The end of the beginning

I'm not entirely clear to me why the cabinet decision to submit a new bill on the MSDF refueling mission deserves this kind of treatment from the BBC, considering that the government announced days ago that it would make its final decision on October 17th — and that there was no doubt that the government would decide to submit its bill to the Diet.

This is nothing more than the end of the beginning, a decision that introduces a new, parliamentary front in the battle over the MSDF mission. The new law limits refueling to ships explicitly involved in maritime interdiction operations and eliminates provisions about parliamentary approval, which will undoubtedly be subject to intense debate in the Diet.

It is still unclear exactly how this drama will play out, and what role the DPJ counteroffer of civilian contributions to Afghanistan's reconstruction — Mr. Ozawa agreed to the compromise position earlier this week — will play in the final outcome, but the debate is moving forward. My money remains on the government's getting its way, extending the Diet session to the end of the year and passing the bill over an Upper House veto. Mr. Fukuda will undoubtedly make all manner of conciliatory gesture to the DPJ, in part as a way to coax the public to support the government's doing whatever necessary to pass the bill.

But I could be wrong, because it's still unclear precisely how a divided Diet will function and how the public will react to the parties' efforts to cope with it, meaning the cabinet's deciding to support the continuation of the refueling mission does not have the air of finality that it might have had four months ago.

Thrust and parry on Afghanistan

Prime Minister Fukuda and members of his cabinet were grilled in Upper House Budget Committee deliberations on Monday, and continued their defense of Japan's participation in coalition activities in the Indian Ocean on grounds of Japan's obligations to the international community as the second largest economic power.

The sparring in the Upper House this week comes in the midst of results of a new opinion poll by Asahi, which show a small gain in support for the refueling mission since last month's poll, with support rising from 35% to 39%, with 44% opposed. For an Asahi poll, that seems to be a decidedly close margin. At the same time, however, the poll recorded marked opposition to a new law authorizing the mission, with 28% in favor and 48% opposed to a new law.

The poll also contains some good news for Mr. Fukuda's hopes for a long tenure. While it recorded a slight drop in support for his cabinet from 53% to 47% and a slight rise in its unfavorable rating from 27% to 30%, the poll also recorded a sharp drop (50 to 32%) in respondents who think that a snap election should be called quickly, and a similarly sharp rise (43 to 60%) who think that it's not necessary to call a general election soon. The poll also recorded a nine-point drop (41 to 32%) in support for a DPJ-centered coalition government, with support for an LDP-centered coalition holding steady at 33%.

Meanwhile, in advance of the scheduled October 17th cabinet decision, the government has agreed that the new law will apply for but one year, a concession by the LDP to Komeito — whose rank-and-file membership is as or more dissatisfied than ever with the now eight-year-old coalition with the LDP. I would expect more concessions to Komeito on legislation in the months to come. What choice does the LDP have? Nothing the LDP can do will probably make the Komeito rank-and-file happy, but the LDP at least needs to give the Komeito leadership something that can be presented to the rank-and-file as a positive outcome of the coalition.

But while the government continues the work of restoring the damage inflicted by Mr. Abe, the DPJ is lurching forward, seemingly making up strategy as it goes along. The DPJ leadership has reportedly decided to submit its own version of a law authorizing Japanese contributions in and around Afghanistan — but the content of said bill remains to be decided. Mr. Ozawa, of course, wants the bill to mandate a JSDF contribution to ISAF, but the compromise position seems to be civilian participation in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT).

It's unclear to me why Japan can't do both — and that might be what happens, particularly if the DPJ bill only mandates a civilian contribution to Afghanistan reconstruction. Of course, LDP approval of the DPJ plan won't be enough to buy DPJ acquiescence on the refueling mission.

I still find it difficult to see how the DPJ can "win." Winning in this case means making passage of the bill over an Upper House veto politically untenable for the government, but it is not clear to me how the DPJ can reverse the trend in the government's favor on this issue. In Budget Committee deliberations, the DPJ seems to have been unable to score a direct hit on Mr. Fukuda, who if he keeps this up may earn a reputation as a "teflon" prime minister. The muddled DPJ response certainly can't help, particularly compared to the government's straightforward, low-risk plan that simply calls for continuing what the MSDF has been doing for six years. Easy to understand, and unambiguous, as long as the government can continue to bat away allegations about Japanese fuel being used for the US war in Iraq.

UPDATE — It looks like Jun Okumura and I have similar takes on the situation.

Locking horns in the Budget Committee

On Tuesday the Budget Committee of the Lower House of the Diet convened; the Budget Committee, of course, is the main stage for clashes between government and opposition, and will provide Mr. Fukuda with plenty of time to elaborate on his policy plans, if he indeed has any.

While there are a host of economic issues that will be discussed — there will no doubt be some spirited exchanges on the pensions issue — the debate over a new bill authorizing the MSDF mission in the Indian will indubitably overshadow everything else. The debate has been transformed somewhat with Mr. Ozawa's declaration last week that he has no problem with Japan's sending ground troops as part of ISAF even as he maintains that the refueling mission is unconstitutional. Mainichi asks what Mr. Ozawa's motive is for purposing this new step, but, as I argued last week, the new proposal should by no means be considered inconsistent with Mr. Ozawa's history. In fact, it probably marks a return to the Ozawa that earned the plaudits of Americans for his advocacy of a "normal" Japan. The government has fiercely dismissed Mr. Ozawa's proposal — Defense Minister Ishiba went so far as to describe Mr. Ozawa as "being callous about the lives of SDF members," which seems a bit rich coming from the self-described "defense otaku."

Indeed, as Mainichi wrote regarding Mr. Ishiba's rebuttal and Kan Naoto's defense of Mr. Ozawa, "We now have the 'topsy-turvy' [the article uses nejire, literally 'twisted,' but I think topsy-turvy gets closer to the idea] spectacle of Mr. Ishiba's advancing traditional 'defend the constitution' arguments and Mr. Kan's advancing arguments in favor of the proactive dispatch of troops abroad."

The government is not likely to cave on its plan for sticking to refueling at sea. In the Diet today, Mr. Fukuda reiterated that the MSDF mission is constitutional, and no doubt consciously contrasted the government's position with the DPJ's by saying, "This action does not entail the use of force prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution, and thus is not in violation of the Constitution." Indeed, Mr. Ozawa may have made it easier for the government to pass its new law, and the LDP will presumably push to contrast the government's "responsible" position with Mr. Ozawa's "reckless" position at every turn. Not surprisingly, former LDP secretary-general Nakagawa Hidenao called for a direct debate between Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Ozawa focused on this issue.

I have a hard time seeing how Mr. Ozawa will get his way on the issue. Indeed, he may have guaranteed that the government gets its way, with full public support, by suggesting an armed approach that is not only unlikely to receive the support of the Japanese people, but also likely to draw considerable opposition from within the DPJ. Even while being right — and I think he is, because contributing to ISAF is exactly what Japan should be doing if it's serious about normalizing its security policy — I can't see this gambit as serving any purpose other than signaling to observers that Mr. Ozawa and his party aren't the do-nothing pacifists that they have been painted as since coming out against the extension of the anti-terror law. Accordingly, within the DPJ the "realistic" option for an alternative bill is proposing civilian aid to PRTs, which means that Japanese personnel will still need to be defended by some other country's military.

That said, the government still has work to do on building support for its new bill, as much within the LDP as within the government at large. Mainichi suggests that some members of the LDP are concerned about the threat posed to civilian control by the new law's waiving of the requirement that both houses approve the dispatch. And one of the central questions I have about the Budget Committee hearings is whether the DPJ will be able to get some traction on the issue of Japanese fuel being used by US warships participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Foreign Minister Komura has stated once again — based on information received from the US — that no Japanese fuel was diverted, but I don't think this will end the discussion, nor should it. The DPJ will comb through whatever it can find, in the hope of getting a snowball effect in public opposition to the government, much like it achieved in the spring with revelations about lost pensions.

Boots for ships?

The DPJ, JCP, SDP, and Kokumin Shinto collectively informed the government on Tuesday in a meeting of Kokutai chairs that they cannot cooperate with the government on the MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean, due to the lack of a provision mandating prior approval from the Diet. Indeed, at a press conference on Tuesday Mr. Ozawa made a point of questioning the constitutionality of the mission.

But Mr. Ozawa has also opened the door to a compromise with the government.

How? Well, it turns out that Mr. Ozawa wants not just civilian aid workers on the ground in Afghanistan, but GSDF troops contributing to ISAF efforts to maintain order in Afghanistan. He even suggested, according to Mainichi, that GSDF troops participating in ISAF might be able to use their weapons if necessary.

Although the article hinted darkly at "objections" within the DPJ, Mr. Ozawa's comments are still of interest. Is the government so hung up on having ships in the Indian Ocean that it won't even consider the idea of GSDF troops on the ground, a contribution that would probably be even more appreciated internationally than the refueling operation? If so, why? I wonder if this isn't a matter of wanting to commit in the least costly way while still pocketing appreciation from abroad for Japan's contributions. It's not like Japan's risking much at the moment. (For all we know, the MSDF sailors are having dance parties at sea.) Is it a kind of rigid legalism on the part of MOFA — the US wants ships, we deliver ships? Is it a fear of the casualties that could result from sending GSDF troops to Afghanistan could derail Japan's "normalization"?

Meanwhile, Mr. Ozawa's remarks should dispel the wild mischaracterizations of Mr. Ozawa that have been flung about over the past couple of months, mostly in the western press. (Try this recent one by Richard Halloran.) The guy's no anti-American pacifist — he's just struggling to keep together a party riven with disagreements on foreign policy. Accordingly, if a LDP-DPJ compromise with the government were to emerge on the grounds of a GSDF dispatch to Afghanistan, I would be curious about whether the DPJ caucus in the Upper House, which strikes me as having a more Socialist coloration, would follow along meekly or whether it would cause trouble for their party's Fearless Leader.