Wanted: a new Japanese grand strategy

Japan apparently has a new strategic concept to replace the irrelevant Yoshida doctrine. At least that's what Greg Sheridan, foreign editor of The Australian, thinks.

To Mr. Sheridan, Japan is back, regardless of the troubles following the downfall of Mr. Abe, because "Japan's new strategic personality will transcend individual politicians." There is a certain truth to that, but the problem with Sheridan's piece is that he doesn't quite get around to telling readers what exactly Japan's new strategic personality is.

We get bits and pieces, like these:

"...Japan, like Germany, can undertake its share of the global security burden, can participate in a degree of collective security and need not be shackled by the post-World War II restrictions."

"The alliance now is reciprocal and Japan is an independent strategic player. That does not mean it will always agree with the US, but as such it is an infinitely more valuable ally to the US and a much more valuable strategic partner for Australia."

And, as is obligatory for articles about Japanese security policy now, the slam of Mr. Ozawa:

This was a monstrous bit of opportunism by Ozawa, who has in the past backed the US alliance and backed Japan becoming a normal nation. Operation Enduring Freedom is authorised by the UN and should not be the subject of controversy. But precisely because Ozawa's move was so cynical it probably does not presage a revolution in Japan's new strategic personality. I suspect that with Abe gone the anti-terrorism law will pass. If it fails, this is a blow to Japan's emerging new strategic personality, but Washington and Canberra will try to work around it, not to let it become a litmus test of the US alliance.

I like that: monstrous bit of opportunism.

In the midst of this, however, Mr. Sheridan does not come even close to elaborating what exactly Japan's new strategic personality is. A "normal" Japan that bears a greater global burden and acts as "the only country besides the US willing to talk about Chinese human rights or to caution China meaningfully on Taiwan" is about as close as he gets.

I can't blame Mr. Sheridan for having little to say on this, because Japan itself doesn't know. Japan "doing more" is the beginning of a discussion on Japan's new security role, not the end of it. For all of Mr. Ozawa's "opportunism," there is a real critique asking whether Japan wants to be a junior member of the US global posse. There is still a debate waiting to be had about how Japan can take up more responsibility for its own defense, enabling it to say "no" when it feels its interests aren't at stake, instead of feeling obligated to say "yes" for fear of displeasing the US.

And so the problem with Mr. Sheridan's talking points. Japan's "strategic independence" has meant, in practical terms, strategic isolation in Northeast Asia, as Japan as pursued an independent course in the six-party talks and found that even the US has a hard time standing with Japan on the abductions issue. Ambitious initiatives hawked by Messrs. Abe and Aso have been met mostly with deafening silence. And last time I checked, the constraints on Japanese security policy were still in effect — and there are few signs that they will change anytime soon. (A re-interpretation of the prohibition on the exercise of the right of collective defense, most pressing from Washington's perspective, looks to be on hold indefinitely, between the DPJ's opposition outside the government and Komeito's opposition within.)

The closer one looks at Japan's much-vaunted strategic change, the less impressive it looks. There are a number of questions yet unanswered. Does Japan have the will and the wherewithal to be a global power (and do the Japanese people want that)? If Japan is focused solely on the Asia-Pacific region, will it act as a genuinely independent strategic actor, even if it means disagreeing with the US (on China, for example)? Will it be able to respond to crises in its near abroad, with or without the US? Would Japan's new "posture" — i.e., the road to a greater security role leads through Washington — survive a change of ruling party?

So, no, Japan still hasn't found a replacement for the venerable but archaic Yoshida Doctrine.

The Upper House elections and Japanese security policy

Of all the factors that went into the LDP's historic loss on Sunday, it is safe to assume that the security policy pursued under the Koizumi and Abe cabinets — an emphasis on the alliance with the US that has seen the JSDF deployed to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, albeit in non-combat roles — was not a significant factor in inducing voters to abandon the LDP.

As Michael Zielenziger argues, echoing a point I made here in advance of the election:

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s stinging defeat in parliamentary elections demonstrates that the Japanese people aren't interested in abandoning their pacifist constitution and taking on the mantle of military might to help Washington manage some form of global hegemony. Japanese citizens don't want to send troops to Iraq and are rejecting Abe’s stand on North Korea which is even tougher than Washington’s own now that direct talks are moving forward between officials from Pyongyang and the State Department.

Instead what voters affirmed on Sunday is that they want a government that will end years of eroding wages and prices, offer hope to millions of alienated young adults, and pledge to the nation’s growingly restive reserve of the elderly that their pensions and retirements will be protected and that the gap between rich and poor will somehow be narrowed.

That seems to be the lesson that the DPJ has drawn from its victory (or perhaps non-defeat is more accurate?) on Sunday. And so almost immediately after the results became clear DPJ Secretary-General Hatoyama Yukio voiced the party's opposition to the renewal of the anti-terror special measures law when it expires in November. The law, first passed in November 2001 as the keystone of the Japanese response to the 9/11 attacks, enabled the dispatch of MSDF vessels to support coalition efforts in Afghanistan, and there they have remained, refueling coalition warships in cooperation with the ongoing multinational campaign against the Taliban. Note that this law applies only to the campaign in Afghanistan; Japanese forces are in Iraq under a different piece of legislation, renewed earlier this year over opposition objections.

DPJ President Ozawa Ichiro, having left his election-day sickbed, has confirmed Hatoyama's proclamation, suggesting that it will be part of an aggressive strategy on the part of the DPJ to force an early election. If the DPJ plans to cooperate with the LDP to make good policy, it's being awfully coy about it.

For Ozawa to hold the special measures law hostage to Diet tactics is shamefully opportunistic, and it will give Ozawa the dubious honor of having both authored Japan's shift to bearing a greater burden in upholding global order and pushed for a new period of isolation. As LDP secretary-general during the Gulf War he pushed hard for Japanese boots on the ground, and when that failed, he authored the postwar international peace cooperation law that resulted in Japanese peacekeepers being sent to Cambodia, the beginning of the legal expansion of Japanese security policy that eventually produced the anti-terror and Iraq special measures laws as well as the formal adoption of "international peace cooperation activities" as a primary mission of the JSDF when the Defense Agency was elevated to ministry status. And yet now he has signaled his opposition to a bill that has enabled Japan to contribute materially to a multinational coalition assisting the reconstruction of Afghanistan, note multinational, not simply the US.

My concern is that backing away from contributing to global security even in minor ways like serving as a floating gas station for coalition ships will encourage passivity among the Japanese people. Passivity, not pacifism: I think the former is more of a problem than the latter, because free-riding is easy to do and does not particularly require the moral commitment of pacifism. The Japanese people did not vote against an activist foreign policy, they just didn't vote in favor of one either, which means that if Japan is going to play some role as a security provider, it will take political leadership to hammer the point home to the people, the kind of leadership that Ozawa once promised but has apparently decided to abandon for the sake of partisan expedience. As US Ambassador Thomas Schieffer noted, "Japan is a responsible member of the international community and I would really hate for Japan to decide that the issue was not important any more or that they didn't want to contribute."

This isn't about Iraq. (I happen to think there are plenty of good reasons for Japan to remove its transport aircraft.) This is about Japan's not withdrawing into itself, focusing on its own problems to the exclusion of the rest of the world. What happens outside of Japan has tremendous importance for the Japanese people — considering their extreme dependence on imported energy and food, for example. The temptation to withdraw clearly still exists, among people and elites.

Japan obviously has a host of domestic problems to confront, and the lesson of this election is that they should be the government's top priorities. But it is not an either/or proposition. The DPJ leadership should think carefully about whether it wants to lead Japan back down the road of free-riding, and it should also consider carefully what impact this strategy will have on party cohesiveness. How far can the DPJ go down this road before pushing its conservatives out of the party and potentially into the arms of the LDP?

The trouble with collective self-defense

Yomiuri ran an editorial on reviewing the prohibition on the right of collective self-defense today, arguing that debate "ought to deepen."

The occasion for this editorial is the government panel's recommendation that MSDF vessels be permitted to counterattack if, when sailing with US warships, the US vessels come under attack. In this case and the case of a missile potentially bound for the US, the panel, rather than simply declaring that collective self-defense is permissible, has suggested that the right of individual self-defense and the provisions of the JSDF law permit a Japanese response, regardless of the prevailing interpretation of the right of collective self-defense.

Not being a lawyer, I am not in a position to question the legal soundness of the panel's recommendations. What interests me is the politics of collective self-defense, and what it means for the US-Japan alliance.

At the heart of Yomiuri's position is the argument that failure to allow collective self-defense in some form will destroy the alliance: "For example, if Japan, by virtue of constitutional restrictions, was an idle spectator to an attack on the US, the alliance would collapse." I do not disagree with that assessment. Once Americans realize that the alliance is actually a one-way alliance, their tolerance for it would disappear quickly, particularly if that realization came about in the aftermath of an attack on the US.

My problem is the idea that the solution to the collective self-defense problem is Japan's simply changing the constitutional interpretation (or revising the constitution). The Japanese people, insofar as they think about collective self-defense, are undoubtedly concerned that changing the interpretation could result in Japan's being forced to march alongside the US in American wars of choice (or war that may be necessary for the US, but not exactly in Japan's interests). This obviously transcends the limited cases under consideration, but it is an essential problem when looking at the road to a more active US-Japan alliance.

The politics of the alliance are such that it is hard to envision Japan standing up in the UN and publicly disagreeing with the US on the need for a war. (I am thinking, of course, of the actions of certain European allies prior to the Iraq war.) Wars of choice ought to mean that allies have a choice too; indeed, that seems to have been the lesson of the Iraq war, given that transatlantic relations seem to be steady again.

Accordingly, the alliance needs to change politically to be capable of handling collective self-defense.

The key is probably Japan becoming more capable of defending itself without the US. As long as Japan needs US military power for its own defense — even excluding nuclear deterrence — collective self-defense will feel like Japan is being press-ganged into helping the US because it feels it has no choice lest it risk the US loosening its commitment to defend Japan. This kind of anticipatory reaction was certainly a part of Japan's commitments to coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq (which leads me to wonder how long Japan will be able to resist pressure from the US to put boots on the ground in Afghanistan). As a result, collective self-defense would be less the product of two allies working together than one ally feeling pressured to help as a way to ensure its security.

All changes flow from this, because as long as Japan depends on the US for its security, it is assigned, implicitly if not explicitly, a subordinate position politically. Creating an alliance council equivalent to the North Atlantic Council in the absence of Japan's being able to defend itself without the US would be futile, because the same psychological pressures that shape Japan's decision making vis-a-vis the US today would come into play.

Of course, the process of Japan becoming able to defend itself largely without the US is a process fraught with risk due to the likely reactions of Japan's neighbors, and constrained both by constitution interpretation and the budget. Indeed, these challenges have been enough to retard the process to date.

But the time is come to make Japanese self-reliance an explicit goal, and work to overcome the aforementioned challenges as much as possible.The US need not be a "cap in the bottle" any longer. It should want a capable, relatively equal ally, an ally that is able to articulate and defend its interests, even if there is divergence with the US. The goal should not simply be for Japan to become a more capable, subordinate ally. As such, permitting collective self-defense beyond the most basic cases, without a major shift in the balance between allies, will ultimately be politically unsustainable in Japan. The risk of being pulled into a US war that the Japanese people feel is not their concern will be enough to derail it. But if the Japanese government were positioned to articulate those fears publicly in the event of a crisis, collective self-defense would mean not an unconditional arrangement whereby each ally promises to aid the other in any and all cases, but an arrangement whereby the allies are capable of airing concerns and opting out if need be (for example, if Japan were in a skirmish with China or Korea over contested islands).

Creative thinking on the alliance is needed as Japan considers how to change its defense posture. Repeatedly restating commitments to one another — renewing vows over and over again — may have been fine during the 1990s, but it is no longer good enough today.

When in doubt, talk about how to make Japan great again

"Now the vote likely will pivot on scandal and mismanagement of the country's enormous pension system. This is a shame. The election really should be about Mr. Abe's vision for a more activist international role for Japan."

So says Michael Auslin, AEI's newest Japan scholar, whom I previously discussed in this post, in which I discussed his unquestioning acceptance of Prime Minister Abe's "beautiful country" rhetoric.

Compared to Auslin's latest — an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal (available free here) — the earlier article was a work of inspired genius.

Let's start with the above quote. Who is Michael Auslin — or Abe Shinzo, for the matter — to tell the Japanese people what the election should be about? Why is it a shame that the Japanese people are concerned about the responsiveness of the government to their very real quality of life concerns? Why should the voters ignore the government's very real indifference to their concerns and vote on the basis of some abstract concern about Japan's position in the world? And why does Auslin think that the Japanese people are just hankering for Japan to play a more significant global role as a US ally?

Once again, Auslin buys the rhetoric emanating from Tokyo: "Despite scandal and missteps, they might find that it is Mr. Abe who offers the most compelling vision of their country's role in the world."

What is Mr. Abe's vision for Japan in the world, and how does Mr. Abe plan to achieve it without wide-scale reform of how Japan is governed? Japan, like Italy, Germany and other continental European countries, is trying to manage the difficult task of coping with an aging and shrinking population while at the same time transforming the economy to ensure survival and prosperity in a globalized economy. But Auslin believes none of the matters. All that matters are the superficial symbols of national power and Japan's rhetorical commitment to the US, not the long-term future of Japan as a great power.

Who cares if swathes of the country are in terminal decline? Who cares if people cannot be certain that care for the elderly will be sufficient to handle the aging of baby boomers? Who cares if corruption and incompetence have shaken public trust in nearly every sector of Japanese life? Why should the election be decided based on these mundane issues when the Japanese people can use the election to acclaim Abe Shinzo as the leader who will make Japan great beautiful again!

The US should not want an ally that is incapable of responsible governance and unable to cope with the challenges that its society will face in the coming decade. And it should not want an ally that comes running whenever the US calls. It should want a country that is confident, well-governed, and a model to its neighbors, one that is a good-faith partner that honors its commitments to its allies, but only makes those commitments after an open discussion as to whether doing so is in its interests.

Before Japan can begin talking about leading in the region, it needs to sort out its numerous domestic governance issues. That is the criteria by which to judge Prime Minister Abe. In his nine months in office, what has he done to transform how the country is governed? Auslin does not address that question; the national referendum bill and the government's stated intention to buy F-22s are apparently all that matter.

What manner of constitution debate will Japan have?

In the wake of yesterday's passage of the national referendum bill, each major daily unsurprisingly featured an editorial looking forward to the next three years of debate on revision.

In the left-wing Asahi Shimbun, the mood was, unsurprisingly, despondent about the passage of the bill. At the same time, though, the tone was defiant, taking up the prime minister's challenge to make the July Upper House elections about constitution revision.

The issue of most concern seems to be that in the LDP's draft constitution produced last year, the second clause of Article 9 says, in lieu of the prohibition on the maintenance of armed forces for aggressive war and the renunciation of the right of belligerency, "To ensure the peace and independence, as well as the security, of our country, the prime minister shall be the commander-in-chief and a self-defense 'army' shall be maintained." [The draft uses 自衛軍 instead of 自衛隊, indicating the elevation of the JSDF — which currently use the nominally more modest-sounding "force" — into a proper military.]

Lamenting the lack of debate heretofore, Asahi argues that this proposed change should be the basis for a popular debate on revision.

The right-of-center Yomiuri Shimbun, meanwhile, criticizes the DPJ for its opposition, in spite of the fact that "not a small number of members" believe strongly in revision. Echoing the prime minister, Yomiuri argues, "The international situation and Japan's security environment have been dramatically transfigured, Japan's economic system is changing fundamentally, and there are conditions at home and abroad that could not even be imagined at the time the constitution was created. Furthermore, [Japan] must weather more waves of great change to come." Yomiuri also argues that it is imperative for the DPJ and Komeito to make their own draft revisions quickly.

The right-wing Sankei Shimbun, similar to the Yomiuri, criticized the DPJ and Komeito for heretofore failing to draft substantive revision, and laments the superficial character of the constitution revision debate thus far, which is odd, considering that unlike the Asahi and Yomiuri editorials, the Sankei editorial does not even hint at what the major points of discussion ought to be.

Obviously readers will note that one common thread running through these editorials is concern about the quality of debate thus far, and calls for a widespread debate on revision in the Diet and among the Japanese people at large. Interestingly, when discussing the issues involved in revision, the editorials talked solely about Article 9. While Article 9 is fundamental — the constitution is, after all, often described as "Japan's pacifist constitution" — it seems that the debate is as much about what kind of country Japan should be in the twenty-first century; Japan's security posture is but one part of that debate, and it is imperative that other parties to the debate begin to take in the same terms as Abe. To date, it seems that Abe alone has talked, however vaguely, about the Japan as it ought to be, essentially having the field to himself.

It is long past due for Abe's opponents to present their own, preferably more concrete, visions for Japan's future, and to challenge the assumptions made by the prime minister that constitution revision is a necessary step to a better future for Japan. The burden of proof is on advocates of revision, not on those who are skeptical about or in outright opposition to revision: Abe and company have to demonstrate, concretely, how the system designed by the constitution has failed, and how revision will enable the Japanese state and people to better cope with future challenges and ensure continuing prosperity.

It is also time that opinion leaders begin questioning the government's assumption that constitution revision is a necessary condition for creating a "beautiful country." I strongly disagree with Yomiuri's argument that because aspects of the world today were not envisioned sixty years ago, the constitution must be reformed. Statements like that must be backed up with solid demonstrations of what makes them so.

Has the modern world fatally undermined the relevance of Japan's postwar constitution? How so?

When Abe talks about discarding the postwar regime, what does that mean? What part of the regime? Just the security bits? Or the whole bloody mess? If so, why isn't Abe talking about destroying the LDP, which has played an outsized role — arguably a more significant role than the constitution — in shaping postwar Japan?

Vestiges of the 1955 system, which has long distorted policy by placing sectional and local interests above national interests, remain. Why isn't Abe turning his attention to this significant piece of the "postwar regime"?

And what about the assumption that because Japan's security environment is changing, it must revise its constitution? Why revise, if re-interpretation will suffice?

And, above all, what exactly do the Japanese people want?

On these questions, it seems that Abe and other advocates of revision have been given a free pass.

Ultimately, I think constitution revision is useless without political reform. Japan's problem is not its constitution, but rather the parasitic policy making system — the alliance between the LDP and the bureaucracy — that has no constitutional standing whatsoever, and has perverted Japan's institutions to selfish ends. Changing the constitution without changing the policy making process, which necessarily means destroying the LDP as it exists, is futile.

Book of the week

This week's book, Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik by Daniel M. Kliman, provides concrete analysis of how Japanese security policy has changed not just in the post-9/11 world as the title suggests, but since the end of the cold war.

Although it is a relatively slim volume, it is packed with useful observations, particularly concerning the role played by the North Korea threat in the process of normalizing Japan's security policy.

Kliman, moreover, further reinforces the idea that the policies resulting from Japan's sensitivity to its international environment — well documented by Kenneth Pyle and Michael Green — have shifted as the region has changed; whereas during the cold war the Yoshida Doctrine's opportunistic pacifism and reliance on the US were a rational response by a broken country at the front lines of cold war, the uncertain post-cold war environment suggests a different set of policies. Steps taken by Abe lend more weight to Kliman's argument.

Making sense of China's Sudan policy

If there's any sense to be made, that is.

In the same week that Amnesty International condemned China for selling arms to Sudan that are purportedly being used in Darfur by Janjaweed militias accused of genocide, China has announced that it is both sending a military detachment to support African Union peacekeepers in Darfur and appointing a special envoy to Africa who will focus on Darfur.

Will this policy change make any difference whatsoever in stopping genocide in Darfur, or will it simply be window dressing to distract observers from China's unstinting support for unsavory regimes worldwide, including elsewhere in Africa? As James Kirchick wrote in the New York Sun this week, China has become the major supporter of Zimbabwe, even as the country's total collapse continues.

For all the talk about how China wants no political trouble surrounding the Beijing Olympics, I strongly doubt that China will completely back away from support for regimes that provide it with critical resources, no matter how much pressure comes from abroad. China's relations with authoritarian regimes is, after all, as much a part of the debate about who runs China as domestic policy, with this week's announcements on Darfur showing that there may be more infighting behind the scenes between the PLA and the CCP than outsiders realize.

In light of this though, I have to ask: where is Japan? Why is Japan, with its self-defense forces now having international activities as one of its primary missions, not in Africa, helping to prevent genocide in Sudan? Seems like a perfect opportunity to show how Japan is willing to bear a greater burden globally.

Abe's id speaks

Well, it was only a matter of time. First, Defense Minister Kyuma signalled in Washington that Japan was approaching a reconsideration of its restrictions on arms exports, prompting Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki to deny that any change was impending and reaffirm the principles. Then, Abe voiced a slightly more ambiguous position, resting somewhere between Kyuma and Shiozaki.

And now, as seems to have been the case throughout the short life of the Abe Cabinet, LDP PARC Chairman Nakagawa Shoichi has put in his two cents on the lifting of the three arms export principles, speaking with less ambiguity than the others on the need to adjust Japan's security norms and institutions for the new era.

Am I wrong to think that Nakagawa, as a party official and not a minister, has acted as Abe's id, saying what Abe wishes he could say, if only he didn't have to be sensitive to public opinion? The best example of this is probably the debate on the debate about nuclear weapons last fall, when Abe refused to censure Nakagawa for his repeated calls for Japan to discuss developing nuclear weapons. Is Abe using Nakagawa as a decoy, testing to see how far his government can push before it runs into implacable opposition?

Whatever the case may be, it seems safe to conclude that the government is opening another front in its campaign to roll back postwar political and legal limits on Japanese security policy. New Komeito has voiced its disapproval once again, but is its discontent with Abe's obsession with overturning the postwar security regime ever going to manifest itself as anything other than public complaints?

Meanwhile, with the government's energy dedicated to challenging longstanding constraints on Japanese security policy, the prospects for further structural reform — the Koizumi revolution — are growing ever dimmer. Why should Abe tackle hard questions about the long-term future of Japanese state and society that would require battling members of the LDP and bureaucracy when he can overturn constraints that have limited Japan's independence in security policy, pleasing the LDP's conservatives in the process?

There is no question that the pursuit of independence is the key to understanding the Abe Cabinet's agenda, enabling Abe to complete the project that proved elusive for his grandfather. Amaki Naoto spells out, sympathetically, this line of thinking in depth in this post. Amaki contrasts Abe with Koizumi, who he feels was content with subservience to the US (he also lambastes Koizumi for his "disgraceful" mimicking of Elvis Presley); Abe, on the other hand, is interested in "independent conservatism," like his grandfather. Amaki spends much of the post elaborating on what sort of US-Japan relationship is consistent with Abe's Gaullism, and he provides an excellent look at the implications of Abe's foreign and security policies.

But the burning question, the question that these "independent conservatives" seem unwilling to answer, is whether any of these changes will make any difference whatsoever if Japan cannot find a way to discover new sources of wealth creation and transform its economy for the post-industrial age.

Shiozaki doth protest too much?

Yesterday I noted that Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki reaffirmed the government's commitment to the three arms export principles, saying that the three principles are "an extremely important policy."

It seems, however, that Abe is leaning more towards Kyuma's position than Shiozaki's, as he said at a press conference at the Kantei yesterday, "It has been decided that henceforth, in conformity with the three principles, we will proceed prudently with an investigation."

I don't think we've heard the last of this issue.

Kyuma's false alarm

While in Washington, Defense Minister Kyuma addressed the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank. (The speech, which, can be viewed here, is nothing special; be sure to fast forward to the seven minute mark, unless you want to watch Heritage President Edwin Feulner fulminate against China and refer to the defense minister as "Mr. Kayuma.") In his speech, Kyuma said regarding Japan's three principles on arms export, "The time to investigate whether the current situation is good or not is coming." (Asahi's article here)

According to Kyuma, joint missile defense research with the US and the costliness of developing weapons in one country (i.e., kokusanka) are the main reasons pushing Japan to consider loosening restrictions on arms exports.

It seems, however, that Kyuma's remarks were indicative of the Abe Cabinet's opening yet another front in the war to roll back the limits on Japan's defense policy. Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki denied that Kyuma's remarks signal a policy change by the government.

But is Shiozaki's denial strategic or tactical? Does the Abe Cabinet really have no designs on the arms export principles, or is it postponing the issue to a time when the agenda is slightly less crowded?

Given Abe's "revolutionary" bent, I strongly doubt that it's the former.

Book of the week

Apologies for not posting a recommended book last week, due to my travels in China.

This week's selection is Fareed Zakaria's From Wealth to Power (Amazon link at right).

Zakaria's book, while in part a theory-laden discussion of the rise of great powers, focuses on how the US went from being an economic giant but a political and military midget in the late nineteenth century. Zakaria takes issue with the standard realist account of the balance of power, suggesting that in the case of the US what mattered in the emergence of the US were decisions taken in Washington in the decades following the civil war that enabled the federal government to exercise the latent power of the continental nation. The state's ability to draw upon the power of the nation forms the basis for what Zakaria calls "state-centered realism."

The implications of this theory for contemporary Japan are obvious. Twenty-first century Japan, in a manner not unlike late nineteenth America, is in the process of making the political decisions that will enable its government to wield national power that it has heretofore been denied.

One significant difference, however, is that Japan is trying to normalize its security policy in a regional environment more akin to Europe in the late nineteenth century, which means that whatever decisions that Abe Cabinet makes regarding Japan's security policy will undoubtedly raise alarms in neighboring capitals. Hence the absurdity of Abe's remarks last week about Japan's needing to keep its neighbors informed about constitution revision. The problem is not a matter of the fairness of Japan's having to genuflect to its neighbors regarding every mooted change to the postwar regime. No, Abe's pronouncement that Japan will explain changes to its neighbors is absurd because changing the constitution will send a clear signal to Japan's neighbors that it will play a more significant, independent role in the regional balance of power, a reality that no amount of "explanation" will be able to obscure.

In any case, Zakaria's book is an excellent corrective to systemic realism and a reminder that in international politics what happens within states is incredibly important (a point that seems obvious to most people but with which some — though, of late, fewer — IR scholars struggle).

Towards a global alliance

Commentators have had a day to digest the joint statement produced at Tuesday's SCC meeting in Washington. For an excellent review of the circumstances surrounding the meeting — including the impact of impertinent statements by Defense Minister Kyuma and Foreign Minister Aso — check out former Japanese diplomat Amaki Naoto's blog, in which he criticizes harshly Abe's handling of the US-Japan relationship. (Granted, he also criticizes the government for failing to assume full responsibility for the defense of Japan.)

Having read the joint statement, I have a few responses.

It is interesting that in the list of common strategic objectives, there is no mention of Taiwan. Readers will recall that the statement produced in February 2005 was notably in that it was the first significant mention of Taiwan being a shared interest of the alliance. As such, Taiwan's absence from this statement is interesting.

In place of Taiwan, there is a clear shift away from thinking about specific contingencies that the alliance might face and a greater emphasis on shaping the East Asian and global strategic environments. Beyond talking specifically about the resolution of the North Korean crisis, the statement calls on China to become a stakeholder in regional and global order; APEC to become a greater mechanism for regional cooperation; a more significant role for ASEAN; strengthened US-Japan-Australian cooperation; greater cooperation with India; and bilateral cooperation in Iraq and the Greater Middle East.

Accordingly, given the broader thrust of the shared strategic objectives, the specific measures for bilateral military cooperation are designed to improve the ability of the alliance to operate throughout the "arc of instability." While the statement also discusses greater operational interoperability on missile defense, it is exceedingly clear that the purpose of this document — statements on realignment included — is to indicate that the alliance is becoming distinctly more global in character, a point entirely missed by this Japan Times summary, for example.

What is absent, however, is more than a line about how the alliance's structure ought to change as it becomes more global and more equal in nature. As in earlier joint statements, the SCC called for the "establishment of a flexible, bilateral interagency coordination mechanism to coordinate policy, operational, intelligence, and public affairs positions before and during crisis situations." This has been a standard line in joint statements throughout the decade, but there is no indication of how the alliance ought to change to reflect its new purpose and new division of roles and missions.

I've said it before and I'll say it again: this is a discussion that needs to happen now, and it needs to happen in full view of the Japanese public (and not just in the form of Abe visiting the troops as "commander-in-chief.")

Deflating the F-22

Over at Wired's Danger Room blog, covering defense technology, Noah Shachtman writes of the long, weird history of the development of the F-22, noting that as the price of the F-22 went up, the US Air Force had to derive new roles for what was originally intended as solely an air superiority fighter.

In discussing the efficacy of the F-22, Shachtman cites a revealing remark by USAF General Ronald Keys on where the F-22 can be deployed: "If war breaks out, I'm sending the F-22...But not for operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. I didn't buy the F-22 for Iraq. We're looking for what can sop up intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance [ISR] in Iraq and Afghanistan. Is the investment [of sending the F-22] worth it? Is it a good idea or just an attractive idea? Will it complicate the air component commander's problems for no gain?"

As such, concerns about Japanese interest in purchasing the F-22 for the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force — such as the three articles published by South Korea's Chosun Ilbo (found here, here, and here) — are, for the moment, vastly overblown. Given the natural reluctance to use a fighter aircraft with a $300 million price tag when another plane might do the job, one has to wonder if Japan would go through with the purchase of a fleet of F-22s when what it needs is a durable workhorse, not a fighter so advanced that it nearly crashed when its systems failed while crossing the international dateline.

Japan's long road to normalization

Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations and director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff early in the Bush administration, has an op-ed on the occasion of Abe's visit that title of which says it all: "Asia's Overlooked Great Power." (Hat tip: Project Syndicate)

Most of Haass' essay is innocuous, typical proposals about more regional cooperation and a more apologetic stance on the history question, but one point he made strikes me as problematic.

He writes, "Intellectuals, journalists, and politicians are now saying and writing things about Japan’s role in the world that were unthinkable a decade ago. It is a question of when, not if, the Japanese amend Article IX of their constitution, which limits the role of Japan’s armed forces to self-defense."

I don't disagree with the former point. One of the more interesting pieces of Japan's normalization has been the normalization of the security policy debate, with the removal of taboos on what security policies can be considered and an eagerness to discuss the regional and global security environments. But a more robust security debate has not necessarily resulted in -- nor resulted from -- an abiding change how the Japanese people think about their nation's role in the world. While fears of North Korea have enabled the Japanese government to deepen missile defense cooperation with the US, it is unclear the extent to which the abductions issue -- as opposed to direct concerns about North Korea's ballistic missiles and nuclear arsenal -- has shaped Japanese public opinion on North Korea. And beyond North Korea, the Japanese people aren't exactly clamoring for their country to take on more risky missions abroad that could result in combat deaths.

Will this reluctance ultimately give way?

I don't think so. The process of normalization has not been, and will not be, a linear process. It has proceeded with baby steps and the occasional step backwards -- and lots of standing still. While the younger generation of politicians, bureaucrats, and commentators has shown itself to be far more willing and eager to see a more robust Japanese global role, they operate in a policy environment in which change happens slowly and in which compromise is a matter of course. And there are a number of politicians who may favor a more prominent Japanese role abroad, but would prefer to be a European-style "soft power" great power. (I suspect that that stance will not be tenable given Japan's highly uncertain regional environment.)

As such, Haass should not be so quick to assume that constitution revision is a foregone conclusion. Given falling support for revision and given that Abe's government may not last the year, Article 9 may live long beyond the sixtieth birthday that it is celebrating this year. I am convinced that re-interpretation is far more likely, but while re-interpretation of the prohibition on the right of collective self-defense would resolve some of the ambiguity surrounding Japan's defense role, especially in the US-Japan alliance, doubts would remain -- and doubts mean that every proposed action (outside of actions requiring immediate response, i.e. a missile launch) will be subject to endless debate in the Diet, parsing whether the proposed mission fits with the new interpretation.

So change is happening, and will continue to happen, but not in the direct, clear-cut, expeditious manner expected by Haass.

The future of the Japanese RMA

The Yomiuri Shimbun reported today on the release of a report by the Japanese Defense Ministry's Technical Research and Development Institute providing a medium- to long-term technology estimate, essentially outlining the future of the Japanese variant of the revolution in military affairs.

The question is, essentially, how will technology impact Japanese force structure and doctrine.

I have only skimmed the executive brief, but several things jumped out at me.

First, the Defense Ministry expects that restricted defense budgets will continue into the future, even as the security environment changes and the JSDF undertakes more peacekeeping and humanitarian missions abroad, in accordance with "overseas activities" becoming one of the primary missions of the JSDF late last year (at the same time the JDA was elevated to ministry status).

Second, there is a heavy emphasis on robotics and unmanned vehicles (not just aerial drones).

Third, the emphasis is on technology that will strengthen Japanese defensive capabilities, especially against unconventional threats.

As such, the shape of the Japanese RMA, rather than facilitating Japan's becoming a more independent military power, will support military cooperation in the US-Japan alliance. The Defense Ministry is not planning on the development of technology that will undergird an independent Japanese deterrent (conventional or nuclear). Instead, there is a heavy emphasis on advanced sensors and other technologies that will create "systems of systems" among units in a given battlespace.

In any case, it's worth a look.

The offensive continues

Yesterday I wrote that the Abe Cabinet launched an "offensive" on the question of collective self-defense.

It seems that that offensive continued today, with Prime Minister Abe meeting with Richard Armitage, former deputy secretary of state, co-chair of the groups that produced the two reports on the US-Japan alliance that bear his name (alongside Joseph Nye), and all-around advocate of greater US-Japan cooperation. (At present, it seems that Sankei is the only major daily covering this story.)

The article reports [my translation]: "Armitage said after the talk, 'If the conclusion leads to more flexibility, it will be good for Japan. He indicated his hope that Japan will become able to exercise its right of collective self-defense. On the other hand, he pointed out that 'it's Japan's decision' and he stressed that Japan is struggling [with the issue] itself."

I expect that in advance of this weekend's summit, Armitage will inform the president about the contents of his conversation with Abe -- and whoever else he happens to meet while visiting -- making clear to the president that Abe is committed to overcoming the prohibition on collective self-defense, the biggest obstacle standing in the way of greater US-Japan security cooperation.

Thus Armitage's meeting with Abe is as much a part of the offensive as remarks in the Diet by Abe's senior advisers, helping to clear the ground in Washington for changes that could be in the offing.

Those changes are far from guaranteed, however, as Komeito Secretary General Kitagawa Kazuo made clear in his remarks in the Diet today, in which he warned the government to be "prudent" in its reconsideration of the prohibition on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, suggesting that the current interpretation provides for the cases under consideration.

Nevertheless, as I said yesterday, the push for reinterpretation may prove more important than constitution revision, which remains a distant prospect, the national referendum bill notwithstanding. Washington must be ready, however, to work with Tokyo to determine the structure of the alliance should Japan become able to act as a full (or fuller) ally.

Collective self-defense offensive

In the past day, the Abe Cabinet has been on the offensive on the question of the review of the prohibition on the right of collective self-defense.

Yesterday, Prime Minister Abe said at a press conference, "As the era changes, I want to have a debate about how the constitution should be interpreted."

At the Diet, controversial LDP PARC chairman Nakagawa Shoichi gave a speech explaining the thinking behind the collective self-defense study group. (The same article reports that in accordance with Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki's reassurance that any recommendations made by the study group will go through the normal LDP policy channels, Ishiba Shigeru, JDA director-general under Koizumi and currently chairman of the LDP-PARC National Defense division, Defense Policy Investigative Subcommittee, will spearhead the debate.)

Then, today, Defense Minister Kyuma reiterated to the press the points made by Abe yesterday about the importance of reviewing the constitutional interpretation that prohibits the exercise of the right of collective self-defense.

The Abe Cabinet's push behind the review is important, perhaps more important than the push to revise the Constitution -- because reinterpreting the constitution to permit collective self-defense, even in limited cases, is a far easier way of strengthening Japanese security policy than revising the constitution. Should the government succeed, it will impact the US-Japan alliance immediately, directly, and concretely.

Perhaps this reflects a tactical shift by the cabinet, recognizing that with constitution revision a distant prospect, the government's efforts are better spent trying to realize a very real policy shift in the short term. There is probably a PR element too, allowing Abe to demonstrate to President Bush this weekend that his government is pushing all-out for a more generous reinterpretation of the constitution.

But make no mistake: reinterpreting the constitution would be a hugely important step in the normalization of Japanese security policy.

Japan's unchanging defense budget

Courtesy of Japan Probe, I came across this summary of Abe's interview with the Wall Street Journal, which seems to have focused more on defense matters than the Washington Post/Newsweek interview.

Abe apparently told the WSJ that Japan does not plan to raise its defense spending to match China's growing defense expenditures, which, the article reports, have actually been falling in Japan for the past five years. This is yet another reminder that for Japan, normalization is a legal process, not a rearmament process -- changing the software of Japanese security policy, not necessarily the hardware.

Accordingly, I wonder how Japan's defense budget will accommodate the purchase of F-22s (which are not even for sale yet) to replace the ASDF's aging fighter fleet. All the more reason for Japan to desire a readjustment of its contributions to the relocation of US Marines to Guam.

But all in all, Abe's remarks serve as a reminder that Japan -- with or without the US -- is hardly prepared to balance against China. "Coopetition" will remain the watchword of the regional security environment for decades to come.

Reviewing collective self-defense

While all of political Japan continues to discuss the assassination of Nagasaki Mayor Ito -- which I discussed here -- I am interested in the ongoing preparations for Prime Minister Abe's visit to Washington at the end of the month.

Today, the Sankei Shimbun reports, Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki addressed questions about the Cabinet's study group on whether to permit the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. Namely, Shiozaki confirmed that no changes will be made to the constitutional interpretation prohibiting collective self-defense without the ruling party's approval. He said, "Naturally, policy cannot be changed without getting the ruling party's understanding." He added, "While the security situation changes, should we not effectively reconstruct the legal foundation? The relationship with the Constitution is being investigated within the administration. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's position is that we should think together with Komeito about what legal foundation is necessary."

Shiozaki uses the word 与党 (yotoo), which can be translated as "ruling party," "government party," or "majority party," but I have a hunch that when push comes to shove, Shiozaki really means to say 自民党 (LDP). While the statement about including Komeito suggests that he might mean ruling coalition, is Abe really going to let Komeito -- which has declared its opposition to both constitution revision and the exercise of the right of collective self-defense -- determine his government's agenda on the normalization of Japanese security policy?

Beyond that, the important point to derive from Shiozaki's statement is that Japan's security policy, unlike that of every other major power, is legislature-directed. Normalization is a legislative process; over the past fifteen years, Japan has -- aside from token, though important, PKO and reconstruction operations -- done little more than pass laws that expand Japan's security policy potential, starting with the International Peace Cooperation Law and continuing on through the series of laws to implement the revised US-Japan Guidelines and permit Japanese contributions to coalition efforts in the Indian Ocean and Iraq.

Despite the "presidentialization" of the Kantei, the Diet remains the place to watch for developments in security policy.

A gift to Bush?

Prime Minister Abe has announced the formation of a special study group chaired by former Japanese ambassador to the US Yanai Shunji to study rolling back restrictions on Japan's exercise of its right of collective self-defense in limited cases, including, according to the Yomiuri Shimbun, (1) the use of missile defense to destroy a ballistic missile targeting an ally (i.e., the US, (2) in the event of an attack on allied ships sailing with MSDF ships on the high seas, (3) in the event of an attack on another country's forces engaged in reconstruction (i.e., in a situation similar to the ASDF deployment in Iraq), and (4) to resist in the case of efforts to obstruct UN peacekeeping operations.

The prohibition on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is the product of a long-standing constitutional interpretation drafted by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, which means, of course, that a re-interpretation can make collective self-defense permissible in these cases. But the study group is informal and its recommendations non-binding; as reported in the Japan Times, a move to permit collective defense in any circumstances is likely to draw opposition both within and outside the government.

This is an important step, because it is the prohibition on collective self-defense that has prevented the US-Japan alliance from becoming a proper alliance in which each ally is committed to the defense of the other. It signals that the bounds of acceptable discourse on Japanese security policy continue to expand, and that the expansion of the Kantei's top-down policy making powers -- which may soon include a national security council, the legislation having been submitted to the Diet last week -- continues unabated in security policy. Just how much stronger the Kantei has become will depend, of course, on how the collective self-defense review process resolves.

The timing of this study group, meanwhile, is important, giving Abe concrete evidence of his government's steps to strengthen the alliance to present to President Bush at the end of the month. (The Japan Times thinks that Abe may be trying to change the subject away from comfort women.)

In the case of the latter, at this point I doubt there is much that Abe can do to change the subject, and as for the former, I don't think the US government will be assuaged by the creation of a study group, given that there is still a long way to go before Japan can be called a "normal" country. The obstacles to embracing even limited collective self-defense are many.

(The editorial cartoon left, from Yomiuri, shows Bush and Abe embracing each other, bound by "falling rates of support"; the captions reads "Believe in each other?")