The shape of the Ozawa revolution

"Now is the time to change Japan. It is not exaggeration to say that this is the last chance to change."

So said Ozawa Ichiro Sunday as he marked his uncontested election to a third term as president of the DPJ.

Mr. Ozawa gave an extended policy address to mark the occasion and to steel his party and its opposition partners for the forthcoming general election campaign. Mr. Ozawa's address will steal some thunder from Aso Taro's imminent coronation as LDP president, but its value is bigger than a ploy to draw media attention to the LDP. Mr. Ozawa tried to give some substance to the revolution that could result from "regime change," echoing the belligerent rhetoric of Koizumi Junichiro — Mr. Ozawa spoke of the coming election as the "last battle" — to advance his position in the fight to reimagine the Japanese state and its relationship with society.

Renewing his party's pledge to put the people's livelihood first, he offered a nine-point program for an Ozawa government, largely a recapitulation of the party's 2007 manifesto: (1) restoring health and pensions systems; (2) instituting policies to encourage childrearing, starting with child allowances; (3) reducing the number of "working poor" and ensuring work for those who want to work; (4) revitalizing regions by revitalizing agriculture and small- and medium-sized businesses; (5) lifting the burden of high prices; (6) eliminating "special account budgets" to return money from the bureaucrats to the people; (7) implementing "true" regional decentralization; (8) opening politics to the people; and (9) working to preserve the environment and international peace.

These proposals are not new — and certainly not unique to the DPJ — and will undoubtedly attract questions about how the DPJ will implement these policies (and how it will pay for them).

To answer that question, Mr. Ozawa offered what may amount to a wholesale reinvention of how the government formulates its budgets. To reorient government to serve the interests of an insecure public and to implement the nine-point program, he called for a "general rearrangement" of the budget, most notably by dissolving the special account budgets that finance semi-public corporations and considerable infrastructure work, among other projects that tend to receive less scrutiny than the general budget. The goal seems to be a reconstruction of the Japanese budget from scratch, a far more revolutionary idea than Nakagawa Hidenao's crusade against government waste. Whether the DPJ will be able to accomplish such an ambitious goal is an open question, but this discussion is only possible under a DPJ government, less attached to the existing arrangement between the LDP and the bureaucracy. Connected with this is a promise by Mr. Ozawa regarding the timing of the DPJ's program, declaring that proposals will be passed into law either next year, within the next two years, or within the next four years.

Not surprisingly, Yomiuri is skeptical of Mr. Ozawa's agenda and asks what of Japan's participation in "the war on terror," but Yomiuri seems to have little idea of the coalition Mr. Ozawa is assembling under the DPJ's banner. Sounding not unlike candidates from the US Democratic Party, Mr. Ozawa spoke of his travels from north to south, his conversations with those who have suffered under LDP-Komeito rule, especially its market fundamentalism and survival-of-the-fittest politics, and grounded his appeal in the sufferings of the Japanese people. He questioned the LDP's attentiveness to the public's insecurities, drawing a contrast between the LDP's casual replacement of prime ministers and enduring economic hardships.

"Although one can reset in video games, one cannot reset in real-life politics and in the lives of the people. Although the LDP president can abandon an administration, the people cannot abandon their lives. People who cannot understand even this self-evident matter do not have the qualities to wield power."

The idea is less that the LDP is the deliberate enemy of the Japanese people than that the LDP is unserious about the people's woes, more concerned with sloganeering and posturing than with fixing Japan's problems.

Contrary to the arguments of the Japanese establishment, a DPJ victory will not depend on the strength and specificity of its policy program, just as an LDP victory will not depend on its policy specifics. Much like in the United States, electoral victory will depend on who can best embody a break with the (recent) past. To win, Mr. Aso will have to run against his predecessors, inconvenient for him considering his service in the Koizumi and Abe governments. Seeing as how the Japanese economy has only worsened since the LDP lost the 2007 upper house election, it is all too easy for Mr. Ozawa to make the case once again that the LDP is indifferent to the people's concerns, to ask the public to set aside their doubts about Mr. Ozawa and to turn their attention to the government in Tokyo that has neglected them.

Will it work again? Will enough voters see the LDP as bankrupt — even with Mr. Aso at its helm — and turn to the DPJ as the best hope for change in Japanese politics? It just might. The combination of a worsening economy, a broken LDP, faltering social services, and Mr. Ozawa's ramblings across Japan may be enough to break the LDP's hold on power. (Here's an intriguing idea: if the general election is held after the US presidential election, will a victory by Barack Obama raise the probability of a DPJ victory by reminding Japanese voters of the possibility of change through the ballot box?)

A DPJ victory will undoubtedly be cathartic, a dramatic break with five decades of LDP rule. But catharsis alone does not make a revolution. It may be that the DPJ comes to find beating the LDP easier than governing in its stead. Japan's problems will not be fixed in one, two, or four years. The broken budget remains the first priority for any Japanese government. But as Mr. Ozawa argues, this is an important turning point, Japan's best chance to chart a new course. The DPJ, for all its flaws, is Japan's best chance to right itself.

No honeymoon for Aso

Voting will begin today in the LDP's presidential election, which looks to be little more than a coronation for Aso Taro.

Ishikawa prefecture had its vote on Saturday, and it appears that Ishikawa will give all three of its votes to Mr. Aso. I expect Ishikawa will be only the first of many sweeps to come.

But will it matter at all? In the early days of the LDP race, it seemed possible that Mr. Aso might be able to heal the LDP's wounds as if by magic, as if simply by having the five candidates stand side by side in apparent agreement on the problems facing Japan (and their solutions), the public would forget the years of incompetent governance and re-embrace the LDP and its "charismatic" new leader.

Alas, the fairy tale is not to be.

Mr. Aso had apparently hoped that he could do like Fukuda Yasuo, but better, using his popularity to unite the whole party in his government, heal the rift with Komeito, and then wheel about to face down Ozawa Ichiro and the DPJ, first in the Diet, then in a general election campaign to come shortly after Mr. Aso bested the DPJ in Diet deliberations on a supplement budget containing an economic stimulus package. Key to his plan was ensuring that all voices were represented in his cabinet, to which end he stated that he would be happy to include his four competitors in his cabinet and party leadership.

Koike Yuriko, however, has thrown water on his scheme, declaring that the "policy differences are too great" to be included in one cabinet. The others might be more willing than Ms. Koike to join with Mr. Aso, but I doubt it. With that statement Ms. Koike has made clear that for all the cordiality in the LDP's campaign events, the party is no less divided than it was on Sept. 1, when Mr. Fukuda resigned. Mr. Aso's embrace of populism may make some LDP members happy — unlike Mr. Abe, Mr. Aso will come bearing gifts, not words — but there are plenty of LDP members unhappy about his new approach, not least the Koizumi children now on the chopping block when an election comes. Incidentally, if Mr. Aso is unable to form a cabinet that unites the LDP's disparate schools of thought, will he fall back on his conservative allies to form a cabinet?

An election that Mr. Aso doesn't prefer to discuss, perhaps because he's realizing that the much-discussed October 26 election may not leave him enough time to bolster his and the LDP's standing. He singled out Asahi for criticism on this score at a campaign event Friday at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, reminding listeners that Asahi doesn't hold the right of dissolving the Diet and calling an election. He insisted that people "should not speak carelessly" about the timing of an election, and made clear that a response to the worsening economy will take priority of holding an election.

As MTC makes clear (welcome back!), all of the talk about economic stimulus may ultimately be irrelevant when the general election comes. There is an unmistakable logic to Mr. Ozawa's recent maneuvers; his coalition, argues MTC, is "an angry, broad-based, below-the-Nagatachō-radar movement," stitching together any and all who have reason to be angry at how the LDP has governed. This coalition provides very little clue to how a DPJ-led coalition government will govern, but that's besides the point. Whether the government calls an election next month or at year's end, there is little Mr. Aso can do to undermine the coalition of the angry, whose grievances are the result of years of neglect or worse on the part of LDP-led governments.

Mr. Aso may be able to blunt the impact of Mr. Ozawa's strategy — certainly better than the alternatives — but ultimately he has little control over his own fate. He will have no more control over his party and his coalition than his predecessor, and he will face potentially unbearable pressure to call an election. There will be no honeymoon for Mr. Aso.

The DPJ and PNP draw closer

Pushing the DPJ to the headlines again for the first time since Prime Minister Fukuda resigned at the start of September, the Democratic Party of Japan and the People's New Party are reportedly close to an agreement to merge. Ozawa Ichiro met with his counterpart Watanuki Tamisuke Tuesday to discuss a merger, and indicated to Mr. Watanuki that he is willing to include a plank in the DPJ manifesto calling for a freeze in the planned sale of government-held shares of the composite companies of the Japan Post group.

The PNP, you may recall, is a product of the 2005 postal reform battle, created when Koizumi Junichiro ousted the postal rebels and dispatched his "assassins" to deprive them of their seats in the 2005 general election, with only some success.

The party has been considerably less visible in the years following its creation, although as a partner of the DPJ its four upper house members are critical to maintaining the opposition's control of the upper house.

Sankei reports that the DPJ executives have conferred and have officially proposed a union to the microparty, which is favorably disposed to the idea. It is less clear what DPJ backbenchers and the party rank-and-file think, but it looks like the DPJ's latest merger is a done deal. (One merger closer to a two-party system?) (This is also yet another blow to Hiranuma Takeo's plans for a new conservative party, the chimera that had everyone talks just under a year ago. The impending election of Aso Taro will be another.)

I can think of a number of theories for why Mr. Ozawa opted to do this, and opted to do this now.

One, this has proved a good way to put the DPJ back in the headlines, although the financial crisis has effectively taken pushed the LDP and the DPJ aside for the time being.

Two, it enables Mr. Ozawa to cement his populist credentials among elderly, rural voters. A glance at the PNP's policy statements shows a party very much in tune with Mr. Ozawa's approach of the past several years: criticism of "market fundamentalism" and an economy in which the strong devour the weak, criticism of the Koizumi theatrical politics that led to the party's creation in the first place, and support for all manner of traditional LDP supporters (farmers, small- and mid-sized businesses, etc.). With Aso Taro's copying Ozawa Ichiro's approach, Mr. Ozawa may be upping his commitment to a populist pitch to voters in stagnant rural districts to head off Mr. Aso before he takes over officially (as seems certain).

A third, related theory is that Mr. Ozawa did this because he could. I can imagine that the DPJ's young turks are dreading having to defend this alliance to their urban constituents, seeing as how this is literally a merger with the newly former LDP. But after having effectively stared down all potential rivals, Mr. Ozawa may have calculated — correctly in my view — that he can get away with quite a lot; the young turks will not defect.

Fourth, and again related to DPJ internal dynamics, Mr. Ozawa may perceive this as a way to bolster his position in the party. The PNP may not be numerous, but they bring Mr. Ozawa some reinforcements in his battle to make the case that his approach to the next general election is correct, that the election will be won or lost in constituencies that have long supported the LDP.

Lastly, Mr. Ozawa may actually share the PNP's beliefs.

These theories are not mutually exclusive, and not one explanation may be correct. And the merger may ultimately not make a difference in the general election, seeing as how it merely reinforces Mr. Ozawa's approach. It does make clear, however, that Japan has come a long way from September 2005. Structural reform is dead. If Mr. Aso is elected, the LDP and the DPJ will be battling over who can promise the more convincing plan to revitalize rural areas, presumably through infusions of public funds.

The final word on Fukuda

The word in the Japanese media is that Fukuda Yasuo's resignation came as a complete surprise, reportedly made even without consulting with his wife.

The LDP was blindsided. The public, it seems, is angry over Mr. Fukuda's "irresponsibility." The DPJ has already called for a general election.

I was not among those who wrote Mr. Fukuda off last year as a mere caretaker. I gave him credit for being a better politician than he appeared and not simply a reversion to the old LDP. I still think that. But I'm convinced that Mr. Fukuda was the right man at the wrong time.

His various public statements, including his first policy address, his speech to the LDP national convention in January, his second policy address, and his May foreign policy address all evince a clear understanding of the nature of Japan's crisis. Mr. Fukuda clearly understands how Japan has to change; indeed, he may understand better than just about everyone in the LDP, Mr. Koizumi included. (I'm inclined to agree with Masuzoe Yoichi's description of Mr. Koizumi as a better destroyer than builder — Japan at this point needs the latter just as much as it needs the former.) When he spoke of the hardships facing the Japanese people, I did not question his sincerity.

The problem is that he faced a political situation that would have stumped all but the ablest of politicians, which Mr. Fukuda is not. I think that he would have been a huge success had he followed Mr. Koizumi in 2006, being more of a builder than Mr. Koizumi and probably being better liked by the public than Mr. Koizumi. I don't mean loved or admired in the way that Mr. Koizumi was, like a rock idol, but rather someone who the public would have trusted to listen to them, to be frank with them, and to do his best to address his concerns and begin the hard work of building a new Japanese system for the twenty-first century. Even Mr. Koizumi, for all his popularity, did not enjoy a relationship like that with the public — as suggested by scornful remarks about his policy legacy.

But Mr. Fukuda took over in September 2007, after Abe Shinzo had already reduced his inheritance to rubble. The agenda facing Mr. Fukuda was more daunting than the previous year, and he faced more obstacles to governing than Mr. Abe had. Mr. Fukuda had to deal with a resurgent DPJ in control of the upper house, but he also had to command an LDP deeply divided over its future in the wake of Mr. Koizumi and the LDP's 2007 election defeat (the former being in some way a cause of the latter) and soothe an agitated Komeito. He failed to overcome all of these challenges. He may well have made them worse: the DPJ looks poised to win the next election, the LDP is no less divided than last year, and Komeito may be on the brink of breaking with the LDP. Press reports will focus on the role of the divided Diet (i.e.,, democracy) in undermining his government, but the LDP deserves at least as much blame. Throughout his tenure Mr. Fukuda had to battle with his own party about priorities, policy, and political strategy. His victories were scarce, and, as he made clear in his statement last night, his frustrations many.

Yes, Mr. Fukuda failed, but success is likely to have eluded most other politicians. The reality is that the LDP as it exists today is incapable of governing Japan.

Mr. Fukuda's resignation may not just be the trigger for a general election; it may be the catalyst for a political realignment. Sonoda Hiroyuki yesterday called for the creation of a new party with part of the DPJ (presumably that also means part of the LDP will be involved too). The manner in which the LDP elects Mr. Fukuda's successor will be crucial for determining whether and how the party survives. I have written that Mr. Aso is likely to be the successor, but that is by no means guaranteed. There is talk of a Koizumi return, although I suspect that at this point Mr. Koizumi would rather return at the head of his own party instead of resurrecting the corpse of the LDP. For the moment there is no apparent rival to Mr. Aso (the foreign press is talking of Koike Yuriko, but I don't think she'll be able to repeat Mr. Koizumi's 2001 feat). But should Mr. Aso somehow not win the prize, I don't think Mr. Aso and his conservative comrades will be long for the LDP. Similarly, Mr. Aso's election could alienate some LDP members — like Mr. Nakagawa and the other remaining Koizumians — to the point of forcing them to leave the LDP and form their own party.

This is the shipwreck that Mr. Fukuda has left behind, though little fault of his own. The LDP is deeply divided along lines of how Japan should be governed, and the differing schools of thought seem disinclined to put the good of the LDP before their individual agendas.

The result may be that we are nearing the end of Japan's long bakumatsu. After years of watching the old system decay — and be prematurely declared dead — the ancien regime may finally be dead.

Before the year is up the DPJ may get its first chance to form a government. The voters seem to be in a hanging mood, especially after a second consecutive LDP prime minister resigned surprisingly. This act will by no means transform Japan overnight — nothing will do that — but it will be the catharsis that signals the final break with LDP rule. Even if the LDP returns to power in the future, it will invariably be a different LDP, one humbled by its time in opposition and splintered.

For that, Mr. Fukuda should at least deserve a footnote when the history of the present era is written. He may not have delivered much — although it's possible that the Fukuda Doctrine in foreign policy may outlast his government — but he at least pointed the way that Japan must go if it is to succeed in the twenty-first century. That's certainly more than one could say of his predecessor.

LDP reformers on the DPJ election

Ozawa Ichiro's path to reelection as head of the DPJ is increasingly open. Despite bold words from the leading lights of the DPJ's anti-Ozawa wing, one after the other has opted not to challenge Mr. Ozawa in next month's election for the party leadership.

Despite demands form Maehara Seiji and his fellow young turks that the DPJ use the leadership election to debate the party's manifesto, not one of them as been willing to sacrifice himself in order to force said debate.

Should the DPJ worry about Mr. Ozawa's being reelected uncontested? Hatoyama Yukio, the party's secretary-general, isn't concerned about the possibility of an uncontested election.

However, Nakagawa Hidenao and Yamauchi Koichi, standard bearer of the LDP's reformers and first-term Koizumi Kid respectively, both think that an uncontested DPJ election is a sign of a serious deficiency in the DPJ (and presumably an opportunity for the LDP to exploit in a general election campaign). Both comment on an article in the Tokyo Shimbun by Sasaki Takeshi, a professor at Gakushuin, in which he criticizes the idea of an uncontested party election. To Professor Sasaki (and Messrs. Nakagawa and Yamauchi), party elections play an important role in calibrating the party's public presence in advance of an election.

It seems to me that the LDP's reformists are desperate to find a way to halt the DPJ's gains. Naturally both men — especially Mr. Yamauchi, who is especially vulnerable in the next general election — need to recast the DPJ as a party of reaction and the LDP as the party of reform without sanctuaries. Mr. Yamauchi uses this discussion to remind readers of his participation in an study group calling for reforms to the LDP's election process. Party elections, he says, should be manifesto elections.

Why? Why must party leaders be elected on the basis of their platforms, as opposed to other reasons (political acumen, charisma, managerial competence, etc.)? A party election is not a primary, a lead-in to a general election. It is an internal administrative matter that is about more than just the party's platform. The alternative to "manifesto elections" is not dictatorship — both the LDP and the DPJ have organs for debating policy questions.

The enthusiasm with which the last of the Koizumians have seized upon the DPJ's perceived failings is a sign of just how vulnerable their position in the LDP is. Mr. Nakagawa believes that the LDP has changed "from the LDP that protects vested interests" to the "reform LDP that destroys vested interests." Will the voters believe that the LDP has followed through on this claim in the years since Koizumi Junichiro left office? More importantly, are they satisfied with the idea of "destroying vested interests," or do they desire a more constructive approach to Japan's problems?

As I've argued before, I have a hard time believing, in light of the events of the three years since the 2005 general election, that voters will be casting their votes on the basis of the DPJ's fitness to govern.

They like him, they really, really like him...but will it matter?

Jun Okumura provides a convenient breakdown of the initial polls pertaining to the Fukuda reshuffle.

The bounce to Prime Minister Fukuda appears to have been somewhere around five percentage points, excluding Yomiuri's freakish poll recording a fourteen-point increase (a poll that can't be compared with earlier Yomiuri polls due to a differing methodology).

What I found interesting, however, is that both the Yomiuri and the Asahi polls recorded widespread approval of the prime minister's decision to name Aso Taro LDP secretary-general.

In the Yomiuri poll, 66.3% of respondents approved of the decision, while only 24.3% disapproved. By comparison, only 32.9% of respondents approved of the decision to bring Yosano Kaoru, Mr. Aso's fellow post-Fukuda contender, into the cabinet, with 42.8% disapproving.

In the Asahi poll, 51% approved of Mr. Aso's appointment, while only 29% disapproved.

There is no doubting that Mr. Aso's appeal across broad swathes of the Japanese public is genuine.

But Mr. Aso's taking the position was a risky decision on his part. His political future will rest on the results of the next general election. Serving as LDP secretary-general might be the worst possible position for Mr. Aso. It will make him directly responsible for the LDP's performance, but gives him little control over policy; he is at the mercy of a prime minister considerably less popular than himself. If the LDP loses badly, badly enough to fall from power, it is unlikely that the party will turn to Mr. Aso to save the LDP; if the LDP manages to hold on to power, there is no guarantee that he will be rewarded for loyal service (although there are apparently rumors that Mr. Fukuda offered to designate Mr. Aso his successor in exchange for the latter's service). The prime minister's hoe, of course, is that he can hitch his wagon to Mr. Aso's star and pull off an unexpectedly strong showing in the next election.

But voters' affinity for Mr. Aso might not make all that much difference in how they vote when the election comes.

Given that as MTC wrote last month, "...In some districts the opposition could put up a dog as a candidate and win" (Yomiuri recently wrote about LDP candidates in urban districts trailing in polls despite the DPJ's having not yet selected a candidate for their district), Mr. Aso certainly has his work cut out for him. He will have to use his personal appeal to convince the public that the LDP can be trusted to fix the mess it created. His presence might make the difference in a handful of districts, but on the whole the election will rest on the Fukuda government delivering tangible progress in tackling the issues of greatest concern to voters, which according to Yomiuri countermeasures for high prices, the pensions problem, eldercare, and global warming.

Mr. Aso and Mr. Fukuda deserve credit for taking a chance, but ultimately it might make little difference in the outcome of the election.

Nakagawa's fantasy world

For once I'm not talking about Nakagawa Shoichi.

Nakagawa Hidenao, onetime LDP secretary-general under Prime Minister Abe and now the putative leader of the LDP's Koizumians, has written a series of posts at his blog over the past week, starting with one on 19 July in which he criticized the DPJ for its "former Socialist Party ideology" in its support for collusion among government and labor, its anti-US, anti-US-Japan security treaty, UN-centered foreign policy — for its policies that are, in his words, "at the same time unrealistic and lacking in persuasive power for the popular will."

He followed it up with a post on 20 July in which he discussed the DPJ's ties to Jichiro, the All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union, which the LDP holds responsible for the pensions scandal thanks to the union's illegal practice of having workers paid for full-time work despite not being present full time. He claimed, "In order to destroy the Abe cabinet, which fought boldly against the practice of illegal pay received for illegal full-time work, wasn't the suicide bombing of leaking the case of the 50 million missing pensions records launched?"

On 22 July he discussed an Asahi editorial and declared that the LDP stands for "eradicating amakudari," while the DPJ, as a result of its ties to public-sector unions, is not really opposed to ending amakudari even though ending the practice is at the center of the party's approach to administrative reform. (Recall that the DPJ wanted tougher provisions against amakudari in the administrative reform bill it compromised with the Fukuda government to pass in the spring Diet session.) He asserted that because of Ozawa Ichiro's ties with Rengo, a DPJ administration would be "heaven for the illegal practice of receiving full-time pay without performing full-time work."

He repeated his criticism of the DPJ's silence on this practice on 24 July, and extended the criticism in a post today, in which he questioned the wisdom of giving the DPJ — which he says moves left or right depending on the political winds — carte blanche.

I would have more respect for Mr. Nakagawa's argument if his criticisms of the DPJ didn't also apply to the LDP — the contemporary LDP.

Mr. Nakagawa writes about the LDP as if we were living in a parallel universe in which the Koizumi revolution succeeded: Mr. Koizumi was able to break the back of the reactionaries, used his final year in office to push a series of wide-reaching reforms, and handed power over to Mr. Abe, who decided that he would continue the reforms and oppose the readmission of ousted reactionaries to the party instead of devoting his energy to the ideological obsessions of the right. He acts as if Mr. Fukuda is controlling the party with a firm hand, that he has faced no opposition from the road tribe to his plan to phase out the road construction fund, that he won't face more opposition this autumn as he attempts to write his road plan into law. In short, Mr. Nakagawa acts if the war for the identity of the LDP was already won by his reformists.

The reality is shockingly different. Mr. Nakagawa's emergence as the leading voice for reform may have given the beleagurered Koizumians some heft, but many of the first- and second-term Koizumi kids may be out of the Diet after the next election.

Yamauchi Koichi, one of those kids, illustrates just how silly this theme coming from the mouths of LDP members in a post at his blog called "The LDP-ization of Ozawa's DPJ." Mr. Yamauchi suggests that the push for reelecting Mr. Ozawa as DPJ leader without a vote is a sign of the traditional LDP tactics learned by Mr. Ozawa from his days as LDP secretary-general. At no point does Mr. Yamauchi say "old LDP;" he says LDP, as in the party of which he is currently a member. Mr. Yamauchi is not so foolish to deny that the LDP is not the bizarro world LDP in which Mr. Koizumi succeeded at transforming the LDP; Yomiuri reported this week that Mr. Yamauchi is finding that he will have to run against the LDP in Kanagawa's ninth district in order to win reelection.

Does the LDP really want to take this approach in attacking the DPJ? Does it really want to describe the DPJ as being like the LDP, an LDP that contrary to Mr. Nakagawa's wishes is still alive and kicking? Mind you, I'm uncomfortable with Mr. Ozawa's ties with labor unions, which are no less reactionary than businesses and farmers long coddled by the LDP, but given that the DPJ has no track record in power, I'm willing to give the DPJ the benefit of the doubt — and I suspect that many Japanese voters might be willing to do so too when given the chance. The LDP is betting that voters will prefer the devil they know (all too well) to the devil they don't; I'd be willing to bet others, and it may turn out that the DPJ isn't the devil that the LDP wants voters to think it is.

The feeling is mutual

MTC reports on comments by Koga Makoto and Suga Yoshihide, the LDP's chief and deputy election strategists regarding the possibility of a general election around the new year.

MTC notes that Nikkei believes that this scheme is connected with the desire of New Komeito's leadership not to have to vote on the latest enabling law for the MSDF refueling mission. MTC concludes that the LDP is unlikely to act out of charity to its junior partner, and will instead use Komeito's campaign machine and then break the partnership following the election.

If Shukan Shincho is to be believed, Komeito is no more eager to retain its partnership after the election than the LDP.

An article headlined "The LDP has finally been abandoned by Soka Gakkai's Ikeda Daisaku" in the July 24 issue of Shukan Shincho chronicles a series of recent remarks by current and former Komeito and Soka Gakkai officials expressing their dissatisfaction with the coalition and their willingness to consider a partnership with the DPJ.

Given the number of reasons for Komeito to be dissatisfied with the LDP — including not just their differing foreign policy views but the LDP's perceived indifference to the plight of Japan's elderly — I would question the political sense of Komeito's leaders if they weren't dissatisfied with their party's partnership with the LDP and searching for a way out.

Accordingly, the next general election campaign, says the article, will be the coalition's last. Komeito will adhere to the coalition to the last, but will look to jump from the LDP's side, especially if its support could make the difference in the DPJ's coming to power.

In light of both parties' dissatisfaction with their coalition, it is worth asking whether either party will be campaigning particularly hard for the other's candidates in a general election campaign. Will Komeito voters buck the party and vote for DPJ candidates over LDP candidates, or not vote at all?

DPJ ranks swell

Nikkei reports that the DPJ now has more "party members/party supporters" than ever before.

The total number at the end of May was 270,000 members/supporters nationwide, compared with 244,000 in September 2006 (when Ozawa Ichiro's current term as party leader began) and 201,000 in 2007 (the month isn't specified).

What matters is where these new members are located. If they are concentrated in the rural districts targeted by Mr. Ozawa, they could be a sign that Mr. Ozawa's efforts in rural Japan are bearing fruit, a sign that rural Japan's "allergy" to the DPJ is vanishing and that the party is set to make major inroads in the next general election. The surge is less significant if it is comprised mostly of urban and suburban floating voters who have been pushed from the "leaning DPJ" category into the "firmly DPJ" category.

Unfortunately the party isn't sharing the geographical distribution of this influx of members and supporters.

Nevertheless, it is a sign that the DPJ is doing something right. Regardless of its internal squabbles, the party will profit from deepening discontent with the LDP-Komeito coalition's management of the government.

Meanwhile, for those wondering about the difference between party members and party supporters, the rules are spelled out in section two of the party's rulebook. Both members and supporters make contributions to the party in their applications for membership. Party members are attached to a campaign office — one per single-member election district — while party supporters apply to local campaign offices and prefectural chapters. Both members and supporters have a vote in party leadership elections. The biggest difference is that members "take a part in planning party administration, activities, and policies" (and are expected to agree with the party's principles and policies), while supporters "can [emphasis added] take part in planning party events and activities" insofar as they are inclined (but don't necessarily have to agree to principles and policies).

The money involved is negligible: members pay 6,000 yen annually, supporters pay 2,000 yen annually.

More important than money, the members and supporters provide bodies, ensuring that DPJ candidates will have volunteers to distribute fliers, stuff envelopes, and make phone calls. Again, if enough of these new members and supporters are in districts in which the DPJ has never won before, they could make the difference between victory and defeat for the DPJ.

The post-Fukuda era looms

Asahi conducted a poll of LDP and DPJ prefectural chapters asking about support for the current party leaders.

In the DPJ, Ozawa Ichiro's relationship with the prefectural chapters is secure: forty-four of forty-seven want him to remain as party head to lead the DPJ into the next general election.

The news for Fukuda Yasuo, however, is bleak. Twelve chapters want Mr. Fukuda to lead the LDP into the next general election; twenty-two want a new leader (no indication what the other thirteen said). Interestingly, there is little correlation between how a prefecture voted in the September 2007 leadership election and its support for Mr. Fukuda today. The reasons given for discontent with Mr. Fukuda are typical: low public support numbers, poor leadership skills, an inability to make progress on the many pressing policy issues facing the Fukuda government. Asked how they think is an appropriate replacement for Mr. Fukuda, only seven chapters answered with a name (as opposed to qualities desired in a leader), and all seven provided the same name: Aso Taro.

The news from the prefectures contributes to a growing sense in Tokyo that Mr. Fukuda is running out of time, a sense that has grown in the weeks since the LDP's defeat in the Yamaguchi-2 by-election as the party has studied its defeat. There is growing talk in the media of the post-Fukuda era, as the media probes the two leading post-Fukuda candidates, Mr. Aso and Yosano Kaoru, the leading anyone-but-Aso candidate for the LDP presidency. (A Google News search finds ninety-eight uses of the term "post-Fukuda" over the past week.) As expected, Mr. Yosano's failure to say yes or no to questions about his ambitions has only fed media speculation about his designs on Mr. Fukuda's job, and now Mr. Aso and Mr. Yosano are spoken of in the same breath as having barely concealed intentions to hasten the arrival of the post-Fukuda era. Indeed, both men have articles in the June issue of Bungei Shunju discussing their plans for saving Japan.

Mr. Aso is at the point where he can no longer deny his intentions. At a press conference Friday, Mr. Yosano was asked whether he intends to aim for the premiership. His response skirted the question: "I am a person who takes pride in his work, and if I have a task, I perform it with all my might. I have no awareness of my individual ambition — I want to do good work." Not quite "I'm in. And I'm in to win." But it is consistent with his overall media approach in recent months: Mr. Yosano has emphasized his desire to do what needs to be done to save Japan (raising the consumption tax rate, for example), regardless of what the polls say.

It is still unclear who has the edge in the post-Fukuda horse race. By dint of his having the support of the LDP's conservative ideologues concentrated in the True Conservative Policy Research Group, his following among prefectural chapters and the public at large, and his tireless efforts to proclaim his understanding of the insecurities of the Japanese people, Mr. Aso probably remains the front runner.

He may also be poised to claim the support of the newly reunited Kochikai, which officially reemerged on Tuesday and with sixty-one members is the third largest faction in the LDP. At its launch the new old faction is already troubled; the phrase that has been used in the press is "setting to sea in the same bed with different dreams." The reason for tension is that there are hints that some faction members are open to supporting Mr. Aso's bid for the party presidency, despite Tanigaki Sadakazu, perennial candidate for the leadership (and likely candidate in the next leadership election), being the faction's number two. Mr. Tanigaki assumed that the new faction would be a major platform for his next bid for the leadership and has reportedly threatened to leave the faction if it fails to support him.

That said, the all-important Machimura faction (i.e., Mori Yoshiro) has yet to signal which way it is leaning, despite Mr. Aso's active courting of Mr. Mori and other Machimura faction chiefs. The post-Fukuda non-campaign campaign is in full swing, the candidates are emerging, and the LDP barons are starting to choose sides — with Mr. Fukuda helpless in the midst of the open campaigning for his job.

Shuffling districts?

At a press conference Wednesday at DPJ headquarters, Ozawa Ichiro hinted at the possibility that he, along with several other prominent figures from the DPJ and other opposition parties, will change districts in the next general election to campaign against governing coalition heavyweights holding seats in Tokyo.

Asahi suggests that if Mr. Ozawa makes the jump from his home district of Iwate-4, he would run in Tokyo-12 against Komeito's Ota Akihiro, who has only ran in Tokyo-12 twice, first in 2003 by a 3,600-vote margin and again in 2005, by a 36,000-vote margin. With Komeito vulnerable, especially after the party's disastrous showing in the 2007 HC election, in which only nine of twenty-four Komeito candidates won, the party's lowest "batting average" in an HC election since 1974, a victory by Mr. Ozawa over the party's leader could be the symbol of Komeito's demise.

The opposition might also have Tanaka Yasuo, former maverick Nagano governor and current HC member from Nagano as a representative of his own New Party Japan (NPJ) run in Tokyo's eighth district against the LDP's Ishihara Nobuteru, former cabinet minister and potential contender for the premiership in the future. Hatoyama Yukio and Okada Katsuya have also been mentioned as possible DPJ "assassins."

There are some who doubt the wisdom of Mr. Ozawa's scheme, however; Asahi notes that some DPJ members are concerned that if Mr. Ozawa has to focus on campaigning in a new district and defeating a prominent foe, he will not be able to travel the country on behalf of DPJ candidates.

I wonder whether this proposal isn't indicative of (over)confidence on Mr. Ozawa's part, so sure is he that not only will the DPJ be able to sweep the LDP out of Tokyo by parachuting heavyweights into Tokyo districts but that second-tier DPJ candidates will be able to retain seats vacated by said heavyweights. Maybe his overconfidence is merited, particularly in regard to his home district in Iwate (AKA Ozawa's kingdom). Maybe the DPJ stands on the brink of a major victory in the next general election. There are certainly signs that suggest that a tipping point has been reached in the public's tolerance for the LDP's policy failures; maybe the Japanese people are finally ready to punish the LDP in a general election and vote for any candidate with "DPJ" next to his or her name. But if that's not the case, this strategy could backfire by forcing formerly secure, heavyweight incumbents to campaign hard for seats while throwing their formerly safe seats open to competition.

In an election that could result in a hung parliament, all 300 single-member districts matter. The DPJ must think hard about whether Mr. Ozawa's suggestion maximizes the party's ability to fight across the country. Will the party be better off leaving Mr. Ozawa and other leaders in safe districts, enabling them to campaign harder for weaker candidates?

So much for the LDP's popularity

In recent weeks, some LDP leaders, hinting that the party might be willing to consider calling a general election sometime before September 2009, pointed to the party's ratings in public opinion polls. Polls have consistently shown the LDP polling higher than the DPJ, even as Prime Minister Fukuda's popularity has tanked. On this point, I asked last month, "Are the LDP and Komeito really willing to bet their two-thirds majority — which Mr. Ibuki admitted will likely not be retained — on the basis of there being some significance to the polls? I have a hunch that the polls fail to capture the extent of the public's discontent. I'm not convinced that the public is any less discontent than it was last summer when the LDP was trounced in the HC election. Will the public really be inclined to punish the DPJ more than the LDP?"

After Sunday's DPJ victory in Yamaguchi, I am more convinced that polls have failed to capture the widespread and growing malaise among Japanese voters — and their willingness to hold the LDP responsible for policy failures that have made their lives more insecure.

Now Asahi has produced a poll showing that the DPJ has topped the LDP in popularity, at the same time that it found that Mr. Fukuda's favorable rating has fallen to 20%. The DPJ's support rose six points to 28%, the LDP's fell two points to 24%. A slim margin, yes, but a margin that deprives the LDP of its claim to be more popular than DPJ. The shift is undoubtedly influenced by the gasoline tax fight, but even so, it is hard for the LDP to argue that it is has the public solidly behind it. In short, it's hard to tell what exactly the party support figure represents. Does it actually measure the level of public support for the parties?

Regardless of the accuracy of these figures, both make it less likely that the LDP will accept an early election — and less likely that it will be Mr. Fukuda who leads the LDP into the next election.

DPJ cruising to victory in Yamaguchi-2

As expected, the DPJ's Hiraoka Hideo is in a strong position with less than a week before the by-election in Yamaguchi's second district.

A poll conducted by Mainichi over the weekend reveals that voters' concerns favor the DPJ. Health and welfare policy are the top priority (22%), followed by the pensions problem (20%), administrative reform (14%), economic growth (12%), regional revitalization (12%), education (8%), combating inequality (6%), and agricultural policy (2%). A majority of respondents who said that health and welfare, and the pensions problem are most important stated that they support Mr. Hiraoka; a majority of those who gave highest priority to regional revitalization said they favored the LDP's Yamamoto Shigetaro. The poll also found that Mr. Hiraoka bested Mr. Yamamoto among respondents in their 60s and 70s, a distressing sign for an LDP that has relied on the elderly vote. Another encouraging sign for Mr. Hiraoka is that the absence of a JCP candidate will be to his advantage: approximately sixty percent of JCP supporters said they would vote for Mr. Hiraoka, compared to only twenty percent who said they would vote for Mr. Yamamoto.

The LDP is clearly panicked over the prospect of getting trounced in Yamaguchi, not least because it could both doom efforts to reimpose the temporary gasoline tax and inject a degree of urgency into the post-Fukuda discussion. The party is particularly concerned about the defection of elderly voters, and is scrambling to provide a simple explanation of the party's plans for a new pensions system. (Jun Okumura has more on the new pensions scheme here.) The LDP and Komeito continue to hope that visits from high-level officials will rally their supporters — Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Ota were in district over the weekend — but it is unlikely that these campaign visits will be enough shift the momentum in Mr. Yamamoto's favor.

The DPJ, not surprisingly, is feeling confident, although the DPJ and other opposition parties are sending party leaders to the district too. On Saturday, Kan Naoto (DPJ), Tanaka Yasuo (NPJ), Kamei Shizuka (PNP), and Fukushima Mizuho (SDPJ) attended an event for Mr. Hiraoka. The speakers attacked LDP rule as failing to protect the weak and revive stagnant regions — and Mr. Kan attacked bureaucrats for putting their interests before the people's interests.

The contrast between the LDP's and the DPJ's positions in advance of the by-election is revealing. The LDP is struggling to figure just what it's running on, while the DPJ is hammering away at the government for misuse of power. Whatever the national opinion polls say, the DPJ sounds increasingly ready to contest a general election and strike another major blow against the LDP.

Nearing a climax?

Japan's political air is once again full of election talk as the end of April approaches, bringing the first by-election of the Fukuda era and the end of the sixty-day period after which the HR can vote again on the tax bill containing the temporary gasoline tax.

Ibuki Bunmei, LDP secretary-general, hinted in remarks in Nara-ken Saturday that the election will likely be held before the expiration of the term in September 2009, perhaps as early as this autumn. Mr. Ibuki suggested that Mr. Fukuda might act if he gets a tailwind so as to minimize the blow to the LDP in the general election that everyone knows is coming.

Asahi builds upon Mr. Ibuki's remarks, noting that he added that the party is encouraged by its strong favorable ratings in public opinion polls, many of which have consistently shown the LDP receiving more support than the DPJ.

Koga Makoto, the LDP's chief election strategist, who has been one of the leading advocates in the LDP for delaying until September 2009, has also changed his tune to echo Mr. Ibuki's line.

Mr. Ibuki's emphasis on the party's popularity, however, suggests a certain distancing from the increasingly unpopular Mr. Fukuda. I suspect that the earlier the general election, the greater the chance that it will not be Mr. Fukuda who leads the party into it, especially once the G8 summit has passed. Now that Mr. Fukuda has admitted that he underwent surgery for stomach cancer nearly a decade ago, there's even a convenient excuse for his stepping down, something like "health concerns brought on from the intense stress of the premiership."

But regardless of whether Mr. Fukuda will be at the helm for the next election, it is worth asking whether the LDP is right to feel confident about its electoral prospects based on opinion polls showing greater support than for the DPJ. Do the party support numbers recorded in polls actually have any meaning for how people will vote? Are the LDP and Komeito really willing to bet their two-thirds majority — which Mr. Ibuki admitted will likely not be retained — on the basis of there being some significance to the polls? I have a hunch that the polls fail to capture the extent of the public's discontent. I'm not convinced that the public is any less discontent than it was last summer when the LDP was trounced in the HC election. Will the public really be inclined to punish the DPJ more than the LDP?

The DPJ may not be able to win a majority outright, but anything close will be more than enough to topple the sitting premier, whether Mr. Fukuda or a successor, and possibly break the LDP as its contending sects battle for control of the party.

It is with this in mind that we head into the final weeks of the battle of the temporary tax and road construction. Ozawa Ichiro is still threatening a censure motion should the HR pass the tax bill again, although he has hedged on his threat by suggesting that the final decision will be for the party's HC members to make. Whether a censure motion will have any meaning depends, of course, on the government's response.

If the LDP's leaders are convinced that its popularity will win the day in a general election, perhaps they will call Mr. Ozawa's bluff.

And then?

Two years of Ozawa's leadership

Today is the second anniversary of Ozawa Ichiro's election as head of the DPJ.

Mr. Ozawa marked the occasion with appearances on several Sunday political talk shows, on which he assessed the political situation and issued his latest call for a hasty general election. He said that an election should be held in advance of the July G8 summit, as the people's voice must be heard.

Is Mr. Ozawa certain that he'll like what the people have to say?

Yamamoto Ichita, in his assessment of Mr. Ozawa's television appearances, suggests that the DPJ head in misreading public sentiment, especially on the temporary tax issue. He argues that if the government reinstitutes the temporary tax, "it will invite 'public opposition' in the short term. This is unavoidable." In short, the public's anger will be real, but it will be short-lived, certainly nothing that will imperil the Fukuda government.

I share Mr. Yamamoto's doubts about the ineffectiveness of Mr. Ozawa's strategy. I find that the DPJ is more effective the less it demands a rapid general election. There is very little the DPJ can do to make the LDP fold and call an election before September 2009. What it can do is find wedge issues that enable it to exploit divisions within the LDP and watch as the LDP tears itself to pieces in the months leading up to a general election. Waiting for the LDP to implode is the last thing that Mr. Ozawa wants to do — but part of his fervor for regime change and reform is an impatience that leads him to abandon strategies before they've reached fruition.

Rather than demanding a hasty election, the DPJ must work harder to package itself as the reform party, to embed its opposition to the temporary tax and special fund in a general narrative that shows why LDP rule has been so disastrous. Saying that Japan needs regime change is not enough: giving the duration of the LDP's hold on power, the reasons for regime change are clearly not self-evident to Japanese voters. This concern underlies the opposition of the DPJ's young reformists to Mr. Ozawa's leadership, who they feel is a poor messenger and a potential drag in urban and suburban districts that should otherwise be easy pickings for the DPJ running against a party led by a prime minister with favorable ratings in the low 20s and unfavorable ratings in the 60s.

Mr. Ozawa, the election will come when it comes. In the meantime, focus on fundamentals and ensure that your candidates are ready to contest a general election.

Election soon?

The signs of change in the DPJ's thinking on the timing of the next general election discussed here is now a definite policy shift.

As Mr. Ozawa told reporters in Kyoto Thursday, "We are struggling on the major premise of a dissolution this Diet session, although since the right to dissolve the Diet is held by the Cabinet, we don't know [what will happen]."

Mr. Ozawa might be encouraged by the findings of a recent Mainichi poll that shows that 44% continue to hope for a DPJ general election victory, compared with only 34% who want the LDP to win. (Interestingly, the poll also recorded a ten-point increase, to 15%, of respondents who want "another party" to win.)

Perhaps there is hope for Mr. Ozawa and the DPJ yet, although I remain convinced that the next general election will trigger a series of events likely to impact both parties profoundly, making it next to impossible to predict the post-election landscape.

And regardless, since the DPJ will not be fielding candidates in approximately fifty single-member districts, it is highly unlikely that it will win outright.

Ozawa foresees an early election

As the natural culmination of the shift in momentum that has the DPJ pressuring the government on all fronts and feeling confident enough to boycott HC deliberations to protest the government's passage of the FY 2008 budget last week, the DPJ is once again preparing for an early general election.

Speaking to reporters in Hamamatsu, Ozawa Ichiro said, "Anticipating that there might well be a dissolution of the House of Representatives and general election during the current Diet, we are hastening the backing of candidates."

He also emphasized the issues that contributed to the DPJ's win in last summer's HC election: "The life of the people is the thing [the central issue in the general election campaign]. It is understood that the mistake of 'market economy omnipotentism' is growing inequality."

I still think that an early election favors the LDP, even if some of the party's elders — Mr. Mori, for example — think otherwise: for all that Mr. Fukuda's popularity has fallen, he remains more popular than Mr. Ozawa, and the DPJ clearly needs more time for its candidates to make themselves known to voters. So with that in mind, a pre-G8 general election remains plausible, if not highly probable.

Waiting for autumn

As the temperature in the debate over the temporary gasoline tax lowers and the parties prepare to negotiate, it seems increasingly likely that Prime Minister Fukuda will succeed in pushing a general election until "after the G8 summit."

Mr. Ozawa admitted as much Thursday in a speech at his annual political workshop. He declared that the party is shifting to a "long-term" strategy that prioritizes the preservation of the party's "centripetal force."

I've been skeptical of the DPJ's post-July push for a rapid election, which seemed to ignore the lack of electoral preparedness readily acknowledged even by Mr. Ozawa himself. This strategy rested on the idea that the DPJ will win a general election largely on the basis of outrage at the LDP. It's possible that after years of policy failures the public might finally be outraged enough at the LDP to vote it out of power, but the DPJ should not base its strategy on this idea. It cannot keep assuming that the LDP will make mistakes that make the job of campaigning easier.

With the horizon for a general election lengthening, perhaps the DPJ will finally get around to crafting a new critique of the government that can carry it through the Diet session and general election campaign. And Mr. Ozawa can spend plenty of time campaigning in the country — he'll be taking another tour of the regions this month.

Mr. Fukuda may have bought himself some time to reverse some of the decline in his popularity and begin moving an agenda once the budget is implemented, but somehow even with his wiseman Yosano and his guardian Mori, Mr. Fukuda will not have it easy. (And I suspect that the longer the time to an election, the greater the likelihood that Mr. Fukuda's rivals within the LDP will work to undermine his government.)

Is the LDP doomed?

MTC makes the bold prediction that the LDP "faces annihilation" in the next general election.

I'm inclined to agree, simply because it seems that the LDP has finally exhausted the patience of the Japanese people — and the members of the LDP seem more interested in dividing into warring ideological camps than in making good policy in advance of a general election. The party elders seem equally aware of the peril facing the LDP. Not surprisingly, over the weekend both Foreign Minister Komura and former prime minister Mori insisted that there is no hurry to hold a general election, with Mr. Komura suggesting that the government should wait until the end of the term (i.e., September 2009) before dissolving the House of Representatives and holding a election.

Will the ideologues, I wonder, permit the government to wait that long before going to the people? Will 2008 be the year of the Nakagawa no ran?

Meanwhile, the gasoline tax issue is shaping up to be a massive boon for the opposition, not least because it will make it harder for Mr. Fukuda and the LDP to campaign on behalf of consumers and urban Japan more generally. That's what I conclude from a meeting at the Kantei with the National Governors Association, in which the governors, led by NGA Chairman Aso Wataru of Fukuoka (no relation to Taro, who is also from Fukuoka), informed the government that they support the extension of the "temporary" gasoline tax. (It's unclear from this Sankei article about the meeting whether the governors are unanimous in support of the tax extension.) The issue is increasingly shaping up to be a battle of consumers and gas-dependent producers versus regions hungry for infrastructure projects funded by the tax. It seems obvious to me which side is the better bet both in the short term, in a general election, and over the long term as the LDP and the DPJ vie for dominance.

The DPJ is set to get as much mileage out of the gasoline tax issue as possible (pun intended), and unlike in the debate over the refueling mission, the LDP may not be able to win the match by using the HR supermajority. A recent Mainichi poll found that even as 46% of respondents said they approved of the government's use of the supermajority on the refueling issue (to 41% who did not approve), 51% said they don't think it should be used for future issues (compared to only 38% who approve of its being used again). Mr. Mori thinks that there is no danger to the government from using the supermajority to resolve the debate over the gasoline tax, that the threat of an HC censure motion is nothing to fear. As I noted in the run-up to the re-passage of the anti-terror law earlier this month, on paper the DPJ's threat to censure the government isn't much of a threat. The government could theoretically ignore it. But a censure motion backed by massive public outcry against the government would be harder to ignore.

It is difficult to see how Mr. Fukuda, for all his good intentions, will be able to reassert his control of the LDP and regain the momentum in Diet deliberations.

Who won the battle over postal reform?

On Saturday, Koga Makoto, the LDP's chief election strategist, announced that the party's candidate in Gifu-1 will be Noda Seiko, a former postal minister ousted from the party as a postal rebel in the summer of 2005 and readmitted to the party in December 2006. The dispute was over whether the party would give the nomination to Ms. Noda or to Sato Yukari, one of Mr. Koizumi's assassins.

In accordance with stated policy, the reason for Ms. Noda's receiving the nomination was on the basis of her "objectively" being able to win — apparently because she has won five elections.

Ms. Sato (or should I say Dr., on the basis of her Ph.D. in Economics from NYU?), having been elected only once, simply could not compete on that criteria.

In case anyone still thought that the LDP is the party of Koizumi Junichiro, this is yet another example that the real winner in the summer 2005 showdown over postal privatization was neither Mr. Koizumi and his band of reformers nor the postal rebels (after all, privatization is going forward), but the party elders who forced Mr. Koizumi to accept amendments to the bills to make them more palatable to the party's risk-averse and cowardly members. Recall the 28 June 2005 LDP executive council meeting when Kyuma Fumio, then chair of the council, forced a vote on the amendments without first achieving a consensus. Mr. Koizumi ended up getting his (amended) legislation and winning a major election victory, expelling the die hards in the process, but upon his leaving office control of the party passed back into the hands of the risk-averse elders, who are now prepared to erase the remaining traces of the Koizumi legacy.

Mr. Koizumi may ultimately get the last laugh — indeed, I suspect that he's been laughing to himself for the past year — because the LDP may be on the brink of destroying itself. But for the moment, the party elders are in control, and will continue to run the LDP as they know best, for the time being anyway.