Open government

Amidst all the changes introduced by the Hatoyama government since it took office in September, it is easy to forget what may be the most revolutionary change of all: transparent government.

The most visible example thus far is the Government Revitalization Unit's comprehensive review of government spending programs, ably chronicled by Michael Cucek here and here. As Cucek notes, for the first time bureaucrats are being forced to account for programs for which they are responsible — and in Cucek's opinion, the bureaucrats' responses have been notable mostly for their lack of enthusiasm. He concludes that "the GRU proceedings have reinforced the DPJ's image as the party that cares about how tax revenues get spent."

He may be understating the significance of what the Hatoyama government is doing.

One of the major themes of the DPJ's 2009 election manifesto and earlier party documents was the importance of transparency and accountability for democracy. Simply put, Japanese democracy was rotten precisely because the authorities in Tokyo did not see fit to trust the public with information about how tax revenue was being spent and who was making national policy. Protected by a press that did not venture beyond press clubs in search of stories, stories that might reveal how policy emerged from opaque negotiations among bureaucrats and LDP fixers, LDP rule was shrouded in a cloud. As a result, public confidence eroded not just in the LDP but in Japan's government more generally. It is little surprise that public opinion polls during the months leading up to the general election showed that voters were skeptical about the DPJ even if they were willing to vote for the party: after years of LDP rule, during which the only thing that was clear was that the government was failing the public, what reason did voters have to be confident that any group of politicians could follow through on its promises? After the devastation wrought by the LDP, skepticism (to the say the least) towards the political system was and is a healthy response.

But little by little the DPJ is chipping away at the years of much-merited cynicism and disgust that have emerged among the Japanese people. Publicizing the GRU's hearings was an important first step. Opening up the press clubs could be another important step. The finance ministry's decision to publicize the budget compilation process piece by piece should help too.

The savings secured by the GRU have thus far been small, totaling just over 1 trillion yen. But the GRU hearings could prove much more consequential for the government if they restore the public's trust in the government, especially when it comes to spending taxpayer money. A Sankei/FNN poll found that the public is nearly unanimous in its support for the hearings. 88.7% of respondents said that the hearings have been useful for eliminating administrative waste. 85.2% said that the hearings should be held annually. Nearly 80% said that they were interested in the contents of the hearings. Most extraordinarily, 77.5% of self-declared LDP supporters said that they saw the hearings as useful.

I do not think that it is mere coincidence that a recent Yomiuri poll found that 61% of respondents said that they view a consumption tax increase to raise revenue for social security as unavoidable. This is just a theory, but I wonder whether the Japanese public had a problem not with consumption tax increases but rather with consumption tax increases carried out by a ruling party with such a dismal record when it came to using the public's money wisely. Why should the public have supported paying for money into coffers controlled by the spendthrift LDP? By taking its duties as the duly elected government of the people seriously in reviewing how public money is spent, it is conceivable that voters will be more understanding if and when a DPJ government seeks public approval for a tax increase, especially if it is explicit about how it will use the additional revenue.

Transparency is inextricably linked with accountability. By being open about how public money is spent, the DPJ will enable voters to assess how the government has performed come election time. This is central to the new policymaking system the DPJ is building today. The 1955 system was effectively premised on the idea that the LDP and therefore the government could take the time to craft a consensus, often working in secret and making various side payments to make it stick. Getting the distribution of benefits right was more important to the LDP than provide a full accounting of its activities to voters. The DPJ's nascent system, on the other hand, is based on Westminster and implicitly recognizes that since the ruling party could lose in competitive elections, transparency is on average is preferable as it enables the government to promote its achievements (while trying to spin away the failings). Without transparency, the ruling party cannot be held accountable by the public for its achievements. I recognize that the LDP did not build the 1955 system with these principles in mind — although I think that the DPJ's leaders are thinking along these lines — but I think this stylized story is useful for thinking about how LDP rule functioned.

So while the DPJ may be conducting a sort of fiscal truth and reconciliation commission through the GRU — a useful political maneuver as the DPJ consolidates its power — the hearings as much about the future as they are about the past.

And openness has as much to do with foreign policy as with fiscal policy. With Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya announcing that the government will proceed with unveiling the "secret" agreement between the US and Japan that permitted the "introduction" of US nuclear weapons into Japan despite the three non-nuclear principles prohibiting such actions, the push for open government also includes an indictment of how the LDP conducted the US-Japan alliance for decades. It could not be otherwise. For too long the US was happy to manage the alliance in the shadows and work with a host of unsavory characters if doing so served the interests of the alliance. While the end of the cold war likely meant the end of the more sordid dimensions of US-Japan cooperation, the US government nevertheless continued to enjoy deep ties with an LDP that essentially governed behind a veil of secrecy. Just as the DPJ is seeking to air the truth of LDP rule at home, so too will it air the secrets of LDP rule in foreign policy, starting with the nuclear pact that has been an open secret for decades. The DPJ's approach to the Indian Ocean refueling mission and the 2006 Okinawa agreement on realignment similarly cannot be understood without reference to the DPJ's emphasis on transparency.

Make no mistake: the DPJ is conducting a revolution in Japanese politics. It may not look like a revolution, because there are few guarantees that the DPJ will deliver sweeping policy changes, but it is important to recognize that a procedural revolution is still a revolution. And for the first time in decades the Japanese people may be able to trust their government to work on behalf of the public interest in full view of the public, so that they may be able to judge the government's progress.

The strengths and weakness of Mr. Hatoyama's government

After meeting with Ozawa Ichiro Monday, it appears that Hatoyama Yukio will get Fujii Hirohisa as his finance minister after all. The party's executive board — comprised of the inner circle of party leaders, including Hatoyama, Ozawa, Kan Naoto, and Okada Katsuya — has approved the roster, which will now go before the party's board of governors Tuesday evening for final approval, the evening before the two houses of the Diet will pick a new prime minister. Meanwhile, Ozawa will have full discretion to choose the DPJ's executives.

While the prospective cabinet lineup will not be announced after this evening's meeting, its membership is becoming increasingly clear. An anonymous source close to Hatoyama referred to the cabinet as an "all-star cabinet." Strip away the hyperbole and there is considerable truth to the idea that Hatoyama has picked a cabinet of DPJ heavyweights, even without knowing the identities of more than half the likely cabinet ministers. Kan and Okada will now be joined by Fujii. Other names mentioned include party group leaders Maehara Seiji and Noda Yoshihiko, and Sengoku Yoshito, a senior party leader close to Maehara. Nagatsuma Akira will be joining the cabinet in some capacity, possibly as the minister responsible for the new "Administrative Renovation" council that will work to trim waste for the government's budget. Naoshima Masayuki, an upper house member currently serving as the chief of the party's policy research council, could enter the cabinet as minister for economy, trade, and industry.

Hatoyama is also providing more details about the national strategy bureau. Addressing Okada's concerns that the bureau will step on his turf as foreign minister, Hatoyama stressed Monday that the bureau's primary task from its creation will be drafting a framework for the 2010 budget. It is still unknown how the bureau will function and who will be appointed to it — Kan, its director, will have the power to shape its work but has said nothing about his thoughts for how it should work, prompting Sankei to warn darkly about the "ambitious" Kan's power in the new government. (Apparently the "opposition" newspaper has tired momentarily of warning about Ozawa's power over the new government.) But of course we do know something about how Kan wants the cabinet itself to function: he wants cabinet ministers to do the heavy lifting through cabinet committees, especially in drafting the budget, suggesting that he would be reluctant to turn the national strategy bureau into a shadowy office unaccountable to other members of the cabinet. I am more confident that the NSB will serve the cabinet with Kan in charge than if another politician were made responsible for the bureau. It also seems that only DPJ members will staff the office: no SDPJ or PNP members will be included in its ranks. Excluding the DPJ's coalition partners from the office that will play an important role in shaping the government's agenda reinforces the idea that the DPJ is trying to limit the ability of its coalition partners to veto its policies.

It does appear that Hatoyama, far from being a presidential-style prime minister towering over his cabinet, will in fact be first among equals, the head of a committee of powerful politicians. The core of the cabinet will be comprised of some of the most experienced politicians the party has to offer, politicians who are distant from Ozawa and have their own followings within the DPJ, critical because a strong cabinet will have to keep Ozawa from bullying the government and its prime minister. Hatoyama may have won his first skirmish with Ozawa, but it is unlikely to be the last. (Indeed, part of me wonders whether the whole thing was staged in an effort to have Hatoyama get his way over Ozawa on some issue to show that Hatoyama is in fact in charge.) It will take the collective leadership of the cabinet to push back against Ozawa and prop up Hatoyama, a task of which Sengoku, among other prospective cabinet members, are acutely aware.

And what of Ozawa? Despite the Fujii "incident," there is still little evidence to suggest that Ozawa will be anything but respectful of the cabinet's authority. Yomiuri continues to warn of the danger of the "140-person" Ozawa group, although it buries an important caveat in its long article on the potential power of Ozawa: unlike LDP factions, DPJ members often belong to more than one group. The article also notes that Ozawa has already turned his attention to next summer's upper house election, leading me to wonder just how much energy Ozawa will have to spend on meddling in the policymaking process. Thus far there is still little evidence that Ozawa plans to use his veto power to do anything but keep the DPJ in line.

With the Hatoyama government's birth a day away, it bears asking two questions. First, what are the greatest weaknesses facing the Hatoyama government? Second, what strengths will work in the government's favor?

Weaknesses: Arguably there are three major weaknesses that could undermine the Hatoyama government and shorten its lifespan.

Hatoyama Yukio: I have been critical of Hatoyama in the past, and little has changed to make me any more impressed with his ability to lead the government.

In particular, I worry about his dealings with the press. The most recent example is a slip of the tongue in a press conference Monday in which he referred to "Ozawa Daihyo [party president, Hatoyama's title and Ozawa's former title" before correcting himself and saying "Ozawa Daiko [acting president, Ozawa's current title]." It is a minor gaffe that could be the result of fatigue, the similarity between the two words, and the fact that Hatoyama spent years saying "Ozawa Daihyo" when he was secretary-general before succeeding Ozawa as party president. But the point is that Hatoyama tends to be loquacious, which during the campaign prompted some in the DPJ to suggest that Hatoyama was being kept from the press to prevent him from saying too much and having to backtrack. The party is considering ending burasagari press conferences entirely, although it is unclear what will replace them. Will the Hatoyama government ultimately act like the Bush administration, keeping its head from appearing before the media in anything but the most controlled settings? (Bush was of course notorious for avoiding press conferences.)

The DPJ will not be able to hide Hatoyama from scrutiny — there is, after all, the unfinished matter of his campaign finance records — and if Hatoyama appears to not be in control of his own government, the press will naturally lambaste the prime minister for lacking the necessary centripetal power. Hatoyama may be first among equals, but he still has to be first. How will he keep himself from being overshadowed by his own cabinet? And if Hatoyama is regularly before the public, how can the DPJ prevent him from making damaging gaffes will still adhering to its commitment to transparent government?

Ozawa Ichiro: There is little to say here beyond what I have already written about Ozawa's role as secretary-general. The DPJ is taking a risk by concentrating such extensive powers in Ozawa's hands. The possibility exists that he could abuse it, forcing the government to negotiate its policies behind closed doors with Ozawa to secure his and the party's approval for every piece of legislation.

The media: Perhaps I should list the media as the greatest threat to the Hatoyama government. The Japanese media are politically powerful, and trusted by the public. The media can amplify small gaffes and mistakes, spinning them into a narrative that will undermine public confidence in the government. We've seen it happen with enough LDP governments in recent years to know how this process works. Public opinion polls conducted by media organizations are taken seriously by political leaders. And all of that is before taking into account the conservative media organizations who have made it their goal to undermine the DPJ government from even before it takes office.

The danger is of a vicious cycle. Imagine that a gaffe by Hatoyama results in a wave of negative media coverage — not just in the conservative press — that results in a sharp drop in public opinion polls. (Feel free to substitute a scandal implicating Hatoyama or Ozawa for a gaffe, or leaks from bureaucrats about the incompetence or malfeasance of some DPJ sub-cabinet member.) The drop in public opinion polls leads to panic within the cabinet and the DPJ. Maybe Ozawa decides to take a more active role in policymaking. Newspapers run articles noting that anonymous cabinet members are concerned about Hatoyama's leadership or Ozawa's influence. Perhaps some suggest a reshuffle. The media then repeats rumors of a reshuffle ad nauseaum, leaping on every hint. Faced with growing calls for a reshuffle — naturally he will be questioned by reporters in press conferences about his plans for a reshuffle — Hatoyama might waver, resulting in editorials about the prime minister's indecisiveness, which then becomes a leading theme on the wideshows. And so on until he is driven to resign. This is just one example, but the process is certainly familiar enough.

The government's survival will depend on breaking this cycle, whether by appointing an official to serve as a dedicated press secretary in place of the chief cabinet secretary and manage a government information office that will control how the cabinet communicates with the public or dissolving the press club system to break the power of the major media organizations. Perhaps both will be required. Whatever the solution, unless the DPJ changes how it communicates with the public via an at least partially unfriendly press, the Hatoyama government will be at its mercy. And for various reasons, both Hatoyama and Ozawa heighten the risks posed by the media.

Strengths: But the Hatoyama government is not doomed to fail, but at least not immediately. (All governments fail sooner or later.) It has several strengths working in its favor.

Policymaking: The DPJ takes power with clear ideas for how the government should formulate policy. It has studied how the Hosokawa government failed to develop a coherent policymaking process in 1993-1994, the pathologies of LDP rule, and strengths of the Westminster system and developed its own plans accordingly. Given that the DPJ's transition plans date to as early as 2003, the party has been thinking about how it would govern for most of its existence. In senior leaders have written at some length about the failings of the LDP system and offered detailed proposals for how to build a new policymaking process. Indeed, DPJ leaders have probably thought more about how to change policymaking than any other area of reform. In the weeks leading up to the birth of the new government, the DPJ has indicated that it will put these ideas into practice.

I have already written about the DPJ's emerging policymaking system, so I will only summarize it here: the goal is to create streamlined, top-down cabinet government that shifts the balance of power in policymaking in the cabinet's favor at the expense of the bureaucracy and the ruling parties. The cabinet will lead in budgeting through the national strategy bureau; cabinet committees composed of small numbers of ministers will take the lead in crafting policies for specific areas, while a DPJ-SDPJ-PNP committee within the cabinet will review the government's policies as a whole so to include the coalition partners in policymaking; Hatoyama's senior-most cabinet ministers have considerable prestige of their own and will constitute an inner cabinet, a steering committee that helps the prime minister override opposition from within the cabinet.

But this new policymaking system is only a means to an end: if the policymaking process at all resembles how it looks on paper, the cabinet should have considerable power to make the bureaucracy follow its lead in implementing the DPJ's campaign promises, and, when those plans inevitably conflict with reality, this system should give the cabinet the power to decide how to alter the party's policy plans. It should give the DPJ-led government the ability to try trial-and-error policymaking as it tackles the host of problems facing the government. The new policymaking process does not guarantee success, but a more flexible cabinet stands a better chance of making progress.

Ozawa Ichiro: Appointing Ozawa as secretary-general may be risky, but it is a risk that could pay off. As I've written previously, concentrating veto power in Ozawa's hands gives him power to challenge the government — but it also gives him the power with which to crush opposition from the DPJ's backbenchers. With Ozawa as secretary-general, the policy research council and other party organs will not wield the vetoes that their LDP counterparts wielded under LDP rule.

A public mandate: It is difficult to determine the precise nature of the DPJ's mandate. It's probably a fruitless exercise: it is impossible to say that the public supports this portion of the manifesto but not that portion. What is clear that when it comes to changing how the government functions the DPJ has the public's support. And just as the media can create a vicious cycle, so can the public support for a new policymaking process lead to a virtuous cycle for the DPJ. Using public support against bureaucratic and media opposition to its new administrative plans in order to win the day, the DPJ will then be free to use its newfound policy tools to implement portions of its agenda to prop up its public approval and win elections. Public support fades, but it doesn't have to collapse as it did for the Aso government.

These strengths and weaknesses are far from comprehensive — I said relatively little about how the bureaucracy might oppose the DPJ (it mostly involves using the media) — but I think these lists capture the dynamics that will shape the incoming Hatoyama government.

I may be overoptimistic, but given its focus on getting the policymaking process right, I think the DPJ stands a good chance of making real progress in changing Japan for the better. The Hatoyama government will undoubtedly make mistakes, there are still too many unanswered questions, and the scandals hanging over the heads of Ozawa and Hatoyama could shatter the government's support at any moment — but the DPJ is at least making decisions now that could set it down the path of success.

Sankei's revealing gaffe

In case anyone doubted that the conservative media will have it out for the incoming DPJ government, the Sankei Shimbun has done everyone a favor and admitted that, like the LDP, it has gone into opposition.

Sankei's city desk recently established a Twitter feed, at which the following was posted on 30 August even before voting was finished:

産経新聞が初めて下野なう

The Sankei Shimbun is going into opposition for the first time.

Faced with criticism, the paper apologized for the careless remark, i.e. careless in that someone actually saw it and complained, not in its basic truth as a statement of the Sankei's intentions in regard to a DPJ government.

As we saw in 2007 when Yomiuri's Watanabe Tsuneo tried to orchestrate a grand coalition between the DPJ and the LDP, Japan's newspapers are accustomed to thinking of themselves as active participants in the political process. Naturally Sankei would use the same term used to describe a governing party's losing an election and going into opposition to describe its own situation after the general election. The Fujisankei group is no friend of the DPJ's — and it will not be alone.

It will pounce on every mistake — real or imagined — of the Hatoyama government in order to embarrass it and otherwise undermine its credibility. It will report on every note of doubt printed in a foreign publication or voiced by a foreign analyst about the DPJ government in order to paint the DPJ as unable to manage Japan's foreign relations.

In other words, episodes like the dust-up with the New York Times/IHT could not only color foreign perceptions of the DPJ government, but Sankei and other publications will do their best to make sure that those perceptions have some impact within Japan.

The DPJ needs to get much better at handling the media, and soon. The LDP may be reeling, but Sankei and others certainly are not. (For more on the political power of the Japanese media, see the report referred to here.)

Everything you ever needed to know about the Japanese media

Via Joël J. Legendre comes a link to a truly encyclopedic report from the US government on the state of the Japanese media, up to and including a wide variety of digital media.

You can find the report here.

The whole report is worth reading, although perhaps not in one sitting, and keeping as a reference.

I found this quote particularly useful:

Compared to three decades ago, there are many more opinion magazines that express right-wing views about history and security. Although the authors of such articles are relatively limited in number, they now find numerous outlets for their views. This fact tends to amplify right-wing voices beyond their actual influence and crowd out countervailing opinions from the political center and left. [Emphasis original]

Hatoyama's media problem

As expected, the translation of Hatoyama Yukio's essay in VOICE (discussed here) has caused a stir in the United States.

Asahi quotes several anonymous former US government officials, as well as Sheila Smith from the Council on Foreign Relations, criticizing the essay. One of the former officials suggested that the Obama administration will simply ignore the essay. On the whole the essay will be at most a footnote in the transition to a DPJ government — the US-Japan alliance certainly isn't in danger because Hatoyama appeared in foreign media indulging, perhaps at greater length than other Japanese politicians, in the demolition of the straw man of "American" global capitalism.

But I hope the DPJ takes to heart the lesson of what can happen when the party is careless about what appears in the press with the party leader's byline.

The Japanese media — particularly Yomiuri and Sankei, as well as the bevy of conservative journals, of which VOICE is one — will be waiting for the DPJ to fail, and will do everything they can to hurry the process along. Sankei has been on the job of smearing the DPJ for months, and as even released a book "dissecting" the DPJ. And then there's Bungei Shunju, the current issue of which is devoted to "studies of the DPJ that nobody knows" — and its sister publication, Shokun! They will repeat every rumor, welcome every leak from anonymous bureaucrats, and pile on every gaffe by Hatoyama and members of his cabinet. They will try to ensure that the DPJ's honeymoon is as short as possible. Whatever role Ozawa Ichiro plays after the general election, they will use the trial of Ozawa aide Okubo Takanori to smear a DPJ-led government.

Managing the press will be an essential task for a Hatoyama government, a task that I fear the DPJ is not taking seriously. After all, why was Hatoyama's essay published in VOICE in the first place? Was it a bid to placate conservative elites, who have shown themselves to be nothing but skeptical of the DPJ? Why was the party not aware that VOICE would then turn around and syndicate an English translation? I am not one for conspiracy theories, but I wonder if VOICE — or whoever was responsible for the translation (I don't believe that it was the DPJ) — knew exactly what it was doing disseminating an essay that would clearly embarrass Hatoyama and make him look more radical than he actually will be in government. Why didn't someone at the DPJ realize that letting the party leader — or someone using the party leader's name — expound at length on his political "philosophy" in an essay complete with obscure references and poorly crafted arguments would make the party look bad on the eve of the general election?

Some commentators to my post wondered what was the problem with the substance of Hatoyama's essay — or with letting the "truth" be know by Americans. Again, I don't see too much problem with the policy content of Hatoyama's essay, insofar as it has policy content. A bit more distance from the US through cooperation in Asia while remaining within the alliance? I suspect that Japanese governments of whatever party will pursue this approach in years to come. But did Hatoyama have to sound so much like a Chinese Communist Party theorist trying to determine the precise moment when unipolarity will give way to multipolarity? Did he have to heap so much scorn on the country that still provides for Japan's defense and from whose government the DPJ will want cooperation on a number of issues, including but not limited to negotiations regarding the realignment of US Forces in Japan, the Status-of-Forces agreement governing the US military presence, the role of nuclear weapons in the alliance, and a free-trade agreement between Japan and the US, the last of which is an important piece of the DPJ's approach to the US-Japan relationship? There were other ways to make the same points without being nearly so antagonistic and furnishing DPJ skeptics with more reasons to doubt the party's abilities to govern Japan. At the very least, some senior official from the DPJ, if not Hatoyama, ought to have written (or lent his or her name) to a piece written originally in English for submission to an American publication. It certainly should do so now.

As the DPJ makes its preparations for a new government, it must also think hard about how it will manage its relations with the press, domestic and foreign, especially given Hatoyama's tendency to speak a bit too freely. A quote from an FT article by Mure Dickie on Hatoyama's shortcomings captures it quite well: "[Mr Hatoyama] has a very free point of view. From morning to night, he always wants to do the right thing. The problem is he doesn't know what the right thing is." It is for good reason that the press's access to Hatoyama has been limited during the campaign. From the time Hatoyama took over as party leader in May he was giving impromptu, burasagari press conferences once a day, but those press conferences stopped when the campaign began. Originally reported by Yomiuri, other media sources have reported on the lack of access to Hatoyama. Sankei notes that while the DPJ says that the reason is simply a matter of time, it cites anonymous sources in the party leadership in reporting that the actual reason for the lack of access is to prevent Hatoyama from making gaffes that could prove fatal during the campaign. But lest you think this report is simply the result of Sankei's bias, Asahi offers the same explanation based on an anonymous source at party headquarters. Asahi adds that there is no such policy in place for other senior party leaders, including Ozawa Ichiro.

Naturally if the DPJ wins Sunday, it will not be able to keep Hatoyama from the press forever. The danger of Hatoyama speaking too much and undermining his own government will remain. Much as Kawamura Takeo, Aso Taro's chief cabinet secretary, has been kept busy explaining away Aso's indiscretions, Kawamura's successor in a Hatoyama cabinet will have the same task. Indeed, explaining away bizarre or contradictory remarks by Hatoyama will likely be an essential task for the cabinet as a whole. It best be filled with officials capable of being as clear and decisive as Hatoyama is vague and self-contradictory.

Ultimately, the DPJ needs to become better at image management and strategic communications — and soon. A vetting process that includes outside experts for publications by party leaders would be a good start.

Fukuda passes, for now

It appears increasingly unlikely that Fukuda Yasuo will decide to reshuffle his cabinet before the autumn Diet session.

NHK is reporting that at the very least there will be no decision on a reshuffle before the end of the month, as two members of the cabinet are delayed in returning from WTO talks abroad.

Mr. Fukuda told reporters — rather sternly — that "not once have I said something about [a cabinet reshuffle]."

This gets to the heart of the matter. The persistence of the cabinet reshuffle story on the basis of complete silence from the prime minister shows both how the media can be the cat's paw of certain ruling party politicians and how a herd mentality among the major media organizations can transform the political discussion. For weeks political discussion has focused on the prospects of a reshuffle, thanks to persistent leaks "from within the ruling party" on the likelihood and timing of a reshuffle.

It was about time that the prime minister stood up to the media's groundless speculation. Unfortunately there may be little Mr. Fukuda can do about the manipulators of the media within his own party, who may now use the media to fuel speculation about the need to replace Mr. Fukuda with someone else quickly. As Nikkei reports today, "there is a possiblity that the 'post-Fukuda era' will appear rapidly."

Mr. Fukuda on holiday

Fukuda Yasuo, his (un)popularity barely affected by his hosting of the G8 summit last week, celebrated his seventy-second birthday Wednesday by starting a six-day vacation.

Asahi notes that this is early for a prime minister to take his summer holiday, and speculates that since the prime minister does not have plans to travel far, there might be some truth to speculation within the LDP that Mr. Fukuda is getting ready to reshuffle his cabinet.

Maybe so, but there is little information in the body of the article to merit inclusion of the phrase "Preparation for a cabinet reshuffle?" in the headline.

Mainichi includes a similar phrase in its headline — "mixed with speculation about a cabinet reshuffle" — but at least provides some reason for why the prime minister would be taking his vacation now as opposed to later in the summer. At the end of July and beginning of August, Mr. Fukuda will be working on budgetary requests, after which he will be in Hiroshima for the anniversary of the atomic bombing and then Beijing for the opening ceremony of the Olympics.

Instead of being a scheme to plan a reshuffle, Mr. Fukuda, no spring chicken at seventy-two, could simply need a few days rest at home with family.

The point is that while it's possible that the prime minister could be planning a reshuffle, neither Asahi nor Mainichi provides any evidence of this apparently headline-worthy claim. This is unfortunately typical for Japanese political journalism.

If they have information suggesting that there's truth to this, they should report it. If they have no evidence, they should write a short article about the prime minister's vacation and leave it at that. No speculation, no wishful thinking, just the facts.

As for a reshuffle, I remain convinced that it won't happen, that the prime minister doesn't want to break in a new cabinet before the next Diet session. He will return from his holiday next week and plunge back into the work of preparing for the autumn session.

UPDATE: Sankei outdoes everyone in its coverage of Mr. Fukuda's vacation and the prospect of a reshuffle. Sankei — Sankei and no other media outlet — claims that on Tuesday, Mr. Fukuda decided (their word) to reshuffle his cabinet on July 28. There is no source for this report. I may be wrong: it may be true that a reshuffle is coming. But this article reinforces my argument about the poor quality of Japanese political reporting. If they know this to be a fact, Sankei should do us the favor of stating just how it came by this knowledge. All they tell us are "government sources," government sources who leaked only to Sankei.

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SPEAKING of holidays, I will be taking one myself from Thursday evening. This will be my first non-blogging (and non-email) holiday since I started writing this blog. I may or may not write a post Thursday, so this may be my last post until next week.

Web developments

The Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan's largest daily by circulation, is finally entering the twenty-first century.

Earlier this month it revamped its website, introducing an RSS feed and other web tools. It also created a clipping service, for which users must register.

Meanwhile Japan's other political parties have followed the LDP and created YouTube channels of their own (DPJ; JCP; NKP; PNP; SDPJ; NPJ — links also available at YouTube's Japanese politics portal). Koike Yuriko has her own channel too.

Like the LDP channel — which at the moment features an odd video of Abe Shinzo promoting a Diet tour led by Mr. Abe himself — none of these channels is particularly interesting: lots of videos of people sitting in front of microphones. Nevertheless they should provide the occasional laugh.

Speaking of laughs, allow me to close with this video, featuring silly pictures of everyone's favorites, the "dangerous" ANA (Abe-Nakagawa-Aso) politicians.

What if the Australian prime minister came and nobody noticed?

Is there a news blackout on Prime Minister Rudd's visit to Japan?

He made a speech on climate change in Kyoto and visited Hiroshima on Monday, and neither Yomiuri nor Asahi have articles online about his activities.

It's possible that they have articles in the print edition that aren't online, but if that's the case, why did neither newspaper feel that it was worth posting articles online?

Australians can talk about the dangers of neglecting uneasy Japan, but perhaps they should be more worried about being neglected by Japan. Or perhaps it's silly to have a discussion about who's neglecting whom and recognize that over the long term Australia and Japan will have a sound relationship on the basis of deepening their bilateral ties and moderating the behavior of the US and China, the region's first-tier powers.

The Koizumi mystery

I hesitate to link an article in Shokun!, but I think this short article raises an important point.

The article wonders about Koizumi Junichiro's support for Koike Yuriko as a candidate for the premiership and his renewed involvement in politics more generally, particularly his recently formed nonpartisan study groups that may resemble proto-parties. It dismisses Ms. Koike's prospects — citing Mori Yoshiro — and attributes talk of her candidacy to Mr. Koizumi's "loose tongue."

There is something to this complaint regarding the former prime minister. Since his resumption of political activity, the media has taken to reporting on his every word, no matter how mundane. Every public appearance and every prognostication on the political situation receives mention, which in turn heightens speculation about Mr. Koizumi's intentions, which in turn leads to greater coverage of his activities, and so on — a giant snowball of media speculation based on thin shreds of evidence. Perhaps observers of Japanese politics — myself included — speculate about Mr. Koizumi's plans because we want Mr. Koizumi to have plans to retake power in a triumphant flourish.

Mr. Koizumi may dream of a return to prominence. He may harbor plans to bolt from the LDP and form his own party. But he has also given few hints as to what his plans might be. Officially, he backs Prime Minister Fukuda and sees no reason why the government should yield to calls for an early election. That's the extent of what we know; the rest is speculation.

There is, of course, a place for speculation about possible realignment scenarios, but it is necessary to step back from time to time and remember just how little we know about the intentions of the figures likely to play important roles in a political realignment.

April fools?

Today, April 1, the Japanese people have received an April Fool's Day gift in the form of a potentially temporary tax cut on gasoline and automobile purchases. There is, reports the media, chaos at the car dealerships and chaos at the petrol pumps. There is uncertainty regarding current road construction projects. And in a press conference Monday Prime Minister Fukuda apologized for the chaos resulting from the expiration of the temporary gas tax.

Mainichi is using the occasion to condemn both the LDP and the DPJ for their failure to act in the national interest.

The people, Mainichi argues, just want the parties to stop playing politics and compromise. What's happening instead is mob rule: "On big themes like national security and the tax system that influence the circumstances of state and society, democratic public opinion is divided. If a political party uses the other side as a pretext for digging trenches and not leaving, only sterile debate will arise. This is not the modern politics of persuading the public; this is the shape of mob rule that incites the public."

Both parties, the newspaper argues, are ultimately to blame for engaging in all-or-nothing politics, the DPJ for be unwilling to listen to alternatives to the immediate lifting of the temporary tax, the LDP for the behavior of the road tribe.

I don't buy this argument. I am proud of how the DPJ has held its ground on this issue, although admittedly it was easier to take a stand knowing that nearly three-quarters of the public supported an end to the temporary tax. For once the DPJ found an issue that enabled it to oppose the government on principle and indicate a way forward for Japan. Mainichi is mistaken to assume that Japan's national problems will be solved by half measures and compromises with the LDP's old guard.

No one ever said that the birth of a new Japanese democracy was going to be easy or clean. The process is ugly. There is much stubbornness and opportunism. None of the urgent national problems are being solved. But then Japan's broken political system is arguably urgent problem number one in that it has undermined efforts to fix everything else. Yes, the current dispute may resemble, in Mainichi's words, "a barroom argument," but an argument — in public — in which the two leading parties are fighting over a matter of principle with real-world implications is a major improvement over what has come before. I'm also pleased that the road tribe has been open in its opposition to efforts by Mr. Fukuda to cooperate on road construction. Better that opposition be in the open and subject to public scrutiny.

In an ideal world, the media would be welcoming this development and encouraging it, instead of haranguing the parties for their failure to come to a gentlemen's agreement to avoid "chaos."

Hopefully one day April 1 will be remembered as the beginning of a new era in Japanese democracy, not the latest sign of Japan's declining international influence.

Dear Japanese MSM: Free your information!

I have to second W. David Marx's gripe at META no TAME about the lack of free access to the content of Japanese dailies. I would also add that the Japanese MSM should be embarrassed by the shallowness of their online archives and the skimpiness of their RSS feeds. (On this latter point Yomiuri should be especially embarrassed — although I suspect that Mr. Watanabe doesn't care.)

Actually, even worse than the dailies are the magazines. In recent days I've used the deep archives of both Time and Atlantic (all 150 years now free*) for research.

By contrast, the online content of Japanese monthlies seems to stop at the table of contents of current issues.

Does Japan's information want to be free?

The press — for the most part — holds its praise

As the Japanese political world digests the newly announced cabinet reshuffle, the major dailies have each editorialized on the new cabinet, sounding some similar notes. Reading Asahi, Sankei, and Yomiuri, each editorial seemed pleasantly surprised by the quality of the individuals tapped by the prime minister for his new cabinet and the LDP executive. None, however, thinks that the new cabinet drastically alters the political landscape, because the Abe government still has to find the best way to deal with the Upper House being in opposition hands.

Asahi acknowledges that the new cabinet signifies a real change — although less than meets the eye, due to the retention of certain members of the first cabinet (i.e., Mr. Ibuki) — from the first Abe Cabinet, but by turning to a cabinet of LDP heavyweights, "the fading of Mr. Abe's presence will not be avoided. Asahi, of course, is not prepared to give the new cabinet a honeymoon period, demanding to know what the second Abe Cabinet's policy goals are, and it expects that the DPJ will be equally unforgiving.

The conservative Sankei Shimbun praised the new lineup, but pointed to the daunting task facing the new lineup in implementing policy in light of the ascendant DPJ — although Sankei thinks that rather than yielding to the DPJ and seeking compromise, the new cabinet should insist that it will not cave on important policies.

Right-of-center Yomiuri, which has easily been the Abe government's most loyal supporter in the media, acknowledges that the "journey ahead is full of troubles," but then proceeds to praise the talents of the new LDP leadership team, suggesting that Mr. Aso will be up to the challenge of uniting the party, and that Messrs. Ishihara and Nikai will be adept at working with the DPJ, Ishihara from his experience as one of the "new breed" of young policy-wonk legislators who worked across party lines in the 1998 "Finance Diet," Nikai from his time spent in opposition alongside Mr. Ozawa. Indeed, on this subject of cooperation with the DPJ, Yomiuri not surprisingly called for the new cabinet to cooperate with the DPJ as much as possible, echoing its recent call for an LDP-DPJ grand coalition (in fact, the last portion of the editorial more or less repeats the previous editorial, suggesting that if the government runs into trouble, it should form a grand coalition).

Yomiuri was equally effusive in its praise for the new cabinet, and has high hopes for Mr. Yosano's elevation to chief cabinet secretary. In fact, despite opening the editorial acknowledging the difficult task facing the new Abe cabinet, Yomiuri actually spends remarkably little time talking about the nature of the challenges and proposing the best course of action to overcome them. In short, there are lots of policy problems, and the best way to deal with them is cooperation. It's not exactly a vote of confidence, though, that in its editorial on the new cabinet Yomiuri once again suggested that the best course of action might be a grand coalition.

In general, then, the mood sees to be "wait-and-see." There is a sense that the new cabinet is certainly capable, but whether it will be able to do anything more than buy the LDP some time with which to sort out its structural problems remains to be seen. There is also the sense that Prime Minister Abe, now surrounded by serious, senior party leaders, will be taking a back seat in the management of his government, particularly with the able Mr. Yosano as chief cabinet secretary.

Said Yomiuri about the new CCS: "It is heard that there is hope that he will act not just as the cabinet's spokesman, but that he will play a central role in policy coordination within the government and between the government and the ruling parties." Rather than falling into line behind the prime minister, it seems that the new cabinet will be issuing orders to Mr. Abe, formulating the government's policy message, setting its Diet strategy, and otherwise trying to avoid the mistakes that doomed the first Abe Cabinet.

Komori rages at Asahi

Don't you hate when journalists — especially those who make no secret of where they stand — criticize other journalists and media outlets for their biases?

And yet Komori Yoshihisa has thrown down the gauntlet, charging the Asahi Shimbun with waging a political campaign against Mr. Abe and his cabinet. He hurls a litany of charges at Asahi: it is trying to present the Upper House election as a "de facto vote of confidence," when it is no such thing; it has completely ignored the Abe cabinet's efforts on constitution revision and bureaucratic reform, and Mr. Abe's diplomatic initiatives to reinvigorate Japan's foreign relationships; it has continued to focus on sensational reporting and criticism on such matters as Matsuoka's suicide, the Kyuma indiscretion, and recent revelations about MAFF Minister Akagi's alleged political funding violations; it has played up the Abe cabinet's responsibility for the pensions scandal and growing inequality; and for not properly proclaiming in headlines each uptick in the cabinet's popularity in opinion polls.

In other words, as he repeats throughout this post, Asahi is producing "propaganda" because it wants to see Abe fall.

It seems Komori has been in Washington too long, and listening to American conservatives complain about media bias — in other words, mastering the art of smearing your rivals without actually addressing their criticism.

Does Asahi want Abe gone? Yes, and its editorials have repeatedly made this clear. But then, Japanese newspapers follow the British model more than the American model. No one can mistake the Guardian for the Daily Telegraph. As a commentator at Komori's blog notes, the opposite of Asahi is Yomiuri, which is slow to criticize the government and which praises the Abe cabinet's "achievements," however small and insignificant. Would Komori prefer that Asahi follow the same line as Yomiuri? Why even bother with competing newspapers, then, if they are only competing in how much they can praise the government?

I wonder if Komori's rant is a sign of the right's vulnerability in advance of the election. Facing a potentially disastrous defeat the the polls, they may already be looking around for those to blame (anyone but the prime minister, of course). The ferociousness of Komori's attack on Asahi for suggesting that a major defeat in the weaker Upper House would be a vote of no-confidence in the government foreshadows, I think, the likely response from Abe and his followers in the event that the governing coalition loses its majority.

"The Upper House is not that important," they will undoubtedly say. "Anyway, the media was focused on distracting, sensational issues, and not our plans for the country."

The thought that Abe will relinquish power easily when his government rests on a two-thirds majority, which enables the Lower House to govern without the Upper House if necessary (see Article 59), is wishful thinking. Look for others like Komori to begin making the case for Abe staying in office regardless of this month's returns.