 (although he won a PR seat in 2003), against LDP incumbent Okashita Nobuko, who in 2005 defeated the now notorious DPJ incumbent Nishimura Shingo. Nishimura, an outspoken conservative, won a PR seat in 2005, was arrested in 2005 on suspicion of having violated the Lawyers Law, fell into depression in 2008 when his son fell to his death from his apartment, and left the DPJ later that year to join the Reform Club, a minor party. Nishimura is running for the seat again, but given what has transpired since 2005, it is unlikely that Nishimura will be a factor in the race. Tsuji should win this year.

In the tenth district, the Social Democratic Party of Japan is fielding the primary opposition candidate, Tsujimoto Kiyomi, against LDP incumbent Matsunami Kenta. In 2005 the SDPJ fielded Tsujimoto while the DPJ fielded the incumbent Hida Miyoko, resulting in Matsunami's winning, as the two opposition candidates combined for more than 120,000 votes to Matsunami's 83,000 votes. With the DPJ's backing Tsujimoto — who finished second and won a PR seat in 2005 — the SDPJ should pick up this seat.

The LDP is strong in four districts. Chuma Koki (first district) will face DPJ candidate Kumada Atsushi for the third straight election — Kumada has never come close enough to win even a PR seat. In the thirteenth district, LDP incumbent Nishino Akira, who first won the district in 1996 as an NFP candidate before winning it in 2003 and 2005 as the LDP candidate, faces the opposition-backed PNP candidate Shiraishi Junko. Nishino will presumably hold his seat, helped by the JCP's running Yoshii Hidekatsu, who has been reelected six times and in 2005 received 41,000 votes. He was won PR seats in the district in the past three elections, finishing second in 2000. Tanihata Takashi (fourteenth district) and Takemoto Naokazu (fifteenth district) should be easily reelected as well.

The LDP is vulnerable in the eighteenth district. The incumbent Nakayama Taro is, at eighty-four, the oldest Diet member and the only one to have been born during the Taisho period. Nakayama faces Nakagawa Osamu, who lost by fewer than 20,000 votes in 2003 and won a PR seat before losing by a sizable margin in 2005. Nakayama has been forced to campaign hard this year, and may be defeated by Nakagawa.

Komeito has strong incumbents in Tabata Masahiko (third district) and Fukushima Yutaka (sixth district). Its incumbents in the fifth district, Taniguchi Takayoshi, and the sixteenth district, Komeito secretary-general Kitagawa Kazuo, are more vulnerable. In the fifth, Taniguchi faces Inami Tetsuo, who lost by 7,000 votes in 2003. For Inami to win, he will have to cut into the JCP vote, 43,000 votes in 2005, 37,000 votes in 2003, both times enough to make a difference in the election. Opposing Kitagawa is Moriyama Hiroyuki, a former Osaka assemblyman running for higher office for the first time. Moriyama could upset the Komeito heavyweight, as Tarui Yoshikazu, the DPJ's candidate in 2003 and 2005 lost by only 11,000 votes in 2003 and won a PR seat.

Finally, Osaka's second district is a tossup. In a rematch of the 2005 election, LDP incumbent Kawajo Shika will face Hagihara Hitoshi, the DPJ candidate who finished third in 2005, and postal rebel independent Sato Akira. Kawajo narrowly bested Sato, winning by roughly 2,000 votes, while Hagihara finished a distant third with just over 50,000 votes. The DPJ has never done particularly well in this district, so it may once again be a battle between Kawajo and Sato. Kawajo may have the upper hand.

In Osaka, the DPJ will likely win eleven seats, the LDP five, Komeito two, and the SDPJ one.

Hyogo

The LDP and Komeito swept Hyogo's twelve districts in 2005, with the LDP's taking ten and Komeito's winning the last two. The balance between government and opposition was nine and three in 2003.

LDP incumbents Inoue Kichi (fourth district) and Nishimura Yasutoshi (ninth district) are likely safe.

Meanwhile it is possible for the DPJ to win nine seats in Hyogo.

In the first district, the DPJ lost in 2005, but its candidate lost by less than 1,000 votes in 2003. Its candidate this year, Ido Masae, is a former prefectural assemblywoman, making her a politically experienced candidate who enjoys the support of DPJ heavyweights. She should defeat LDP incumbent Moriyama Masahito, who won for the first time in 2005.

In the second district, Komeito's Akaba Kazuyoshi faces DPJ challenger Mukoyama Koichi, a former Kobe city assemblyman. Akaba won by more than 20,000 votes in 2005, but in 2003, he defeated the DPJ's Izumi Fusaho by little over 3,000 votes. Mukoyama should defeat Akaba this year.

Seki Yoshihiro, the LDP's incumbent in the third district, defeated the DPJ's Doi Ryuichi by around 5,000 votes in 2005. Doi, first elected to the district in 1996 from the Democratic Reform Party and from the DPJ in 2000 and 2003, should regain the seat this year.

In the fifth district, LDP incumbent Tani Koichi faces the DPJ's Kajiwara Yasuhiko for the third straight election. Kajiwara lost by 4,000 votes in 2003 and won a PR seat, but lost by nearly 30,000 votes in 2005. Kajiwara should be helped by the absence of independent candidate Himura Toyohiko, whose 36,000 votes in 2005 were more than Tani's margin of victory.

The DPJ candidate in the sixth district, Ichimura Koichiro, won the district in 2003 but finished 10,000 votes behind LDP incumbent Kobiki Tsukasa in 2005, winning a PR seat instead. Ichimura should win the seat this year.

In the tenth district, LDP incumbent Tokai Kisaburo defeated his DPJ challenger Okada Yasuhiro by roughly 20,000 votes in 2003 and 2005. The absence of a JCP candidate this year — JCP candidates received 15,000 and 16,000 votes in 2003 and 2005 respectively — could make the difference in a DPJ victory.

The DPJ candidate in the eleventh district, Matsumoto Takeaki, won the seat in 2000 over the current LDP incumbent Toida Toru. Matsumoto won again in 2003 over Toida but lost to him by fewer than 3,000 votes in 2005. He should retake the seat this time.

In the twelfth district, the DPJ's Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi faces LDP incumbent Komoto Saburo for the fifth time. Yamaguchi has won all but once, in 2000, when Komoto won as an independent. Yamaguchi lost by 5,000 votes in 2003, and in 2005, running as a DPJ candidate for the first time, he finished within 10,000 votes of Komoto and won a PR seat. He should win this time.

Oomae Shigeo (seventh district) faced a split field in 2005, with the DPJ and SDPJ candidates combining for 120,000 votes to Oomae's 145,000. In 2003, the SDPJ's Doi Takako finished roughly 15,000 votes behind Oomae and won a PR seat. With Ishi Toshiro, the DPJ candidate from 2005, as the unified opposition candidate, the DPJ should at least make the election close, although Oomae will likely win.

Finally, in the eighth district Komeito's Fuyushiba Tetsuzo may profit from a divided field: New Party Japan leader Tanaka Yasuo will be contesting the seat, as well SDPJ candidate Ichiki Banko. The SDPJ ran candidates in the district against DPJ candidates in 2003 and 2005, and while they received even fewer votes than JCP candidates, they affected the race — especially in 2003, when the SDPJ's Kitagawa Renko received votes greater than the difference between Fuyushiba and DPJ candidate Muroi Kunihiko.

The DPJ should win at least eight seats in Hyogo, while the LDP will likely win three seats and Komeito one.

Nara

The LDP took three of four seats in Nara in 2005, while the LDP and DPJ split the four in 2003.

The DPJ's Mabuchi Sumio (first district) should win his seat for the third time.

In the second district, LDP incumbent Takaichi Sanae, who had previously served three terms in the Diet 1993-2000, defeated postal rebel Taki Makoto, who in 2005 ran as a NPJ candidate and won a PR seat despite receiving fewer than 30,000 votes, compared with the DPJ's Nakamura Tetsuji, who received more than 70,000 votes. Nakamura had in fact narrowly defeated Taki in 2003, forcing him to settle for a PR seat. This time, however, Taki will be running as the DPJ candidate against Takaichi. Based on the party's performance in the past, the DPJ should be able to pick up the seat — based on declining support for Taki, however, Takaichi could win reelection.

The third district features a rematch between LDP incumbent Okuno Shinsuke and DPJ challenger and former Nara prefectural assemblyman Yoshikawa Masashige. The DPJ lost by 25,000 votes in 2003 and 30,000 in 2005. Okuno should be reelected.

The LDP's Tanose Ryotaro (fourth district) has won the district comfortably, although his margin of victory did fall from 60,000 to 30,000 votes from 2003 to 2005. The DPJ candidate this year is Oonishi Takanori, a former DPJ headquarters staffer and secretary to current upper house member and former lower house member Maeda Takeshi. Oonishi will make it a closer fight, but Tanose should be reelected.

The result? The LDP and DPJ split the prefecture's four seats again.

Wakayama

Wakayama, with three seats, has given all three to the LDP in 2003 and 2005 (technically two to the LDP and one to the Conservative Party in 2003, which soon became an LDP seat). A DPJ candidate has never won an SMD in Wakayama, although NFP candidates won in the past.

In the first district, in 2005 LDP incumbent Tanimoto Tatsuya defeated DPJ challenger Kishimoto Shuhei, a former finance ministry official by 22,000 votes. Kishimoto may be able to upset Tanimoto, who like most LDP incumbents is struggling against the mood in the DPJ's favor.

Ishida Masatoshi, the LDP's incumbent in the second district, has won comfortably in the past, and faces a new DPJ challenger, Sakaguchi Naoto, a prefectural party official. The JCP will not be fielding a candidate in the district, but Ishida should still win reelection.

Finally, against Nikai Toshihiro, METI minister in the Aso cabinet, who has won reelection by enormous margins in the past, the DPJ is running former Wakayama assemblyman Tamaki Kimiyoshi. Nikai has to campaign this time, but he should still win reelection.

The DPJ's best chance to win a seat in the prefecture is the first district, where Kishimoto should be able to close the gap.

Proportional representation

Once again using the d'Hondt method simulator, Yomiuri's latest polling data, and turnout data from 2005, it is possible for the DPJ to win seventeen seats, the LDP nine, and one each for Komeito, the JCP, and the SDPJ. (The distribution of seats among smaller parties is probably not accurate: with the NPJ's Tanaka Yasuo running simultaneously in Hyogo-8 and Kinki PR, the NPJ could pick up one seat. Also, given the JCP's strength in the Kinki block, the JCP will likely do better than one seat.)

Between SMDs and PR seats, the DPJ could win forty-six seats, the LDP twenty-four seats, Komeito four, the SDPJ two, and the JCP one. Forty-six seats would be a major improvement over 2005, of course, but it would also be a fifteen-seat improvement over 2003.