The DPJ prepares for its first steps towards a new style of government

The general election may be another four days away, but the DPJ's position in the polls seems secure and so the party is acting like a "responsible party" and putting plans in motion for its transition into government.

I have already written of the names mentioned for the leading positions in a Hatoyama cabinet — but naming politicians to the leading cabinet positions as early as next week is but one of the party's plans for the first days after an electoral victory.

In order to hasten the formation of a cabinet, the party has reportedly already begun vetting some 200 politicians who could be apppointed to the cabinet, the new national strategy office, and the new administrative reform and decentralization council whose task will be to identify areas where the government can cut waste from the budget. The goal is to have the cabinet lineup set before the new Diet is convened to choose a new prime minister. As for the vetting process itself, it seems that it is focused mostly on the political suitability of prospective appointees: namely, the state of their political finances and whether they have any past or present indiscretions that might embarrass the government (women, money troubles, etc.). I am a bit dubious about the process itself — as Sankei reports, the DPJ, lacking the government resources that have been available to the LDP when forming cabinets, is basically conducting open-source investigations using newspapers and weeklies, as well as talk in a candidate's hometown to gather information. But at least it's a start, and Japanese journalists are remarkably well informed. (I hope and presume that they're talking to journalists and not just reading articles.)

But beyond laying the groundwork for quickly staffing up a Hatoyama government, DPJ leaders are trying to set the tone for the party's first months in office. Kan Naoto's remarks on foreign policy — discussed here — are for better or worse part of this trend. I am more impressed with the party's initial moves regarding preparations for administrative reform.

Plans for the national strategy office are being finalized. The party plans to staff the office with ten Diet members, and gave them the power to oversee not only the budgeting process, but foreign policy and administrative personnel decisions. The Diet members will be joined by ten outside experts, and the plan is ultimately to amend the National Government Organization Law to legitimate the office.

As for the administrative reform council, its membership will include Diet members, outside experts, and representatives from the National Governors' Association and six local groups. The council will have a role in the budgeting process, mostly by looking for ways to economize so that the DPJ might be able to afford its manifesto.

The DPJ, moreover, is considering plans for reorganizing the government's tax commission, mainly by scrapping its party tax commission. The government's tax commission has long existed alongside the LDP's tax commission, with the latter being the more important of the two. The DPJ's plan is to make the finance minister the chair, the internal affairs minister the vice chair, and to fill the commission with parliamentary secretaries responsible for taxation from ministries and agencies. This reform follows the same principles of the DPJ's other administrative reform plans: put politicians in a position to oversee and instruct the work of bureaucrats.

The bureaucrats themselves continue to brace for the likely arrival of their new DPJ overlords. The first skirmish will be over the second FY2009 supplementary budget, portions of which the DPJ has made clear it wants removed. In a speech in Fukuoka Tuesday, Fujii Hirohisa, the likely next finance minister, repeated the party's call to remove spending related to Prime Minister Aso Taro's so-called "anime palace" (AKA the "state-managed manga kissa") and other public works spending from the supplementary budget and replace it with unemployment benefits and other spending directed to the immediate needs of Japanese citizens.

It is a worthwhile question whether the DPJ can actually follow through on its desire to introduce a policymaking process centered on politicians in the cabinet. Indeed, it is the central question facing a likely DPJ government. Journalist Shiraishi Hitoshi, writing in the monthly magazine Foresight, looks into the party's manifesto for clues as to whether the DPJ will be able to succeed in reforming Japanese governance. Not unlike LDP reformists like Nakagawa Hidenao, Shiraishi sees a number of points on which the DPJ appears to have compromised previously espoused principles and thus constitute warning signs of the DPJ's going soft on the bureaucracy. Most notably, he cites the absence of a proposal for radical decentralization (either the creation of a state system or the outright elimination of the prefectural level of governance) and the absence of the party's earlier call to demand resignations from top ministry officials, which he argues will undermine the impact of more political appointees and the proposed dissolution of the administrative vice ministers' conference. He is also concerned that the party will not be able to deliver on its proposed 20% cut in administrative personnel expenses and that the party will end up working hand-in-hand with the finance ministry.

I think Shiraishi makes some fair points, but on the whole I am less worried. I have no doubt about the DPJ's desire to accomplish consequential administrative reform once in power. But revolutions are not won by zealots; they are won by the realists capable of making tactical compromises with the old guard in order to outlast their enemies. The DPJ not only has to reform Japanese governance — it has to last long enough in power to do so. Nothing would undermine a DPJ government quicker than to declare open war on ministry officials, which would likely result in an endless stream of leaks, sabotage, and foot-dragging on the part of Kasumigaseki, a unified Kasumigaseki, which would in turn undermine the DPJ's ability to deliver on some of its promises in advance of the 2010 upper house election. And as for joining hands with the finance ministry, the finance ministry may prove to be the DPJ's best friend in Kasumigaseki during the early days. The DPJ has no greater enemy than ministries like the ministry of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, whose work has been deeply integrated in the LDP machine. It is these ministries that are especially threatened by the DPJ's plans to cut waste, and it is the finance ministry that is keen to cut waste. I have previously expressed my support for the DPJ's "realistic" turn in administrative reform, because I think it signals a recognition on the part of the party's leaders that the fight for administrative reform will be a long one and that they are better off dividing and ruling the administration than facing a Kasumigaseki united against the DPJ.

Fujii characterized it thusly: "The LDP is currently beneath Kasumigaseki. We will place Kasumigaseki under the DPJ. It is imperative to have a system that uses Kasumigaseki." The DPJ cannot govern alone. It needs to be able to use the talent and diligence of the national administration in order to realize its plans, imperative to remaining in power, which is turn imperative to reforming the government over the long term. Administrative reform still will not be easy, but at least the DPJ appears to recognize that it is a goal to be pursued steadily and patiently.

The DPJ faces the bureaucracy

With the DPJ's prospects on the rise and the LDP mired in what may be terminal disarray, the DPJ is receiving greater scrutiny when it comes to how the party will govern should it take power.

That, after all, is what this election is about: if seiken kotai [regime change], the DPJ's longtime mantra is to have any meaning, the DPJ must be prepared to change how Japan is governed. A change of government must be more than a change of the name of the party wielding Japan's shambolic administrative machinery.

To this end, the DPJ's Kan Naoto opted for an observation tour in Britain. Kan was in Britain for six days, where he met with officials from government and opposition parties to discuss power transitions and relations between politicians and bureaucrats. (Although if the DPJ is going to look to Britain for lessons, can someone please send a box set of Yes Minister to Mr. Kan and company?)

It is revealing that Kan went to Britain because in effect the DPJ hopes to transform Japan's "Un-Westminster" system into a proper Westminster system, with power concentrated in the cabinet at the expense of the governing party and bureaucracy. The vaunted administrative reforms implemented under Prime Ministers Hashimoto and Koizumi served more to strengthen the Kantei as a pillar competing with the LDP and the bureaucracy in the policymaking process than to turn the cabinet and the prime minister's office into a proper Westminster-style executive. The DPJ's hope — and its primary mission — is to concentrate power in the cabinet, declawing its own policymaking organs and forcing the bureaucracy to bend to the will of the duly elected government. Because the DPJ's policymaking organs are underdeveloped compared to the LDP's Policy Research Council, policy zoku, and other mechanisms for LDP backbenchers to intervene in the policymaking process, to effect regime change a DPJ-led government will obviously be forced to confront the bureaucracy. (Although the DPJ has thought ahead about how to prevent its policymaking council from becoming a power base independent of the government: the DPJ plans to have its head serve concurrently as chief cabinet secretary. Naturally the need for coalition partners could complicate this effort considerably.)

The DPJ has plenty of ideas for confronting the bureaucracy, many of which are spelled out by Kan in detail in the July issue of Chūō Kōron. But the sum of these ideas is a scheme to destroy the customary practices that have given the bureaucracy its power, most notably the customs of allowing the bureaucracy to wield the power of personnel appointment delegated to the cabinet and respecting the decisions reached in the conference of administrative vice ministers. Perhaps it would be easier to change Japan's administration if the bureaucracy's powers were written into law. Changing customs can be more challenging, entailing a protracted war of words between the DPJ and the bureaucracy played out in the media. The bureaucracy's goal is akin to the LDP's goal: create a public image of the DPJ as an irresponsible party incapable of acting on behalf of the Japanese people. The media will be the primary arena for the battle between the bureaucracy and a DPJ-led government, but there will be other tools at the bureaucracy's disposal. Bureaucrats may be able to use back channel connections to former bureaucrats in the DPJ in an attempt to sow dissent within the DPJ. Bureaucrats could leak information to the LDP in opposition to undermine or embarrass the government. We should expect that the bureaucracy will do whatever necessary to defend its prerogatives.

The war has already started. Ichide Michio, administrative vice minister for agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, questioned the DPJ's plans for income support for agricultural households as "unrealistic" at a press conference, a clear case of political intervention by a supposedly politically neutral public official. Hatoyama Yukio responded to Ichide's remarks by suggesting that in Britain "he would be sacked." Sasayama Tatsuo shows that Ichide was responding to leading questions from reporters, a mitigating circumstance certainly, but this episode shows what we should expect from the media should the DPJ take power — and more importantly, in the months leading up to the general election.

Admittedly I should not be so quick to speak of the "media" and the "bureaucracy" as monolithic entities. Indeed, success or failure for the DPJ will depend on the extent to which the DPJ is able to sow dissent among bureaucrats, to find and support officials sympathetic to the party's plans. But the point remains that the central task for a DPJ-led government will be engineering a dramatic shift in how power is executed in the policymaking process, a shift conceived by Kan as from "bureaucratic cabinet/centralized government" to "parliamentary cabinet/decentralized government" (the centralization dimension referring to the relationship between the center and the periphery in Japan as a whole).

What the DPJ should not do is compare this task to the two previous great reforms, the Meiji-era reforms and the Occupation-era reforms. The DPJ is simply incapable of delivering reform on that scale, not because it is the DPJ but because it is a party in a functioning parliamentary system. Consider the circumstances during which the great reforms occurred. The first followed an internal, top-down revolution that enabled the new ruling elites to redraw Japanese institutions as they saw fit. The second set of reforms followed catastrophic defeat and was the product of an external, top-down revolution. In both cases there was a blank slate, or at least as blank a slate as possible in human affairs. Reform was largely extra-parliamentary — and as a result, opposition to reform was extra-parliamentary, isolated from power and easily repressed or ignored.

Needless to say, the DPJ will not enjoy the same freedom. It will face considerable legitimate opposition, within the Diet from an LDP that will likely find its voice in opposition and even from members of the coalition government that will likely emerge from the government (even if the DPJ wins a simple majority due to the need to keep its upper house partners involved). It will face opposition from prefectural governors, mayors, prefectural and local assembly members, NPOs, industry groups, and unions. Sooner or later it will face opposition from a considerable portion of the public. And while the bureaucracy may not be elected, its members are certainly participants in the political process. Accordingly, the less grandiose the DPJ is regarding what it hopes to achieve through administrative reform, the less vituperative the party is in its rhetoric regarding the bureaucracy, the more effective the DPJ will be should it take power.

I applaud Kan's efforts to move the DPJ away from harsh, anti-bureaucracy rhetoric that will make it more difficult to work with the bureaucracy. At a press conference last week Kan stressed that the DPJ is not against the bureaucracy, that it recognizes that it needs to make use of the experience and intelligence of Japan's bureaucrats. The DPJ, he said, stands for "post-bureaucratic politics, not anti-bureaucratic politics." Nakagawa Hidenao, Schmittian in his desire for political enemies, dubbed Kan's remarks as heretical to the cause of administrative reform, a sign that the DPJ does not have the stomach to tackle the challenge. But Nakagawa has it precisely wrong. The existence of a strong, entrenched bureaucracy is a fact of life for any Japanese government. Demonizing the bureaucracy accomplishes nothing. As a party with no experience in governing the DPJ will be especially dependent on the bureaucracy.

Does that mean that there is no hope for administrative reform? Hardly. In looking to unify cabinet and party, the DPJ has sought to learn from the LDP's mistakes: bureaucratic rule has been harmful precisely because the LDP did little to prevent collusion between backbenchers and bureaucrats, which prevented the government from speaking with a single voice and enabled backbenchers to misappropriate enormous sums of public funds. A DPJ victory would be a positive development for precisely this reason, as it would represent an opportunity to create a system in which elected representatives serving as prime minister and cabinet ministers could determine national priorities and direct the administrative machinery accordingly, confident that their work would not be undermined by backbenchers following their own agendas. The task, in short, is to establish a clear division of labor between politicians and bureaucrats, making politicians accountable for setting national priorities and drafting legislation, and making the bureaucracy responsible for implementing the public's will as embodied in legislation.

LDP rule has effectively erased this line. The challenge for a DPJ-led government will be to restore it.

How can Japan be saved?

With the sudden departure of Nakagawa Shoichi from twin posts of finance minister and state minister responsible for the financial services agency (FSA), Yosano Kaoru has been elevated from state minister for economic and fiscal policy and now holds all three positions simultaneously, making him, to borrow a term from American politics, the Aso government's economy czar.

It is most likely a temporary arrangement; the government has indicated that he will stay in place until the budget is enacted, but thereafter the posts will be divided, either with Yosano being bumped back down to his state minister's post or with Yosano's becoming a "permanent" (insofar as anything about the Aso government can be described as permanent) replacement for Nakagawa.

Nevertheless, until that happens, Yosano bears a heavy burden — it is not for nothing that Ozawa Ichiro wished his go partner good luck, not least because Ozawa and his party will do all they can to make his life more difficult.

While he has a fairly straightforward task for the first month of his tenure, it is worth considering Yosano's views and speculate as to what might have been. Arguably, if Aso was sensible and chose his ministers — or at the very least his finance minister — on the basis of merit, Yosano would have been a fine first choice for the post he now occupies. While Yosano was perhaps denied the post due to his long advocacy of a consumption tax increase as the means to set Japan's finances right (and to Aso's need to reward Nakagawa for his loyalty), he has been nothing if not pragmatic, as he stressed at his inaugural press conference Tuesday. He has also, unlike the prime minister, been unflinchingly realistic.

While Aso has done everything in his power to play down the severity of the crisis and the responsibility of LDP governments for its severity, while repeatedly making the fanciful promise to make Japan the first country out of recession even as its economy declines faster than other developed countries, Yosano has served as the bearer of bad news. His speech at the start of the current Diet session is a good illustration of his thinking. The underlying idea is that if the government is going to ask for the people's forbearance, it must be straight with them. It must be forthright about crisis and the broader structural changes underway in the global economy, and must have a clear vision about how Japan should change over the long term in response to the crisis and broader trends.

This is consistent with his approach to politics as outlined in his 2008 book Dodotaru seiji / 堂々たる政治, which can be translated as Open Politics, in the sense of straightforwardness. It is telling that Yosano says, in the closing pages of the book, that his favorite word is "decency" (he uses the English), arguing that decency is a "weapon sustaining Japan" as it struggles to adapt. Yosano's vision of politics is not unlike Barack Obama's, in that he wants to deescalate conflict within the political system — he is a uniter, not a divider. He is opposed to "market fundamentalism," although not, he notes, opening Japan's economy more to the global economy. He wants to ensure, however, that the weak are protected. He also does what few in Japanese politics seem willing to do today: he defends the bureaucracy, suggesting that the failings of some should not condemn the good work done by most. Yosano stresses that there needs to be a clearer division of labor between bureaucrats and politicians, with the latter taking clear responsibility for big decisions about the direction of the state. (I heard Furukawa Motohisa, a finance ministry bureaucrat-turned-DPJ member, make the same argument in Tokyo last month.) It does no good for governance to demonize the bureaucrats and shift the blame for Japan's problems on their shoulders. He takes a nuanced view to the common reformist theme of "cutting waste," suggesting that while there are some wasteful expenditures that can be easily cut, other expenditures require more careful consideration as they can have tremendous impact on the life of citizens in forgotten corners of Japan. Similarly, he does not dismiss Nakagawa Hidenao's "Rising Tide" school offhand, but rather suggests that it is unrealistic to expect the automatic reconstruction of Japan's finances that Nakagawa believes will result if Japan simply gets its economy growing fast enough. With Japan's sinking deeper into recession, Yosano may not see his desired consumption tax increase any time soon, but the recession suggests that it might be a long time before Japan sees the kind of growth needed for a rising tide to lift all boats.

Yosano's thinking is strongly reminiscent of the LDP's old mainstream, a view that could be called "politics as administration." In another era, he might have been a successful prime minister governing in the "low posture" style, abjuring ideology while solving national problems.

The question, however, is whether Yosano's politics are appropriate for an era of faltering institutions, mounting economic insecurity, and the need for drastic change.

More than the debate over economic policy, this is the major difference between Yosano and Nakagawa Hidenao. Nakagawa's political vision is rooted in conflict. Arguably he subscribes to Carl Schmitt's view of the political, in which the political sphere is separated from other spheres of life by its divisions of the world into friends and enemies. As Schmitt wrote, "The political is the most intense and extreme antagonism becomes that much more political the closer it approaches the most extreme point, that of the friend-enemy grouping." [NB: I am not citing the controversial Schmitt to discredit Nakagawa.

Reading Nakagawa's Kanryo kokka no hokai 官僚国家の崩壊 (The destruction of the bureaucratic state), which was published around the same time as Yosano's book, I got the impression of Nakagawa as a politician in search of monsters to destroy. His bete noire, introduced in the introduction, is what he calls the "stealth complex:" a network comprised of the universities, the bureaucracy, the Bank of Japan, the financial world, and the media that works to retard reform and protect their vested interests. (He explicitly cites Eisenhower's military-industrial complex as his model.) He explores the way in which bureaucrats undercut political rivals by leaking information, how they dominate the policymaking process as "Japan's biggest think tank," and how through government by informal networks they have hollowed out the policymaking process so that no one is accountable. Japan, he argues, is ruled by a void. And in order to transform Japan, this stealth complex must be destroyed and politicians given firm control of policymaking, to which end he more or less endorses the Watanabe Yoshimi-Takahashi Yoichi-Eda Kenji administrative reform agenda, based on the notion that in hard times, bureaucratic rule must give way to political rule (a theme with deep roots in Japanese politics). The remainder of the book contains Nakagawa's countless ideas for Japan: a kinder, gentler market capitalism in which the Japanese people help each other without the government's intervention, a decentralized government and a bureaucracy reined in and accountable to the people, and a full embrace of the IT and green technology revolutions to revitalize the economy.

But running through it all — and through his writing at his blog — is the need for someone to blame for Japan's problems; someone other than the LDP, that is. His politics clearly require an enemy against which to direct political efforts, much like Koizumi Junichiro's emphasis on the "opposition forces" within the LDP who stood in the way of reform.

In short, between Yosano and Nakagawa there are two very different approaches to politics, two very different ways of tackling the problems facing Japan. With the implosion of the conservatives, it may in fact be these two men who are left fighting over the wreakage of the LDP after the next general election. MTC wonders what exactly Nakagawa is planning (i.e., whether he intends to bolt the party at an opportune time), but it may be the case that he is prepared to fight it out within the ranks of the LDP, that he's convinced that Japan's system is a two-party system and since one party is unacceptable to him — if his writings about the DPJ are to be believed — he has no choice but to fight on to remake the LDP.

And while Yosano himself is an unlikely prime minister, his worldview could provide the right mix of concern for Japan's downtrodden and an emphasis on (as Ozawa says) change so that things can stay the same.

The question, however, is which approach to politics is most likely to get things done. That, after all, is what the public has been waiting for for years: a government that will move deliberately to tackle the problems that both Yosano and Nakagawa believe ail Japan. I think Koizumi's enduring popularity has less to do with the content of his policies than that for the first time the public saw a government in action. Perhaps at times it was only the appearance of action, but it was a significant enough departure that I think voters still appreciate the former prime minister, much to the chagrin of writers like Morita Minoru. Which suggests that Nakagawa may be right that a confrontational approach is the only way to break the establishment and set Japan on a new course. Yosano's "softly, softly" approach simply expects too much goodwill from all actors, probably more goodwill than is possible in the midst of economic collapse.

But at the same time Nakagawa is far too forgiving of the LDP: the bureaucracy is as powerful as it is because it has governed hand in hand with the help of an LDP unable to govern itself. And I'm not convinced that the LDP can reform itself to become the party Nakagawa envisions without a cataclysmic defeat that forces the party into opposition.

Ultimately the picture that emerges from both books, however, is that the range of policy ideas in Japanese politics today is fairly limited. There is a general consensus that some form of decentralization is necessary, with varying degrees of scope. There is a general consensus in a broad swath of the political class of the need to reform the bureaucracy drastically and forge a new relationship in which the bureaucracy is an instrument of the cabinet. There is a growing sense of the need to develop and draw upon the skills and expertise of Japanese outside the bureaucracy. There is an acknowledgment of the need to fix the government's finances, with the debate focusing on the extent to which trimming waste from the budget will solve the problem. (and it is unclear where exactly the DPJ falls in this debate, seeing as how they've done everything they can to avoid talking about a consumption tax increase).

(Of course, what's missing from this consensus is the most pressing problem of all: how to replace foreign demand for Japanese goods with domestic demand for Japanese and foreign goods as the basis for Japanese economic growth.)

Given that an agenda has more or less coalesced, the overriding question in Japanese politics then is who can get the government moving. After watching three consecutive LDP prime ministers crash and burn, the public seems unconvinced that LDP is up to the task, no matter how passionately Nakagawa fulminates against the bureaucracy and castigates the DPJ as an enemy of reform. Nakagawa's diagnosis may be right, to an extent, but his cure has been tried, and it has failed. The LDP is too dependent on the bureaucracy for policymaking and its members too free to manipulate policy and undermine the prime minister to make the policies both Nakagawa and Yosano see as necessary.

It is entirely possible that the DPJ, should it form a government, will be no more successful — Japan may languish for years to come. If it does, it won't be for lack of recognition of what's wrong with Japan but rather due to an inability to reshape the system of government wholesale.

Good luck, Mr. Yosano (and Mr. Nakagawa).

The LDP's tax revolt

The upper house has begun debating the Aso government's second stimulus package and its controversial proposal to distribute roughly two trillion yen to Japanese citizens, 12,000 yen (US$132) per person in the hope of restarting the Japanese economy.

At the same time, the LDP is in the midst what could be the climactic battle in a long civil war over whether to raise the consumption tax.

The two policies are linked, the product of a bargain between the government and the finance ministry whereby the finance ministry agreed to release the stimulus funds in exchange for a commitment from the government to raise the consumption tax at the earliest possible date. Accordingly, the battle raging around these policies involves the same protagonists: on one side, bureaucrat bashers Nakagawa Hidenao, Yamamoto Ichita, and other Koizumian reformists (with Watanabe Yoshimi now sniping from the sidelines), and on the other, Aso Taro, Nakagawa Shoichi, his finance minister, Yosano Kaoru, the economy minister and longtime advocate of consumption tax increase as indispensable for sound public finance, and the Japanese bureaucracy.

The debate is over whether the government should include a commitment to phase in a consumption tax increase from 5% to 10% starting 2011 in the government's mid-term tax program. In making the case for the increase, it appears that Mr. Aso and his ministers will emphasize the importance of the tax for providing economic security for all citizens. Asked about the planned increase in Diet proceedings Monday, Mr. Aso stressed the importance of restoring the country's finances for providing pensions, health care, and welfare for Japanese citizens and insisted that Japan must wait no longer than the time it takes for the economy to recover to set about fixing its fiscal situation. In a sop to the reformers, Mr. Aso has also promised that any tax increase will be accompanied by efforts to cut waste and reform the bureaucracy.

Mr. Aso will likely spell out his thinking on the consumption tax question in his policy speech, which will not be delivered before January 26. Yomiuri reports that his address will spell out his economic philosophy and emphasize the need to put social security on surer footing — and also suggests that Mr. Aso will join in the capitalism bashing, criticizing "market fundamentalism" and distancing the LDP ever further from Koizumi Junichiro's structural reform agenda.

Despite indications to the contrary, the government does not appear to be backing down from its commitment to either half of the stimulus package/consumption tax increase program, despite opposition from within the party, opposition parties, business leaders, and an overwhelming majority of the public. If anything, the government is doubling down on its commitment, despite taking a beating in the court of public opinion — and the prime minister is convinced he will get his way. Asked Monday evening whether he expects rebellion within the party over the bill to revise the tax system for the 2009 fiscal year, which will contain the promised consumption tax increase, Mr. Aso dismissed the idea. His finance minister rejected an appeal from a ministry shingikai to withdraw the stimulus package with an outright "no." Jun Okumura thinks there might be more to it, but it seems possible that the Aso government is so far gone down this path that to abandon this course of action could mean the end of the government, the final push that brings the government's approval rating into the single digits and results in a vote of no confidence.

In any case, in Monday's deliberations Mr. Aso reiterated his government's decision to push forward with the stimulus package

Of course, pushing ahead with the scheme could mean the end of the government as well. While Mr. Aso dismissed the chances of a rebellion should the government need a supermajority to reapprove its bills in the Diet during the current session, the possibility is all too real. The Koizumians, having become the LDP's anti-mainstream since Mr. Koizumi left office in 2006, may finally have been pushed too far. As the Tokyo Shimbun reminds us, it will take only sixteen rebels to defeat the bill should the lower house have to pass it again over upper house opposition. Will sixteen emerge? Even without considering the Koizumians, the Aso government could be in trouble. Even Tsushima Yuji, head of the LDP's tax commission and head of the Tsushima faction, has voiced his opposition to explicitly setting a date for the introduction of a consumption tax increase. One does not need to be a Koizumian to wonder whether it is politically sensible to commit to a consumption tax increase when it appears that Japan still has not reached bottom in the current economic crisis.

But should Mr. Aso get his way in party deliberations and succeeds at introducing a consumption tax commitment into Diet deliberations, the LDP's reformists may finally stand up and say no to the government after two years of being pushed to the side, with Nakagawa Hidenao and Yamamoto Ichita the two leading figures in the campaign against both sides of the government's bargain with the finance ministry. Mr. Nakagawa's fight is as much against the bureaucracy as it is with Mr. Aso. In this post at his blog, for example, Mr. Nakagawa argues that the bureaucrats are insensitive to the lives of the Japanese people, that their planning on the consumption tax question is based solely on economic statistics instead of on the reality of daily life. Mr. Yamamoto writes at greater length on the reasoning behind the opposition of the reformists. Mr. Yamamoto, like Mr. Nakagawa, claims to not be opposed to the consumption tax increase in principle but believes that other steps must be taken first before introducing the tax: steps to eliminate waste, cut the number of Diet members (an intriguing idea, seeing as how Japan has nearly two hundred more national legislators than the United States for a country with just over a third the population), and combat amakudari. He also rejects the arguments floated to defend the idea that a consumption tax increase is political suicide for the LDP — Mr. Yamamoto finds the notions that the public will praise Mr. Aso for tackling the consumption tax issue and for showing how the LDP will pay for its proposals (unlike the DPJ) laughable.

Messrs. Nakagawa and Yamamoto have now been joined by the maestro himself, Mr. Koizumi. The former prime minister met with Mr. Nakagawa and Takebe Tsutomu Monday evening and declared that the idea of setting a date for the introduction of a consumption tax increase is mistaken. Mr. Koizumi's guidance might not influence the government, but it may steel the resolve of the LDP's reformists. I wonder too whether Watanabe Yoshimi's now constant presence on television will give courage to his former compatriots, providing a reminder that they have a place to go should they decide to rebel against the government. Mr. Watanabe's decision to act as an advance guard may yet prove to be a wise decision.

In any case, as this debate unfolds it is worth noting that the tax debate captures everything that is wrong with the LDP today and illustrates why prime minister after prime minister has failed to govern.

The tax issue encompasses everything: Kasumigaseki-Nagatacho relations, the size and role of the state, the future of economic governance (neo-liberalism versus something else), control of the LDP and the government, and the LDP's prospects beyond the 2009 general election. It shows that the LDP is several parties traveling under one label, several parties that increasingly see the political system in fundamentally irreconciliable ways. Mr. Aso and his predecessors have failed because the LDP is beyond the command of any one politician. Japan is ungovernable because the LDP is ungovernable, meaning that the loser in all of this is, of course, the Japanese people, who are no closer to having a government capable of fixing the government's finances and providing the protection they desire.

Is such a government waiting in the wings? The DPJ has been sniping on the sidelines of the LDP debate, presenting an argument similar to the LDP's reformists — the DPJ will oppose any bill stating a date for a consumption tax increase because efforts to reform the bureaucracy should precede any increase in the tax burden for the Japanese people. The DPJ, however, should tread carefully. It is easier to bash the bureaucracy than to offer a plan to fix the budget that does not include a consumption tax increase in some form. And if and when the DPJ forms a government, it will need that selfsame bureaucracy in order to govern.

Finally, as an aside, it is worth asking whether the current Diet, nearing the end of its term, should be allowed to vote on such weighty matters as whether to provide a stimulus package of dubious effectiveness or to commit to a consumption tax increase. While in a purely technical sense the current Diet is, of course, legitimate, it is in some sense a lame duck Diet, given the likelihood that the government will call an election as soon as it has the 2009 budget in hand. Why should a collection of parliamentarians, many of whom will no longer hold their seats at year's end, be allowed to decide Japan's fate at this critical turning point? It is clear why Mr. Watanabe wants an election to be held immediately.