That area east of Iraq

President Bush, after an unannounced layover in Baghdad, has arrived in Sydney for the APEC summit.

The Washington Post's article on the trip (inadvertently?) identifies the problem with Asia policy in the waning years of the Bush administration. The headline reads, "Bush Arrives in Australia for Summit," but the body copy proceeds to focus entirely on conditions in Iraq, pausing to mention APEC on to dismiss the idea that the 2007 APEC summit is a "China summit."

The Australian has printed a number of articles in the day leading up to the summit criticizing the Bush administration's inattention to a tremendously significant region of which the US happens to be a significant actor — and in which the power balance in changing quickly. A pair of articles by The Australian's Greg Sheridan, including an interview with former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, criticize the Bush administration's tendency to view everything through "the prism of Iraq." Armitage's criticism of the administration is particularly harsh, especially of Secretary of State Rice, but also of the Asia team. He said, "In the seventh year of an eight-year administration, you've got a lot of third and fourth teamers occupying these positions. I don't think you can expect much from this bunch."

I think the intensity of Mr. Armitage's criticism might have more to do with rivalries from his time in the administration than with the substance of US Asia policy; I disagree with Michael Turton's reading of this interview, because, after all, his argument is that the US isn't paying enough attention to Asia, not that everything the administration is doing is wrong.

Nevertheless, the next administration will inherit a changed Asia, with new constraints and new opportunities. And it's never too early for Washington to start looking to Asia again, because, as Armitage said, "In almost every measure - military budgets, population growths, the need for raw materials - our interests will force us back to Asia."

The offensive continues

Yesterday I wrote that the Abe Cabinet launched an "offensive" on the question of collective self-defense.

It seems that that offensive continued today, with Prime Minister Abe meeting with Richard Armitage, former deputy secretary of state, co-chair of the groups that produced the two reports on the US-Japan alliance that bear his name (alongside Joseph Nye), and all-around advocate of greater US-Japan cooperation. (At present, it seems that Sankei is the only major daily covering this story.)

The article reports [my translation]: "Armitage said after the talk, 'If the conclusion leads to more flexibility, it will be good for Japan. He indicated his hope that Japan will become able to exercise its right of collective self-defense. On the other hand, he pointed out that 'it's Japan's decision' and he stressed that Japan is struggling [with the issue] itself."

I expect that in advance of this weekend's summit, Armitage will inform the president about the contents of his conversation with Abe -- and whoever else he happens to meet while visiting -- making clear to the president that Abe is committed to overcoming the prohibition on collective self-defense, the biggest obstacle standing in the way of greater US-Japan security cooperation.

Thus Armitage's meeting with Abe is as much a part of the offensive as remarks in the Diet by Abe's senior advisers, helping to clear the ground in Washington for changes that could be in the offing.

Those changes are far from guaranteed, however, as Komeito Secretary General Kitagawa Kazuo made clear in his remarks in the Diet today, in which he warned the government to be "prudent" in its reconsideration of the prohibition on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, suggesting that the current interpretation provides for the cases under consideration.

Nevertheless, as I said yesterday, the push for reinterpretation may prove more important than constitution revision, which remains a distant prospect, the national referendum bill notwithstanding. Washington must be ready, however, to work with Tokyo to determine the structure of the alliance should Japan become able to act as a full (or fuller) ally.