Bowling against democracy

When not bowling together, former prime ministers Koizumi Junichiro and Mori Yoshiro apparently spend their time scheming against Japanese democracy.

Both have signed on as advisers — along with Abe Shinzo, another former prime minister from the Machimura faction — to a new LDP study group called the "Diet members league to integrate both houses of the Diet and establish a new unicameral 'People's Diet.'"

I have to concur with Yamauchi Koichi, an LDP HR member representing Kanagawa-9: this is an extremely radical group.

The league, founded by Eto Seishiro, Ota Seiichi, and other LDP Diet members, argues that if Japan were to implement a unicameral system, it would be in line with the majority of the world's countries, nearly three quarters of which have unicameral legislatures. Mr. Yamauchi retorts by noting that no member of the G7 has a unicameral system.

Mr. Yamauchi goes on to describe this proposal as "possibly giving an unfair impression" since it is being introduced after the opposition took control of the House of Councillors. I would say that "unfair" is a woeful understatement. How about anti-democratic? This desire to undermine the DPJ's control of the upper house appears to be all too common in the LDP (and Komeito), especially among senior members of both parties. Faced with its first institutional check on its power, the LDP's response has been to complain about how "useless" the HC is, how irresponsible the DPJ is, and how important it is for the LDP to be able to do whatever it feels necessary to save Japan, despite the voters having decided last year that they're not particularly pleased with the job the LDP has done to this point. Some LDP members, including the current prime minister, have taken the opposition of the public to heart and talk of the need to listen to the people; others, however, including the members of this new league, have decided that it is not the LDP but the system that's broken.

I've said it before and I'll say it again: before any specific economic or social reforms, what Japan needs is transparency and accountability in its political system, mechanisms for checking the power of the government and monitoring its policy execution. DPJ control of the upper house is a great experiment in checks and balances.

The league's proposal is not a particularly realistic one, as it would require a constitutional amendment, which would require approval of the upper house, which would in all likelihood not vote itself out of existence. (The head of the LDP's HC caucus has already voiced his opposition to this idea.)

The significance of this league is in what it says about attitudes within the LDP towards increased political competition. Some LDP members claim to want a "two big-party system" but I cannot help but wonder whether what they really want is just another one-and-a-half party system in which the opposition provides democratic window-dressing for an LDP that does whatever it wants — all in the name of "the people," of course.

Speaking of democracy

Addressing the DPJ's rejection of the nomination of Watanabe Hiroshi to be deputy governor of the Bank of Japan at a press conference Wednesday, Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura Nobutaka commented upon the internal dynamics of the DPJ. He said, "Although a majority of the DPJ's investigatory subcommittee on joint personnel decisions approved the nomination, I want to say that there is no democracy within the party. This is truly a complicated and mysterious party."

Yes, Mr. Machimura, chief cabinet secretary of the LDP-led coalition government and titular head of the LDP's largest faction, is questioning the democratic bona fides of the DPJ.

How does one even begin describing how inappropriate it is for Mr. Machimura to comment upon the lack of democracy in the DPJ? One could start with last September's LDP presidential election and go from there, but I'm not going to do that, because since when did political parties have to make internal decisions democratically?

No, Mr. Machimura's comments are particularly galling because of the current government's attitudes about democracy in the political system at large. In the same press conference, Mr. Machimura noted that the LDP and Komeito are considering revising the law governing the Bank of Japan, enabling HR decisions on the Bank's leaders take precedence.

On Wednesday, the LDP-Komeito "investigatory committee concerning the way joint personnel decisions ought to be" held its first meeting to look into changing the BOJ law so that the bank's succession is never again challenged by the HC.

This is typical of how the LDP has viewed DPJ control of the HC. If the DPJ can't be made to shut up and do what the government tells it to do, then it and the HC should be circumvented and ignored. If the DPJ uses the powers accorded to the HC, then remove those powers bit by bit, all while claiming to be acting in the name of the national interest, to be putting country before party, to be desirous of compromise.

I hope the DPJ loudly opposes this move, not because of its immediate significance but because of its symbolic importance. The DPJ's control of the HC is an important moment for Japanese democracy, certainly more important than the question of whether Mr. Shirakawa or Mr. Muto was named governor of the BOJ.

Democracy is a process by which those out of power can keep those in power honest and accountable. It may not always result in good policymaking, but when it works properly it enables the outs to challenge the sagacity, the morality, and the competence of the government over the course of making and executing policy.

With the DPJ in control of the HC, an opposition party is finally in a position to question the government and hold up policy when it feels that the government is lacking on one or all of the above-mentioned counts.

Ozawa Ichiro replied in this manner to Fukuda Yasuo, who criticized the DPJ for "misusing its power" (as if the LDP is the arbiter for the proper use of power). He said, "The government has a majority in only one of two houses. The government has not reflected sufficiently on the kind of situation that arose from last summer's election."

As Mr. Machimura's and Mr. Fukuda's comments and the governing parties' actions show, the LDP and the Komeito haven't made their peace with the conditions of Japan's evolving democracy.

The Machimura faction tries to untwist the Diet

The Machimura faction, which just gained a new member to solidify its position as the LDP's largest, has delivered a proposal to Prime Minister Fukuda that calls for the drafting of new rules for Diet management in light of the divided Diet. The proposal, according to Asahi, points to a "structural deficiency in the constitution," in that it mandates different methods for dealing with the budget and budget-related bills. As such, it demands that Mr. Fukuda push through rules that provide for the passage of the budget and budget-related bills at approximately the same time.

As usual for LDP and conservative complaints about the post-July political situation, the proposal bemoans how the divided Diet makes it difficult to address Japan's national interests, in this case fixing the country's abysmal fiscal situation. (No mention, of course, as to how that situation came about in the first place.)

May I make the modest proposal that perhaps more democracy is in Japan's national interest, no matter what the impact on public policy (and no matter how insufferable Mr. Ozawa and the DPJ can be at times)?

The rule changes demanded by the Machimura faction are nothing short of anti-democratic, in that they would limit the HC's ability to exercise its constitutional duty to act on a certain type of legislation. The Japanese people voted last year to give control of the House of Councillors to different parties than that controlling the House of Representatives. Just because it has made governing more difficult does not give the LDP the right to manipulate the political process to reverse the consequences of the election.

Fortunately Mr. Fukuda disagrees with the opinion of his faction. He replied by emphasizing that he intends to "take every opportunity to appeal to the opposition parties" for cooperation. And so it should be: as we learned this month, the government and opposition are perfectly capable of cooperating on legislation, despite the media-driven impression of gridlock. The constitution mandated roles for each house, and the LDP should not opportunistically undermine one house just because it's now become a hindrance to LDP rule.

(Incidentally, this is why Japan needs regular alternation of ruling parties: a ruling party aware that it could easily end up in the opposition would perhaps be less blithe about proposing rule changes to handicap the opposition.)

Damn the DPJ, full speed ahead!

The Fukuda Cabinet has announced a schedule for the passage of a new law enabling the MSDF's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. A final cabinet decision will be made on October 17th, following the conclusion of deliberations in the Upper House Budget committee, and the new bill will be introduced for deliberation to the Lower House's special anti-terror committee on October 19th, with the bill expected to pass the whole house on October 26th.

Barring some kind of last-minute DPJ surrender, it looks like the sixty-day countdown to automatic passage will begin on the 26th, meaning that the MSDF will have to return to Japan — or leave the area of operations — for close to two months, unless the DPJ decides not to use up the full sixty days and act quickly to reject the bill.

There is some question as to whether the government will balk at re-passing the bill in the House of Representatives over Upper House rejection. Yamasaki Taku, who has been the party's voice of reason on this issue from the moment it became clear that a new law would be needed, has once again expressed his concerns about the government's forcibly passing the law. He suggested that using the supermajority to override the Upper House could result in an Upper House censure motion against Prime Minister Fukuda, forcing a snap election.

But I wonder whether an Upper House censure motion would be as devastating as anticipated by Mr. Yamasaki. The Japanese Wikipedia entry on censure motions shows only one motion passing, forcing the resignation of Nukaga Fukushiro as JDA chief back in 1998. There is not much precedent to work from when it comes to reacting to a successful censure motion. After all, unlike Lower House no-confidence motions, censure motions are non-binding. The government is not obligated to do anything — it would all depend on the public's response to both the LDP's use of its supermajority to pass the law over the Upper House's rejection and the DPJ's responding with a censure motion. Presumably with public support, Mr. Fukuda would be able to ignore a censure motion without fear of consequence. But it's all part of figuring out the rules of the game for divided government.

Meanwhile, it's not clear what role the DPJ will play in this drama, aside from opposing the government's plans. Mr. Ozawa is already backtracking on his stated desire to see JSDF troops contributing to ISAF, suggesting that he will work within the DPJ to draw up a prudent plan and stating that stabilizing the livelihoods of the Afghan people is most important. Mainichi suggests that Mr. Ozawa's gyrations have muddied his party's stance and diminished the DPJ's ability to challenge the government, and demands that the DPJ both question how long the government intends to keep the MSDF at work on refueling and formulate alternate plans for participating in the war on terrorism. Maehara Seiji admitted on Wednesday that there is some fatigue with Mr. Ozawa, in no small measures due to the party's differing factions; members from before the DPJ's merger with Ozawa's Liberal Party are at odds, he says, with members who accompanied Mr. Ozawa.

The DPJ may also have lost the momentum with which to challenge the government on reports that US warships used Japanese fuel in Operation Iraqi Freedom, with the Pentagon nixing the suggestion by reporting that the 675,000 gallons of fuel received by the USS Kitty Hawk from the MSDF supply ship Tokiwa via the USS Pecos was used within three days in late February for maritime interdiction activities before moving to the Persian Gulf to participate in Operation Southern Watch. Defense Minister Ishiba reiterated the Pentagon's explanation in his sparring with Kan Naoto in Budget committee deliberations, and barring any new revelations — by no means impossible — the government may be in the clear on this issue, not least because public opinion continues to trend the government's way.

With the new law ready to be sent to the Upper House by month's end, the DPJ better know exactly how it intends to respond. It is in the midst of a sustained war over public opinion, for which it appears wholly unprepared. In this second Kaku-Fuku war, the DPJ (the "Kaku" team) has thus far been about as overwhelmed by the unassuming Fukuda fils as my beloved Chicago Cubs were by the unassuming Arizona Diamondbacks last week.

Catch-22 for the DPJ

Jun Okumura comments on an Asahi article — available here — that discusses former Prime Minister Koizumi's speech to a meeting of the Machimura faction, in which he described the DPJ as being akin to the LDP anti-mainstream. Now, this might strike some as a strange, but it's actually an apt description for the current political situation, especially since the LDP has largely united behind Mr. Fukuda, leaving an opening for an anti-mainstream group.

Winning the Upper House election might have been the worst thing to happen to the DPJ, because now the party is trapped between the demands of being an opposition party — doing whatever possible to hinder the government and raising the rhetoric to sharpen the differences between government and opposition — and the responsibilities inherent in controlling one of the chambers of the Diet. The latter problem is compounded by the weakness of the Upper House, which means that the DPJ can't use its majority to pass legislation without cooperating with the LDP, even while the LDP possesses the trump card of its Lower House supermajority, enabling it to outmaneuver the DPJ when necessary.

With Mr. Abe in the Kantei, an aggressive DPJ strategy that abjured from cooperation in the hopes of forcing an early election might have worked, exacerbating internal disagreements within the LDP and perhaps sparking a rebellion reminiscent of the Kato insurrection (only this time successful). But the same strategy will not work facing the wily Mr. Fukuda, not least because the less likely a snap election seems, the more the DPJ will be expected to use its Upper House strength constructively. Indeed, the more confrontational the DPJ is, the easier it may be for the LDP to use its supermajority to override the Upper House without fear of public backlash (and thus put off a general election until September 2009).

What should Mr. Ozawa and the DPJ do? They might have no choice but to act like the LDP anti-mainstream — act as part of the government, but hold those with power responsible for their mistakes and use the power that they do have from controlling the Upper House to shape the agenda as much as possible and extract concessions from Mr. Fukuda, who apparently is willing to give them up.

Perhaps this arrangement will fall into place following the battle of the MSDF mission, but one way or another the DPJ has to stop hoping for an early election and actually beginning meeting Mr. Fukuda's flexibility and nuance with flexibility and nuance of their own.

(I have developed this idea at greater length in an article in the forthcoming November/December issue of J@pan Inc.)