Who will lead the LDP?

Masuzoe Yoichi, the upper house member who I recently listed as the obvious front runner in the race to replace Aso Taro as LDP president, said Wednesday that he would not seek the position.

Masuzoe cited his responsibility as a member of the ruling cabinet for the party's defeat as his reason for not seeking the position — although Jiji suggests that Masuzoe's candidacy faced opposition from within the party, not surprisingly given that Masuzoe has been stubbornly independent even as an LDP member. (Incidentally, it is worth recalling as Masuzoe prepares to leave office that he actually managed to serve in the same post from the reshuffled Abe cabinet in August 2007 — which he joined after criticizing the prime minister following the upper house election defeat — until the present, a remarkable run considering the circumstances.)

Masuzoe was joined by Koike Yuriko in bowing out from the race: the former defense minister said Wednesday that she would not seek the post for the second year in a row, citing her weakened status as a "zombie" politician, in the Diet only by virtue of proportional representation after losing her seat.

Ishihara Nobuteru, another potential front runner, remains noncommittal about running in the race.

For those who ultimately decide to run, it will be a harder race — and harder to ascertain the outcome in advance. To compensate for the dramatic decline in the number of LDP Diet members, the LDP will give its prefectural chapters 300 votes in the election. The chapters will each receive a minimum of three votes, with the remaining 159 votes distributed proportionally on the basis of the number of votes in a chapter. Combined with the 200 votes of Diet members, 500 votes will determine the next LDP president.

Between the decline of the factions and the tremendous power that will be wielded by the prefectural chapters, the outcome will be difficult to predict. But given the manner in which the prefectural votes will be distributed, the race could be won by a candidate popular in urban areas capable of getting (presumably discouraged) party members in populous prefectures out to vote in large numbers.

It appears as if we are witnessing the birth pangs of a new LDP. Nakagawa Hidenao, renewing his fight to make a new LDP, writes that the first step to the LDP's rebirth is the dissolution of the factions. Whether or not they are officially dissolved, the age of factional politics appears at an end. Instead we will be witnessing a renewed period of ideological conflict within the LDP, conflict that will often fall along geographical lines. As a member of the former Tanigaki faction now in the Koga faction said, since Koizumi's bid to make the LDP an urban party destroyed the party's provincial base, the next LDP leader ought not to come from an urban district. It seems to me that this kind of thinking assumes that it is possible to resurrect the "conservative kingdoms," if only the LDP reorients itself to a rural base, ignoring the mounting evidence that in the present age floating voters are everywhere — and that Komeito has become an indispensable LDP support group, which happens to be closer to the DPJ in policy terms, is in even worse straits than the LDP after its entire leadership went down to absolute defeat Sunday thanks to the decision not to run simultaneously for PR seats, and is publicly reconsidering the nature of its partnership with the LDP.

It seems that perhaps the most essential quality for the LDP's next leader is the ability and willingness to work closely with Komeito on a new path to power, lest the party forfeit even more support than it already has.

The LDP has an election date

Aso Taro has resigned his post as party president and the LDP has scheduled its party leadership for four weeks from today, 28 September. The campaign for the party presidency will officially begin ten days earlier, on 18 September, giving the candidates just over two weeks to make their intentions known and then begin traveling the country to make their appeals to the party's chapters.

Safe to say, the race is wide open. Given that Masuzoe Yoichi is just about the most popular politician in Japan and the only LDP politician candidates wanted to be seen with, he probably has the upper hand in the race for the 141 votes wielded by the LDP's prefectural chapters — if he decides to run. His position may be weaker, however, among the party's Diet members, who now number 202 betweens the two houses. The list of names in the LDP field could be lengthy, and the race chaotic. Masuzoe has said that he is a blank slate as to whether to run, and in the meantime plans to focus on his work as a cabinet minister. Tanigaki Sadakazu might run once again.

Given that the race won't officially begin until 18 September, it is likely that the party will be choosing its leader after Hatoyama Yukio is officially elected as prime minister, which will presumably occur a few days earlier.

On the eve of destruction?

The denizens of Tokyo have started voting for representatives to the metropolitan assembly, and the LDP is already explaining away a defeat. Turnout may be up compared with 2005, which, as Jun Okumura notes, bodes ill for the LDP and Komeitō.

Appearing on TV Saturday, Hosoda Hiroyuki, the LDP secretary general, said that the election will have no impact on national affairs, the LDP's refrain throughout the string of defeats in local and prefectural elections. Similarly, Prime Minister Asō, returning to Japan from the G-8 summit in Italy, stressed that of course he wouldn't resign if the coalition loses its majority in the Tokyo assembly.

I do not doubt Asō's resolution to stay. And he is far from friendless in the LDP — even Masuzoe Yoichi, dubbed his most likely challenger by the media, has backed off from open criticism, and Ishiba Shigeru, another potential challenger in his cabinet, recently voiced his support for the prime minister. Whatever unease the LDP's chieftains feel about having Asō as the face of the party in the general election, none seems to be excited at the prospect of a party leadership election before a general election. And why should they be? Rather than enabling the LDP to rid itself of Asō, a party election at this point would serve only to air the LDP's internal divisions even more than they are already being aired. There is some hope within the LDP that Asō will leave voluntarily, but it would strike me as uncharacteristic for the prime minister to bow out willingly.

And Asō still has his nuclear option, the power to call a general election. Yomiuri reports that the prime minister will base his decision regarding the general election on the returns in Tokyo. Regardless of whether the coalition wins or loses power in Tokyo, the election could impel Asō to call an early election. If the coalition wins, he may want to call an early election to take advantage of the temporary shift in the government's favor. If the coalition loses, he may want to call an early election to undercut the anti-Asō movement within the LDP. The question then is how the reformists will react to having no choice but to contest the election under Asō's leadership. Shukan Bunshun suggests that the reformists are thinking about contesting the election with their own manifesto, making them a virtual new party.

How likely is this outcome? I suppose we'll find out soon enough.

Koike versus the "soft liners"

On Tuesday, Koike Yuriko, former defense minister and aspirant to the LDP presidency, announced her resignation as chair of the LDP's special committee on base countermeasures.

She told the media that her resignation was intended as a protest against the decision to soften the language on preemption in the LDP Policy Research Council's defense division in the recommendations for this year's National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) sent to Prime Minister Asō Tarō this month. She sees the longstanding doctrine of "nonaggressive defense" as injurious to the national defense, unacceptably tying the government's hands in addressing threats to Japanese national security.

Koike has a point: if Japan is to acquire the capabilities to strike at "enemy bases," it might as well be straightforward about the circumstances in which it intends to use said capabilities. What is the deterrent value, after all, of capabilities that Japan may or may not use if faced with an imminent missile launch?

This feud may be indicative of what I thought the response to the remarks (mentioned here) by Cui Tiankai, China's ambassador to Japan, would be among LDP members. While it is unclear at what point the language was softened to rule out preemptive strikes even while calling for capabilities to strike enemy bases, Ambassador Cui's remarks surely reinforced concerns by LDP members like Yamasaki Taku that Japan must be careful about sending the wrong signals abroad — while reinforcing the resolve of hawks like Koike who unabashedly want Japan to be ready and able to carry out preemptive strikes.

Naturally there is also the question of Koike hopes to achieve by resigning her post in this fashion. She has reinserted herself into the discussion of a hot-button issue just as the Asō government has entered into what might be its endgame. She has taken a hardline position on an issue of prime importance to Asō's conservative backers, perhaps in hope of prying their support away should the prime minister be forced out before an election. Of course, I am not questioning the sincerity of her beliefs — just the timing and form of her protest.

It's a small step, but it could be an important one. If Asō does not survive long enough to lead the LDP into the general election, the conservatives might reason that backing Koike is a way to ensure that their approach to North Korea and national security generally enjoy top priority in the LDP's election campaign — while allowing Koike to take the fall should the LDP lose disastrously in the general election. (Of course, I remain skeptical that the prime minister's critics will be able to force him out before a general election.)

Meanwhile, I am curious about the political salience of the debate over preemption in the LDP. Curiously, I have yet to see a single poll that asked respondents for their opinion on the idea of preemptive strikes and the acquisition of capabilities in order to carry out attacks on North Korean bases. I suspect that there's little interest in the issue as a priority, especially if respondents were informed that acquiring new capabilities would entail greater defense spending, but I am keen to see some data on this question. If a poll has asked this question and I've missed it, do send it my way. Otherwise, the question remains: why no polling on preemption?

There is another question in the preemption debate that advocates like Koike have not addressed forthrightly. Can Japan actually preempt a possible North Korean attack? Jiji calls attention to a recent report by the International Crisis Group that suggests that North Korea has an estimated 320 Rodong intermediate range ballistic missiles on mobile launchers directed at Japan, exceeding the previous estimate of 200. Would Japan be able to find these missiles, let alone destroy them? Have Koike and other hawks made an honest assessment of what capabilities Japan will realistically need to possess in order to carry out this mission? If Japan is to have a proper debate about preemption versus deterrence, the advocates of preemption ought to be honest about what the JSDF would need to possess — and what such an arms program would cost.

For now, all I see is posturing from politicians like Koike about how Japan lacks a "true national defense."

Time for a mercy killing

After a brief period of buoyancy, the bottom has finally fallen out of the Asō government.

In addition to the drops below twenty percent approval in the Mainichi and Kyodo polls, the government's approval rating dropped 8.7% to 17.5% in the Sankei poll, with its disapproval rating rising ten points to 70.6%, a poll in which respondents favored the DPJ over the LDP by nearly twenty points and in which nearly fifty percent of respondents said they would vote for the DPJ in proportional representation voting in the forthcoming general election.

As has often been the case in recent years, poor public opinion polls tend to trigger (or exacerbate) snowball effects within the LDP. Party elders like Mori Yoshirō go public with their concerns about the viability of the government and begin talking about ways to fix the government, usually by discussing a cabinet reshuffle. Accordingly, Machimura faction leaders, including Mori, former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, and former Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura Nobutaka met Tuesday evening to "exchange opinions" on a cabinet reshuffle, a reshuffle that if it were to occur would surely rank as one of the most meaningless cabinet reshuffles ever. It is unclear to me that reshuffles are an effective way to reverse a decline in support for a government, especially for recent LDP governments. After all, the public's problems with recent governments have had little to do with the cabinet lineups. Rather, the LDP has so few tools at its disposal to deal with public disapproval that LDP members look to the cabinet reshuffle out of a desire to "do something" about public discontent. To his credit, Prime Minister Asō has given no sign that he is considering a reshuffle.

Meanwhile, party reformists and wakate giin rusih to distance themselves from the unpopular prime minister, while intensifying calls for accelerating the party's presidential election scheduled for September so that dissatisfied LDP members could replace Asō Tarō with someone better able to lead the party in a general election. Of course, it is not entirely who could save the LDP at this point — or who wants a chance to save the LDP at this point. Hosoda Hiroyuki, the LDP secretary-general, has dismissed the idea of moving up the party election, but the prime minister's opponents continue to scheme for a way to dump Asō. The latest idea is to tie the prime minister's future to the LDP's performance in next month's Tokyo assembly election. An unnamed member of the LDP executive has stated that if the LDP does not remain the assembly's largest party, Asō should step down. Hosoda has also rejected this idea, but there is little question that the 12 July Tokyo election is taking on considerable importance for both the LDP and Komeitō as a test of the coalition's ability to win urban electoral districts that were critical to its 2005 landslide, especially following the LDP's losing streak in recent municipal elections.

Interestingly, Koga Makoto suggested this week that he supports a July 12 general election, which I suppose would be one way to avoid the turmoil that would follow a disastrous performance in the Tokyo elections. Komeitō is of course opposed to this idea, but this is a good reminder that Asō still has the trump card in the battle with his own party, the prime minister's right to dissolve parliament and call an election.

Kato Koichi said Tuesday that an early election would be suicidal, but at this point I have to wonder whether it wouldn't be a mercy killing. While the Asō government claims to have important business to attend to, at this point nothing is more important than holding an election, which will hopefully result in a government with greater legitimacy and a greater ability to act on policy than the current coalition government. And while Kato says an early election would be suicide, it is unlikely that an election at term's end will be any less fatal to the Asō government and the LDP-Komeitō coalition government more generally. The interesting question now is whether the general election will be fatal to the LDP itself.

Aso limps on

The Aso government won a small victory on Friday when the lower house passed the 2009 budget, ensuring that even if the upper house does not act on it the budget will pass into law before the start of the new fiscal year.

The discussion will now unavoidably shift to the timing of the general election. Aso Taro will try to shift the discussion to a new economic stimulus package, but I wonder whether the LDP has the energy left to pass yet another round of economic stimulus. Yamaoka Kenji, the head of the DPJ's parliamentary affairs committee, saw the link between further economic stimulus and the government's desire to prolong its life, and not surprisingly rejected it. The DPJ has a point. Why should a government on its last legs be given license to spend even more public money in a desperate bid to stave off an economic crisis and electoral defeat? At this point, will it make much difference in overcoming the crisis if the political system takes one month off to contest an election?

Nevertheless, the LDP looks determined to press forward with a supplemental budget before calling an election. In a TV appearance over the weekend, Koga Makoto, the LDP's chief election strategist, indicated that it is the government's responsibility to formulate another stimulus package before going to the voters. If the debate over the supplemental budget drags on, however, the LDP may find it convenient to delay longer, enabling Aso to attend the July G8 meeting in Italy (although after Nakagawa Shoichi's performance last month perhaps Japanese officials should stay away from Italy for a while). In other words, Koga's statement looked like an acknowledgment that the election might be held earlier than the end of the term in September, but circumstances might guarantee that government holds off until then.

Not everyone is pleased with the prospect of waiting too long. Ishiba Shigeru, MAFF minister and possible Aso successor, said Saturday that the government should go to the people sooner rather than later, that it is not wise to wait until September. That being said, Ishiba still stands behind Aso as the man to lead the LDP into the election.

And so, it seems, does much of the LDP's leadership. The party's young turks remain discontent — a new group called the "association to reform the LDP and regenerate Japan," including a number of members of the anti-Aso group formed last year by Shiozaki Yasuhisa, recently formed in the hope of finding a post-Aso party leader, but has called itself not anti-Aso but non-Aso. I'm not entirely sure what the difference is, but the fact that the group's leaders felt the need to stress that they are not anti-Aso is telling. The LDP leadership has unified around the besieged Aso, not out of love for Aso but because the party has little alternative. As dismal as the party's prospects are with Aso at the helm — Koga revealed that the party hopes to take 230 seats in the general election, which would mean a loss of seventy-three seats and leave the LDP short of an absolute majority — it is hard to see how matters will improve without Aso. The very process of removing him could guarantee the party's defeat. Without an obvious successor, the fight to replace Aso could be bitter and brand the LDP as completely irresponsible for focusing more on party infighting than policy in a time of crisis. And that's assuming that Aso could somehow be convinced to step down without a fight or without calling a general election against the party's wishes.

As a result, senior LDP officials have been lashing out at those who have talked of taking down the prime minister. Sasagawa Takashi, the head of the LDP's executive council, simply dismissed the idea that Aso would resign. Sonoda Hiroyuki, the deputy head of the Policy Affairs Research Council, said it is shameful that people like Takebe Tsutomu, a former LDP secretary-general, would call for the prime minister's resignation in the midst of a crisis. Suga Yoshihide, one of Aso's conservative allies, added that it was "truly regrettable and shameful" that someone who had served as secretary-general would call for a new leader.

Aso has also received a vote of confidence from Komeito's leadership, which is only fair given the extent to which Aso has bowed to his coalition partner's wishes. Ota Akihiro insisted that now is a time for focusing on economic policy, instead of political positioning.

The Aso government is therefore in an unusual position. It is limping along, its popularity teetering on the ten-percent threshhold, but it cannot be removed, not without a display of uncommon courage on the part of the prime minister's critics within the LDP who thus far have failed to match words with action.

It seems impossible, but Aso may be able to hold out until September.

Anything goes

As Prime Minister Aso Taro prepares to travel to Washington to meet with President Barack Obama, he leaves behind a political situation that is nothing short of chaos.

Asahi has published a snap poll that found that 71% of respondents — and 76% of self-described independents among the respondents — believe that Aso should resign immediately, while a growing number of respondents favors an election being called quickly. Meanwhile, DPJ leader Ozawa Ichiro's edge over Aso in category of who ought to be prime minister continues to grow, as Ozawa gained six points and now is favored by 45% of respondents compared to Aso's 19%. The cabinet's approval rating dipped only slightly, falling one point to 13%, but that's surely cold comfort for the prime minister.

More important than public opinion polls, however, is the mounting dissent within the LDP from all corners. Perhaps the most significant development is Koizumi Junichiro's announcement that he will absent himself from a lower house revote on the bill that provides funding for the government's stimulus payment plan. Yamamoto Ichita, a reformist who nevertheless intends to vote for the bill, argues that Koizumi's act is primarily a protest against Aso's comments on postal reform. Whatever the former prime minister's reasoning, however, it has prompted a wave of criticism from cabinet members, who have called Koizumi irresponsible, even though — as MTC noted — a Koizumi abstention would actually lower the threshhold for the bill's passage as it would take one more rebel to defeat it. And yet the LDP is considering punishing Koizumi for his insubordination, which presumably is a sign of how much the party fears the still-popular Koizumi, as party leaders apparently feel the need to punish him so that his example does not inspire young reformists to rebel.

In the process the LDP has reached a nadir of sorts, threatening to punish the man largely responsible for the government's supermajority that will ensure the passage of a bill opposed by a vast majority of the public and, at some level, a not inconsequential number of LDP members.

Is there anybody in charge here?

Surely the bad publicity resulting from punishing Koizumi in one form or another will have more severe consequences for the LDP than letting Koizumi abstain unmolested. Surely potential rebels may give some more thought to defecting now that the party has threatened the former prime minister. If the LDP punishes Koizumi it will naturally be a slap on the wrist, but considering the target it is a slap that will resonate.

At the same time, there may be a movement gathering steam against the prime minister, but then again, maybe not. The biggest handicap is that the movement has no standard bearer. Ishiba Shigeru and Noda Seiko, members of the Aso cabinet who have been mentioned as possible successors, have both denied that they are interested in the premiership, which may or may not be true, but as long as they're unwilling to do anything to overthrow the prime minister they will most likely not get the chance no matter how interested they are in the role. It is unlikely that the motley assortment of nine first and second term Diet members led by Matsunami Kenta — the "third generation club to reform the LDP" — will be the author of Aso's downfall.

The opposition of Nakagawa Hidenao, who warns that Aso is rapidly losing the confidence of LDP backbenchers, and, increasingly, Mori Yoshiro, is more serious. For the moment, Mori is not prepared to act against the prime minister as doing so would jeopardize the passage of the budget, but his opposition to Aso's leading the LDP into the next general election is out in the open.

At the same time, however, it is unclear what Aso's opponents can do to oust him. Back in the waning days of the Fukuda cabinet I speculated about Fukuda Yasuo's nuclear option, calling an election should the party move against him. As events transpired, the situation did not reach that level of desperation, as Fukuda yielded without a fight. Something tells me, however, that Aso won't be nearly as reluctant as his predecessor.

I think Aso has a greater sense of mission, a feeling that he is the man for the job and that if he can't do it, no one can. Not having Abe's weak constitution and Fukuda's lack of fighting spirit, it is difficult to see Aso leave office willing, public and party opposition not withstanding. Indeed, he seems almost impervious to the criticism buffeting his government — at a press conference Thursday he said that the criticism is healthy. At the same press conference, however, he also sent a signal to the LDP leadership that I am certain that no one missed. Asked about calling a general election, Aso said that of course the budget and economic stimulus come first, but he also said that he would call an election by himself, i.e. without consulting with the party, whose leaders undoubtedly share Yamasaki Taku's assessment that the party cannot contest an election as long as its support is as weak as it is today. Aso, it seems, will use the nuclear option should he face a rebellion within the party. (Precisely the scenario hoped for by the DPJ.)

In short, things are falling apart. Even as the ship of state sinks due to the storm roaring through the Japanese economy, the prime minister is at war with his own party, which is at war with itself, at odds with the opposition, and abandoned by the public.

There is no reason to expect this situation to change before a general election, even if the LDP somehow manages to nudge Aso out without his calling an election.