Kyushu, a conservative bastion

This is the eleventh and final installment in my general election guide. For an explanation of my purpose in making this guide, see here. For previous installments, see here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.

The Kyushu regional block contains thirty-eight single-member districts spread over eight prefectures: Fukuoka, Saga, Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Oita, Miyazaki, Kagoshima, and Okinawa. The block elects an additional twenty-one representatives through proportional representation, for a total of fifty-nine seats.

The region's major population center is Fukuoka, which constitutes roughly a third of the region's population, with the rest of the region's prefectures being roughly equal in population. The region's economic profile is mixed, including agricultural production suiting that region's sub-tropical climate and heavy industry in northern Kyushu. It was once a major mining center, home to Aso Mining, the family business of Prime Minister Aso Taro.

Along with Shikoku and Chugoku it has been a historically important electoral base for the LDP.

In 2005, opposition parties won seven SMDs, four of those being won by DPJ candidates. Meanwhile the LDP won twenty-five seats and Komeito won six. In PR voting, the LDP won nine, the DPJ seven, Komeito three, and the SDPJ and JCP one each. In 2003, the LDP won twenty-six seats, Komeito one, and the opposition parties eleven, with the DPJ winning eight.

However, opposition parties in five of the region's single-member upper house districts in 2007, suggesting the possibility of DPJ gains in the region.

Fukuoka

In Fukuoka in 2005, the LDP won nine seats and Komeito and the DPJ one each.

The DPJ's Matsumoto Ryu (first district) should easily win the district in which he has won every election since the first election under the new system in 1996.

Meanwhile LDP candidates are likely safe in two districts: Aso Taro (eighth district) and Takeda Ryota (eleventh district). Given that Aso is acting as if his seat is vulnerable — he is declined to run simultaneously as a PR candidate — perhaps I should not list his seat as safe, but I think that Aso will not join John Howard as a leader who loses his government and his constituency in the same election. DPJ candidate Yamamoto Gosei may put pressure on the prime minister — he'll be helped by the absence of a JCP candidate — but I expect Aso will win. If he doesn't, perhaps these predictions are the lower bound for the DPJ's performance on 30 August.

Takeda, who after three attempts finally won a seat in 2003 as a conservative independent who joined the LDP in 2004 only to leave it in 2005 as a postal rebel and win the district as an independent once more, will run as the LDP's candidate this year. He faces the SDPJ's Yamaguchi Haruna and JCP candidate Yamashita Tomiko. The fight will be over the 78,000 votes received by Yamamoto Kozo, the LDP candidate in 2005. Takeda will likely win.

But otherwise LDP candidates across Fukuoka are vulnerable. In the second district, Yamasaki Taku, an LDP faction leader, has profited from divided fields in 2003 and 2005 to win reelection. In 2000, the last time the field included only a DPJ candidate and a JCP candidate (as it does this year) Yamasaki lost by 10,000 votes. Yamasaki is high on the list of LDP heavyweights likely to go down to defeat, bested by DPJ newcomer Inatomi Shuji.

Ota Seiichi in the third district may be even more vulnerable than Yamasaki: in 2005 Ota defeated Fujita Kazue, this year's DPJ candidate and winner of the district in 2003. Fujita will likely win again.

In the fourth district the DPJ may benefit from the absence of a JCP candidate, as JCP candidates received around 15,000 votes in the past several elections, turning what would have been close races into comfortable victories for LDP incumbent Watanabe Tomoyoshi. This time DPJ candidate Koga Takaaki has the field to himself, and could emerge as the winner as a result.

Similarly, in the fifth district DPJ candidate Kusuda Daizo will try for the third time to unseat LDP incumbent Harada Yoshiaki. Harada won by 35,000 votes in 2005, 25,000 in 2003, when Kusuda won a PR seat. But in 2003 Harada shared the field with candidates from the JCP and the SDPJ, who combined for 30,000 votes, enough to swing the election to Harada. This time Harada won't have help from other opposition parties.

Also vulnerable is Hatoyama Kunio, DPJ leader Yukio's brother, who parachuted into the sixth district in 2005 and defeated DPJ incumbent Koga Issei. Koga lost by 22,000 votes and won a PR seat, with a JCP candidate taking 11,000 votes. The absence of a JCP candidate should help Koga, but for his part he is publicly skeptical of his chances, citing the press Hatoyama received due to his departure from the Aso cabinet. Hatoyama may hold on to win.

A third LDP faction leader — besides Yamasaki and Aso — is up for reelection in Fukuoka, Koga Makoto in the seventh district. Like Aso, Koga has declined to run simultaneously as an SMD and PR candidate. Koga faces the DPJ's Noda Kuniyoshi, who previously served as mayor of Yameshi city — and no other candidates. The JCP, for example, took nearly 20,000 votes in 2005, which made little difference in 2005 but could be decisive this year, especially since Koga's vote total has fallen gradually since 2000. Like Yamasaki, I think Koga will lose.

The DPJ may have an even easier time in the ninth district, which until 2005 had been represented by Kitahashi Kenji, first elected in 1996 as an NFP candidate and reelected in 2000 and 2003 as a DPJ candidate. He lost by 15,000 votes in 2005 and won a PR seat, but resigned to run for and win the mayoralty of Kita Kyushu city. In his place the DPJ is running Ogata Rintaro, a former foreign ministry official. Given the DPJ's history in the district, I suspect Ogata will win against LDP incumbent Mihara Asahiko.

Finally, in the tenth district LDP incumbent Nishikawa Kyoko faces the DPJ's Kii Takashi, who first ran in 2003 and finished 12,000 votes behind the LDP's Jimi Shozaburo. Jimi left the party as a postal rebel in 2005 and finished second behind Nishikawa with 65,000 votes, 5,000 votes ahead of Kii. The JCP is running a candidate again, but the SDPJ, which received 10,000 votes in 2005, is not. If Kii can take the bulk of the votes received by Jimi in 2005, he should win the seat.

The DPJ should do very well in Fukuoka, winning at least eight of eleven seats.

Saga

In 2005, postal rebels won two of three seats, with the LDP winning the third. As the postal rebels have returned to the LDP, the LDP is defending all three seats in the prefecture.

In the first district, DPJ candidate Haraguchi Kazuhiro has run in each of the four elections since 1996, winning in 1996 as an NFP candidate and 2003 as a DPJ candidate, and losing in 2000 and 2005 as a DPJ candidate but returning as a PR representative. In this race he faces Fukuoka Takamoro, the victorious LDP candidate from 2005 who Haraguchi defeated in 2003. Haraguchi should return as the SMD representative.

In the second district, 2005 postal rebel Imamura Masahiro returns as the LDP candidate facing Oogushi Hiroshi, the DPJ candidate from 2005 who lost by 15,000 votes and won a PR seat. The question in the second district is what will happen to the 35,000 voters who supported LDP candidate Dokai Chiaki in 2005: do they vote for the party or for the policy line, and if so, which policy line? Imamura could hold on to his seat.

The third district features, in addition to the LDP's Hori Kosuke — another postal rebel — and the DPJ-backed SDPJ candidate Yanase Eiji, candidates from the JCP and Watanabe's YP. Hori should retain the seat.

The DPJ will win at least one of three seats in Saga.

Nagasaki

In Nagasaki's four districts in 2005, the LDP won three and the DPJ one.

The DPJ Takaki Yoshiaki (first district), who has represented the district since 2000, should win reelection comfortably.

In the second district, Kyuma Fumio, Japan's first ever defense minister, faces Fukuda Eriko, the twenty-eight-year-old leader of the Kyushu group of victims of Hepatitis-tainted blood transfusions, handpicked by Ozawa to run against Kyuma. Kyuma is clearly worried after having years of being reelected comfortably. Like Koga Makoto in Fukuoka, Kyuma's vote shares have gradually declined in recent elections. Kyuma may also suffer from memories of the remarks regarding the Nagasaki bombing in 2007 that led to his resignation as defense minister. With the DPJ focused on defeating Kyuma, Fukuda might win the upset.

Tanigawa Yaichi, the LDP's incumbent in the third district, has fought close elections with the DPJ's Yamada Masahiko in the past two elections, winning by 6,000 votes in 2003 and 9,000 votes in 2005. Yamada won PR seats in both elections. Reporting suggests that Tanigawa is confident that he can retain his seat on the back of Komeito support in the district, as is the LDP's Kitamura Seigo in the fourth district, who faces DPJ candidate Miyajima Daisuke. Miyajima won a by-election in the district in 1998 as an LDP candidate but lost to Kitamura by 30,000 votes in 2005.

The result could be a split in Nagasaki.

Kumamoto

In Kumamoto in 2005 the LDP won four seats and the DPJ won one.

The DPJ's Matsumoto Yorihisa (first district) will win the seat he first won in 2000.

In the second district the LDP's Hayashida Takeshi, running again in the SMD after alternating with Noda Takeshi in a Costa Rica arrangement, faces DPJ newcomer Fukushima Kenichiro and should win the district.

The third district was won by the late Matsuoka Toshikatsu in 2005, and was won by independent Sakamoto Tetsushi in the by-election following Matsuoka's suicide. Sakamoto has since joined the LDP, and faces the DPJ's Goto Hidetomo and former LDP member Miura Issui, running as an independent. It seems, however, that Sakamoto and Miura may divide the support of groups that have traditionally supported the LDP. Nevertheless, the DPJ has never done well in the district, and the winner will be either Sakamoto or Miura. Miura may edge out Sakamoto, who did the same to Matsuoka running as an independent in 2003.

In the fourth district LDP incumbent Sonoda Hiroyuki should win reelection easily, as should Kaneko Yasushi in the fifth district.

The LDP will win three, the DPJ one, and an independent conservative one.


Oita

The LDP took two seats and the DPJ one in Oita in 2005.

The DPJ's Kira Shuji (first district), who first won as an independent in 2003 and won reelection in 2005, should win the seat again.

In the second district, the SDPJ may be poised to pick up a seat, as Shigeno Yasumasa runs for the third time against LDP incumbent Eto Seishiro. Shigeno lost by 21,000 votes in 2005, closing the gap from 2003 and earning Shigeno a PR seat. With no JCP candidate running this time — the JCP received nearly 15,000 votes in 2005 — Shigeno could unseat Eto.

In the third district, the DPJ's Yokomitsu Katsuhiko will try for the third time to unseat LDP incumbent Iwaya Takeshi. Yokomitsu, losing by 12,000 votes in 2003 and 15,000 votes in 2005, won PR seats both times. The election will be close, and may ultimately depend on the ability of Yokomitsu to bring out SDPJ voters — Yokomitsu ran in 2003 as an SDPJ candidate before switching to the DPJ, and the two parties had a bitter dispute over who should run in Oita in the 2007 upper house election, resulting in both parties' fielding candidates and the LDP's winning the Oita single-member district.

Iwaya could hold on, with the result that the DPJ wins one, the LDP one, and the SDPJ one.

Miyazaki

Miyazaki is odd: LDP-affiliated candidates won all three seats in 2005, although at the time two of three were running as independent postal rebels (and both had first won in 2003 by running as independents, joining the LDP after the election). The postal rebels have returned to the LDP, but meanwhile, Nakayama Nariaki (first district), the one LDP member who did win in 2005 and is now known for resigning three days after taking office as Aso's transport minister due to comments about Nikkyoso, initially announced that he would retire but changed his mind and is now running as an independent, albeit as an independent with the support of senior LDP leaders like Machimura Nobutaka.

In the first district, the field includes, in addition to Nakayama, LDP-related independent Uesugi Mitsuhiro, a former upper house member who ran as the LDP candidate in the second district in 2005 and lost, Kawamura Hidesaburo, a former MAFF official running as an independent with DPJ, SDPJ, and PNP backing, and a JCP candidate. I suspect that Nakayama will win reelection.

Eto Taku, a postal rebel who returned to the LDP, is seeking another term in the second district, facing the DPJ's Dokyu Seichiro and an independent. Eto will likely win reelection.

In the third district, Furukawa Yoshihisa should win reelection easily.

With Nakayama likely to return to the LDP after the election, the LDP will presumably win three seats in Miyazaki.

Kagoshima

Although the LDP did not win all five seats in 2005, it is now defending all five seats in Kagoshima.

The DPJ's best chance of picking up a seat is in the first district, where LDP incumbent Yasuoka Okiharu faces the DPJ's Kawauchi Hiroshi, who has lost to Yasuoka by roughly 20,000 votes the past two elections and 9,000 votes in 2000, winning PR seats each time. The JCP is fielding a candidate and independent Yamashita Junichi is running, but Kawauchi may manage to win the district this time.

The LDP candidate in the second district, Tokuda Takeshi, was elected as an independent in 2005 but migrated to the LDP and now faces DPJ candidate Uchikoshi Akashi, a former prefectural assemblyman. As the DPJ has never fielded a candidate in the district, it is unclear how the DPJ brand will do. Uchikoshi ran as an independent in 2005 and received nearly 45,000 votes, but Tokuda and the LDP candidate combined for nearly 160,000 votes. Tokuda will probably be reelected.

In the third district, the PNP may be poised to pick up a seat as the joint PNP-DPJ candidate, Matsushita Tadahiro, finished second in 2005 to the LDP's Miyaji Kazuaki, but the DPJ vote combined with Matsushita's votes would have bested Miyaji.

The DPJ candidate in the fourth district is former Rengo Kagoshima vice president Minayoshi Inao, who faces LDP incumbent Ozato Yasuhiro. Ozato has consistently beaten opposition candidate by 40,000 votes and should win again.

Moriyama Hiroshi, the LDP's former postal rebel incumbent in the fifth district, won by 55,000 votes of an LDP "assassin" in 2005 and in 2003 defeated the DPJ's candidate by nearly 100,000 votes. He will be reelected.

The LDP will win three seats, the DPJ one, and the PNP one.

Okinawa

In Okinawa in 2005 the LDP won two seats, the SDPJ won one, and a DPJ-backed independent who has since joined the PNP won one.

In the first district, PNP incumbent Shimoji Mikio should win reelection, as should the SDPJ's Teruya Kantoku in the second district.

The LDP's incumbent in the third district, Kakazu Chiken, won in 2005 because both the DPJ and the SDPJ fielded candidates, Tamaki Deni and Tomon Mitsuko respectively. Once again the two opposition parties will be fielding these candidates, despite their combined vote in 2005 being enough to defeat Kakazu. All that may change this year is that Tamaki finishes second instead of Tomon.

Finally, in the fourth district the LDP's Nishime Kosaburo faces DPJ newcomer Zukeran Chobin. Nishime also won due to a divided field, with the DPJ, JCP, and PNP dividing up 72,000 votes that would have been sufficient to beat Nishime. Zukeran, having the field to himself, may win the district for the DPJ.

The result in Okinawa will be one for the DPJ, one for the LDP, one for the SDPJ, and one for the PNP.

Proportional representation

It is unlikely that the DPJ will run as strong in the Kyushu regional block as it will elsewhere, especially because Komeito will run stronger in Kyushu than it will elsewhere. In 2005, for example, Komeito received nearly 16% of the vote and won three PR seats. The likely PR outcome is for the LDP and the DPJ to reverse their totals, and perhaps the PNP winning a seat instead of the SDPJ, leaving the distribution at nine for the DPJ, seven for the LDP, three for Komeito, one for the JCP, and one for the PNP.

If these predictions, the DPJ will win twenty-four seats, the LDP twenty-five, the PNP three, Komeito three, the SDPJ two, the JCP one, and an independent conservative will win the last seat.

Why does Japan need a pipeline?

Prime Minister Abe, in this week's mail magazine, echoes some of the media coverage of his appointment of Koike Yuriko as the new defense minister in describing her as a "pipeline" to the US: "Koike-san has pipelines to ministers responsible for defense and foreign policy in other countries, and she is well versed in security policy."

Why on earth does the defense minister of one of the world's biggest defense spenders and ally of the world's greatest military power need to have unique pipelines to other governments? If she calls through normal channels, are they going to put her on hold?

It is this cloak of meekness that Japan needs to shed if it is going to be taken seriously as a security provider. (Oh, and the sensitivity that leads a defense minister to resign after stating facts that are acknowledged more or less universally outside of Japan — but then doing that would mean "[sticking] to dry, strategic arguments," as Asahi's Tensei Jingo column warns us not to do.)

This whole sorry episode — including the trumpeting of Defense Minister Koike's foreign network — shows just how far Japan has to go before it can be called a "normal" country. For all the new laws, for the dispatches of the JSDF abroad (including the ASDF into the line of fire in Iraq), for all the rhetoric emanating from the government, the thinking of the Japanese people remains thoroughly steeped in the sentiments of "one-country pacifism." The Japanese people remain deeply uneasy about all things martial, even as they benefit from the US Military's ensuring that Japanese consumers enjoy access to Middle Eastern oil.

I recognize that the contradiction makes many Japanese uncomfortable — I discussed this here — but rather than just pausing to acknowledge the contradiction, and then carrying on as always, Japanese leaders will have to face up to reality, to stop indulging in "compassion for the people who suffered under those mushroom clouds" and start focusing on how they can actually ensure that no people need suffer the same fate again. Chances are that resolutions and high-minded statements of principles will not be enough to do it. There is a place for remembering the events of August 6 and August 9, 1945, but memory and sentiment cannot be the whole of the story.

This is the problem with the argument made in recent years by Kenneth Pyle, Michael Green, and others that Japan is the consummate realist: I do not disagree that Japan has benefited from the leadership of some extraordinary strategists since it modernized, but they have operated largely out of sight of the Japanese people, and as a result the people have little appreciation for the strategic considerations that have guided Japan's actions in the international system. I recognize this is a problem for many countries, but the problem seems especially acute in Japan. Look at the "awakening" on North Korea that has occurred over the past decade. While the 1998 Taepodong launch was important, while nuclear fears are important, both pale in comparison to public sentiment on the abductions (explained in part but not entirely by the government's emphasis on the issue). It has taken a soft, sentimental issue for the Japanese people to pay attention to a threat next door.

For many countries, even for many democracies, this would not be a problem, but in Japan security and defense policy are less insulated from public sentiment than in other democracies; indeed, in security and defense policy the government is uniquely vulnerable to public pressure, as the Kyuma resignation illustrates. While Kyuma's resignation was not about defense policy in particular, it was about defense policy in general, including how Japan should think about nuclear weapons — and even how Japan should think about its alliance with the US. A foreign policy tied to public sentiment is dangerous, vulnerable to either undershooting or overshooting, as even the US has learned in the years following 9/11, with considerable costs in blood and treasure.

Meanwhile, the Kyuma affair shines light on the problems of history. "Nuclear weapons do not fall from the sky of their own accord," notes Asahi. "People make them, and people release them on other people's orders." True and true. But what about the people who launch wars of aggression on an entire region? And what about people who wage war with no regard to the laws of war governing the treatment of prisoners of war? And what about people who are willing to sacrifice the lives of civilians in order to continuing waging their war?

Indeed, Asahi's column is a great example of how pacifists have furthered the interests of Japan's hypernationalists, because the history of Imperial Japan's aggression becomes obscured by Japan's suffering from American bombing. A responsible column would have, even while condemning the US for the bombing, spared at least a sentence to criticize the government in Tokyo that had laid Okinawa to waste and was prepared to do the same for the rest of Japan in order to resist the US.

Kyuma who?

In a move so blindingly obvious it hurts, Koike Yuriko, Abe's highly touted "national security adviser," has been appointed as the new defense minister.

With a new boss appointed to Ichigaya within hours of Kyuma's resignation, one wonders whether they will also be airbrushing Kyuma out of pictures from the past nine months.

It will be curious to see whether Koike will grow into the ministry position. She entered the cabinet secretariat under Abe as national security adviser in a move widely regarded as signifying the presidentialization of the Kantei — and then vanished. Sure, she was sent abroad on a few trips, but in retrospect it seems that her appointment as an adviser to the prime minister was a sinecure that kept her in the loop on defense policy but did not give her significant responsibilities.

Koike is known as a "wandering bird of the political world." Trained as an Arabist in Cairo, she entered politics in 1992 as an Upper House proportional representation candidate in Hosokawa Morihiro's Japan New Party. The following year in the election that ultimately chased the LDP from power, she was elected to the Lower House from Hyogo Prefecture's second district. After the breakdown of the Hosokawa-Hata coalitions, Koike broke off into Ozawa's New Frontier Party (and after that, Liberal Party). From the Liberal Party, she veered off into the Conservative Party — and finally in late December 2002 she joined the LDP. She was quickly recruited into the Koizumi Cabinet as environment minister, where she developed the Cool Biz concept.

Her final migration — this one literal — was shifting electoral districts from Hyogo to Tokyo as one of Koizumi's assassins to defeat postal reform opponent Kobayashi Kouki.

Will bringing a mediagenic Koizumi assassin into the cabinet staunch the bleeding and make the people forget Kyuma? She certainly has her work cut out for her. Just when the LDP thought that the cabinet's falling popularity had bottomed out, Asahi issues a poll that shows that it has fallen to 28%. If she cannot help stabilize the government's position, she may not be in office long enough to leave her mark on Japanese defense policy.

An indiscretion too far

Under pressure from his own constituents, Defense Minister Kyuma offered his resignation to Prime Minister Abe, who accepted.

Asahi reports that he told reporters that his reasoning was based on fears that he would influence the Upper House elections.

His tenure as Japan's last JDA director-general and the first defense minister was marked by ill-considered public remarks, so it is altogether fitting that he has been brought low for violating the taboo of taboos, this after comments that publicly questioned the US war in Iraq (breaking with government policy of supporting the US rhetorically one-hundred percent) and suggested a reconsideration of the three principles on arms exports, one of the pillars of Japanese security policy.

While he may be out of the way for the Upper House campaign, I wonder if voters in his Nagasaki district will remember his comments the next time a Lower House election rolls around.

Meanwhile, I stand by what I wrote earlier — whatever the political impact of Kyuma's remarks, they, and the response to them, have been revealing.

Those other historical issues

Defense Minister Kyuma Fumio — a Lower House representative from Nagasaki of all places — remains under attack today despite backing away from his argument that the US atomic bombings "could not be helped."

The Nagasaki Prefectural Assembly has, in fact, passed a resolution condemning Kyuma's remarks.

Kyuma has once again showed his utter lack of political judgment, and, mutatis mutandis, called into question once again Prime Minister Abe's choice in advisers.

But I for one find DPJ President Ozawa Ichiro's response to Kyuma more interesting. Ozawa, in a debate with Abe earlier this week, not only condemned Kyuma but also demanded that the US apologize for the atomic bombings. Politically speaking, this is a no-brainer. The reaction to Kyuma's remarks show just how sensitive this issue is, and just how much anguish at being the only country to be attacked with nuclear weapons — and then to be allied with and defended with nuclear weapons by the very country that used them — lurks beneath the surface of Japanese society. So for Ozawa and the DPJ, facing a tough election battle, not just condemning the government for Kyuma's remarks but demanding an apology from the US (implicitly criticizing the government for being on the receiving end of historical criticism without responding in kind) seems to make good political sense.

Even more interesting, however, is what this reveals about the strong desire for independence that colors Japanese attitudes towards the US. Once again, the thoughts of Amaki Naoto are revealing. Recognizing Ozawa's opportunism, Amaki takes the opportunity to attack the whole political class for its longtime timidity on the question of forcing an apology out of the US. He wrote:

Japan, as the only country to be attacked with atomic bombs, should seek an American apology limited not just to our country, but, so to ensure that no other people undergoes this tragic experience, it is our responsibility to show our leadership qualities and take the initiative and demand that the US, which committed a crime, totally abolish nuclear weapons from the earth. The Japanese prime minister's demanding an apology from the US before the eyes of the world — this would strongest demand for an apology, and it would be a demand for an apology that the US could not refuse.

However, successive LDP cabinets have not tried even once to demand this from the US. Of course, this is also Ozawa. On the contrary, by virtue of being defended by the US nuclear umbrella, the Japanese government has not even received a judgment from the International Court of Justice on the illegality of the use of nuclear weapons.

The pain associated with the atomic bombings is an incredibly important factor in how Japan has come to view the war and war guilt, because in a flash of light Japan, in the eyes of its people, became the first victim of a terrible new age. Even as the world viewed and continues to view Imperial Japan as the executor of an extensive war of aggression, the Japanese people themselves have long thought of themselves as victims (although being victims of atomic weapons has not stopped Japanese governments from relying on American extended deterrence).

There are no easy answers here, at least that I can see. But all of these unresolved historical issues need to see the light. If it makes for tense bilateral relations in the short term, the benefits of Japan's "truth and reconciliation" process over the long time will be innumerable, and will be felt through the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, amidst all the talk about Sino-Japanese and Japanese-Korean reconciliation, everyone forgets the serious historical issues between the US and Japan, issues that remind Japanese of the pain of being bombed (conventionally and atomically) and then being occupied. Strategic considerations have meant these feelings have been concealed, at least, partially for most of the postwar period, sneaking out only occasionally (the debate over constitution revision is steeped with these emotions too). The US-Japan relationship is in as much need of historical openness as Japan's relationships with its Asian neighbors.

So no more taboos or sacred cows. If anything, Kyuma should be given credit for trying to look at the war through American eyes. That kind of thinking is necessary for Japan to begin confronting the past nakedly, unshielded by victimhood.

What is it going to take for Japan to do this? And if Japan were to take steps to assess its wartime past more honestly, would the US respond in good faith, dutifully looking back at its own wartime behavior?

Not a thing to say?

Following yesterday's sharp discrepancies between Asahi and Yomiuri in coverage of alleged GSDF spying on Japanese anti-war activists, it is interesting to see how both have stuck (or not) with this story.

In Asahi, there were two brief articles, one regarding JCP Chairman Shii Kazuo's response to Defense Minister Kyuma's reaction to the report, the other regarding questioning of Kyuma in the Upper House's committee on foreign and defense policy.

In Yomiuri, there was no discussion of this issue whatsoever.

So a day later, and I am still unclear exactly what is going on, and why the opposition parties have been relatively quiet on this issue thus far. On the one hand, the tame political response leads me to think that Asahi was overreacting, fishing for another scandal to use against the government. On the other hand, is the opposition waiting for Prime Minister Abe to return from Germany before going on the offensive?

Into the realm of the symbolic

While I obviously recognize that Asahi and Yomiuri approach public affairs from drastically different perspectives, I have never thought that they were living in different worlds.

Until today.

In Asahi, prominently featured on the front page, was an article on a Japanese Communist Party report suggesting that a special Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces (JGSDF) unit conducted surveillance against citizens' groups and political parties opposed to the dispatch of JSDF troops to Iraq. On the editorial page, where normally there are two editorials, Asahi devoted the entire space to this report, and there were two more articles on the subject in the Society section.

In Yomiuri, there was a single, tiny article buried on p. 33.

It seems that both can't be right. Either this incident is of tremendous importance, and Yomiuri is playing it down to protect the government, or it is of little significance, and Asahi is exaggerating it to attack the government.

As the Japan Times reports, the JCP received two documents, including one entitled "Activities of Domestic Forces Opposing the Dispatch of Self-Defense Forces to Iraq." Asked about the documents, Defense Minister Kyuma prevaricated, admitting that the GSDF conducted the alleged surveys but questioning the authenticity of the documents possessed by the JCP.

The significance of this program seems unclear, but to Asahi, there is little doubt that the documents are authentic — and that the revelations are pregnant with significance, especially because the JCP's report suggests that the program also monitored opponents of other government policies, and all opposition parties. The conclusion of the editorial is worth citing in full:

Shaking civilian control

The Self-Defense Forces are an organization that protects the nation, but it is because it is a democratic country with freedom of speech and press that it is truly deserving of protection. It is deplorable that this basic precept is not heard.

The Defense Ministry, regarding this intelligence gathering, has stated the position that this work was to protect JSDF personnel and their families from the Iraq dispatch opposition movement. However, this is not an acceptable reason.

The historical lesson that the armed forces can easily be converted to an institution of public order directed internally must not be forgotten. In the prewar period, the Kempeitai, police within the army, before long spied on the people and became an organization that suppressed liberty.

We certainly do not think that what happened before the war is the same as today, but we must pay very close attention. If one thinks about the present constitution revision draft published by the governing LDP, whereupon the Self-Defense Forces are called an "army," we must be all the more careful.

At this time, only one part of the whole of these activities has become public. Regarding these activities, the government should make a detailed disclosure.

Moriya Takemasa, vice-minister of defense, said, "Since it has been decided to reveal our intentions, comment is not appropriate." It is extremely difficult to understand this defiance. It is the height of irresponsibility.

The fact of the matter is that with the government's murky actions, we cannot have faith in civilian control. It is also the Diet's role to ask questions.

To the lingering remnants of the Japanese left, and others besides, the symbolism of these reports of the government's monitoring of opposition parties, religious groups, and citizens' groups opposed to Japanese participation is unmistakable, harking back not only to the prewar period, but also the concerns of the immediate postwar, when many Japanese citizens feared that the alliance with the US would undermine Japanese democracy and lead to Japan being forced into a war against its will, with US forces being called in to suppress domestic unrest (under the terms of the 1951 security agreement). While the US had no hand in this affair, it seems that one cannot discuss Japan's actions on the Iraq dispatch without some reference to the alliance (which Asahi, surprisingly, does not do). But this action by the government must surely resemble the worst nightmares of many Japanese: their government, in the course of seemingly doing Washington's bidding (or more specifically, the bidding of Bush the warmonger), undermining democracy at home.

Of course, in the scheme of things, the practical impact of the GSDF program was (is?) undoubtedly small. There is not the slightest indication that the GSDF interfered with or tried to prevent organizations from opposing government policy. But then the debate surrounding Japan's postwar identity is not grounded solely in reason and matters of practicality. This affair could potentially have sentimental resonance among citizens already skeptical about the government's plans to revise the constitution and otherwise abandon the postwar regime, with citizens coming to see something more sinister in Abe's appeals.

Asahi is right to demand vigilance on the part of the Japanese people — and questioning from the Diet. At the very least, this is yet another example of the incompetence of LDP government, even if it is not indicative of something rotten in the Empire of Japan, as Asahi would like to believe.

So whose world is closer to reality? Asahi's, which sees this as a serious concern for Japanese democracy? Or Yomiuri's, which sees this as a trifle barely worth mentioning? And if Asahi is right, could this be the final straw that breaks the Abe Cabinet's back?

Kyuma's false alarm

While in Washington, Defense Minister Kyuma addressed the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank. (The speech, which, can be viewed here, is nothing special; be sure to fast forward to the seven minute mark, unless you want to watch Heritage President Edwin Feulner fulminate against China and refer to the defense minister as "Mr. Kayuma.") In his speech, Kyuma said regarding Japan's three principles on arms export, "The time to investigate whether the current situation is good or not is coming." (Asahi's article here)

According to Kyuma, joint missile defense research with the US and the costliness of developing weapons in one country (i.e., kokusanka) are the main reasons pushing Japan to consider loosening restrictions on arms exports.

It seems, however, that Kyuma's remarks were indicative of the Abe Cabinet's opening yet another front in the war to roll back the limits on Japan's defense policy. Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki denied that Kyuma's remarks signal a policy change by the government.

But is Shiozaki's denial strategic or tactical? Does the Abe Cabinet really have no designs on the arms export principles, or is it postponing the issue to a time when the agenda is slightly less crowded?

Given Abe's "revolutionary" bent, I strongly doubt that it's the former.

No surprise here

The Japan Times is reporting here that Vice President Cheney will not be meeting Defense Minister Kyuma when he visits Japan later this month.

This was all too expected, being entirely consistent with how the Bush administration has dealt with critics throughout its tenure.

Not really much more to say here, other than that this is another sign of the palpable chill that has settled in between Washington and Tokyo.

Japan repeats its "dissent"

Steven Clemons, Japan expert and fellow at the New America Foundation, calls attention on his blog to comments by Foreign Minister Aso reiterating Defense Minister Kyuma's criticism of the invasion of Iraq, which drew a response from the State Department (previously discussed here).

It seems like a 2 + 2 meeting, between both countries' state and defense ministers, which had originally been arranged to convene in January, is indefinitely postponed -- and that the alliance is suffering from serious drift at the political level.

As such, I have to disagree respectfully with AEI research associate Chris Griffin, who wrote here about deepening military ties between the US and Japan. I'm not disagreeing with the picture he paints of cooperation between the US military and the JSDF, and the way that cooperation is changing in the face of the changing East Asian threat environment.

What's missing, however, is sustained political leadership to guide the process. Sooner or later -- and sooner is best -- the two governments are going to have to discuss alliance decision making, the global reach of the alliance (if any), crisis response, and joint planning; meanwhile, Japan has yet to overcome the prohibition on collective self-defense, which remains a firm barrier to a true alliance.

With official Washington focused on Iraq to the exclusion of everything else, and with the Abe Cabinet mired in a host of domestic disputes, it seems that the political and bureaucratic leadership that was critical to pushing the process of reforming the alliance forward at critical junctures since the end of the cold war is totally absent. The alliance appears to be in a trough similar to that of 1998-2000, when the Clinton administration was distracted by impeachment and focused on the Middle East and Japan's governments were obsessed with the worsening financial crisis -- meaning that despite outlining new guidelines for alliance cooperation in 1997, little was done to build on that agreement.

The alliance emerged from that nadir with the start of the Bush administration, but with East Asia changing rapidly, can the US and Japan really wait until January 2009 to rejuvenate political cooperation? Perhaps the new Armitage Report that is supposedly in the works will be able to outline the way forward.

Japan walking into a trap at Essen?

The G7 is due to meet in Essen, Germany this weekend, and there are dark rumblings that Japan may be called to account for failing to allow its currency to rise as the dollar falls, which has forced the euro to appreciate to a greater extent than the yen, which has remained the weakest of the major currencies.

At a recent ECOFIN (that's the Economic and Financial Council of the Council of the European Union -- the finance ministers' group in the European presidency) meeting, German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrück and French Minister of Economy, Finance and Industry Thierry Breton suggested that the weakness of the yen would be on the table at Essen. In Breton's words, "We agreed that the yen ought to reflect the reality of the Japanese economy" (From Jiji, in Japanese).

That was from 31 January.

Just before that, however, US Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Affairs Tim Adams said at Davos that the US viewed Japan's economic policy as "appropriate," suggesting that any attempt by the European members of the G7 to cajole Japan into allowing the yen to bear more of the burden of the dollar's fall would be nixed by the US.

Recent changes in the US, however, suggest that Japan may in fact be confronted in Germany.

First, Adams tendered his resignation on Friday. His letter gives the usual "more time with my family" excuse, but I can't help but wonder if there isn't a dispute going on in the upper reaches of the Treasury Department over how the US should deal with currency manipulation. As Ken Worsley notes in this post at his Japan Economy News blog, Congressman John Dingell (D-MI), chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, apparently wrote a letter to Bush calling for the administration to press Japan on the currency issue. (Apparently if China won't budge, Congress can always turn to Japan as a scapegoat.) Maybe Secretary Paulson is caving on this front.

Second, I wonder how the Kyuma dispute plays into all this. The Bush administration, after all, isn't known for being especially charitable to critics, and Kyuma trod upon the administration's toes -- well, toe, probably the pinky toe -- just as it struggled to sell the new course in Iraq to the American public. While alliance managers have traditionally tried and mostly succeeded at keeping the economic and security realms separate, I can't help but wonder if the Bush administration, embattled at home and abroad and short on prominent Japan hands, isn't particularly concerned about breaking with tradition in the US-Japan relationship.

As such, should Japan face a united front of criticism from the rest of the G7 in Essen, it could be a crippling blow for the already tottering Abe Cabinet. Combined with the boycott of budget hearings by the opposition as a result of l'affaire Yanigasawa, pressure from the G7 to change course at home could further paint Abe into a corner.

Is it too early to start placing bets on how many more months (weeks?) Abe has before being ousted?

Japan says no (kind of)

Last week Japanese Defense Minister Kyuma Fumio criticized the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq as a "mistake."

I held off from commenting right away, because I was curious to see what the US response would be, if any.

Now, after Kyuma repeated his criticism this weekend, prompting the State Department to protest to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, I figured some comment was in order.

I'm actually more dismayed by the US reaction to Kyuma's comments than by the comments themselves. Kyuma's comments are more or less irrelevant. Koizumi committed troops to the reconstruction of Iraq at the risk of political disapproval at home -- and without a specific request from the US (see Daniel Kliman's monograph from CSIS on this decision). The Bush administration got the support of another major liberal democracy, and Koizumi solidified his reputation as a daring risk-taker. So why should the Bush administration be all that concerned if a Japanese official decides to get on the bandwagon of people "reassessing" the Iraq war, especially after his country's ground forces have already left Iraq?

Look, as Japan becomes a more active participant in international security, both within and outside -- as indicated by Prime Minister Abe's recent visit to Europe -- the US-Japan alliance, the government of Japan may occasionally disagree with the US. A strong alliance will have no problem absorbing disagreements between the two governments, and may be even better for it.

Back in the late 1980s, Ishihara Shintaro, current governor of Tokyo and longtime enfant terrible, captured Japan's economic triumphalist mood with his polemic, The Japan That Can Say No. Much of his argument crumbled with the bursting of Japan's bubble, and in any case Japan had been saying no throughout the cold war in a subtle, indirect manner -- the Yoshida Doctrine, by which Japan subordinated an active foreign policy to economic development, coupled with the US-bestowed postwar constitution, was a way of saying no to US desires for a more meaningful alliance.

What needs to happen now, as Japan seeks a greater international role, is that it needs to learn how to say no directly but constructively. "No, but...," in other words. If Japan wants to opt out of US goals elsewhere in the world, that's its prerogative. No bilateral agreement obligates Japan to contribute to US efforts anywhere aside from defending Japan within Japanese territory, and, theoretically anyway, the area surrounding Japan. But even if Japan is reluctant to support future US missions elsewhere, it will be expected to compensate in other ways: deeper cooperation between the two countries' militaries in East Asia, greater participation in humanitarian missions in Asia and throughout the world, and political leadership within East Asian regional organizations on behalf of goals and ideals shared with the US.

So, in short, rather than focus narrowly on Kyuma's comments, the US should be focused on how to strengthen the alliance, so that the bilateral activities overshadow whatever comments officials in either country might choose to make on issues of bilateral concern.

And this needs to happen sooner rather later, because of the looming question of what will happen when a Japanese soldier is killed abroad, especially if it happens in support of a US mission. The death of a Japanese soldier abroad could result in Japan saying no in a very loud way, and unless sufficient work to strengthen the alliance is done in advance, the alliance may be seriously wounded by a Japanese no in such a situation.

Meanwhile, I'm a curious as to whether Vice President Cheney will meet with Kyuma when he visits Japan next month. Given Cheney's (lack of) generosity to domestic critics, I can only imagine the generosity he'll extend to a foreign critic like Kyuma.