Can the anti-terror law be rescued this session?

The most significant challenge facing Mr. Fukuda as he enters office may be responding to allegations that the MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean was in fact refueling US ships participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom, which would, of course, contravene the terms of the MSDF mission.

In addition to the allegations noted by Jun Okumura, the former commanding officer of the USS Enterprise told Asahi that Japanese vessels provided fuel for operations related to OIF — with the Ministry of Defense's admitting that this was possible.

All of this gives credence to the DPJ's claims that the government has been less than forthcoming with information about the MSDF mission, thereby justifying the DPJ's opposition to the extension of the law.

Argues Nagashima Akihisa, DPJ member of the House of Representatives: "And still the government argues this [the MSDF only support OEF] vehemently! They not know when to give up, and they're excessively dishonest and insincere." Mr. Nagashima suggests an important point — namely that American officers weren't particularly concerned about the finer points of the law enabling Japan's contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom when they went about their missions, which straddled OEF and OIF. He is unclear, however, about the impact these revelations will have on public support for renewal, which has been trending in the government's favor of late.

But Mr. Fukuda has expressed his determination to introduce a new bill this session that authorizes support for OEF, this despite the recommendation of Yamasaki Taku, his ally, that a new bill should wait until next year's regular Diet session. He insists that it is necessary to pass the bill this session, lest other countries begin to wonder "what is Japan really doing." It's altogether unclear to me how Mr. Fukuda can do this. As Amaki Naoto suggests, these latest revelations about the deception surrounding the MSDF mission should and will likely stiffen Mr. Ozawa's and the DPJ's resolve on this issue, which means that presumably any anti-terror bill sent by the Lower House to the Upper will languish there until the end of the session. Regardless of how quickly the government could get a new law through the Lower House, that would mean that the government would have to wait until several weeks into the new Diet session before the bill automatically became law by virtue of the Upper House's not acting on it.

The wild card might be public opinion. If Mr. Fukuda is given a honeymoon, he may be able to use public support as a bludgeon to pressure the DPJ to compromise on the Indian Ocean mission, regardless of the allegations of illegal activities by the MSDF. The ASDF's Iraq mission is probably beyond salvaging in light of these revelations, if it wasn't doomed already; it's too good a bargaining chip for the government not to use to get a compromise on a bill that has become the single biggest test facing Mr. Fukuda.

Japan says no (kind of)

Last week Japanese Defense Minister Kyuma Fumio criticized the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq as a "mistake."

I held off from commenting right away, because I was curious to see what the US response would be, if any.

Now, after Kyuma repeated his criticism this weekend, prompting the State Department to protest to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, I figured some comment was in order.

I'm actually more dismayed by the US reaction to Kyuma's comments than by the comments themselves. Kyuma's comments are more or less irrelevant. Koizumi committed troops to the reconstruction of Iraq at the risk of political disapproval at home -- and without a specific request from the US (see Daniel Kliman's monograph from CSIS on this decision). The Bush administration got the support of another major liberal democracy, and Koizumi solidified his reputation as a daring risk-taker. So why should the Bush administration be all that concerned if a Japanese official decides to get on the bandwagon of people "reassessing" the Iraq war, especially after his country's ground forces have already left Iraq?

Look, as Japan becomes a more active participant in international security, both within and outside -- as indicated by Prime Minister Abe's recent visit to Europe -- the US-Japan alliance, the government of Japan may occasionally disagree with the US. A strong alliance will have no problem absorbing disagreements between the two governments, and may be even better for it.

Back in the late 1980s, Ishihara Shintaro, current governor of Tokyo and longtime enfant terrible, captured Japan's economic triumphalist mood with his polemic, The Japan That Can Say No. Much of his argument crumbled with the bursting of Japan's bubble, and in any case Japan had been saying no throughout the cold war in a subtle, indirect manner -- the Yoshida Doctrine, by which Japan subordinated an active foreign policy to economic development, coupled with the US-bestowed postwar constitution, was a way of saying no to US desires for a more meaningful alliance.

What needs to happen now, as Japan seeks a greater international role, is that it needs to learn how to say no directly but constructively. "No, but...," in other words. If Japan wants to opt out of US goals elsewhere in the world, that's its prerogative. No bilateral agreement obligates Japan to contribute to US efforts anywhere aside from defending Japan within Japanese territory, and, theoretically anyway, the area surrounding Japan. But even if Japan is reluctant to support future US missions elsewhere, it will be expected to compensate in other ways: deeper cooperation between the two countries' militaries in East Asia, greater participation in humanitarian missions in Asia and throughout the world, and political leadership within East Asian regional organizations on behalf of goals and ideals shared with the US.

So, in short, rather than focus narrowly on Kyuma's comments, the US should be focused on how to strengthen the alliance, so that the bilateral activities overshadow whatever comments officials in either country might choose to make on issues of bilateral concern.

And this needs to happen sooner rather later, because of the looming question of what will happen when a Japanese soldier is killed abroad, especially if it happens in support of a US mission. The death of a Japanese soldier abroad could result in Japan saying no in a very loud way, and unless sufficient work to strengthen the alliance is done in advance, the alliance may be seriously wounded by a Japanese no in such a situation.

Meanwhile, I'm a curious as to whether Vice President Cheney will meet with Kyuma when he visits Japan next month. Given Cheney's (lack of) generosity to domestic critics, I can only imagine the generosity he'll extend to a foreign critic like Kyuma.

New survey on Japan's Iraq mission

The Yomiuri Shimbun reports today on a government survey that shows that among those surveyed (around 1800 people), 71.5 per cent said they "valued" the JSDF's reconstruction operation in Iraq, with only 22.6 per cent saying that they didn't value the mission.

Among those who said they valued it, as with earlier polls, they pointed to the mission's contributions to the Iraqi people, its role in improving the security environment, and its contribution to improving Japan's position in the world.

At the same time, the survey shows what I've said before: the Japanese people will support a Japan that cooperates by sending troops abroad to uphold stability, keep the peace, and rebuild shattered societies, but it will not support dispatches to fight -- not yet. As the JDA concluded from this survey (my translation), "There has been increasing popular recognition of how the JSDF helped Iraq, but the public also highly values that the JSDF troops left Iraq without suffering any fatalities."