The wages of uncertainty

The exchange of fire between the North and South Korean militaries that left two ROK Marines dead and at least a dozen wounded (see the roundup at Wired’s Danger Room blog), following closely on the heels of revelations regarding a new North Korean uranium reprocessing facility, strengthens hopes that the US and Japan might be able look past Futenma and strengthen their security relationship. The relationship has, of course, had a bit more wind in its sails since the standoff between Japan and China over the maritime collision near the Senkakus.

Can we really draw a straight line from regional instability to closer security cooperation between the US and Japan? Arguably this logic has worked in the past, with North Korean provocations from 1994 onward stirring Japanese policymakers to bolster Japan’s capabilities and launch new bilateral initiatives with the US, ballistic missile defense being perhaps the most notable example. And there are signs that the DPJ-led government is remarkably more realist in its approach to the region than many expected. I think Foreign Minister Maehara Seiji spoke for many in the DPJ when he told an official Chinese foreign affairs publication that he is “by no means a hawk but a realist who values idealism.” The distinction between “hawk” and “realist” is meaningful and says a lot about the DPJ’s approach to foreign and security policy.

To be a hawk in Japanese politics is not just to support a certain set of policies: it is more a cultural identity than a policy stance. It is a worldview that, in addition to wanting to dismantle political and legal constraints on Japan’s security policy, questions the value of Japan’s postwar regime (that which former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō wanted to "leave behind"), supports revising the constitution (not just Article 9), opposes “masochistic” interpretations of history, and promotes traditionalist values. While they cite the threats posed by North Korea and China to justify their policies, the idea of Japan as a great power is valued in its own right — it is not driven by material considerations.

Meanwhile, to be a realist in Japan means much the same as it does in other countries: valuing the sober assessment of national interests, and thinking clearly about how best to secure those interests using the means available. While I think “realism” is often associated with a predisposition towards military capabilities and the use of force, it need not be. As Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels argued in a 1998 article in the journal International Security, postwar Japanese leaders have been “mercantile realists,” thinking of Japanese national interests in broader terms that prioritized Japan’s economic position.

The DPJ has thus far been far more realist in its foreign and security policies than has been generally recognized. Like earlier LDP governments it is working to maintain some sort of constructive relationship with China, however difficult, while building closer bilateral ties with other countries in the region that are also concerned about Japan’s rise. The government has signaled that it is willing to invest in Japan’s security, for example announcing last month that the MSDF will increase its purchase of new submarines from sixteen to more than twenty. As this post at Sigma1 notes there are signs that the government’s new National Defense Program Guidelines, which the DPJ has been considering since it took power, will contain a number of sensible proposals to enhance Japan’s security, including a relaxation of the arms exporting principles and relocation of SDF personnel from the north to the south. Is Japan “rearming”? Arguably not. But we are not seeing a passive and pacifist Japan either, despite the idea that the DPJ is “left wing.”

But what about the relationship with the United States? On the face of it, the dispute with the US over Futenma has shown the limits of the DPJ’s realist tendencies, allowing its position on the bases to be driven by domestic political considerations instead of the “national interest.” However, is it really in the interest of either Japan or the US to force bases on an unwilling Okinawan public? The point is not that the DPJ has been particularly sober minded in its approach to the issue, but that it is not altogether clear how the bases in Okinawa serve Japan’s interests, which leads to the larger question of how the US-Japan alliance can best serve the interests of both countries.

This is the big question hanging over the alliance, the question that the two countries may finally be in the process of addressing as they begin consultations in advance of a bilateral summit that is expected to be held sometime in the spring. Will North Korean provocations or Chinese maritime adventurism push the alliance in new directions? If anything, I think regional uncertainty reinforces the trend towards a “strong but limited” security relationship focused deterrence in and around Japan instead of more expansive or grandiose plans for the alliance. And given Okinawan opposition to US bases and the uncertainty regarding the US economy, the countries should be talking about politically and economically sustainable deterrent capabilities. 

As such, while developments in the region may lend a certain urgency to bilateral talks about the future of the alliance, it is unlikely that they will push the US-Japan alliance in a drastically different direction than it was already going.

After the showdown

Japanese Prime Minister Kan Naoto and Wen Jiabao, his Chinese counterpart, have met briefly in Brussels on the sideline of the ASEM summit, marking an end to the bilateral standoff following the collision between a Chinese trawler and Japanese Coast Guard vessels in the vicinity of the disputed Senkakus.

As expected, Japan and China reiterated the importance of the strategic, reciprocal partnership initiative. High-level talks and cultural exchanges will resume. All in all, it is difficult to say what has changed strategically as a result of the dispute. That China will fiercely resist any perceived change to the status quo in its maritime disputes? That China has greater leverage at its disposal? That countries — not just China — don't like having their nationals held by other countries, particularly when, Sourabh Gupta argues, there may have been little basis for Japan's holding the Chinese fishermen in the first place? 

Meanwhile, the conventional wisdom that the US is the biggest winner from the dispute is probably overstated. The allies will not find it any easier to resolve the Okinawa dispute, which continues to loom over the alliance. More importantly, however, the dispute appears to have merely reinforced the DPJ government's basic approach to China: having little choice but to forge a working political relationship with its neighbor, Japan will redouble its commitment to building constructive relations with China. In short, the dispute, rather than signaling that Japan must change course entirely, may simply lead the Kan government to try harder. 

The basic idea that has animated foreign policy under the DPJ from the day it took office — that Japan, living in a region dominated by a rising China and a declining but still powerful US, needs to find a way to navigate between and live with both power — remains intact.

That being said, the dispute with China has obviously had consequences within Japan, not least for the Kan government's public approval ratings. Despite having received a remarkable bump in his support after defeating Ozawa — nearly twenty percent in some polls — Kan's numbers are back to around fifty percent thanks to his government's perceived mishandling of the dispute. Peter Ennis makes a strong case that the Kan government actually handled the issue well, getting the assurances it needed out of the US while resisting Chinese pressure long enough for the government to claim that the captain's release was the result of a decision by the prosecutor's office in Naha and not the central government. But the Japanese people apparently do not see it the same way. In Yomiuri's poll, for example, eighty-three percent of respondents were not convinced by the prime minister's claim that there was not political intervention. The same poll found a ten-percent increase in the number of respondents who said foreign and security policy should be a top priority for the Kan government; in early August only four percent said it should be a top priority. Whether this change in the public mood is more than temporary remains to be seen, but the drop in the government's approval ratings give Kan that much less room to maneuver as the prime minister tries to coax the opposition parties to cooperate with the government.

Indeed, the LDP has rushed this issue to the top of the agenda as the autumn extraordinary session of the Diet begins. The party has declared that the "abrupt" release of the captain was the worst foreign policy failure in postwar history. The LDP is sure to build its response to the Kan government around this issue, together with the latest Ozawa indictment, meaning that the largest opposition party has two tangential issues with which to attack the government — with the sanction of the public, thanks to the public opinion polls showing that these issues matter — and put off talk of cooperation on an economic agenda. The LDP will of course get an assist from the Japanese media, particularly its more conservative precincts, which appear to have found their voice again after a dismal couple of years during which their issues vanished from the agenda as the global financial crisis unfolded and then the LDP was unseated by the DPJ.

The dispute with China not only has given ammunition to an LDP desperate to obstruct the Kan government and force an early election — it has also provided an opening for dissent within the DPJ, stirrings of which could be found in the petition signed by forty-three DPJ members, including Nagashima Akihisa, and submitted to Sengoku. The petition goes out of its way to soften its criticism of the government, but it does suggest that China policy could create some space between the government and the ruling party. However, since Kan's cabinet has been united on the issue, grumbling within the DPJ can be safely ignored for now.

So did Kan lose? I cannot agree with Ennis entirely that the government handled the dispute well. The government's biggest mistake was stressing that it was a matter for the Japanese legal system to handle. This stance may well have contributed to China's raising the stakes on the issue (because it could not accept this stance without tacitly acknowledging Japanese sovereignty) but it also ensured that the rule of law would be tarnished in the event of a Japanese climb down. If the Japanese government was indeed prepared to allow the legal process to run its course I suppose this position would have been acceptable, but I doubt that Tokyo really was prepared to wait that long (unless the Kan government was actually caught off guard by Beijing's response). The Kan government should have treated the issue like the diplomatic dispute it was from the very beginning instead of staking the credibility of Japanese institutions on the outcome. That it did so at least partially explains the public's opposition to the government's handling of the issue.

By holding out for as long as it did Japan may well have forced China to think twice about how hard it will push Japan in the future, perhaps won Japan more support from other countries locked in disputes with China, and provided an opportunity for Japan and other countries to take steps to mitigate China's economic leverage (as in the case of rare earth elements), but these gains may have come at the expense of Kan's credibility at home. Without public support, the prime minister, already the head of a de facto minority government, will find it that much more difficult to move an agenda centered on fixing Japan's economy, which in turn is critical to maintaining Japan's influence in the region (as argued by Maehara Seiji, Kan's foreign minister, at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan Tuesday). Whatever the medium-term benefits to Japan from the dispute, it may not have been worth the short-term costs for Kan.

Hatoyama delivers an impressive cabinet

The votes are being counted in the House of Representatives, after which the House of Councillors will vote for the new prime minister. Hatoyama Yukio's election as the next prime minister is assured.

On the eve of his election by the Diet, Hatoyama decided the presumptive lineup of his cabinet — but he did not share it with the press Tuesday, warning that if appointments "are leaked, they will be changed." (Hatoyama actually deserves credit for his handling of the press regarding cabinet appointments during the past two weeks: he said he would hold off on making announcements, and he has stuck to it, offering little to the press when questioned. Undoubtedly he has made few friends among the media as a result.)

But the list itself, now public, is impressive. In addition to already-known appointments of Kan Naoto (deputy prime minister and head of the national strategy bureau), Okada Katsuya (foreign minister), Fujii Hirohisa (finance minister), and Hirano Hirofumi (chief cabinet secretary), the Hatoyama cabinet includes as host of senior DPJ politicians balanced among the party's different groups. The balance led Yomiuri to refer to it as a "safe driving" cabinet, as if safe driving is a bad thing after Aso Taro's reckless driving (how else to refer to his appointment of Nakagawa Shoichi as finance minister during a severe global financial crisis, after all?). Appointing ministers from across the party is a good way of ensuring that there will be lively debates in the cabinet and that there will be few senior politicians left in the party to cause trouble for Ozawa Ichiro and the cabinet. (Noda Yoshihiko, an "anti-mainstream" leader, was denied a cabinet post and has reportedly complained about it, but he has relatively little company.)

In addition to the aforementioned names, the cabinet will tentatively include the following:

Haraguchi Kazuhiro, a five-term member from Saga prefecture, will serve as minister of internal affairs and communications. Haraguchi is exceptional in that he actually held the same portfolio in the DPJ's shadow cabinet. In fact, he has held the postal reform portfolio in previous shadow cabinets, suggesting not inconsiderable familiarity with his brief. At fifty years old, he will be the third youngest member of the cabinet.

The justice minister will be Chiba Keiko, an upper-house member from Kanagawa who is unusual in that she is one of a tiny number of DPJ members who did not leave the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) until well after the party's ill-fated coalition with the LDP. Chiba is liberal on history and social issues, and has served as the shadow justice minister and the shadow minister for gender equality and human rights under various party leaders (including Maehara).

Kawabata Tatsuo, one of the party's vice presidents and an eight-term Diet member (first elected from the Democratic Socialist Party), will take the lengthy title of minister of education, culture, sports, science, and technology. Befitting his long service, Kawabata has held a number of party leadership positions, including chairman of the party's board of governors.

In a somewhat surprising move, Nagatsuma Akira, "Mister Nenkin," scourge of the Social Insurance Agency, will be Masuzoe Yoichi's successor as minister of health, labor, and welfare. At forty-nine he will be the second-youngest cabinet member. I think giving Nagatsuma a proper ministry is a brilliant stroke, ensuring that a problematic ministry will get an energetic minister strongly committed to the party's administrative reform program (and reforming social security) at its head, and giving Nagatsuma experience that will raise his national profile further. His popularity will no doubt be a boost for the cabinet.

The ministry of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries — perhaps the most problematic ministry — will go to Akamatsu Hirotaka, a seven-term Diet member who began his career in the Socialist Party and has been in the DPJ since its first iteration. He will have his work cut out for him.

Naoshima Masayuki and Maehara Seiji (at forty-seven the youngest cabinet member) received the economy, trade, and industry, and land, infrastructure, transport, and tourism portfolios respectively. Maehara will also hold portfolios for disaster relief, and Okinawan and Northern Territories affairs. (Perhaps the latter briefs are a way to give Maehara a voice in foreign policy discussions through the back door? Presumably any cabinet committee discussion of either issue will include Maehara.)

The environment ministry goes to Ozawa Sakihito, along with Hirano Hirofumi a close ally of Hatoyama's. A member of Sakigake and an original member of the DPJ, Ozawa's appointment may reflect the prime minister's interest in emissions controls.

After worries that the defense ministry would go to the PNP's Kamei Shizuka, the post will go to Kitazawa Toshimi, along with Maehara and Kawabata a party vice president. Kitazawa is also one of four upper house members in the cabinet. Coming from Nagano, it is not surprising that Kitazawa has long been close to former Prime Minister Hata Tsutomu, once Ozawa's co-conspirator in splitting from the LDP in 1993 and one of the participants in the creation of the new DPJ in 1998. He recently served as chair of the upper house foreign and defense policy committee.

Nakai Hitoshi, who first joined the DPJ in 2003 in the merger with the Liberal Party, will serve as head of the Public Safety Commission, and Ozawa critic Sengoku Yoshito will head the new Administrative Renovation council.

Also joining the cabinet will be SDPJ head Fukushima Mizuho, whose portfolio will include consumer affairs and the aging society problem, and PNP head Kamei Shizuka, whose portfolio will include the Financial Services Agency (FSA) and the postal issue. Kamei is pleased to have received this post, describing the appointment as "perfect." It is not clear, however, what role Kamei will play in dealing with Japan Post, as the ministry of internal affairs will continue to take the lead in managing postal affairs. The portfolio may simply assure Kamei a seat at the table without any attendant administrative responsibilities. Mainichi reports some unease from investors regarding Kamei's position as head of the FSA due to his opposition to "structural reform," although Kamei will likely have little independence regarding finance and investment. (And, incidentally, it was Kamei who reassured the Obama administration that Nakagawa Masaharu's remarks about Japan's buying only Samurai bonds under the DPJ was not an official statement.)

Ikeda Nobuo sees Kamei's participation in the cabinet as an ill omen for the Hatoyama government, citing shady dealings of Kamei's from the 1980s. I cannot speak to these rumors, but Ikeda makes one claim regarding Kamei's participation in the cabinet that I disagree with: Ikeda argues that Hatoyama will have a difficult time controlling Kamei and suggests that he could become a "bomb that destroys Japan's economy." I think that both Kamei and Fukushima will end up being marginal figures in the new government. Neither has an important portfolio, and with the DPJ aiming to move away from unanimous decision making in the cabinet, they will have little power to stop cabinet decisions. Their parties obviously have the ability to stop legislation in the upper house, but if they are included in the decision-making process from the beginning it should simplify management of the upper house. As MTC argues, the DPJ may need the two small parties beyond July 2010, and it makes good sense to include both leaders in the cabinet to streamline the policymaking process. Undoubtedly Kamei and Fukushima are simply happy to be in the cabinet. The DPJ has given up very little to secure their participation. I think worries about the two are, for now, overblown.

I think that Hatoyama did an extraordinary job picking his cabinet, for which he deserves credit. He has shown that he has no problem delegating authority to politicians who may have more policy expertise than him or independent standing within the DPJ. Few politicians in the cabinet are dependent on Hatoyama for his patronage. He will be surrounded by ministers who will have no problem disagreeing with the prime minister. But he also chosen talented ministers who by and large have been in the DPJ for most if not all of its existence, are committed to its policy programs (especially administrative reform), and are independent from Ozawa Ichiro. As I told Yuka Hayashi of the Wall Street Journal, Hatoyama as prime minister will be "more of a committee chairman than a president." He will have to manage debates among his ministers, intervening when appropriate, closing debates, and setting the policy agenda. But he will not be in a position to dictate policies to his cabinet and demand that the ministers follow along.

When it comes to cabinet personnel, Hatoyama has put his government in a position to succeed.

The Hatoyama system takes shape

The coalition with the SDPJ and the PNP cemented, the DPJ is getting to work filling in the rest of the cabinet.

One question is what posts the SDPJ's Fukushima Mizuho and PNP's Kamei Shizuka will fill. The SDPJ has requested either the ministry of health, labor, and welfare or, it seems, the environment portfolio. Despite an earlier report that suggested Kamei would enter the cabinet as a minister without portfolio, it seems that the PNP now wants the ministry of internal affairs and communications, not surprisingly given that the PNP's issue is reversing postal privatization. It is unlikely that the DPJ will give the post to Kamei.

Hatoyama Yukio has set 15 September, the day before the Diet will elect the new prime minister, as the target for finalizing cabinet appointments. Nothing, it seems, will be decided before then.

But the names of likely cabinet ministers are emerging. In addition to Fukushima and Kamei — and before them Okada Katsuya, Hirano Hirofumi, Fujii Hirohisa, and Kan Naoto — DPJ members under consideration are Nagatsuma Akira ("Mr. Nenkin"), Maehara Seiji, Sengoku Yoshito, and Naoshima Masayuki. Maehara, despite (or because of) his reputation as a hawkish defense specialist, is rumored to be under consideration for the ministry of land, infrastructure, transport, and tourism. Sengoku is being considered for the justice and health, labor, and welfare, while Naoshima, currently the DPJ's policy affairs research council chairman, may end up as the METI minister.

That leaves at least seven more names to be included in the new cabinet, which could be more depending on how many "special mission" posts the Hatoyama cabinet decides to create.

What seems clear, however, is that with Maehara and Sengoku likely to receive important posts in the cabinet, it will be difficult to speak of the Hatoyama cabinet as an "Ohato" cabinet. It is possible that Ozawa's favorites could fill out the remainder of the cabinet, but with Sengoku and Maehara — Sengoku was close to running against Ozawa last year, and both were against Ozawa's continuing as party leader as the Nishimatsu scandal unfolded — in the cabinet, the idea that Hatoyama's cabinet will simply be under Ozawa's thumb is unlikely.

Indeed, it is possible that the DPJ has solved its Ozawa dilemma. Ozawa will still wield tremendous power, but his power will be more directed at the party's now numerous backbenchers. He could use those backbenchers against the cabinet, but that assumes that their loyalty to Ozawa is so strong as to lead them to rebel against their party's leadership in cabinet. I will believe in the existence of an Ozawa faction when I see some evidence for it beyond speculation rooted in Ozawa's past as a lieutenant of Tanaka Kakuei linked to his work on behalf of DPJ candidates across Japan.

Walter Bagehot provides an appropriate metaphor for thinking about Ozawa's role in the new government: "A cabinet is a combining committee, — a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens, the legislative part of the state to the executive part of the state. In its origin it belongs to the one, in its functions it belongs to the other." In the case of the Hatoyama government, Ozawa will be the hyphen that joins the DPJ-led cabinet to the DPJ's parliamentary majority. His voice will carry weight — I have a hard time seeing him stay completely quiet on policy affairs — but his influence on policymaking may be less than feared.

Indeed, in this role Ozawa could be indispensable to moving Japan away from LDP's cumbersome policymaking process into an era in which politicians in cabinet are capable of making decisions, enacting policies, and leading. Ozawa has long lamented the role that bureaucrats (and the United States) have played in limiting the ability of Japan's political leaders to direct the country. The question now is whether Ozawa can accept other political leaders' directing the country. With enough Ozawa skeptics in the cabinet, he may have no choice but to accept their lead.

Party A vs. Party B

Maehara Seiji, the former DPJ president who has been viewed as a possible defector from the DPJ, said in a TV appearance Thursday evening that "even if the DPJ loses the election, it will absolutely not break apart." I have long been skeptical of the willingness of Maehara and his fellow conservatives to defect from the DPJ, particularly when the DPJ has been ahead in public opinion polls. Maehara's remarks are yet another reminder that the DPJ — often criticized as being as divided as the LDP — is more unified than the party's critics acknowledge. Moreover, it suggests that a political realignment after the general election is far from inevitable.

Rather what we are witnessing is simply part of the evolution of a mostly two-party system. A post at The Economist's Democracy in America blog is useful on this point.

Questioning the importance of a coherent governing philosophy for either the Republican or the Democratic Party, the anonymous blogger notes:

The American political system all but guarantees dominance by two stable parties over time, but there's no sound reason to think that two basic ideological frameworks adequately represent the diversity of citizens' political views, even in a very rough sense. And, of course, the actual platforms of the two 'modern' parties—which is to say, the parties boasting the names 'Republican' and 'Democratic'—have fluctuated wildly over time. What if we dispensed with any pretense of ideological content and simply branded them 'Party A' and 'Party B'?

Party A and Party B? That actually sounds like a fairly good description of the Japanese political system. Indeed, given the ideological polarization within American politics it is a better account of Japanese politics than American politics.

The DPJ is often criticized for being "LDP-lite," but that implies the LDP has a stable identity to which the DPJ can be compared. The LDP may be the world's most successful big-tent party, having succeeded in preserving an ideologically diverse coalition for more than a half century. Perhaps the key to its success has been that the ratio of pragmatic moderates (i.e., pork-barrellers) to ideologues has long been skewed in favor of the former. Whether this is still the case is an open question, but the LDP has succeeded by being less ideological than its rivals. The DPJ, like the LDP, has its share of ideologues — of the left and the right — but like the LDP it will enjoy more success the more it is "Party B" to the LDP's "Party A." Of course, the more success the DPJ has had at selling itself as "Party B" the more imperative it has been for the LDP to sell itself as "Party A." Thus past elections saw both parties trumpeting "reform" on their campaign posters. (Indeed, back when I was doing campaign work I remember seeing posters for LDP and DPJ candidates side by side, each poster proclaiming the candidate's commitment to 改革. Alas, no picture.) And this election will see the two parties committing over which is more sensitive to the concerns of the average citizen, which is more opposed to the consequences of the Koizumi reforms, which party offers the kinder, gentler reform package. Both parties promise to punish the bureaucracy. Both parties have punted on tax reform.

Party A The LDP will no doubt respond to this situation by borrowing from Karl Rove's 2004 strategy for the re-election of George W. Bush, using swine flu and North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons tests to appeal to voters' fears of an uncertain world — and suggest that now is no time to trust an untested, immature party like the DPJ with power. The LDP flirted with this approach in the 2007 upper house election, but as that election was not a general election, the fear card did not have the same salience. Hatoyama Kunio, minister of internal affairs and communication and brother of DPJ leader Yukio (and possibly friend of a friend of terrorists), said after North Korea's nuclear test this week that under the DPJ "the country cannot be protected." To make this argument he continued to cite Ozawa Ichiro's February remarks about one day reducing the US presence in Japan to the Seventh Fleet. No doubt we'll be hearing those remarks cited out of context up until the general election.

The fact that LDP officials keep referencing Ozawa's remarks may be evidence of how little the LDP has to gone on in trying to argue that electing the DPJ would be risky in these dangerous times. In reality, the DPJ has given remarkably little ammunition to the LDP: it is no less enthusiastic about recovering the abductees than the LDP, it has balanced criticism of China with outreach to Beijing, especially under Ozawa, and it is open to autonomous defense capabilities and, as mentioned in this post, preemptive strikes against North Korea. Nevertheless, the LDP will try to paint the DPJ as irresponsible, irresolute, and pacifistic when it comes to the defense of Japan.

If fear is not enough to win the election for the LDP, it will ultimately come down to intangibles, with the DPJ's benefiting from being just different enough from the LDP to unseat it from power. (Party B! The choice of a new generation?)

The end of the beginning

Ozawa Ichiro indicated, in a tearful press conference Tuesday evening, that he will stay on as DPJ president despite the indictment of his chief public secretary — but Ozawa's statement may have only been the end of the beginning of the final act of Ozawa's long career.

The press conference itself was a masterpiece of defiance. Ozawa did not give an inch, insisting on the outrageousness of the actions of the public prosecutor's office and the lack of wrongdoing his part or the part of his secretary. He appealed to the public for support and understanding, and insisted that now as ever his purpose is to build Japanese democracy. (The press conference can be read in its entirety here, here, here, and here.)

But it is unlikely that the press conference will be the end of Ozawa's troubles.

First, by staying on Ozawa will remain a target for the media. As Jun Okumura notes in his reading of editorials on Ozawa, the press has for the most part called for Ozawa's resignation, and will likely to continue to press for it by reporting every snippet of news that might back Ozawa into a corner. To paraphrase another politician who had his troubles with the media, it looks that the Japanese press will have Ozawa to kick around for at least a little while longer — and it will not hesitate to get its kicks in.

The press will also report on every note of criticism of Ozawa from within the DPJ, of which there appears to be plenty. Apparently DPJ members were holding back their criticism in the hope that he would bow out freely, without their having to do anything to force him out. But as before Ozawa's press conference, the press is being disingenous in its reporting on criticism of Ozawa. The critics mentioned in press reports on "cracks in the DPJ" appear to be none other than the usual critics of Ozawa, the youngish, reformist members clustered around Maehara Seiji, Edano Yukio, and Noda Yoshihiko. Mainichi, for example, quotes Sengoku Yoshito as calling for Ozawa to "independently make the political decision [to resign]." Sengoku Yoshito is one of Ozawa's most outspoken critics within the DPJ and had made some noise about challenging Ozawa in last year's party leadership election before backing down like Ozawa's other critics. Maehara Seiji, Ozawa's predecessor and perhaps his most frequent sparring partner within the DPJ, has also questioned the wisdom of Ozawa's decision and wondered why Ozawa received so much from one company. Sankei's discussion of criticism of Ozawa comes entirely from the Maehara-Edano-Noda axis, featuring quotes from Sengoku, Komiyama Yoko, education minister in the DPJ's shadow cabinet, and Edano, who said that Ozawa's explanation was inadequate. Sankei actually mentioned Komiyama's remarks in a separate article, which notes that this was her first public criticism of Ozawa without mentioning her connection to what is effectively the most anti-Ozawa portion of the DPJ.

It is for that reason that the image of a DPJ falling to pieces must be taken with a lump of salt.

The DPJ has a mainstream-anti-mainstream dynamic not unlike that which has characterized the LDP for much of its history. By ignoring this background, press coverage of the DPJ's divisions conveys a misleading impression of Ozawa's having been completely abandoned when in reality criticism from these members is entirely in keeping with their role as the opposition within the opposition. There are critics outside of this section of the party, but for the moment it appears that most of the criticism comes from the party's anti-mainstream. And given their history, it is worth asking whether their criticism is any great concern. In its battles with Ozawa, the Maehara-Edano-Noda axis has repeatedly failed to follow up its criticism with action. After spending most of last summer painting a portrait of Ozawa as DPJ dictator, not a single member of the anti-mainstream decided to run against Ozawa in the September election. When Ozawa stepped down after facing criticism for his discussions with Fukuda Yasuo regarding a grand coalition, not a single member of the anti-mainstream stepped forward as a possible successor. For all of Maehara's participation in LDP-centered study groups, there are few signs that he is actually willing to defect along with other anti-mainstream DPJ members.

In short, the press coverage of the criticism may be worse than the criticism itself. These critics are simply doing what the anti-mainstream is supposed to do, and I read their remarks as being more about election positioning than a serious effort to drive Ozawa to resignation. As I wrote when the first polls after the scandal were published, the indictment merely reinforces the trend towards urban, reformist DPJ candidates running against Ozawa and the party in order to win their seats. But in order to do that, they have to act like anti-mainstream candidates. I don't take their fretting about whether they will win their districts all that seriously: they are still facing LDP candidates who are weighed down by Aso, Fukuda, Abe, 50 million missing pensions records, and a disintegrating economy. Reformist candidates for both parties will be running against their party's leadership — and for all the suspicion surrounding Ozawa, DPJ candidates should still have an easier time distancing themselves from him than their LDP rivals.

I am not ruling out the possibility that the DPJ leadership is making a grave mistake in backing Ozawa, but I do not think that the political situation as been wholly transformed or that an LDP victory is assured by Ozawa's staying on as party leader. The LDP does have more reason to hope; the LDP has officially questioned why Ozawa is staying on, but I think this Mainichi article is right that the LDP would actually prefer Ozawa as the face of the DPJ than any other leader. But Aso has critics of his own within the party, and his future as the head of the LDP is no more secure than Ozawa's future as DPJ leader. And the public is far more concerned with what Aso is doing as prime minister than what Ozawa did or did not do a few years ago in service of his political ambitions.

Maehara will not run

In case there were any doubts about Ozawa Ichiro's reelection chances as head of the DPJ, Maehara Seiji has announced that despite his problems with Ozawa Ichiro's leadership, he will not run against Mr. Ozawa in the September leadership election.

Speaking at Japan's national press club Wednesday, Mr. Maehara reiterated his desire to see a new debate on the party's election manifesto, but said he would not be running against Mr. Ozawa.

Mr. Ozawa, however, rejected suggestions that the party should revisit the manifesto upon which it won the upper house in 2007: "Just one year ago we debated and drafted a manifesto. For a general election in the fall, how would we explain the differences from last year?"

The marginal benefits of reopening a debate on the manifesto in order to clarify some issues are probably outweighed by the costs of airing the party's dirty laundry any further. And if Mr. Maehara and the other discontents are unwilling to stand for the party leadership and use the campaign to advance their ideas, why should the party overextend itself to accommodate their concerns?

I noted yesterday that Mr. Ozawa should be magnanimous to his rivals, but his magnanimity should not be boundless.

Too significant a revision would only exacerbate intra-party tensions and make the DPJ's beliefs even less clear to the public. But some revision, especially in terms of providing a more detailed account of the party's governing priorities and a map to how it intends to proceed upon taking office would be helpful.

Maehara backs down?

The DPJ is increasingly focused on its forthcoming leadership election, the date of which has been set for 21 September, with the campaign's official start set for two weeks prior.

The DPJ's anti-Ozawa groups have still not agreed upon a candidate to stand against Ozawa Ichiro, while Hatoyama Yukio and Kan Naoto have both expressed their support for Mr. Ozawa. Mr. Ozawa, reports Asahi, will likely go into the campaign with a majority of the parliamentary party behind him. The groups (factions) of Messrs. Hatoyama and Kan, as well as the left-wing Yokomichi group have pledged their support for Mr. Ozawa. The Isshin-kai, an Ozawa-sponsored group for DPJ members who have been elected fewer than three times, is also expected to support Mr. Ozawa, as are a number of the party's endorsed candidates for the next general election (who get a vote in the leadership election). Mr. Ozawa's support among the party's prefectural chapters is also overwhelming.

In the midst of this gathering Ozawa landslide, Maehara Seiji has softened his critique of the party's policies. Speaking Wednesday at a symposium with Yosano Kaoru, a possibile post-Fukuda LDP president, Mr. Maehara stated, "I don't reject the party's thinking, but the manifesto must be made better." He suggested that the points of contention in the party leadership election should be (1) the form and manner of decentralization, (2) the place of the UN in the party's security policy thinking, and (3) the question of how to fund the party's manifesto proposals.

I'm not surprised by Mr. Maehara's retreat from Liebermanian territory in relations with the DPJ — and I'm not surprised that it looks as if Mr. Maehara will leave it to Sengoku Yoshito to fall on his sword in the September election.

And, I should add, I'm not particularly impressed with Mr. Maehara's attempt to spur a discussion about the DPJ's "failure" to demonstrate precisely how it will govern if and when it takes power.

Yahoo's Minna no seiji has published both Mr. Maehara's article in Voice and the conversation with Tahara Soichiro and Mr. Yosano in Chuo Koron that have prompted criticism of Mr. Maehara from within the DPJ (and given the LDP hope that the DPJ might fragment).

In the first part of his article in Voice, Mr. Maehara chides his party for its role in creating the nejire kokkai by prioritizing opposition to the government over solving national problems. (He also criticizes the LDP and Komeito for dismissing opposition proposals out of hand, unlike, he says, in Germany, where since "various opinions are presented from within the government and the opposition parties, seventy or eighty percent of legislation is revised.") In short, he argues that both the LDP and the DPJ should stop politicking and start working for the good of Japan, logic that sounds awfully similarly to the logic behind last year's push for an LDP-DPJ grand coalition. He then proceeds to criticize DPJ positions on the temporary gasoline tax, the new eldercare system, before explaining his ideas on the aforementioned points of contention in the leadership election.

The interesting section is when he discusses the Koizumi-Takenaka reforms, because this section reveals much about Mr. Maehara. He says, "The direction and sense of the Koizumi/Takenaka reforms is completely correct." But — there had to be a but — the reforms as implemented were sham reforms because the bureaucracy interfered with them. And perhaps, he suggests, Mr. Koizumi could have been a little more attentive to growing inequality and the need for more spending on health care.

In the second part, he provides fodder to those who see Mr. Maehara as being at the center of any political realignment by discussing the existence of "reformists" and "conservatives" in both the LDP and the DPJ. He then talks at length about his cross-partisan activities, especially on national security and foreign policy, and notes how there are many politicians in the LDP who understand Japan's problems.

Finally, he closes with advice to the DPJ. First, he has the gall to note that "only the LDP will profit" from cracks in the party that will be the result of internal squabbling. Second, he calls on the DPJ to resist the temptation to populism, to telling the people what they want to hear instead of what they need to hear.

The conversation with Mr. Yosano hinges more on specific policy questions, but Mr. Maehara's criticisms of the party and Mr. Ozawa are the same. (Part one; part two.)

I don't necessarily have a problem with Mr. Maehara's policy ideas; like most politicians, he has some good ideas and some not-so-good ideas (in the latter category I would put his statement, "If I were at the helm, I would make 'world leader in per-capita GDP' a national goal"). My problem is with his naivety. He genuinely believes that if reformists in both the LDP and DPJ just work together to craft good policy, Japan will be saved.

But to paraphrase Horace, you may drive politics out with a pitchfork, she will nevertheless come back. There is no escaping the "political situation," reputedly an obsession of Mr. Ozawa above all others. Working with the LDP simply means giving the LDP the means to cling to power. There may be reasonable, intelligent LDP members, but the LDP remains the LDP, collectively frightened of any change beyond that necessary to stay in power, allied with the bureaucracy, and bereft of any vision beyond survival.

This is the unspoken meaning of what Mr. Yosano says in his discussion with Mr. Maehara: "The LDP is a rather flexible political party. If we receive various requests, we change that which can be changed."

For all of Mr. Maehara's ideas, he lacks wisdom (or political sense). He fails to see that any compromise behind tactical, issue-by-issue compromise abets the LDP. He fails to see that in many ways the continuance of the LDP in power — no matter how well-intentioned and sensible some members of the party are — is the single biggest obstacle to remaking Japan into the kind of society that Mr. Maehara purports to want. His fixation on balancing the budget in the DPJ's electoral manifesto simply misses the bigger picture that regime change will provide a new government, free of the pathologies of fifty years of one-party rule, with the opportunity to chart a new direction for Japan, a goal that Mr. Ozawa shares. Unlike Mr. Maehara, however, it seems that Mr. Ozawa has actually given some thought to how to topple the LDP in an election first. And his way of thinking would not only give the LDP policy victories, but it would also make it increasingly difficult to tell the two parties apart, a development that would make it easier for the LDP to fend off a DPJ challenge to its rule.

For all his unhappiness with how the DPJ is run — and all of his efforts to cultivate partnerships with LDP members — I expect that Mr. Maehara will ultimately fall into line. The election end in a landslide reelection for Mr. Ozawa, Mr. Maehara and a buoyant Mr. Ozawa will reconcile on Mr. Ozawa's terms, and the party will unite in pursuit of regime change.

The DPJ debates its election

The DPJ is scheduled to hold a leadership election in September.

There is some debate about the election. Should the party even bother with an election (see this article in Liberal Time), or should it just reaffirm Ozawa Ichiro as party president to minimize the risk of election-related instability? Should it wait until September, when the extraordinary session of the Diet is likely to have already begun, or should it hold an election in August, just before or at the very beginning of the session?

On the former, there should be no debate. While the LDP hopes that the DPJ will hold an election and that it will be fierce, pitting Mr. Maehara and his followers against Mr. Ozawa, that is no reason not to hold one. On the other hand, if the DPJ doesn't hold a vote, the LDP will complain about the DPJ's being antidemocratic. So the DPJ should ignore the LDP, ignore the media, and hold an election. If Mr. Ozawa's position in the party is so strong that he can be reaffirmed without a vote, then he should have no problem winning a vote. Yes, having a proper leadship campaign will give Mr. Maehara or a surrogate an opportunity to air their grievances against Mr. Ozawa's leadership (something that Mr. Maehara is obviously already doing). The party is better off letting him challenge Mr. Ozawa in a formal setting than continue to undermine the party in the media and to add "dictatorial control" to his list of grievances about Mr. Ozawa's leadership of the party. A formal election could be cathartic, and as a result strengthen Mr. Ozawa's legitimacy and power at the head of the party.

As for the latter question, there is little reason to wait until September to hold the election. Tahara Soichiro argues in Liberal Time that "until the DPJ leadership election, nothing will improve in Nagata-cho." I think Tahara overstates internal opposition to Mr. Ozawa — large sections of the party may be uncomfortable with Mr. Ozawa, but I don't think a majority of the party "always opposes" him — but his general point is right. As long as Mr. Ozawa is distracted by sniping from his internal opponents, he will be less able to pressure the government. An election won't end internal opposition to his leadership by any means, but it will delegitimize it somewhat, as he will have a new mandate to lead.

There is no consensus on the timing of the election, however. Hatoyama Yukio, the secretary-general, has nixed proposals to move it forward; Koshiishi Azuma, the head of the DPJ caucus in the upper house and an advocate of reelecting Mr. Ozawa without a vote, would prefer to hold an election before the new Diet session, as soon as the party finishes its survey of party members and supporters eligible to vote in a leadership election (now scheduled for completion in early August). No word on where Mr. Ozawa himself stands on the issue.

He should push for an early election, giving his critics their moment in the spotlight , disposing of them, and getting back to the business of unseating the LDP before the Diet reopens in late August.

Mr. Maehara's rebellion

On Monday, Suga Yoshihide, the deputy head of the LDP's election strategy committee, praised Maehara Seiji, deputy head of the DPJ for his comments about the DPJ's ability to govern and incoherent policy agenda in a speech in Kawasaki, Kanagawa. Mr. Suga said: "He spoke courageously. If someone like Maehara-san becomes leader, it will become a party that can be trusted and Japan will have a true two large-party system."

What better way to foment further turmoil by praising Mr. Maehara for his courage? I've noted previously that with the LDP in turmoil and the prime minister's popularity abysmal (but recovering slightly), the government and the LDP have pinned their hopes for a surprisingly strong showing in the next election on a divided DPJ that can be portrayed as incapable of governing.

If Mr. Maehara has any political sense, he would stop his rebellion now, unless, of course, he wants to give comfort to the LDP and deepen the impression that the DPJ is incapable of wielding power. The DPJ, it seems, is powerless to stop the wayward Mr. Maehara. The senior leadership appears willing to tolerate Mr. Maehara's public trashing of the party even as he serves as one of seven DPJ vice presidents. Indeed, it appears that there is little the party can do to discipline any dissenter, whether Mr. Maehara or the upper house members who voted against the party on road construction earlier this session. If Mr. Maehara is to be restrained, he will have to do it himself — or his peers, the DPJ's other wakate members, will have to lean on him.

Perhaps they can call attention to the behavior of his fellow young turk/former party leader, Okada Katsuya. Mr. Okada, who took the blow for the party in the 2005 election, is said to want to return to the leadership, but in contrast to Mr. Maehara, he has refrained from public criticism of Mr. Ozawa's leadership. A telling sign is the title of Mr. Okada's new (and first) book, Seiken Kotai (Regime Change). While he offers a "reform menu" for a DPJ government, including proposals for administrative reform, social security reform, fiscal reform, and regional decentralization, the title indicates that whatever his policy disagreements with the DPJ's current leadership, he remains committed to the party's goal of "regime change." He still believes that a DPJ-led government, whatever its flaws, would be better than a continuation of LDP rule (which, as we've learned this Diet session, means the continuation of zoku rule). It remains to be seen whether Mr. Maehara believes the same.

Indeed, Mainchi, in reporting on Mr. Okada's new book, contrasts Mr. Okada and Mr. Maehara, noting that Mr. Maehara desperately wants a complete debate on the party's policies and has indicated that he will stand in the September election if no one else does, while Mr. Okada remains committed to regime change first and has said nothing about running in September. I don't disagree with Mr. Maehara's belief that Mr. Ozawa should be reelected uncontested, but there are ways to do that without completely undermining the party.

Incidentally, continuing the discussion in this post, it bears mentioning that the clash between idealism and realism is not just within the party — it is within Mr. Ozawa himself, as I argued here. Mr. Ozawa's DPJ is politically schizophrenic in part because Mr. Ozawa is politically schizophrenic.

Idealism and realism in the DPJ

The Japanese political system's pendulum continues to swing, as the DPJ's fortunes are worsening at the moment that Fukuda Yasuo's fortunes are on an upswing.

The tension within the DPJ is spilling into the open again, with Maehara Seiji waging an open campaign on the pages of Japan's monthlies against what he sees as disingenuousness in the DPJ's policy platform as presented in the party's 2007 election manifesto.

The main target of Mr. Maehara's ire is the party's plan to provide 18 trillion yen in subsidies to small farmers, a plan described by Mr. Maehara in Chuo Koron as "completely impossible" to implement. He went further and suggested that if the DPJ takes the government, it will be unable to govern. His contributions to Chuo Koron and Voice, however, prompted criticism from other DPJ members. Tsutsui Nobutaka, the agriculture minister in the DPJ's "Next Cabinet" and other DPJ members emailed the party's members to call for Mr. Maehara to leave the party. [MTC informs me in the comments that he believes that Mr. Tsutsui demanded that Mr. Maehara step down from his position as a deputy leader of the party, a reasonable request in my eyes.] Hatoyama Yukio responded by criticizing Mr. Tsutsui for misusing the party's email system — and Mr. Maehara for speaking impertinently about the break-up of the party.

Mr. Maehara's concern about the DPJ's ability to govern is touching, and his desire for truth in advertising in politics noble — but ultimately irrelevant. The DPJ made a decision when it embraced Ozawa Ichiro, first by merging with his Liberal Party, then by making Mr. Ozawa party leader, to embrace Mr. Ozawa's cynical political maneuvering. The DPJ spent the first half of its life as the party of the high road, whose good intentions would propel it to victory over the LDP. But good intentions, which might have worked had Mori Yoshiro lasted more than a year as prime minister, were inadequate in the face of a skilled political operator like Koizumi Junichiro, the master manipulator who both desired change and, as head of the LDP, had the ability to act on his reformist intentions (unlike the DPJ, mired in impotent opposition).

Mr. Ozawa was to be the antidote to Koizumism. The DPJ would play hardball. It would not wait for the Japanese people to see the merits of DPJ reformism and embrace it accordingly. It would swing violently between confrontation and cooperation with the government (Ozawa-induced whiplash), campaign hard nationally, and put politics before policy in a single-minded effort to force the LDP from power. The emphasis on support for small farmers was central to Mr. Ozawa's strategy. It is likely that Mr. Ozawa knows that as long as rural areas control a disproportionately large number of votes in lower house elections — and as long as the LDP has a lock on the votes of the small farmers — the LDP will not lose power. As a result, as long as the DPJ remains an urban, reformist party dependent on the sympathy of floating voters, it will remain in opposition (and vulnerable to reversals like 2005, when urban voters deserted the DPJ for Mr. Koizumi). And so Mr. Ozawa has poured his efforts into strengthening the party's position in rural Japan. He has personally campaigned around the country, undoubtedly a factor in the DPJ's success in largely rural single-seat prefectures last summer. He has emphasized support to small farmers in the form of the subsidies criticized by Mr. Maehara. The subsidies might be bad policy — terrible policy even — but politically they might make the difference between the DPJ's remaining in opposition or winning enough seats in the next election to form a government. Having been completely shut out of single member districts in seventeen mostly rural prefectures in the 2005 general election and fifteen in the 2003 general election, strong campaigns in these areas will determine whether the DPJ wins: the cities will most likely swing back to the DPJ, but the countryside is up for grabs, and holds the key to taking power.

Mr. Maehara, of course, is not interested in power, at least not first and foremost; Mr. Ozawa is. He wants power to be wielded properly, hence his echoing of the LDP complaint about the DPJ's being unable to govern. By making Mr. Ozawa party leader, the DPJ rejected idealism — whether Mr. Maehara's right-wing idealism or Kan Naoto's left-wing idealism — and embraced realism, realism in the pursuit of regime change and power. Mr. Maehara will continue to rail against the prevailing realism, and he (or a surrogate) will likely challenge Mr. Ozawa in September, but his protests will likely be of little use. The party has thrown in its lot with Mr. Ozawa, and will do whatever it takes to win the next election, up to and including fudging the numbers in its policy program.

Will Mr. Maehara's dissatisfaction lead to his defection? If he means what he says, he won't be jumping to the LDP, which is not exactly a paragon of idealistic governance. And while the media is speculating about Mr. Koizumi's creating a proto-party with Mr. Maehara and Koike Yuriko, that remains groundless speculation. To leave before an election risks being wiped out should the DPJ copy Mr. Koizumi and send "assassins" to unseat Mr. Maehara and his followers. If he does leave, it will be after an election, when he can let the LDP and the DPJ bid for his loyalty as they struggle to assemble a government should the next election produce a hung parliament. In the meantime, Mr. Maehara will make his peace with Mr. Ozawa's realism, not least because the pendulum will likely swing back towards idealism in time. It is unlikely that Mr. Ozawa's realism will survive his leadership of the party.

Meanwhile, DPJ members have other reasons to be dissatisfied with Mr. Ozawa's leadership. Party members are reportedly unhappy with a decision to boycott lower house debates in the wake of the upper house censure motion — a foolish decision considering that the lower house is deliberating on opposition-sponsored bills that have already passed the upper house, including the bill calling for scrapping the new eldercare system. The communists have been left to defend the legislation in deliberations.

This is the reality of life under Mr. Ozawa: regular, unpredictable changes of tactics with little regard for ideals and principles, grandstanding, and policy taking the backseat to politics. But for better or worse, the DPJ is likely stuck with Mr. Ozawa at least until the next election.

Discontent in the air

There is no shortage of discontent in Japanese politics today.

The HANA right (that's Hiranuma-Abe-Nakagawa-Aso), including their sympathizers in the media, are finding their voice again, and as always, it's a belligerent, combative voice — as described by MTC in this post about the contents of Voice's latest issue. The November issue too was full of discontent, with the cover prominently calling for a "conservative reconstruction," and an article inside by Nakanishi Teramasa calling for a new conservative party. (Looking at the contents of the latest Voice compared to the November issue, I wonder if they just keep the same articles month to month and change the bylines.) Anyway, Sasayama Tatsuo, former LDP member of the House of Representatives, concurs with Nakanishi at his blog, calling for a shift from "skillful politics" to "righteous [or just or correct] politics," while criticizing Mr. Fukuda for his "self-destructive" actions as prime minister.

Readers of Tetsuo Najita's The Intellectual Foundations of Modern Japanese Politics will find this dichotomy familiar: dissatisfied idealists interested in a "truer" politics squaring off against "bureaucrats" and politicians with a bureaucratic mindset. The LDP was in a similar place some forty years ago, after another crisis that resulted in the resignation of a prime minister. I was recently at the US National Archives — not the antechamber downtown, but the actual archives in College Park — looking through documents from the US Embassy in Tokyo in the early 1960s and it found it fascinating to read the embassy's reports about the ferment in the LDP under Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato. The embassy noted mounting dissatisfaction with Mr. Ikeda's "low posture," yielding politics from conservatives in the LDP, including a younger Nakasone Yasuhiro. Like today, the right had one of its own champions forced out of office "prematurely," and after licking its wounds, was ready to fight. The vitriol directed by the HANA right (thanks guys, for this term) towards not just Mr. Fukuda (the usurper) but to Mr. Ozawa (he who is responsible for a series of crimes against the cause, the latest being his hounding of Mr. Abe) drips off the page. It is still unclear whether their rage will translate into action. Rage is cheap. Does anyone really think that these conservatives are going to abandon the LDP — the party of their fathers and grandfathers — to form their own party when all they have to do is wait for Mr. Fukuda to falter, giving them an opportunity to reclaim leadership of the party? In the meantime, expect more angry articles by the usual suspects in the usual places.

The LDP's right does not, however, have a monopoly on discontent. The latest issue of Chuo Koron has an interview with Maehara Seiji, onetime DPJ leader and top on the list of potential DPJ splitists (to use that delightful Maoist term). In it, Mr. Maehara expresses his dissatisfaction with DPJ politicking in the aftermath of Mr. Ozawa's aborted resignation as party chief. Looking at the national agenda and seeking a solution to gridlock, Mr. Maehara argues, "I think the LDP and the DPJ should establish a conference group that avoids sneaky discusions. I think that to the last, debates should happen in committees and the like in the Diet." He lays into Mr. Ozawa's choices on foreign policy — Mr. Ozawa "has made bills to which the governing coalition cannot possibly agree" — and domestic politics — he lambastes Mr. Ozawa's plans to transfer savings from administrative reform to farmers, which "by no means will rejuvenate agriculture." He also stakes out a clear position on Mr. Fukuda's recent statement on the refueling bill: "...Since I think the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean is necessary, I think it's good if Prime Minister Fukuda plays the two-thirds card without apology." And on top of that, he states his discomfort with Mr. Ozawa's admissions about the DPJ's weakness, seeing as how "that should be his responsibility to consider."

In short, many of Mr. Maehara's complaints are just slightly removed from those of his fellow conservatives in the LDP dissatisfied with tactical maneuvers of the party leader. The question applies to Mr. Maehara, however. It's easy to complain about just about everything Mr. Ozawa has done since taking office — I certainly know how easy it is — but it seems considerably harder for anyone in the DPJ to do anything about it. Mr. Maehara, one of the party's deputy heads, is an unlikely splitist. What would he do, form his own splinter party? Unless his split was matched by the secession of the ANA conservatives from the LDP, thereby triggering the much-discussed political realignment, a Maehara splinter group would meet the same fate as the Conservative Party that splintered from Mr. Ozawa's Liberal Party. Namely, it would be absorbed into the LDP. (The Maehara interview is available in two parts.)

Moving from partisan discontents, we come to a fascinating blog post from Ikeda Nobuo translated by W. David Marx and published at Néojaponisme. Ikeda writes about the use of blogs as an outlet for the discontent that resulted in street demonstrations in the early postwar period: "Young people’s means of lodging a formal objection have therefore shifted from violence in the streets to debate on the internet; and the target of their protest has moved from the government to the media. In most cases, this kind of rebellion is simply young people venting their excess energy, but there is a possibility that youth can create something new if they can skillfully channel that energy."

I think that Ikeda might be on to something, in that even as politicians debate the merits of grand coalitions, the perils of the divided Diet, and solutions to "National Problems" (given the way publications like Yomiuri talk about it, the capitals are merited), there is real discontent manifesting itself in different, seemingly trivial ways among the Japanese people, especially among members of the younger generation who have watched their parents completely squander their inheritance. It may take some time before their discontent translates into action, but I suspect that the trends in the political use of the Internet maturing in the US will find their way to Japan before too long — and the blogging malcontents may yet make Nagata-cho tremble.

I have long suspected that what Japan needs is not another Meiji Restoration — the much-anticipated third opening, following the restoration and the occupation will not be the product of an electoral manifesto or even the activities of the Diet. The next opening, if it is to truly merit the name, will be at the individual level, as citizens learn to be citizens.

Fukuda answers some questions

After weeks of uncertainty, Prime Minister Fukuda has moved to answer definitively the six unanswered questions of the current Diet session, answering at least two of them by announcing that he will use the government's supermajority in the House of Representatives to pass the new anti-terror law, and he will extend the Diet session into January in order that the bill will be sent back to the Lower House should the Upper House not act on it within sixty days.

At the same time, Maehara Seiji, a deputy chief of the DPJ and potential thorn in the side for Mr. Ozawa, is making noise again for the first time since August, when there were rumblings of discontent over the DPJ leadership's opposition to the MSDF refueling mission. He is once again criticizing the DPJ for its failure to think of Japan's national interests and warned, "In the event that we quit without the session being extended, the Indian Ocean activities will be suspended for a long time. If there is a dissolution from this, our party will be in trouble."

MTC suggests that the DPJ's immediate response to the above course of action by the LDP will be a censure motion in the Upper House.

The consequences of this chain of events, however, are still unclear and will remain so right up until the moment they transpire. The potency of the weapons possessed by each side still depends largely on public and media support. If the government can somehow get the public to break its way, at least enough so that Mr. Fukuda can spin it as a trend in his favor, then he may be in a position to ignore the non-binding censure resolution and carry on as if nothing happened. A trend the other way, harder to ignore. Will the public continue to remain non-committal through all of this?

As for Mr. Maehara, to date, Mr. Maehara has been long on sound and fury, short on action. I think that he will continue to toe the Ozawa line when forced to choose, but then again, it is in moments like this that the whims and caprices of a disgruntled actor like Mr. Maehara could become very important, if not in terms of numbers — if Mr. Ozawa would have found it difficult to destroy the DPJ's position in the Upper House by leaving the party, would Mr. Maehara find it any easier? — then in terms of perceptions regarding the fitness of the DPJ as a credible contender.

In any case, his remarks mean that we haven't heard the last of the 政治再編 (political realignment) in the Japanese press, that panacea for all of political Japan's problems on the lips of commentators, even though few seem able to sketch out exactly what it would look like.

The DPJ united, the LDP in shambles

In Yomiuri on Wednesday, there was an article — not online, of course — on the creation of a new DPJ security policy discussion group by Maehara Seiji. The article noted that the group will meet once a week to discuss the content of the anti-terror special measures law, conditions on the ground in Afghanistan and the activities of other coalition members there, the UNSC resolutions supporting the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and the outline of DPJ security policy.

Meanwhile, on Wednesday Maehara spoke at the FCCJ and backed down slightly from his stance on the renewal of the law, placing the onus on the government to speak more openly about the impact the mission in Afghanistan has had — and indicating that he will obey his party's decision — even as he reiterated his belief that it is important for Japan to contribute to the fight against terrorism.

It seems that Mr. Maehara will not be going anywhere, and may even succeed at forging a compromise that enables Japan to continue to contribute even as the DPJ rakes the government over the coals for its subservience to the US. In fact, Sankei has reported, in another article not online, that DPJ members are preparing trips to Europe and the US to exchange opinions with officials about how Japan can contribute in Afghanistan.

Mr. Ozawa must be given credit for holding the line on the anti-terror law (even if I don't agree with his stance). Indeed, we're a month out from the Upper House election and the contrast between the LDP and the DPJ is revealing: the LDP is confused, seeing no way out of the hole that Mr. Abe has dug for the party, while the DPJ is confident, united, and fully prepared to use its Upper House veto power in the coming months. This may not be a permanent situation; the public can be fickle, after all. But if Mr. Ozawa can somehow keep the party's big tent together, assuaging both the Maehara group and the former Socialists, we may actually be witnessing the creation of a new permanent majority party, which may have been Ozawa's goal all along (veteran Tokyo correspondent Sam Jameson has speculated about this).

Much will depend, of course, on how the DPJ follows through on its promises, not least to Japan's small farmers, as MTC notes. But it's difficult to see how the LDP is going to revive itself without the DPJ making serious tactical mistakes. In fact, I think we can gauge the LDP's desperation by the growing calls from LDP members for the creation of an LDP-DPJ grand coalition. The latest call is from Takebe Tsutomu, former LDP secretary-general, who argued that such a coalition would ensure that the government would be accountable to the people. Meanwhile, Nakatani Gen, who was at the FCCJ Wednesday with Maehara, also suggested that a grand coalition might be desirable. I guess they reason that if the public supports a grand coalition, the LDP stands to gain if its members call for one and the DPJ repeatedly nixes the idea.

I remain unimpressed by the idea, and I don't think that the DPJ's troika is going to fall for it. As Maehara said at the FCCJ, there is a 99.99% chance that the DPJ will turn down any offer of a grand coalition. But even if the highly improbable grand coalition were to happen, the LDP's salvation will not come in the embrace of the DPJ. The party has yet to figure out what the post-Koizumi LDP is to be, and until it does, it will flounder. For Japan's sake, I hope it doesn't take too long. Japan is in need of a proper two-party system, not a new permanent majority party (even one with a reformist tinge).

Koike opens a second front

As the skirmishes over the extension of the anti-terror special measures law intensify, Defense Minister Koike Yuriko has decided to take the fight to Washington, DC at the same time that DPJ President Ozawa Ichiro met with US Ambassador Thomas Schieffer.

On Wednesday morning, Koike met with US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who expressed his appreciation of the role played by Japan in the war on terror. She also met with Vice President Cheney, who thanked Japan for its support in Afghanistan and Iraq and took care to note Japan's long-term importance due to the rapid rise of Chinese military power. Koike, meanwhile, used the occasion to criticize Ozawa for his hypocrisy in having pushed hard for Japanese involvement in the Gulf War but opting to back away from support for Japanese contributions in Afghanistan and Iraq. (Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki in Tokyo also contributed to the offensive against Ozawa, citing the deaths of Japanese citizens on 9/11 to illustrate the part Japan has to play in the war on terror.)

I think it is a mistake on the part of the Bush administration to encourage Japan to think of its contribution in Afghanistan as contributions to the alliance. Doing so encourages Japanese citizens to associate a minor supporting role in a broad coalition of countries participating in the reconstruction of Afghanistan with serving as spearcarrier for the wholly unpopular Bush administration. MTC is right to point out just how much unease there is with the US across the political spectrum — I am constantly amazed at just how anxious Japanese seem to be about being entrapped in an American war. At the same time, however, no matter how inconsequential Japan's material contributions are in the Indian Ocean, it is important that Japan is there, for reasons having nothing to do with Japan's relationship with the US.

There is no question that Japanese foreign policy is America-centric to a degree unhealthy for both Japan and the US. The US shouldn't want a Japan that is incapable of acting on its own and feels it necessary to follow along with the US even when its interests aren't at stake — because that constrains the US to some extent. At the same time, the Japanese government must not be left in a position where it is forced to follow the US even against its own interests, because it has no choice. The extension of the bill permitting Japanese support in the Indian Ocean is an excellent opportunity to recast Japan's activities as part of a broader coalition that enjoys the imprimatur of the UN, Ozawa's sophistry about its being post-facto support notwithstanding. Yes, the war may have began as the US response to 9/11, but by now the reconstruction of Afghanistan is a broadly legitimate if under-supported mission to ensure that the country does not revert to wholesale lawlessness, an open wound in the heart of Eurasia.

MTC mentions that there is no constituency for renewal. He's right — but that's not a good thing, and it means that Japan's political leadership needs to be ever more diligent in making the case that Japan does in fact have a role to play, however small and far from the battlefield. The fact that there is no constituency for renewal, that to the Japanese people it's all the same whether or not the JSDF serves in coalitions abroad, means that it will be remarkably easy for Japan to backslide into the easy life of a security consumer (which undermines the idea, expressed by Norimitsu Onishi and others, that Japan is on a linear track to becoming a more formidable security actor in the region and the world). Doing so would, of course, result in a Japan as dependent on the US as ever.

As such, a mooted DPJ plan that would call for a withdrawal from Iraq, reported in the FT earlier this week, might be a way for Japan to distance itself from the US while at the same time reaffirming its commitment to bear some of the burden for global order by extending the MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean. Of course, thanks to the Abe government's response to the DPJ call to reject the latter — huddling close to the US by sending Koike-san to DC — it will be harder for the government to convince the Japanese people that the Afghanistan mission is anything but a contribution to the alliance with the US. If Japan is to take a different approach to this issue — rejecting Japan's slavishly following the US, while reaffirming Japan's commitment to contribute to global security in some trifling way — the DPJ will have to articulate this line. Mr. Maehara and his followers may be of some use in this respect should the party leadership choose to change course. (I agree with MTC that the chances of Mr. Maehara's leaving the party are slim at best, and that having egregiously bungled his leadership of the DPJ, no one seems to be in a hurry to give him the reins again.)

The DPJ's first tactical mistake?

The debate over the extension of the anti-terror special measures law is quickly becoming the defining issue of the post-election political environment, with each party struggling to stand fast and embarrass the other side — with Washington watching closely for signs of whether Japan's commitment to the alliance is withering, and wondering whether the DPJ can be trusted.

Even before Ozawa meets with Ambassador Schieffer on Wednesday, there are signs that the DPJ might be willing to compromise. On Sunday, DPJ Acting President Kan Naoto signaled that the party recognizes the differences between the Iraq and Afghanistan missions, hinting that it might be open to a compromise bill, but not before raking the government over the coals. Prime Minister Abe responded on Monday with conciliatory gestures in a press conference following the ceremony in Hiroshima.

For his part, Amaki Naoto, former diplomat and recent Upper House candidate on a anti-constitution revision platform, is convinced that the issue is all about Japan's subservience to the US and its participation in America's wars, and that the DPJ will have little choice but to cave eventually.

So if the DPJ is in fact destined to step down and compromise on the extension, what will drive it to do so? A desire to avoid appearing irresponsible and incapable of governing, an impression that would undoubtedly result from a serious dispute with the US? Fear of secession by the hawkish Maehara wing of the party if the leadership pushes too hard against this bill?

Interestingly, this issue may be more of a wedge for the DPJ than the for the LDP-Komeito governing coalition. As Jun Okumura argues, there are good reasons for Komeito to stick with the LDP despite the recent emergence of ideological fissures within the coalition, not least because it is unclear whether the DPJ will be a more suitable partner for Komeito on foreign policy. Meanwhile, this issue highlights differences between the DPJ's Upper and Lower House caucuses. As an article in Yomiuri (not online) noted, DPJ members in the Upper House caucus are more likely to be in the former Social Democrat or Democratic Socialist groups, and beyond that Maehara's group is centered on the House of Representatives. It seems that the danger for the DPJ is the DPJ-controlled Upper House's pushing forward legislation that the party's Lower House caucus finds difficult to support. Why the party hasn't put more emphasis on pocketbook issues as a way to unite keep the party united and maintain considerable pressure on the government is beyond me.

As such, if the DPJ ends up backing down on this issue, I'm not exactly clear what it will have gained. It will have exacerbated fissures within the party needlessly, while giving the government a chance to regroup in the aftermath of the landslide defeat. The DPJ could not have made it any easier for the LDP to rally, with members standing up in the Diet haranguing the DPJ for abandoning the US, endangering Japan's security, and shirking Japan's burden to support global security. Indeed, the LDP's line in this confrontation will undoubtedly resemble this editorial in Sankei, which wonders whether the DPJ "is following the road of a responsible political party."

Watching the fault lines

When looking at the post-election political landscape, observers have turned to the Democratic Party of Japan and asked whether it has the durability to press its advantage following the election and push for a quick dissolution and general election. After all, one need not look all that far back for signs of division within the party.

For the moment, I think that talk of a party split is premature, because nothing succeeds like success.

But the rifts exist, ready to reopen at the first sign of trouble. The DPJ "faction" usually cited as a potential splinter group is that of former DPJ party leader Maehara Seiji, who led the party for a brief period following the party's disastrous showing in the 2005 House of Representatives election until forced to resign as a result of the DPJ's claiming — based on a fake e-mail — that LDP politicians took bribes from convicted Live Door head Horie Takafumi.

Maehara's faction, a group known as the Ryounkai [凌雲会] is generally recognized as "conservative" or "neo-conservative," and many of its members voiced their support for Koizumi-style structural reform, not to mention their support for constitutional revision, the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, and more robust China and Korea policies. By the reckoning of one blogger at Kihachin, this group and its associates in the DPJ could number somewhere between four and five dozen members, with most of its members in the House of Representatives.

It is for this reason that the DPJ leadership's emphasis on opposing the renewal of the anti-terror special measures law is important. Mr. Maehara has already come out in opposition to the DPJ's official position, stating that he thinks renewal is "essential," although he criticized the government's failure to explain its reasoning.

As noted in this month's issue of The Oriental Economist, Mr. Ozawa may be using the anti-terror law as a wedge issue to drive Komeito out of the governing coalition and back into his arms (remember the self-destructive role played by Ozawa's alliance with Komeito's Ichikawa Yuichi — the Ichi-Ichi line — in bringing down the anti-LDP coalition engineered by Ozawa). This might work. It is no secret that a massive gulf separates the foreign and security policy positions of Komeito and the Abe government of which they are a part. Indeed, Asahi, in its editorial today, lambastes Komeito President Ota Akihiro for immediately reaffirming his party's support for the government, despite the serious blow suffered by his party last week — and despite alienating supporters by tacitly support policy positions that are fundamentally at odds with Komeito's. In other words, Mr. Ozawa is gambling that it is more likely to attract Komeito than to repel the Maehara group. For the moment, that may work, especially if Mr. Ozawa can, by meeting with Ambassador Schieffer next week, dispel some of the concerns that have arisen from the US.

This position is not without risk, not least because it could undermine DPJ efforts to present itself as capable of wielding power. At the moment, according to a Yomiuri poll cited in an op-ed criticizing the DPJ position on the extension, 46% found the DPJ incapable of wielding political power compared to 36% who thought otherwise.

I don't expect any changes immediately, but much will depend on how the DPJ leadership deals with the fallout from its initial announcements and how it intends to move the issue forward henceforth.

Meanwhile, Mr. Ozawa, it seems, is not the only one in need of a few days' rest. On TV today, Matsuzoe Yoichi said that the LDP doesn't have the energy for a leadership fight at present. He might as well have been discussing the entire Japanese political system. All parties appear to be bracing for the coming turmoil, in which Mr. Maehara and company may be set to play an important role.