Japan looks homeward

Curzon at Coming Anarchy is fed up with the DPJ.

Considering the DPJ's muddled position on the dispatch of JSDF ships to fight pirates alongside the naval forces of eighteen countries, he maintains that by waffling on the Somalia question, the DPJ has shown that it is incapable of governing.

I do not want to appear as a mere DPJ apologist, but I find Curzon's argument a bit too simplistic. The DPJ has one goal — and one goal only — in mind: win the next election. Blocking the dispatch of JSDF ships, if it in anyway moves the DPJ closer to victory, is a small price to pay for political change. The DPJ is doing what an opposition party is supposed to do, keeping the government honest. Given the lack of oversight that has marked the Indian Ocean mission and the MSDF more generally (cf. the Atago Incident), the opposition is not wrong to block the government's actions. (This is reportedly a major reason for DPJ skepticism about the dispatch.) Why should the DPJ be criticized for doing what an opposition party is supposed to do, especially since the LDP-Komeito government has such a poor record in command?

Of course it's frustrating that Japan has been reluctant to commit its forces to a mission consistent with the three fundamental missions of the Self-Defense Forces, according to the revised SDF law. Article 3 of the law states that the JSDF's primary missions are (1) the defense of Japan, defending its peace, independence, and security from invasions direct or indirect, (2) the maintenance of public order, and (3) cooperation with other nations under UN auspices to preserve international peace and prosperity (this last being a recent addition under Prime Minister Abe). Moreover, Article 82 authorizes the defense minister — with the approval of the prime minister — to dispatch MSDF forces to protect lives or property or preserve order at sea. I have a hard time seeing what is stopping the Aso government from going forward with full participation in coalition activities in the Gulf of Aden. The government controls two-thirds of the lower house of the Diet. If it believes that the dispatch is important, it should go ahead and do it, even if it means submitting a bill and waiting up to two months for the upper house to reject it. (That is, if a bill is required...)

The important question, therefore, is not why the DPJ is reluctant, but why the government, despite its supermajority, despite its principles, has dragged its feet. At least one reason for the delay is reluctance on the part of Komeito, the LDP's junior partner in government. The LDP has also made the mistake of connecting the dispatch with the question of Japan's right of collective self-defense, the exercise of which is prohibited by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau's prevailing interpretation. This mission should have nothing to do with collective self-defense and everything to do with Japan's responsibilities to the international community. If Japan's politicians are reluctant to fulfill those responsibilities, then the question is not to pin blame to one party or another but to pull back the curtain on Japanese foreign policy and ask why the Japanese people are so reluctant to approve any mission abroad by the JSDF.

In recent years, it appears that foreign policy has become a luxury for the Japanese people. Of course, given the difficulty of getting Japan to contribute more internationally in the best of times, is it fair to expect a substantial shift in Japan during the worst of times?

Opinion poll after opinion poll has shown that a tiny portion of the public thinks foreign policy is an important priority for the government. Polls show that a plurality favors some contribution to the multinational coalition in Somalia, but on the whole foreign policy achievements promise few gains and much risk for Japanese politicians. The Japanese people are, for the time being, interested in cultivating their own garden. Japan's institutions are broken, the economy is tanking, and the Japanese people are rightly concerned with whether their futures are secure. Arguably ensuring access to energy is essential to the country's economic future, but no leader has explained why events in the Horn of Africa (for example) are intimately connected with Japan's prosperity. No Japanese leader has gone before the Japanese people and said that Japan has been free riding throughout the postwar period, and that it is time to change. The Japanese people, it seems, would rather be Switzerland, at least for the time being, while their elected representatives are torn between the demands of their tired constituents and the demands emanating from foreign capitals, in the case of some the demands from their friends abroad.

The Japanese people have little interest in being a normal nation, at least for now. They want their abductees accounted for, they want their pensions paid, and they want to know that they will have access to quality medical care as they age. This may not be what Washington wants to hear, but for the time being it is what Washington will get. For now Japan is not a global great power, nor was meant to be.

Sooner or later Japan will resolve its foreign policy identity crisis. The Japanese people may eventually decide that they're ready to be a normal nation after all — or they may decide to undo the Meiji Restoration altogether and return to some twenty-first century iteration of sakoku. But ultimately it will be for the Japanese people and their leaders to decide.

Strange days

Perhaps showing just how serious China is about not mentioning the war and acknowledging Japan's "consistent pursuit of the path of a peaceful country," not to mention illustrating just how dire the situation in Szechuan is, the Chinese government has reportedly asked the Japanese government to dispatch planes to China in order to deliver tents, blankets, and other relief supplies.

It apparently doesn't matter whether those planes are civilian or JSDF.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura, answering questions about the request in his daily press conference, could confirm only that Beijing made the request, that the Fukuda government is considering its response, and that the request appears to be for planes to deliver the supplies to Chinese airports instead of directly to affected areas.

What a dilemma for the Japanese right — a new opportunity for the JSDF to show its quality...by aiding "the grotesque superpower, China." (The Social Democratic Party of Japan, as if to rub this dilemma in the right's face, has quickly stated its opposition to using the JSDF to deliver supplies, declaring that "the JSDF is not a disaster relief organization.")

In short, this request is another blow to those in Japan and the US who see a belligerent, dangerous China that must be contained — and want Washington and Tokyo to take steps that will guarantee a belligerent, dangerous China.

Here's hoping that the Fukuda government swiftly agrees to provide China with the requested supplies, borne on the wings of JSDF transport planes.

Bigger than the alliance

As noted in this post, much of the discussion surrounding the DPJ leadership's decision to oppose the extension of the anti-terrorism special measures law before it expires in November has focused on the impact on the US-Japan alliance of Japan's effective departure from coalition activities in and around Afghanistan.

The debate has hinged in part on questions surrounding the lack of a meeting between DPJ President Ozawa and Ambassador Schieffer, with Asahi reporting that Schieffer requested a meeting to discuss the special measures law following the DPJ victory, but Ozawa insisted such a meeting was "unnecessary." According to Amaki Naoto, meanwhile, Michael Auslin, the Sankei Shimbun's newest friend-of-Japan-in-Washington, was quoted by Sankei as saying, "In the event that it is not extended, it will have a worrisome impact on US-Japan relations."

Amaki, in his summary of this dispute, embraces Asahi's suggestion that the Bush administration has been uninterested in cultivating a relationship with Ozawa's DPJ, preferring to focus entirely on working with the Republican party's traditional friends in the LDP, and then goes on to argue that the debate over the extension is a great opportunity for Japan to demonstrate its independence from the US.

If the debate over the renewal of the anti-terrorism special measures law is an alliance matter, it is only because advocates of a more independent Japanese foreign policy wish to make it one (and alliance managers in Washington are happy to oblige them by suggesting that it is a major concern for the US).

The way I see it, however, is that the basis for Japan's renewing its participation in the coalition has little if anything to do with the alliance, and in fact rests on both Japanese law and UN Security Council resolutions, and is consistent with the DPJ's own foreign policy proposals. While the initial passage of the law in November 2001 had much to do with the alliance and the need for Japan to commit its support to the US campaign in Afghanistan, it is now 2007 and the logic behind coalition activities has changed. Afghanistan is still troubled, and Pakistan too is now embroiled in the struggle (as Barack Obama made clear, perhaps indelicately). Somehow it seems that the need for Maritime Interdiction Operations in the Indian Ocean as part of Operation Enduring Freedom is as important as ever, given who and what (drugs, nuclear material, etc.) could be flowing out of Pakistan by sea. Japan is refueling the warships of some eleven of the more than twenty countries participating in the coalition, this according to the 2006 Defense white paper. Meanwhile, in the intervening six years the campaign in Afghanistan has been internationalized, becoming as much as NATO project as as US-UK project, in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions 1386, 1383, and 1378.

Recall that in December, when the Defense Agency was elevated into a full ministry, some of the JSDF's secondary missions became primary missions. Among those missions are, according to the MOD's latest white paper, "activities that contribute to maintaining the peace and security of Japan and the rest of the international community, including international disaster relief operations, international peace cooperation operations, operations based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, and operations based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq." While this provision does not permanently bind Japan to current missions abroad, it does suggest that constitutional concerns, and alliance concerns for that matter, are overblown. The discussion ought to be based on an assessment of the situation in and around Afghanistan and whether Japan can still contribute to the mission.

According to its own policy list produced for the Upper House elections, the DPJ acknowledges the legitimacy of international missions on the basis of UN Charter Chapter VII: "UN peace activities concur with the philosophy of the constitution, which seeks a positive role in international society. Our country, under subjective judgment and democratic control, will participate positively based on UN demands that are in turn based on Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter, which differ from the character of a sovereign nation's right of self-defense." While the DPJ's position reserves a place for Japan to adjudge whether to participate in a UN mission, it also suggests that Japan has a role to play internationally outside of the alliance with the US and based on the constitution, in this case the preamble, which states, "We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in the peace, free from fear and want."

So yes, under the DPJ's own policy statements Japan reserves the right to decide whether to participate in a mission under UN auspices, but presumably such a decision would be based on an assessment of the facts of the matter and not held hostage to domestic political exigencies. Frankly, DPJ members and other politicians who seek a more independent foreign policy role for Japan ought to welcome opportunities for effective international cooperation such as that in the Indian Ocean, which shows both the US and the rest of the world that Japan is capable of cooperating outside the narrow confines of the US-Japan alliance in contributing to global security.

Japan's foreign policy needs to become less US-centric; it is unhealthy for both Japan and the US for Japan to defer to the US on every security policy issue. And the multinational coalition in and around Afghanistan is the perfect opportunity for Japan to begin weaning itself off depending on the US, seeing as how the coalition includes not just the US but NATO and other participants, and that the mission enjoys the imprimatur of the UN and thus greater international legitimacy than the Iraq mission.

So I repeat my objection. Barring an argument against renewal based on the facts of the campaign suggesting that there is no longer any role for Japan to play, the DPJ's actions are shamelessly opportunistic and constitute a failure of leadership on the part of Ozawa.