Aso in a tailspin

Prime Minister Aso Taro is in Peru for this year's APEC summit, a summit that will undoubtedly be an even greater exercise in futility than usual.

At home, his administration is faltering.

He is under fire from within the LDP for recent gaffes. (It was only a matter of time before Mr. Aso talked without thinking.) The most politically costly gaffe may prove to be his remark that many doctors lack "common sense." Masuzoe Yoichi, the health, labor, and welfare minister, admonished his prime minister to stay on message, as he has struggled to make the case for the LDP's efforts to fix medical care for the elderly. Mr. Masuzoe is not alone in criticizing the prime minister. Oshima Tadamori, the LDP's Diet strategy chairman, cautioned the prime minister to "be careful with his words." More significantly, Karasawa Yoshihito, the chairman of the Japan Medical Association, called upon Mr. Aso to take back his remark and apologize. Chairman Karasawa's remarks are indicative of a growing rift between the LDP and the JMA, a longtime supporter of the LDP. While the JMA may no longer wield the clout it once did — as Gerald Curtis noted — the JMA can damage the LDP simply by making a public show of breaking with the ruling party. The Ibaraki prefectural medical association has already announced that it will endorse DPJ candidates in the next general election to protest the new eldercare system. How many more will follow Ibaraki's lead after Mr. Aso's remarks?

More significantly, Mr. Aso may be facing a wider rebellion within the LDP on matters of policy. The prime minister told a press gaggle earlier this week that he is considering a plan that will freeze the privatization of Japan Post. It did not take long for the LDP's remaining reformers to recoil in horror. Nakagawa Hidenao, de facto leader of the Koizumians, swore that the prime minister must not be allowed to reverse course on postal privatization. Yamamoto Ichita responded with an angry post at his blog, promising that he (and presumably his fellow reformers) would not remain silent. Mr. Yamamoto noted that if Mr. Aso were to proceed with a freeze, it would be a direct repudiation of the supermajority upon which his government is based, seeing as how the 2005 general election was contested on the very question of postal privatization. I'm not certain that the public is as enamored with postal privatization now that Mr. Koizumi's spell has been broken. But the symbolic effect of reversing course on postal privatization would be unmistakable: it would illustrate clearly that the Japanese people have been the victim of a classic bait-and-switch in the three years since the last general election, voting for a party that promised reform without sanctuary only to be ruled by governments interested in fortifying the walls of existing sanctuaries.

Finally, a group of twenty-four young LDP reformers led by former Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki Yasuhisa and administrative reformer minister Watanabe Yoshimi has appealed to the government for the passage of the second stimulus package during the current Diet session, echoing similar calls from the DPJ. The group called for the government to lead effectively in the face of the crisis. Kawamura Takeo, chief cabinet secretary, responded by saying that the government is reluctant to act because it cannot trust the DPJ to cooperate on the stimulus, thus illustrating the young Turks' point. What's the point of having a supermajority if it cannot be wielded decisively in response to a crisis? (Of course, I'm skeptical about the value of the stimulus package — this article has me convinced.) In any case, both Yomiuri and Sankei speculate whether the new group is the beginning of an anti-Aso group.

Clearly Mr. Aso's landslide victory in September did not spell the end to the LDP's civil war. The LDP is no less divided over its future, and despite being marginalized by Mr. Aso, the reformists are still capable of stirring up trouble for the prime minister. Mr. Aso appears to have little control over his party or the agenda. His government seems reduced to searching for new ways to rally support for the government rather than finding new policies or implementing old ones. MTC describes this as Mr. Aso's "lightness." I agree wholeheartedly. Mr. Aso sold himself as the agent of an aggressive reform conservatism that would reinvigorate the LDP and make the case to the public that under his leadership the LDP can be trusted to fix the problems created by Mr. Aso's LDP predecessors. But it seems that, as MTC suggests, Mr. Aso is little more than the exhorter-in-chief, long on pep talks for the Japanese people, short on policies that will make the least bit of difference in rescuing his faltering country.

And now the LDP is stuck with him, at least until the prime minister decides to call (or is forced to call) a general election.

In the meantime, we will be treated to the spectacle of yet another prime minister's approval ratings take a nosedive.

The DPJ gambles

Prime Minister Aso Taro returned from the G20 meeting in Washington and immediately met with Ozawa Ichiro to discuss the conclusion of the extraordinary session of the Diet.

The LDP and the DPJ are set for another showdown over the MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, as the DPJ has announced that it will boycott upper house deliberations and prevent the enabling bill, which passed the lower house on 21 October, from coming to a vote in the upper chamber. By boycotting deliberations it will also prevent a vote on a bill to recapitalize struggling banks. By blocking votes, the DPJ hopes to force the government to extend the Diet session — originally scheduled to expire at month's end— in order to pass these bills. To pass both bills for a second time in the lower house (by way of Article 59), the government would have to extend the Diet session until 5 January; to pass only the refueling mission bill, it would have to extend the session to 2o December.

This time around the refueling mission is an incidental hostage. Mr. Ozawa's strategy in blocking a vote is eminently clear. By forcing the government to extend the Diet session to pass the aforementioned bills, Mr. Ozawa hopes to pressure the government into submitting a second stimulus package in the current session rather than waiting until next year's ordinary session. In his meeting with Mr. Aso, Mr. Ozawa was adamant — the stimulus must be submitted in the current session. The government is now on the defensive. If it fails to submit the bill in the current session after the DPJ declared its willing to cooperate, it leaves itself vulnerable to charges from the opposition that it is dangerously passive in its management of the Japanese response to the crisis. If it yields to Mr. Ozawa's demand, it runs the risk of the DPJ's withdrawing its offer of cooperation. Little wonder that the government is already trying to use the media to bind Mr. Ozawa to his promise. Yomiuri reports that according to the executive of the ruling party (parties? — Yomiuri's sourcing is vague), Mr. Ozawa said in his meeting with Mr. Aso that "if the second stimulus is submitted, we will cooperate. In the event that I break this promise, I will resign my seat."In a press conference after the meeting Mr. Ozawa denied that he said such a thing, and based on Yomiuri's dubious sourcing, I suspect there's little truth in the quote. But it does show the government's need for a guarantee for DPJ cooperation if it is to submit the supplementary bill before it would like to.

Of course, the government could simply call Mr. Ozawa's bluff and submit the bill, daring the DPJ to reject it. Asahi suggests that this is what the LDP is beginning to come around to this view. Presumably the DPJ reasons that if it does reject it, it will trigger an election contested on the question of economic stimulus. It is conceivable, however, that the government could stick to its intention to postpone an election until after April, resubmitting a new stimulus package in the regular session as planned.

However, it is worth recalling that amidst all of this tactical maneuvering by the LDP and the DPJ, the Japanese people are not entirely convinced that it will make any difference in their lives.

In short, this clash has less to do with the content of the legislation in question than in the images each party wishes to project to the public. The DPJ wants to show itself as concerned about the public, compared with the out-of-touch LDP. The LDP wants to appear responsible and deliberate, compared to the reckless and untrustworthy DPJ (led by the shifty Mr. Ozawa).

Plus ça change...

There appears to be little doubt that on Thursday Aso Taro will announce a new set of economic measures — and will also announce that he will not schedule an election for the later part of November. Yomiuri reports that Oshima Tadanori, the LDP's parliamentary affairs chairman, has voiced his disagreement with the prime minister's intention to postpone an election, arguing that delaying will make the opposition less willing to cooperate with the government on its agenda. Nikai Toshihiro, METI minister, and Amari Akira, administrative reform minister, have sided with the prime minister, citing the urgency of the global financial crisis.

"Not before the end of November" probably also means not before the end of this year. Asahi speculates that the next possible dates are at year's end after the budget compiliation for the next fiscal year, in January at the start of the next regular session of the Diet, or April, after the passage of the budget. Yamamoto Ichita, however, suggests that delaying now means that it is likely that Mr. Aso will delay until September 2009. I'm with him. Barring an unlikely uptick in Japan's economic fortunes (or in the LDP's standing in public opinion polls), I see no reason why the prime minister would chance an election unless he had no other choice, as will be the case in September.

An Asahi poll suggests that the public is not in a hurry to vote. In a dramatic reversal, 57% of respondents (up from 33%) think that an election is not urgently necessary. The poll contains some less-than-good news for the prime minister, however. It lends support to the idea that the government may be pushing on a string when it comes to building public support with its economic stimulus plans. Respondents were nearly divided on the value of the government's stimulus package, with 40% approving and 41% disapproving. Perhaps the next package will tip the balance, but the government's support may depend on which pages of the newspaper citizens read: are they swayed more by the relentless string of bad news on the financial pages or the promises of stimulus to come on the politics page?

Regardless of how the government will fare in the court of public opinion, the DPJ is already repositioning itself to respond to the delay (beyond calling Mr. Aso a chicken). While Okada Katsuya, the DPJ president who led the party into the last general election, doesn't want to believe that Mr. Aso means what he says, the DPJ appears to be taking Mr. Aso at his word. The response? For now, backing off on a promise not to hold up the government's new bill authorizing the MSDF refueling mission in the upper house. The upper house foreign affairs committee was supposed to vote on the bill Tuesday, but the DPJ's upper house affairs chairman denied an LDP request for a vote. The rejection may be part of a strategic decision by the DPJ to back away from cooperation now that the government is signalling that it will a delay an election.

It is unlikely that the DPJ will uniformly oppose the government, seeing as how it has little to gain from obstructing the government's efforts to respond to the crisis. (At least I hope it will see that there is little sense in being wholly uncooperative — the DPJ is currently mulling its response to the government's plan for shoring up troubled financial institutions.)

In short, the political system is back to where it was when Fukuda Yasuo decided to depart. The DPJ is hungry for an election, the LDP sees no reason to hurry given external events. The DPJ will cooperate with the government on an ad hoc basis, the LDP will paint the DPJ as putting politics before country.

Expect another ten months of this.

Aso pushes back

Prime Minister Aso, holding a press conference in Beijing where he is attending the annual Asia-Europe meeting (ASEM), suggested that in the midst of the current crisis, he will be prioritizing Japan's international role over the "domestic political situation."

The press interpretation of this remark is that Mr. Aso was signaling that he will not call an election for the latter half of November. He is still scheduled to make an announcement regarding election timing by month's end, but it appears unlikely that the prime minister will call for an election by the end of November.

Of course, by Japan's international role, Mr. Aso actually meant domestic stimulus in the hope of replacing vanishing foreign demand for Japanese products with more robust domestic consumer spending. Naturally the means by which to encourage greater domestic consumption have nothing to do with the "domestic political situation" and the LDP's electoral prospects...

The LDP and its partner Komeito are, according to Mainichi, divided over whether to hold an election within the year. Komeito actually used the F-word ("Fukuda") to argue that Mr. Aso should not delay an election, suggesting that if Mr. Aso tarries, the DPJ will become uncooperative yet again, rendering the Aso government a premature lame duck, like the former prime minister. (Apparently Komeito foresees that an election will "untwist" the Diet. Is that because Komeito thinks the LDP is bound to lose its majority?) Finance Minister Nakagawa Shoichi, meanwhile, suggested that it would be irresponsible for the government to call an election in the midst of the current crisis.

What, I wonder, do the LDP's backbenchers make of this? At this point will waiting until the spring or next September make any difference in their electoral prospects? Is it reasonable for the LDP to expect that the economy will look any better in the new year, new stimulus package or no new stimulus package? Does any expect that the Aso government will finally find a way to stimulate sluggish domestic demand in the midst of a crisis that seems to be encouraging anything but consumption? The Bank of Japan has already revised its growth expectations for the 2009 fiscal year down to zero.

MTC suggested Friday that the government could use talk of a future consumption tax increase to encourage more spending in the near term. Maybe, but such suggestions could simply leave citizens outraged and put them in even more of a hanging mood as regards the LDP. For a backbencher, the delay simply means more scare campaign funds spent idling in the non-campaign campaign. Given that the LDP's prospects are unlikely to have improved by the spring, it's probably just as well (from the backbencher's perspective) that the party opt for an election sooner rather than later. Holding an election will at least clarify the muddied political situation.

Of course, from the perspective of Mr. Aso and his cronies, delaying is entirely in their interest. Will the public — already angry at the government for a host of reasons — be charitable to the Aso government and return it to power in the midst of a crisis? The prime minister is better off waiting to see whether the two stimulus packages have some salutary effect before going to the people in a general election. And I doubt Mr. Aso is keen on the idea of potentially being one of the shortest-serving prime ministers ever.

All of which goes to say that the DPJ's new approach of calling Mr. Aso a coward for not calling an election is unlikely to succeed at either forcing Mr. Aso's hand or drastically impacting the prime minister's approval rating.

Pushing on a string

During its long "lost decade," Japan became painfully acquainted with the concept of pushing on a string.

In monetary policy, pushing on a string is when a central bank finds itself unable to reverse an economic downturn with customary monetary policy tools; famously, the Bank of Japan slashed nominal interest rates to zero without success in reversing the slump.

Aso Taro and the LDP may be facing similar circumstances a month into the Aso premiership (an anniversary Mr. Aso celebrated in style).

Over the course of 2008, the LDP has struggled to reverse dismal poll figures that show the public ready to abandon the LDP and give the DPJ its first chance to form a government. Former Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo withered in the face of declining popularity, doing little but a cabinet reshuffle late into his government after months of grueling battles with the DPJ and within his party. Mr. Aso was supposed to be the key to reversing the slide. He was supposed to ride into office on a wave of support from not just within the LDP but from the public at large. But not only was his initial public support soft, but it has done nothing but slide. Mainichi's latest poll recorded a nine-point drop in Mr. Aso's public approval rating, falling to 36%. The same poll gave the DPJ a twelve-point lead over the LDP when it comes to which party respondents want to win the next general election. Support for the LDP fell five points to 36%, while support for the DPJ rose eleven points to 48%. As before, respondents continued to prefer Mr. Aso over DPJ President Ozawa Ichiro as prime minister, but it seems that the LDP's attacks on Ozawa Ichiro have had little impact on public support for the DPJ.

Of course, the public has little enthusiasm for the DPJ in and of itself. A recent Yomiuri-Waseda poll found widespread discontent and disappointment with both the LDP and the DPJ. The poll found that 78% of respondents are "dissatisfied" with the LDP and 79% are dissatisfied with the DPJ, while 69% are disappointed with the LDP, and 50% disappointed with the DPJ. Respondents were evenly split on whether they have hope for both parties. Without a look at the survey itself, I have no idea what the difference is between disappointment and dissatisfaction. I'm not certain whether these numbers actually tell us anything other than what we already know: that there is widespread disillusionment among Japanese voters about the state of Japanese politics going back years, if not decades. The LDP can take little pride in the finding that the public's expectations for the DPJ are just as low as its expectations for the LDP.

The upshot leads us back to the idea of pushing on a string. In the teeth of widespread public disillusionment with the status quo, there is little Mr. Aso can do to extract himself and his party from its predicament. Despite its first stimulus package and the promise of a second, the Mainichi poll recorded a drop in confidence in Mr. Aso's policy line (a shift found in other polls, as noted by Nakagawa Hidenao). The DPJ has refused to bite on foreign policy, and even if it did, the public has little interest in whether Japan continues refueling, at least compared with the public's interest in the state of the economy. It's possible that the second stimulus package, set to be formalized next Monday, will reverse the trend. The plan will contain a host of income and municipal tax cuts, tax cuts for homeowners, tax cuts for businesses large and small, and support for regional public works. The plan may also contain provisions to support the conversion of irregular employees to regular employees, a plan that theoretically would appeal to Mr. Aso's Akihabara base. But what reason is there to think that a second wave of goodies for the public will lead to a decisive shift in public opinion? It will take some time before voters begin seeing the fruits of the government's efforts, and in the mean time they will have plenty of time to reflect on the legacy of LDP rule and the gathering global gloom.

What we're left with is Mr. Aso's feeble attempts to illustrate that he understands the hardships facing Japanese citizens.

The prime minister is scheduled to decide on the timing of a general election by month's end. I will be surprised if he opts to hold one within the year. Why would he, when he has eleven months to keep pushing on the string of limp public support for the LDP in the hope of a breakthrough?

The DPJ embraces tactical retreat

Yamaoka Kenji, the DPJ's Diet strategy chairman, indicated in Diet proceedings Wednesday that the DPJ will consent to a quick vote on the bill extending the MSDF's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. He didn't say that the DPJ would support it, of course, but he did say that the DPJ would consent to moving the bill through the Diet with minimal debate.

Naturally Mr. Yamaoka and the DPJ are not acting out of charity. Rather, Mr. Yamaoka took care to emphasize in his remarks that why should the opposition sit on the bill when the LDP is assured of Komeito support in passing the bill a second time in the Diet.

By that Mr. Yamaoka clearly meant is that the DPJ should not waste precious time debating a bill that will pass anyway — now that Komeito has apparently backed down from its threat to not vote for the refueling mission should it come before the lower hosue a second time — and refocus the discussion on how the LDP has mismanaged pensions and health care.

The DPJ seems to have concluded that the next election will not be won on the floor of the Diet. It gains nothing from appearing unreasonably obstructionist, and it loses little from giving Mr. Aso victories on issues of lesser importance or of paramount importance, like the stimulus package, in which case the party would suffer if it were to oppose the bill. The election will be won in delivering the party's message that it is more responsive to the public on healthcare and pensions than the cold-hearted, "market-fundamentalist" (a term that surely resonates more today) LDP. This necessarily entails buying time for DPJ candidates to work that much harder to communicate with voters. Depriving Mr. Aso of salient issues is one way to buy some time.

Ozawa responds

Two days after Aso Taro issued his challenge to the DPJ to put country first, DPJ President Ozawa Ichiro delivered his rebuttal to Mr. Aso's address.

The speech was mostly a repeat of his speech last month to the DPJ convention following his uncontested reelection as DPJ president.

In contrast to Mr. Aso, he provided a series of detailed policies that the DPJ wants to see passed. The proposal to end special account budgets and redirect the money into the general fund, a much more radical plan to free up budget room than the LDP's emphasis on "trimming waste." His pitch for a DPJ-led government is rooted in the idea that political change is essential if Japan is to reverse the decline in the living standard of the Japanese people. In this sense, Mr. Ozawa is taking Koizumi Junichiro's argument to its logical conclusion: if changing the LDP from within failed to bring structural change to Japan's economy, then throwing the LDP out of power is the next step.

Of course, where Mr. Ozawa and Mr. Koizumi part ways is in how the Japanese economy should change. Mr. Ozawa reiterated the need to "build a new livelihood for the people." Central to his plan is "fundamentally changing how tax revenue is spent," which will in turn free funds for use in rebuilding a social safety net. The components of Mr. Ozawa's plan for that safety net are (1) shifting full responsibility for paying pensions to the state, (2) a 26,000 yen monthly child allowance to families until a child leaves middle school, (3) making public high schools free and lowering fees for private high schools and universities, (4) banning dispatch labor contracts that are shorter than two months, (5) raising the national average minimum hourly wage by 1000 yen, (6) implementing the income compensation program for farmers and possibly fishermen, and (7) cutting taxes for small- and medium-sized businesses.

Jun Okumura looks at the DPJ's budgetary figures and reckons that after three years the DPJ will not have enough revenue from the new sources it wants to tap to pay for its agenda, which only goes to show that changing how the government spends tax revenue is only a temporary fix. The budget deficit will not be fixed simply by shuffling revenue around. This scheme may simply postpone Japan's fiscal day of reckoning.

Meanwhile, Mr. Ozawa also offered his foreign policy vision. He first offered his support for the US-Japan alliance as a pillar of Japanese foreign policy, but argued that a strong alliance depends on an equal partnership. I have no argument with Mr. Ozawa on this point. Second, he emphasized the importance of strengthening relations with Japan's neighbors, China and South Korea especially. Finally, he reiterated his argument that the UN is the second pillar of Japanese foreign policy alongside the US-Japan alliance. The LDP loves to criticize Mr. Ozawa for his "UN-centrism," but I'm not sure that the Japanese people are all that upset with the UN or Mr. Ozawa's emphasis on Japan's contributions through the UN organization. Mr. Ozawa's foreign policy proposal is, in short, the status quo — a stronger, more equal US-Japan alliance, closer relations with Japan's neighbors, and international cooperation through the UN.

Arguably, Mr. Ozawa's speech should reassure Japanese voters that the DPJ's hand will be steady. Change, but not too much, and more as a result from tossing the LDP. As in Mr. Ozawa's motto, change so as to remain the same. With Mr. Aso accepting the DPJ's terms for debate, the next election increasingly looks to be a question of managerial competence. Which party can best deliver on the promise of remaking policy to ease public insecurities and set Japan down the right path for the future? The LDP thinks it can win this debate by harping on Mr. Ozawa's personal flaws, but for that to work the public will have to view Mr. Ozawa's failings as outweighing the collective failings of the LDP, past, present, and future. It's also little wonder that Mr. Aso is now talking about delaying a general election and prioritizing economic stimulus legislation. This may be a feint, but it looks like a rational response to the news that the public will not automatically flock to the LDP simply because Mr. Aso is now the prime minister. His government has to deliver. Fortunately for the LDP, it has the help of a supermajority in the lower house.

As noted previously, the DPJ must tread carefully. It cannot simply say no. It must debate in good faith and attempt to put its personal stamp on any economic stimulus package. Mr. Aso wants a plan for the good of the nation? Good. Then force him to accept revisions that prevent him from taking sole credit for the plan, and hope that the LDP continues to provide examples of why it cannot be trusted with power. And argue that even if the LDP can get economic stimulus right, it has no plan for what to do next.

The stereotype of the DPJ as an unserious opposition party should be put to rest. The DPJ has a plan for governing. It may not be perfect, but it's a plan, complete with details about spending. But the job of a political party isn't to have a plan that's perfect in every detail. It's to have the right marriage of political vision and policy program. The DPJ increasingly has both, and both resonant with the voters. It will take more than calumny aimed at the "Ozawa DPJ" to chip away at the DPJ's mounting support.

Aso the exhorter

Prime Minister Aso Taro officially opened the extraordinary session of the Diet with his first policy address.

Press coverage of the speech has uniformly characterized it as taking to the offensive to the DPJ.

In the first portion of the speech, Mr. Aso suggested that in its opposition to government plans, the DPJ has put the people's livelihoods second or third, not first as its slogan proclaims. He declared that he would attack the DPJ on its own terms, challenging the DPJ's claim to speak for the people against the LDP-Komeito coalition.

To do so, he offered his three-pronged economic plan focused on (1) fighting the recession, (2) medium-term fiscal reconstruction, and (3) long-term structural reform in the interest of economic growth. Under the first scheme, he pledged tax cuts designed to provide immediate relief for Japanese citizens, although Mr. Aso called particular attention to farmers, fishermen, and small- and medium-sized businessmen. He appealed to the DPJ to support the supplementary budget that includes the tax cut, or at least engage in a debate and offer a bill of its own. Meanwhile he mentioned fiscal reconstruction only to state that it is off the table for the foreseeable future. Fiscal reconstruction, Mr. Aso said, is a means to an end, namely Japanese prosperity. Unless Japan's economy is growing it is misguided to talk of fiscal rectitude. (It would be nice, however, if Mr. Aso weren't so cavalier about the idea that if Japan doesn't find a way to both stimulate its economy and fix its budget situation, the medium- to long-term prognosis for the Japanese economy is dismal. Given how little space Mr. Aso devotes to this second point, it appears that it was included because it had to be included, but that Mr. Aso's government will particularly concerned with the budget. The public, after all, isn't exactly clamoring for a balanced budget.)

Finally he turned to his version of structural reform, although he did not use the now-tainted term. Clearly drawing on the ideas experienced in his March Chuo Koron article, he called for restoring confidence in the pensions and health care systems. On health care, he rejected a wholesale revision of the April eldercare system, suggesting that the problem was that it was "poorly explained" by the government and asking for patience. Turning to the "youth" problem, he called for a minimum wage increase and reviewing the labor dispatch problem. He included two leftovers from the Fukuda government, the pursuit of a consumer affairs agency and the need to cut government waste. On the latter, however, he fudged by declaring that the task is making government more efficient and more responsive to the public, but not necessarily a less expensive government. He called for greater regional decentralization — as he has articulated before — and said that he's aiming for fifty percent agricultural self-sufficiency. And he concluded with a long explanation of his government's foreign policy goals, starting with "stable and prosperous" relations with Japan's neighbors, moving on to greater involvement in solving global problems, supporting young democracies in the region, and reaffirmed the centrality of the resolution of the abductions issue for Japan-North Korea normalization to proceed. He then, in a move that undoubtedly pleased Washington, appealed to the DPJ to recognize the importance of the US-Japan alliance and reiterated the importance of the MSDF's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean.

This was a campaign speech masquerading as a policy address.

It's not just a matter of his redirecting questions back at the DPJ; it's that he doesn't really seem that interested in articulating policy except in exceedingly broad strokes. To call it a laundry list would be insulting to laundry lists. Consider the two policy addresses Fukuda Yasuo gave to open last year's extraordinary session and this year's ordinary session. The conditions facing Mr. Fukuda in both instances were little different than those facing Mr. Aso. But Mr. Fukuda in both instances worked to call attention to the gravity of the problems facing Japan and tried to articulate a way out. His speech this time last year was less detailed, but he laid out his priorities and signaled that he would govern differently. His January address, however, was full of specific policies to address a range of problems. And he did not shrink from stating just how serious Japan's current predicament is.

With his optimism, Mr. Aso breezed over the latter — his belief in Japan's latent power seems to have him convinced that Japan can weather anything. His optimism is undoubtedly an asset. The public will likely be pleased to hear a prime minister who believes that things will get better and that there will be an end to their insecurities. In this, Mr. Aso addressed one of the major complaints about Koizumi Junichiro, namely that he put destruction before construction.

But I don't think his strategy of reclaiming the momentum by calling out the DPJ will work. I see the political logic: Mr. Aso needs the public to forget that the LDP is responsible for having brought Japan to where it is today and to see the DPJ as responsible for having created gridlock for putting party before country. (Of course, this is exactly what Mr. Aso is doing too.) But will the public buy it? The public seems to be more interested in things getting done than in this kind of political gamesmanship. And I doubt that a single speech will make voters forget years of LDP maladministration.

Morever, at MTC argues, I don't think the DPJ will be cowed by Mr. Aso's exhortation to put country first. (The McCain-Aso comparisons continue to mount...)

The DPJ shouldn't shy away from a policy debate. Indeed, they should relish the opportunity to ask Mr. Aso for details about what exactly he plans to do. The DPJ should be insistent on discussing whether the stimulus package pushed for by the government will actually address the public's concerns, whether he thinks the current eldercare system is really working for Japan's citizens, whether the prime minister should be so concerned about foreign policy at a time like this. There's the assumption in this speech that there's one best way to solve Japan's problems. There's not. And with the DPJ in control of the upper house, any solution must be an LDP-DPJ solution. Under Mr. Fukuda the LDP appeared to think that cooperation in the divided Diet means dictating terms to the DPJ. Under Mr. Aso it appears that things will be little different.

Mr. Aso is vulnerable. He can parry and thrust on these policy questions, but in being drawn into a protracted policy debate with the DPJ, he will look less like the newly ordained leader of the nation and more like the leader of the decrepit, old LDP with its anti-Midas touch. The DPJ must not allow Mr. Aso to portray himself as transcending politics and parties, as acting only with the country's interests at heart. Mr. Aso's genuine love for Japan may make this hard — it's a pretty convincing act — but if the DPJ stands fast on policy questions and allows the Aso cabinet to self-destruct, it will be able to halt the Aso offensive.

Fukuda resigns

The autumn extraordinary session of the Diet has been looking quite similar to the 2007 extraordinary session of the Diet.

We can discuss whether history rhymes or repeats, but one thing is clear:

Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo has resigned, less than one year into his tenure as prime minister.

The questions on the table are obvious. Will public outcry against a third prime minister without an election lead the LDP to call an early election? Will Aso Taro be ushered into power in the hope that his popularity might buy the LDP some time before rushing into an election?

The reasons seem more apparent. Going into the new Diet session, Mr. Fukuda has had control of neither his party nor his governing coalition. He has been pressured to make decisions against his will — such as the date for the opening of the Diet — and stymied in his efforts to move an agenda.

Do we stand at the brink of a second 1993?

Komeito riles the LDP

It is safe to assume that when Mori Yoshiro admonishes someone, the mood in the LDP is bleaker than previously thought.

Mr. Mori, whose mission is not the advancement of an agenda of reform or reaction but the preservation of LDP primacy, has taken it upon himself to use his bully pulpit as a former prime minister and head of the party's largest faction to warn those who threaten the LDP's position that they are mistaken. (See his criticism of Nakagawa Shoichi for his dealings with LDP exile Hiranuma Takeo, for example.)

With Mr. Mori's criticism of Komeito, we can now be sure that the LDP's guardians are panicked now that the coalition's long-silent partner has discovered that it holds the balance in the nejire kokkai.

Speaking at a Komeito event in Ishikawa prefecture Sunday, Mr. Mori — in Yomiuri's reckoning (note the passive voice) — "was seen to have as its purpose the containment of Komeito's growing distance from the Fukuda government." It bears mentioning that Jiji's report on Mr. Mori's remarks paint them in a different light, as a defense of the recently announced stimulus package shared with Komeito leader Ota Akihiro. Yomiuri's emphasis on the perceived threat to Komeito actually reinforces the idea that Mr. Mori's remarks hint at the depth of the fears of the LDP's doyens in the face of an invigorated Komeito; if any press organ shares the philosophy of Mr. Mori and the other risk-averse LDP elders, it is Yomiuri.

And they should be afraid.

Only now, a year into the divided Diet in which Komeito, thanks to its status as the guarantor of the lower house supermajority, holds power disproportionate to its numbers, is the junior partner beginning to flex its muscles and push for a lowest common denominator consensus. I had anticipated Komeito playing such a role in the Fukuda government, but I didn't anticipate that it would take a year before Komeito began to take its position seriously.

It appears to be making up for lost time, pushing for a late start to an abbreviated Diet session that could spare Komeito from having to vote for the renewal of the MSDF refueling mission, trumpeting a stimulus package that appears to be little more than a sop to its supporters (i.e., "energy subsidies for businesses most hit by higher energy costs, medical benefits for the elderly"), and generally using its clout to cajole the government (on the date of Prime Minister Fukuda's policy speech, for example).

The Fukuda government is increasingly looking like a lame duck, with Komeito increasingly looking like the probable executioner. Jun Okumura suggests that on the issue of the refueling mission — which will once again casts a shadow over the extraordinary session — it is theoretically possible for the LDP to overrule the upper house without Komeito's votes, provided Komeito's members stay away from the vote. Maybe so, but presumably the price of Komeito's staying away will be steep (perhaps even the power to decide the date of the next election?). Is Mr. Fukuda prepared to pay such a price, particularly on an issue that has little payoff for his political prospects? Beyond Mr. Fukuda, how will the LDP's members take Komeito's growing clout? Arguably Komeito's growing activism could fuel the conservative revolt against Mr. Fukuda. Japan's conservatives are, to the say the least, dubious about Komeito, its mother organization Soka Gakkai, and Ikeda Daisaku, the head of Soka Gakkai. Excessive deference to Komeito could well be the final straw for the LDP's conservatives.

Given a choice between acquiescing to Komeito and pushing for a general election that may be disastrous for the LDP, the conservatives may be drawn to the latter, seeing as how it would likely mean the end of both the LDP's partnership with Komeito and the Fukuda adminstration, clearing the way for the rise of their champion, Aso Taro.

All of which suggests that Mr. Mori's pleas will be useless. Like King Canute, Mr. Mori is trying to hold back forces beyond his control.

What is the DPJ to do in the midst of the feuding within the coalition?

Hokkaido University's Yamaguchi Jiro argues, "Now is the time for DPJ politicians to walk about the regions, see people's hardships, and hear their miserable hopes regarding politics."

"In the extraordinary session of the Diet," he continues, "the opposition should take the line of all-out confrontation. The lame-duck Fukuda administration lacks the skill and the legitimacy for policy discussions. If Komeito is opposed to reapproval in the lower house, important legislation cannot be passed at all."

Professor Yamaguchi's advice is probably sound. There is little the DPJ can and should do at this point than take the party's case directly to the people, call attention to the government's short-sightedness and disarray, and prepare the party for a general election that looks increasingly likely to occur by year's end.

Out with a whimper

MTC beats me to pointing out the futility of the forthcoming seventy-day extraordinary session, which will convene from Sept. 12.

The government, he notes, will lack the time to pass the most significant pieces of legislation on the agenda (beyond a stimulus package) and override the upper house if necessary. No refueling mission extension. No tax reform. No road construction reform.

Naturally the government can squeeze some life out of the Diet session by working with the DPJ or by extending the Diet session yet again (over the objections of Komeito).

The LDP continues to hope for the former; Aso Taro recently called on the DPJ and other opposition parties to cooperate with the government to extend the Japanese mission in the Indian Ocean.

Such appeals are likely to fall on deaf ears. What, after all, does the DPJ stand to gain from extending a helping hand to the government on this or any other legislation at this point?

As for the latter, I would imagine that Komeito is not alone in its diminished enthusiasm for the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. Surely some LDP legislators must be wondering whether it is the best use of the government's time and energy when the list of problems affecting Japanese households is so long (and when those households are watching the government's actions closely). And if the government extends the session, it is practically daring Komeito to vote against the bill when it comes before the lower house a second time and thus trigger a general election precisely at the time when it wants to have an election.

Prime Minister Fukuda has promised and will continue to promise that the mission will go on; but even if he manages to pass the bill, the refueling mission might as well be dead. What began as a promising symbol of a new Japanese security role is now a symbol of Japan's unwillingness to play a greater security role.For better or worse, we will likely see the seven-year-old (minus a couple months) refueling mission come to an end, with no mission to replace it. The refueling mission, much heralded in 2001 as a symbol characterizing Japan's emergence as a robust security actor in the region, increasingly looks like the high water mark for Japan's evolving thinking about its place in the world, with Japan once again withdrawing into itself as it struggles to achieve an economic and social revolution without a revolution.

And so it is with the LDP itself. After fifty-three years in power, the very foundations of the LDP rule are crumbling. An article in the Sept. 1 issue of AERA says it all: "Support groups abandoning the LDP." The article observes that traditional LDP backers like the Japan Medical Association and postal workers (obviously) are increasingly open to backing DPJ and other opposition candidates, and concludes: "The governing LDP has overwhelming power, but the traditional structure of a monopolistic relationship with industry appears to be at an end." After what happened to the LDP last summer, this seems to be only the tip of the iceberg. The longer the DPJ sits in control of the upper house, the more Japanese industries — long accustomed to working with the LDP because they had no other choice — are willing and even eager to look to the DPJ for help.

The LDP needs a strong performance in the forthcoming Diet session to have even a chance of returning to power with a majority (forget a supermajority). It needs to deliver concrete results on a number of policy areas, with the economic stimulus package not necessarily the most important in the eyes of voters. With a short Diet session and no concrete plan for coaxing agreement out of the opposition, the government appears to be setting itself up to fail.

I want to note in closing that it is common among some foreign observers of Japanese politics to assume that somehow the LDP will pull through, because the LDP has always managed to survive. That may have been true, but it only explains situations past. It does nothing to predict how the LDP will turn its dire circumstances today into an improbable election victory. I'm open to explanations for how the LDP can do this, but the lack of LDP defeats in the past tells me nothing about the LDP's future, which to me appears bleak and short indeed.

This is a classic example of the problem of induction: the LDP's failure to lose an election over the past fifty-three years (1993 doesn't count as a loss for technical reasons) by no means guarantees that it will not lose an election tomorrow (or next year).

This is, in Nassim Nicholas Taleb's recapitulation in The Black Swan of Bertrand Russell, the turkey problem:

Consider a turkey that is fed every day. Every single feeding will firm up the bird's belief that it is the general rule of life to be fed every day by friendly members of the human race 'looking out for its best interests,' as a politician would say. On the afternoon of the Wednesday before Thanksgiving, something unexpected will happen to the turkey. It will incur a revision of belief. (P. 40. See also Ch. 4, passim.)

Of course, the seventy days means the Diet session is scheduled to end in late November.

The Fukuda standoff

After weeks of debate within the LDP and between the LDP and Komeito, the government has suggested that the autumn extraordinary session is likely to begin no earlier than mid-September. A final decision will be made on Tuesday, 19 Aug.

As MTC notes, the late start means that the future of the Maritime Self Defense Forces refueling mission in the Indian Ocean is bleak, provided that the DPJ remains uniformly opposed and Komeito fearful of partaking in the use of Article 59 to override the upper house (a procedure that would, given the late start of the session, likely entail yet another extension of a Diet session). MTC also notes that the late start ensures that the government will focus its efforts on a supplementary budget containing economic stimulus measures, instead of structural reform. The government's priorities were made clear following a meeting between Prime Minister Fukuda, LDP Secretary-General Aso Taro, and LDP Diet strategist Oshima Tadanori.

MTC suggests that the abbreviated Diet session guarantees an early election.

I'm not so sure. I'm certainly not willing to rule out the possibility, but the situation strikes me as more complex than mere election timing. The LDP and Mr. Fukuda are increasingly in a standoff, with Mr. Fukuda as prime minister holding the bomb of an early election that could spell doom for the party's majority. It is increasingly clear that the LDP would like to coax the weapon out of the hands of the cornered prime minister, especially with the resurrected Aso Taro looking increasingly like the man to lead the LDP to a less-than-disastrous finish in the next general election.

A recent Yomiuri poll found the new LDP secretary-general to be the overwhelming favorite answer to the question of who would make the most appropriate prime minister: twenty-five percent of respondents favored him, compared to thirteen percent for Koizumi Junichiro, ten percent for Ozawa Ichiro, and three percent for Mr. Fukuda, DPJ acting president Kan Naoto, and health, labor, and welfare minister Masuzoe Yoichi.

I have doubts that even the popular Mr. Aso can save the wreck of the LDP, but if enough LDP members convince themselves that he is their only hope — this may already be the case — Mr. Fukuda could face a choice between holding on to power (futilely) by calling an election before he can be removed, or quietly ceding the reins to a successor, presumably Mr. Aso, at the end of the extraordinary session.

It seems to have come down to this: by year's end there will either be an LDP presidential election or a general election.

Fukuda, the LDP, and Japan: all hamstrung

Fukuda Yasuo has returned from his vacation at the Prince Park Tower hotel near Shiba Park in Tokyo.

His agenda is no less crowded than it was last week.

In the final week of the month, Mr. Fukuda, his government, and his party will be considering the new budgetary guidelines, deliberating on when to start the autumn extraordinary session of the Diet, and considering whether to reshuffle his cabinet before the autumn session.

Mr. Fukuda has provided few hints as to his thinking on the latter, and day by day the pressure from his party — using the media to pour on the pressure — grows for the prime minister to decide on a reshuffle.

On the question of timing, there is no hint as to when the Diet will convene again, but obviously if the government waits too long, the extraordinary session could turn into another marathon session stretching into next year as the government is forced to use Article 59 to pass priority legislation (like another enabling law for the MSDF's refuelling mission). Ibuki Bunmei, LDP secretary-general, said as much at a press conference Tuesday, and expressed his desire for the new session to begin by the end of August. Asked about it at his press conference later Tuesday, Machimura Nobutaka, chief cabinet secretary, said no agreement had been reached and provided no insight to the government's thinking.

The timing of the new session is intertwined with the question of a reshuffle. The argument — at least as made by Asahi — is that a reshuffle now will strengthen the prime minister's efforts to pass legislation on health care, social security, and eldercare, and countermeasures to address high energy costs. By giving the cabinet a "Fukuda color," the government will apparently have an easier time moving its agenda.

I'm unimpressed by this logic. I don't know what a Fukuda-colored cabinet would look like, but I'm not certain that it would be an improvement. And I don't see how it would strengthen the government's ability to move legislation. Instead I see it as freeing people who disagree with the prime minister to intensify their activities to undermine the prime minister. Meanwhile, is Masuzoe Yoichi, the minister for health, labor, and welfare (HLW) and the point man on the aforementioned issues (and a major critic of Abe Shinzo's despite being a holdover from the second Abe cabinet, thereby exposing the folly in the logic that the second Abe cabinet inherited by Mr. Fukuda is out of place today) somehow an obstacle to the government's plans?

The arguments being made on behalf of a reshuffle are flimsy, and yet the media is repeating them unquestioningly.

In the end, talk of a reshuffle is a distraction from the realities of policy: the Fukuda government and the LDP are unable to rescue Japan from its ongoing crisis. As Ken Worsley noted, the Cabinet Office admitted that the budget won't be balanced by 2011 as desired by Koizumi Junichiro. The economic outlook is worsening. The latest HLW white paper on the Japanese labor market recorded the inexorable growth in the use of un-regular staff, indicating the crumbling of Japanese labor system.

In the midst of this, government and ruling party are dithering over whether a new cabinet will improve the prime minister's public approval ratings.

The LDP's empire is crumbling.

It is not yet known what will rise in its place — and if it's a new DPJ regime, whether it will be more of the same — but we are without question witnessing the death throes of the ancien regime. Problems are mounting faster than the hamstrung government can tackle them. The LDP has, according to Yamasaki Taku, abandoned Koizumism, but it has adopted nothing in its place, not even the old way of conducting politics. It is merely treading water, and poorly.

How will a prime minister who can't decide whether to change his cabinet push through sweeping changes to how Japan cares for its sick and aged, provides opportunities for young workers, and enables firms to innovate and grow?

The DPJ may find itself similarly hamstrung, but the DPJ's qualities should not (and are not, I would argue) the most important matter facing the Japanese people. The question is whether the party that failed to anticipate and act responsibly in the face of a gathering crisis should be trusted with the power to attempt to fix the mess it created.

Don't expect Japanese troops in Afghanistan

With five or six weeks until the start of the autumn extraordinary session of the Diet, one of Fukuda Yasuo's responsibilities during the recess is determining his government's approach to the Japanese contributions to operations in and around Afghanistan. The enabling law for the current Maritime Self-Defense Forces refueling mission will expire in January, meaning that if the government wants to extend the mission it will have to do it during the upcoming session.

As noted last month, the government was investigating whether to ramp up Japan's commitment to Afghanistan to include the deployment of Ground Self-Defense Forces personnel to Afghanistan.

Komeito, the LDP's partner in government, may have killed the idea of a ground component. Ota Akihiro, Komeito secretary-general, said Saturday that there are few within the government and the LDP — and, by implication, the bulk of his party — who are enthusiastic about sending ground troops to Afghanistan. Komeito's opposition is probably enough to ensure that the government will do nothing more than push for an extension of the refueling mission, which the DPJ will oppose, prompting the government to use Article 59 to pass the bill for the second straight year. Recall that the LDP has previously conceded to Komeito on this issue: the very fact that the government has to renew the mission again this year is the result of a concession to Komeito last year, shortly after Mr. Fukuda took the reins.

Given that Komeito's thirty-one lower house members give the government its two-thirds majority, it's safe to assume that the lowest common denominator will win the day on this issue, meaning a repeat of last year's spectacle.

Fukuda the prevaricator

Fukuda Yasuo, done playing the (overly) generous host in Toyako, is back in Tokyo to face his ever growing pile of problems.

First on the agenda is, of course, the question of whether he should reshuffle his cabinet before going into the autumn extraordinary session.

After meeting with Ibuki Bunmei, LDP secretary-general, at the Kantei on Thursday, Mr. Fukuda's perspective on a cabinet shuffle was unchanged from before the G8 summit: "a completely blank paper." He is giving no sign that he is leaning one way or another, although the very act of delaying and remaining noncommital could be a sign of his intention to keep his cabinet unchanged. Given the intra-LDP wrangling that will necessarily accompany a reshuffle, he will have to make a decision to proceed soon if he is going to have a new lineup ready by early August.

A possible sign that there will be no reshuffle can be found in an interview Mori Yoshiro gave to Mainichi. Asked about the reshuffle, Mr. Mori said that his previous argument was a "general argument." He was making no hints about Mr. Fukuda's intentions. He explained that his thinking on a reshuffle rests largely in concerns that the cabinet is Mr. Abe's, not Mr. Fukuda's, a situation that should be corrected. And he acknowledged that there is a "linkage problem" between a reshuffle and a possible lower house dissolution.

That, ladies and gentlemen, may be the sound of the bursting of the reshuffle bubble.

The prime minister is better off spending his time figuring out how to outmaneuver or neutralize LDP opponents to his initiatives and craft an agenda for the autumn session that will put the DPJ on the defensive. He should put an end to reshuffle speculation now and stop speaking about his "blank paper."

The DPJ debates its election

The DPJ is scheduled to hold a leadership election in September.

There is some debate about the election. Should the party even bother with an election (see this article in Liberal Time), or should it just reaffirm Ozawa Ichiro as party president to minimize the risk of election-related instability? Should it wait until September, when the extraordinary session of the Diet is likely to have already begun, or should it hold an election in August, just before or at the very beginning of the session?

On the former, there should be no debate. While the LDP hopes that the DPJ will hold an election and that it will be fierce, pitting Mr. Maehara and his followers against Mr. Ozawa, that is no reason not to hold one. On the other hand, if the DPJ doesn't hold a vote, the LDP will complain about the DPJ's being antidemocratic. So the DPJ should ignore the LDP, ignore the media, and hold an election. If Mr. Ozawa's position in the party is so strong that he can be reaffirmed without a vote, then he should have no problem winning a vote. Yes, having a proper leadship campaign will give Mr. Maehara or a surrogate an opportunity to air their grievances against Mr. Ozawa's leadership (something that Mr. Maehara is obviously already doing). The party is better off letting him challenge Mr. Ozawa in a formal setting than continue to undermine the party in the media and to add "dictatorial control" to his list of grievances about Mr. Ozawa's leadership of the party. A formal election could be cathartic, and as a result strengthen Mr. Ozawa's legitimacy and power at the head of the party.

As for the latter question, there is little reason to wait until September to hold the election. Tahara Soichiro argues in Liberal Time that "until the DPJ leadership election, nothing will improve in Nagata-cho." I think Tahara overstates internal opposition to Mr. Ozawa — large sections of the party may be uncomfortable with Mr. Ozawa, but I don't think a majority of the party "always opposes" him — but his general point is right. As long as Mr. Ozawa is distracted by sniping from his internal opponents, he will be less able to pressure the government. An election won't end internal opposition to his leadership by any means, but it will delegitimize it somewhat, as he will have a new mandate to lead.

There is no consensus on the timing of the election, however. Hatoyama Yukio, the secretary-general, has nixed proposals to move it forward; Koshiishi Azuma, the head of the DPJ caucus in the upper house and an advocate of reelecting Mr. Ozawa without a vote, would prefer to hold an election before the new Diet session, as soon as the party finishes its survey of party members and supporters eligible to vote in a leadership election (now scheduled for completion in early August). No word on where Mr. Ozawa himself stands on the issue.

He should push for an early election, giving his critics their moment in the spotlight , disposing of them, and getting back to the business of unseating the LDP before the Diet reopens in late August.