Can the DPJ legislate a new relationship with the bureaucracy?

On Tuesday, the House of Representatives began debate on the Hatoyama cabinet's bill revising the National Civil Service Law, the first of three cabinet bills intended to introduce political leadership to be considered in the Diet (the others being bills establishing the national strategy bureau and increasing the number of sub-cabinet political appointees).

If passed, the revision will, among other things, introduce a Cabinet Personnel Bureau (CPB) attached to the Cabinet Secretariat. The cabinet will be able to control the promotion of senior civil servants — administrative vice ministers, division chiefs, and section chiefs — with the cabinet selecting senior bureaucrats from a list with an eye towards not just ability but also the willingness to perform, as suggested by Sengoku Yoshito, Hatoyama's administrative reform czar in an interview in Asahi's Globe section. The expectation seems to be that the government would move senior officials laterally, away from their "home" ministries, in the hope of overcoming compartmentalized administration. When asked whether appeals to expertise could render the revision a dead letter, Sengoku questioned whether the Kasumigaseki's level of expertise is as high as assumed, although when pressed he suggested that perhaps the Finance Ministry's budget bureau will enjoy a certain degree of insulation. Another reform included in the bill would enable the CPB to demote officials.

Looking over this plan — which shares certain features with plans for a basic law produced under by the LDP, and which has in fact been criticized by the LDP and YP leader Watanabe Yoshimi for being weaker than the Aso government's plan — it is unclear to me what exactly the government hopes to achieve. Sengoku stresses the importance of overcoming compartmentalization. This plan may be effective to this end, but I wonder whether it raises other problems in its place.

Under the Thatcher government, the British civil service faced a prime minister who intervened aggressively in civil service personnel administration, which had perverse consequences for the civil service. Traditionally, the job of British civil servants was to provide advice and options for ministers as they went about implementing the cabinet's program as outlined in the party's manifesto. Bureaucrats would push back against ministers, they would do their best to dissuade ministers from making poor choices, but ultimately they served political leaders as a matter of professional duty. Under Margaret Thatcher, bureaucrats became more circumspect about the advice they dispensed to political leaders as prospects for promotion became linked to sticking with the government's program, and were more inclined to tell ministers what they wanted to hear instead of offering frank advice. In other words, security in office for civil servants was linked to the quality of service that they provided political leaders. Colin Campbell and Graham Wilson consider the changes that occurred under the Thatcher government to have been so consequential as to have marked the "end of Whitehall."

Accordingly, it is unclear from this legislation how the government intends to ensure that the bureaucracy will provide quality guidance to the government when the bureaucrats will have incentives to please political leaders.

I understand why the Hatoyama government feels obligated to enshrine reform in law, as it gives the government's reform agenda a symbolic permanence that it otherwise lacks. And it it is understandable why in the near term the Hatoyama government wants to be able to control senior-level personnel appointments. It needs to sever whatever links remain between the bureaucracy and the ancien regime. Under LDP rule, after all, the LDP and the bureaucracy developed a symbiotic relationship, in which the party preserved the prerogatives of the bureaucracy while the bureaucracy served as a policymaking staff for the party and cooperated with LDP backbenchers' desires to direct national resources to particularistic ends. To build a new system that DPJ needs to be able to forestall sabotage, shirking, or foot dragging on the part of the bureaucracy.

But I would argue that the most effective reforms to the policymaking process have been those that have limited interaction between bureaucrats and backbenchers, and intra-party reforms that have sharply limited the ability of backbenchers to participate in policymaking. Without being able to play backbenchers off against the cabinet, bureaucrats have already had to accommodate DPJ rule to an extent that few expected.

As for the goal of building a politically neutral civil service that dutifully serves the government of the day, perhaps the only way to build such a civil service is regular changes in ruling party. The British civil service has been described as "politically promiscuous," willing to serve any government even when successive governments have contradictory aims.  If there is not regular alternation in power, the bureaucracy will wind up simply shifting its loyalties to the new long-term ruling party, bending to the interests of the ruling party instead of dispensing guidance with an eye towards national and public interests.

In short, the process of building a new policymaking system will require at least as much change in the minds of actors in the system as change in formal institutions, if not more. As the DPJ comes to see the bureaucracy not as a hostile remnant of the ancien regime but as the source of expert advice, as the bureaucrats come to recognize the legitimacy of a government in power on the basis of a public mandate for its electoral program and come to recognize that there is a realistic chance of a different party with a different program taking power, the system will change to something approximating top-down political leadership. The new system will not come about through bullying the bureaucracy — except perhaps in very rare instances — but through the bureaucracy's recognizing the role it has to play in the new system, and the DPJ's (and whatever ruling party succeeds it) recognizing that no advanced industrial democracy functions without an effective civil service.

The Hatoyama system takes shape

The coalition with the SDPJ and the PNP cemented, the DPJ is getting to work filling in the rest of the cabinet.

One question is what posts the SDPJ's Fukushima Mizuho and PNP's Kamei Shizuka will fill. The SDPJ has requested either the ministry of health, labor, and welfare or, it seems, the environment portfolio. Despite an earlier report that suggested Kamei would enter the cabinet as a minister without portfolio, it seems that the PNP now wants the ministry of internal affairs and communications, not surprisingly given that the PNP's issue is reversing postal privatization. It is unlikely that the DPJ will give the post to Kamei.

Hatoyama Yukio has set 15 September, the day before the Diet will elect the new prime minister, as the target for finalizing cabinet appointments. Nothing, it seems, will be decided before then.

But the names of likely cabinet ministers are emerging. In addition to Fukushima and Kamei — and before them Okada Katsuya, Hirano Hirofumi, Fujii Hirohisa, and Kan Naoto — DPJ members under consideration are Nagatsuma Akira ("Mr. Nenkin"), Maehara Seiji, Sengoku Yoshito, and Naoshima Masayuki. Maehara, despite (or because of) his reputation as a hawkish defense specialist, is rumored to be under consideration for the ministry of land, infrastructure, transport, and tourism. Sengoku is being considered for the justice and health, labor, and welfare, while Naoshima, currently the DPJ's policy affairs research council chairman, may end up as the METI minister.

That leaves at least seven more names to be included in the new cabinet, which could be more depending on how many "special mission" posts the Hatoyama cabinet decides to create.

What seems clear, however, is that with Maehara and Sengoku likely to receive important posts in the cabinet, it will be difficult to speak of the Hatoyama cabinet as an "Ohato" cabinet. It is possible that Ozawa's favorites could fill out the remainder of the cabinet, but with Sengoku and Maehara — Sengoku was close to running against Ozawa last year, and both were against Ozawa's continuing as party leader as the Nishimatsu scandal unfolded — in the cabinet, the idea that Hatoyama's cabinet will simply be under Ozawa's thumb is unlikely.

Indeed, it is possible that the DPJ has solved its Ozawa dilemma. Ozawa will still wield tremendous power, but his power will be more directed at the party's now numerous backbenchers. He could use those backbenchers against the cabinet, but that assumes that their loyalty to Ozawa is so strong as to lead them to rebel against their party's leadership in cabinet. I will believe in the existence of an Ozawa faction when I see some evidence for it beyond speculation rooted in Ozawa's past as a lieutenant of Tanaka Kakuei linked to his work on behalf of DPJ candidates across Japan.

Walter Bagehot provides an appropriate metaphor for thinking about Ozawa's role in the new government: "A cabinet is a combining committee, — a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens, the legislative part of the state to the executive part of the state. In its origin it belongs to the one, in its functions it belongs to the other." In the case of the Hatoyama government, Ozawa will be the hyphen that joins the DPJ-led cabinet to the DPJ's parliamentary majority. His voice will carry weight — I have a hard time seeing him stay completely quiet on policy affairs — but his influence on policymaking may be less than feared.

Indeed, in this role Ozawa could be indispensable to moving Japan away from LDP's cumbersome policymaking process into an era in which politicians in cabinet are capable of making decisions, enacting policies, and leading. Ozawa has long lamented the role that bureaucrats (and the United States) have played in limiting the ability of Japan's political leaders to direct the country. The question now is whether Ozawa can accept other political leaders' directing the country. With enough Ozawa skeptics in the cabinet, he may have no choice but to accept their lead.

Maehara backs down?

The DPJ is increasingly focused on its forthcoming leadership election, the date of which has been set for 21 September, with the campaign's official start set for two weeks prior.

The DPJ's anti-Ozawa groups have still not agreed upon a candidate to stand against Ozawa Ichiro, while Hatoyama Yukio and Kan Naoto have both expressed their support for Mr. Ozawa. Mr. Ozawa, reports Asahi, will likely go into the campaign with a majority of the parliamentary party behind him. The groups (factions) of Messrs. Hatoyama and Kan, as well as the left-wing Yokomichi group have pledged their support for Mr. Ozawa. The Isshin-kai, an Ozawa-sponsored group for DPJ members who have been elected fewer than three times, is also expected to support Mr. Ozawa, as are a number of the party's endorsed candidates for the next general election (who get a vote in the leadership election). Mr. Ozawa's support among the party's prefectural chapters is also overwhelming.

In the midst of this gathering Ozawa landslide, Maehara Seiji has softened his critique of the party's policies. Speaking Wednesday at a symposium with Yosano Kaoru, a possibile post-Fukuda LDP president, Mr. Maehara stated, "I don't reject the party's thinking, but the manifesto must be made better." He suggested that the points of contention in the party leadership election should be (1) the form and manner of decentralization, (2) the place of the UN in the party's security policy thinking, and (3) the question of how to fund the party's manifesto proposals.

I'm not surprised by Mr. Maehara's retreat from Liebermanian territory in relations with the DPJ — and I'm not surprised that it looks as if Mr. Maehara will leave it to Sengoku Yoshito to fall on his sword in the September election.

And, I should add, I'm not particularly impressed with Mr. Maehara's attempt to spur a discussion about the DPJ's "failure" to demonstrate precisely how it will govern if and when it takes power.

Yahoo's Minna no seiji has published both Mr. Maehara's article in Voice and the conversation with Tahara Soichiro and Mr. Yosano in Chuo Koron that have prompted criticism of Mr. Maehara from within the DPJ (and given the LDP hope that the DPJ might fragment).

In the first part of his article in Voice, Mr. Maehara chides his party for its role in creating the nejire kokkai by prioritizing opposition to the government over solving national problems. (He also criticizes the LDP and Komeito for dismissing opposition proposals out of hand, unlike, he says, in Germany, where since "various opinions are presented from within the government and the opposition parties, seventy or eighty percent of legislation is revised.") In short, he argues that both the LDP and the DPJ should stop politicking and start working for the good of Japan, logic that sounds awfully similarly to the logic behind last year's push for an LDP-DPJ grand coalition. He then proceeds to criticize DPJ positions on the temporary gasoline tax, the new eldercare system, before explaining his ideas on the aforementioned points of contention in the leadership election.

The interesting section is when he discusses the Koizumi-Takenaka reforms, because this section reveals much about Mr. Maehara. He says, "The direction and sense of the Koizumi/Takenaka reforms is completely correct." But — there had to be a but — the reforms as implemented were sham reforms because the bureaucracy interfered with them. And perhaps, he suggests, Mr. Koizumi could have been a little more attentive to growing inequality and the need for more spending on health care.

In the second part, he provides fodder to those who see Mr. Maehara as being at the center of any political realignment by discussing the existence of "reformists" and "conservatives" in both the LDP and the DPJ. He then talks at length about his cross-partisan activities, especially on national security and foreign policy, and notes how there are many politicians in the LDP who understand Japan's problems.

Finally, he closes with advice to the DPJ. First, he has the gall to note that "only the LDP will profit" from cracks in the party that will be the result of internal squabbling. Second, he calls on the DPJ to resist the temptation to populism, to telling the people what they want to hear instead of what they need to hear.

The conversation with Mr. Yosano hinges more on specific policy questions, but Mr. Maehara's criticisms of the party and Mr. Ozawa are the same. (Part one; part two.)

I don't necessarily have a problem with Mr. Maehara's policy ideas; like most politicians, he has some good ideas and some not-so-good ideas (in the latter category I would put his statement, "If I were at the helm, I would make 'world leader in per-capita GDP' a national goal"). My problem is with his naivety. He genuinely believes that if reformists in both the LDP and DPJ just work together to craft good policy, Japan will be saved.

But to paraphrase Horace, you may drive politics out with a pitchfork, she will nevertheless come back. There is no escaping the "political situation," reputedly an obsession of Mr. Ozawa above all others. Working with the LDP simply means giving the LDP the means to cling to power. There may be reasonable, intelligent LDP members, but the LDP remains the LDP, collectively frightened of any change beyond that necessary to stay in power, allied with the bureaucracy, and bereft of any vision beyond survival.

This is the unspoken meaning of what Mr. Yosano says in his discussion with Mr. Maehara: "The LDP is a rather flexible political party. If we receive various requests, we change that which can be changed."

For all of Mr. Maehara's ideas, he lacks wisdom (or political sense). He fails to see that any compromise behind tactical, issue-by-issue compromise abets the LDP. He fails to see that in many ways the continuance of the LDP in power — no matter how well-intentioned and sensible some members of the party are — is the single biggest obstacle to remaking Japan into the kind of society that Mr. Maehara purports to want. His fixation on balancing the budget in the DPJ's electoral manifesto simply misses the bigger picture that regime change will provide a new government, free of the pathologies of fifty years of one-party rule, with the opportunity to chart a new direction for Japan, a goal that Mr. Ozawa shares. Unlike Mr. Maehara, however, it seems that Mr. Ozawa has actually given some thought to how to topple the LDP in an election first. And his way of thinking would not only give the LDP policy victories, but it would also make it increasingly difficult to tell the two parties apart, a development that would make it easier for the LDP to fend off a DPJ challenge to its rule.

For all his unhappiness with how the DPJ is run — and all of his efforts to cultivate partnerships with LDP members — I expect that Mr. Maehara will ultimately fall into line. The election end in a landslide reelection for Mr. Ozawa, Mr. Maehara and a buoyant Mr. Ozawa will reconcile on Mr. Ozawa's terms, and the party will unite in pursuit of regime change.

Sengoku steps forward?

Is this the next leader of the DPJ?


That is Sengoku Yoshito, a five-term member of the House of Representatives from Tokushima's first district.

When we last heard from him (on this blog), he was leading the fight against the nomination of Muto Toshiro to be the governor of the Bank of Japan from his position as chairman of the DPJ's subcommittee on joint appointments. Thanks in part to his opposition, Ozawa Ichiro opted for a harder line on the BOJ succession than he had perhaps initially intended, outmaneuvering Mr. Sengoku and other DPJ rivals while embarrassing the government (and, some would say, the DPJ) at the same time.

Speaking at a fundraising party in Tokushima, Mr. Sengoku alluded to a possible run against Mr. Ozawa in the party's forthcoming leadership election.

There is a certain logic to a Sengoku candidacy. At 62, Mr. Sengoku is the oldest member of the Maehara group and enjoys a reputation as the guardian of the rabble of (mostly) thirty- and forty-somethings. His anti-Ozawa credentials are sound — he was a prominent critic of Mr. Ozawa's attempt to form a grand coalition last November — and as a former member of the Socialist Party he is somewhat out of place in the hawkish conservative Maehara group. All of which make him an ideal patsy for the Maehara group, ensuring both that Mr. Ozawa is not reelected unchallenged and that allowing the young, ambitious members of the group to keep their powder dry for a future leadership election.

It grows increasingly unlikely that Mr. Sengoku or anyone else will unseat Mr. Ozawa. The DPJ's Hokkaido chapter has already declared its support for Mr. Ozawa on the basis of the party's success in elections under his leadership, a not entirely surprising announcement given that Hokkaido is something of a DPJ kingdom (home to both Hatoyama Yukio and Yokomichi Takahiro, head of the DPJ's former Socialist wing). Hokkaido is unlikely to be alone for long.

Mr. Ozawa, meanwhile, claims to be focused only on his next swing through the country's regions, scheduled for August. Asked about Mr. Sengoku's remarks, Mr. Ozawa said, "Since Setagaya-kun or anyone else who wants to step forward is free to do so, they may step forward."

The DPJ may get the best of all outcomes: an election, which deprives LDP members like Nakagawa Hidenao of the argument that the DPJ is less than democratic and not to be trusted, but one that is not especially rancorous and returns Mr. Ozawa to power with a solid mandate with which to proceed in his campaign to unseat the LDP.