The short race to pick Ozawa's replacement

The campaign to replace Ozawa Ichiro as DPJ president quickly turned into a race between Okada Katsuya and Hatoyama Yukio, who have until Sunday to convince the DPJ's upper and lower house members of their merits to serve as the face of the party in the forthcoming general election.

Uesugi Takashi, writing in Shukan Daiyamondo, argues that the DPJ has missed an opportunity to reverse the political momentum by scheduling its election for Sunday. A longer campaign would have commanded media attention and given the candidates to present the DPJ's message undiluted to the public. (I would add that a longer campaign would have given the party to have the party's local chapters vote too, as would have happened in a normal election, thus ensuring that the inner party and the outer party are in sync going into the campaign.)

But on the other hand, the DPJ will enjoy a bump simply by having cast off Ozawa and elected someone new. It may be best that the party will choose a new leader quickly and set back to work.

Who has the upper hand? Jun Okamura argues that the race is wide open. Like in recent LDP presidential elections, it is not sufficient to assume that if a DPJ faction head supports a candidate, the faction's members will follow the leader. Press coverage suggests that the race is "pro-Ozawa versus anti-Ozawa," with the party's anti-mainstream flocking to Okada. But if that is the case, Okada will lose. The dedicated anti-Ozawa groups — most notably the Maehara and Noda groups — are a minority of the party. There is a reason why they are not putting up their own candidate (and why, despite talk of challenging Ozawa last year, no one stood against him).

It is not clear to me how or why the DPJ should distance itself from Ozawa. Obviously the DPJ wants to wash away the taint of Ozawa's scandal — but electing a new leader will largely take care of that problem. Would the public really hold Hatoyama accountable for corruption in Ozawa's political organization?

But what of Ozawa's impact on the DPJ's policies and party governance? Should the DPJ scrap his changes? Despite his reputation as uncooperative and dictatorial, Ozawa was able to draw upon support from across his party. He inspired loathing from some, but he also included rivals in the DPJ's Next Cabinet and in other party leadership positions. The final word may have rested with Ozawa, but considering the frequent complaint that Japan does not have enough top-down leadership, why should that be a negative? On policy terms, Yamaguchi Jiro praises Ozawa for promulgating the "Seikatsu dai-ichi" line that was the party's slogan in 2007, which he believes distinguished the DPJ from the LDP's neo-liberals. Indeed, evidence of the success of this approach can be found in the LDP's about-face since the 2007 election: both Fukuda Yasuo and Aso Taro have stressed the importance of listening to the voice of the people and providing for public welfare. Should the DPJ scrap this approach? Should the DPJ scrap Ozawa's efforts to make the DPJ a party capable of challenging the LDP in rural districts? Ozawa's legacy as DPJ president should not be reduced to Nishimatsu.

I doubt either candidate will break with the Ozawa system. This campaign is wholly about image: personality, youth, support of the party rank-and-file, and the ability to reach out to independents. It will not be about policy.

For my part, I do wish a third candidate, preferably one who has not already led the DPJ into a general election, would enter the race. I would prefer someone like Nagatsuma Akira, who at forty-eight is younger than both candidates and as a result of his role in exposing the pensions scandal in 2007 has made a name for himself as a crusader against official malfeasance. He is only a third-term member, but on the other hand, maybe the DPJ would be better off with a leader who is comparatively new to Nagata-cho. Unfortunately the short DPJ race rules out the possibility of a dark horse challenger to Hatoyama and Okada.

But for all the shortcomings of the two contenders, I think that after weeks of talking about Ozawa, the discussion will turn once again to Aso, the LDP, and the state of the Japanese economy.

How severe is the fallout from Ozawa's fall?

Despite widespread expectations that he would not survive to lead the DPJ into this year's general election, Ozawa Ichiro's resignation is reverberating around the Japanese political system.

Aso Taro, commenting on the Ozawa's resignation, claimed that he could not understand why Ozawa would resign now, two days before the debate scheduled between the party leaders. It does not seem that hard to understand to me. Why would Ozawa stand up and speak on behalf of a party that had been sending overt signals that it wanted an amicable divorce from its embattled leader? Why would the DPJ want him to speak for the party? Did Ozawa reach this conclusion himself, or did someone senior within the party have to lean on him?

Regardless of why Ozawa finally decided it was time to go, he's gone. Not surprisingly he said very little in his press conference Monday, other than that he was stepping down for the sake of party unity and the goal of regime change.

The political consequences of his resignation are actually not particularly interesting, at least compared to his last resignation, when the DPJ was not quite ready to part with its helmsman. I anticipate a smooth return to the leadership for Okada Katsuya. He's probably the one candidate acceptable to the party's various factions and sects — he inspires neither love nor loathing (unlike Ozawa), but he is acceptable. At this point acceptable to all is good enough. If it is Okada, he won't be a significant departure in policy terms from the outspoken Mr. Ozawa.

On foreign policy, he accepts Japan's alliance-centered foreign policy but has recently suggested that the US-Japan relationship should not be overdependent on the bilateral military relationship (a view reciprocated by some in the Obama administration). Like others in his party, he wants Japan to cooperate more with its Asian neighbors.

On domestic policy, he has the inescapable air of a technocrat, not surprising considering his background as a MITI official, and as a result he does not ooze pathos when talking about the nation's problems as some other politicians do. But he has a solid grasp of the issues, he has reformist credentials, and he has worked hard to travel the country and connect with voters like Ozawa has done. Given his background, he might even be better at coaxing the bureaucracy to accept the DPJ's administrative reform plans. Although I'm not certain about this: lasting administrative reform may require a dramatic battle of the sort that would have likely occurred under an Ozawa premiership. Sankei cites an anonymous source at METI headquarters who wonders whether an Okada premiership would be better for the bureaucracy than an Ozawa premiership. If there is a different, it is not a matter of an agenda. The DPJ's adminstrative reform plans predate Ozawa's leadership of the party. What is at issue is the enthusiasm with which the new leader goes about the task.

Either way, Okada is more than adequate. If the LDP isn't worried — and there were signs earlier in the Ozawa scandal that the government feared that Okada would replace Ozawa — it should be, if only because, as MTC notes, with Ozawa gone, so goes one of the last obstacles keeping voters from embracing the DPJ.

Would the same apply if Hatoyama Yukio, the outgoing secretary-general who has virtually served as Ozawa's footman, is elected DPJ president? He may have adequate support from the left of the party, but I think Hatoyama would be more compromised as party leader than Okada. Hatoyama, like the prime minister, is a scion of a political family who in his time in leadership posts in the DPJ has shown himself to be better suited to supporting roles than to leadership. Hatoyama, I think, would be the poorer of the two choices in a race with Okada. And I wonder whether his time as Ozawa's designated apologizer will tar his image.

Regardless of who winds up as party leader, the tasks facing the new leader are simple: don't forget the countryside, remind voters how disastrous LDP rule has been just since the last election, add some details to the party's economic plans, and prevent LDP politicians from running against the LDP. Don't let LDP reformists get away with their bait-and-switch again.

Now the Ozawa era is over

It appears that Ozawa Ichiro is finally tired of fighting for his political life.

After weeks of circling the drain, of calls from members of his own party to resign or clarify his explanation of why his aide was wrongfully accused, Ozawa has decided to call it quits. He will not be resigning from the Diet, and he has called for a DPJ party election following the debate over the supplementary budget.

Sankei reports on the damage that Ozawa has done to the DPJ by waiting until now to resign, but on the whole it is hard to see how this hurts the DPJ. In the short term it might, as the media hammers the DPJ leadership for protecting Ozawa for so long. But before long the candidates to replace Ozawa will step forward and Ozawa's grizzled visage will fade from view as the public face of the party that aspires to be the party of change in this year's election. Particularly since it looks as if a general election will not be held before July, the new DPJ leader — presumably Okada Katsuya — will have just enough time to expunge the taint of Ozawa, to promise that the DPJ will be the party of clean politics, before heading into the election campaign.

Deprived of the gift that was Ozawa's scandal, the LDP and Komeito are back to hoping that the economy somehow shows signs of life in time for the general election. Ozawa's resignation will also deprive the LDP of its argument that Ozawa would endanger Japanese security by undermining the US-Japan alliance with his "irresponsible" talk.

There is still the chance that the DPJ let Ozawa hang on for too long, but in this case, perhaps too late is better than never.

Ozawa, on top again

Ozawa Ichiro has granted an interview to Asahi (one of the papers he didn't single out for criticism in his "parting" remarks) in which he reviews the circumstances surrounding the meetings with Prime Minister Fukuda that resulted in his decision to resign, his plans for a general election campaign, and the DPJ's policy goals.

With a confidence that is perhaps the result of being firmly in control of his party, Mr. Ozawa is defiant and seemingly free of doubts surrounding his position and that of his party.

In recounting his discussion with Mr. Fukuda, he denied that they discussed the timing of a snap election or the distribution of cabinet posts in an LDP-DPJ grand coalition. But he did, as Amaki Naoto notes, "even now assert with amazing self-confidence and arrogance that the grand coalition plan was right," suggesting that the plan would have given the DPJ an opportunity to pass its cherished policy goals, enhancing its position for an election and helping DPJ members "know power." He also snapped at opponents within the DPJ. When asked about rumors that he was considering leaving the party with enough members to throw the Upper House back to the government, he said, "Isn't it stupid? It's awful that there is a group of people within the party who say such foolish things."

As for his party's strategy, he insists that winning the next election comes first — indeed, winning elections is the only thing that matters. He suggested, regarding the party's plan to aim merely to become the Lower House's largest party, that the DPJ is open to a coalition with all parties — Communists included — except the LDP. He demurred when asked about conditions that could lead to a snap election, and declined to say whether the DPJ would push for an Upper House censure motion in the event of the government's passing its anti-terror law over an Upper House veto.

Meanwhile, as far as policy goes, I detect a desire on Mr. Ozawa's part to shift the discussion away from foreign policy and the Afghanistan mission and back to the "lifestyle" issues that helped the DPJ win in July, the issues about which the Japanese people actually care. Indeed, asked about ISAF participation, he said, "Since we promised participation in UN activities to the people in our manifesto, from now on we will not speak of a debate. Why this simple debate is not understood — it's a mystery to me and can't be helped." Finally, he both dismissed the idea of a compromise with the LDP on a permanent law on JSDF dispatch and suggested that a DPJ government would prepare to revise the constitution to make provisions for JSDF dispatch.

In short, as is widely assumed, a DPJ government, especially one led by Mr. Ozawa, would differ very little from LDP rule. Beyond the policy questions, of course, there could be value to a DPJ victory in producing alternation of ruling parties, but then, if the DPJ doesn't try to take a majority of its own, a DPJ victory would just result in a sloppy reenactment of 1993 (especially if the JCP were to join a coalition government).

For my part, I think Mr. Ozawa comes across as arrogant in this interview, and, as I suspected, he seems to be in more control of the DPJ than ever before.

Ozawa in charge

Ozawa Ichiro addressed a conference of the DPJ's Upper and Lower House members on Wednesday, where he spoke at length about the crisis that saw him resign from the leadership of the party only to reverse his decision days later.

He was, of course, exceedingly apologetic in his remarks, and, I think, exceedingly forthright in explaining his reasoning for entertaining the notion of a grand coalition with the LDP. He recognizes the DPJ's predicament — he knows that winning the Upper House may not have been the best thing for the party after all. "In the twisted Diet in which the LDP has overwhelming numbers in the House of Representatives, how do we implement policies promised in the manifesto that place the life of the people first?" (The press conference following his remarks can be read in three parts here, here, and here.)

This problem remains for both the LDP and the DPJ; Mr. Ozawa may stay away from any formal arrangement, but the DPJ will still have to find a way to cooperate — quietly — with the LDP if it wants to see its bills pass both houses. This will undoubtedly entail some concessions from the DPJ. It is unclear to me why the Japanese political system, in which the LDP has for decades paid heed to the views of opposition parties through the Kokutai system, cannot handle a slightly more involved form of this cooperation between the LDP and the DPJ to ensure smooth management of parliamentary affairs. Neither side will get everything that they want, but then Mr. Fukuda is not Mr. Abe: unlike his predecessor, Mr. Fukuda does not necessarily believe that policy is everything. Procedure counts too.

The DPJ is to blame for having failed to change its approach the moment that Mr. Fukuda took over for Mr. Abe, with the party's intransigence effectively driving Mr. Ozawa into Mr. Fukuda's arms as a way out of the predicament — producing the latest drama in Japanese politics, and effectively exposing the party's frailty to the world.

Maybe Mr. Ozawa's wielding greater power over the party will be a good thing for the DPJ. Perhaps I have underestimated his ability to manage the delicate task of being an opposition party responsible for a whole house of the Diet. But he better get to work forging a cooperative Diet strategy that his party can support.

It's Ozawa's party now

After imploring Ozawa Ichiro to remain as head of the party, Mr. Ozawa has decided to embrace the party once again: "I want to give my best once more."

I'm still not convinced that Mr. Ozawa — a bull in a china shop if I've ever seen one — is the man to walk the tightrope between being an opposition party and cooperating with the LDP on matters of mutual concern. But the DPJ chiefs evidently think differently.

Perhaps it's time for the DPJ to consider its own (formal) factions, as a way to ensure that this kind of thing doesn't happen again. If Mr. Ozawa was obliquely trying to make the case for factional politics, he succeeded admirably. Think about it: a stable of leaders who can step in at a moment's notice, institutionalized jockeying for power, and checks on the party leader.

A thorny question

Does anyone else find it strange that the reaction of nearly all the DPJ's leaders to Ozawa Ichiro's decision to resign as head of the party was to beg Mr. Ozawa to stay?

To my knowledge, not a single DPJ politician openly declared his intentions to succeed Mr. Ozawa, and both Kan Naoto and Okada Katsuya, likely candidates in a party leadership race, have urged Mr. Ozawa to stay.

Now, correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems that one characteristic that every political organization has in common is that they're political: they are rooted in the struggle for power, no matter how much that desire is cloaked in civility. The DPJ is certainly no stranger to infighting of varying degrees of intensity. And yet when a vacuum opens up at the top, giving an ambitious politician a chance to lunge for power, not unlike Mr. Aso's petite coup in September, there is not one who makes a bid for control of the party? Not a single politician who thinks that Mr. Ozawa's departure can mark the beginning of a new era for the DPJ, pointing to Mr. Ozawa's own critique of the party (discussed in this post) as a sign that change is needed?

If so, then the DPJ is weaker than I thought, in which case it is no surprise that its leaders are practically begging for Mr. Ozawa to stay.

Should Mr. Ozawa decide to remain as the party's leader, whatever "dictatorial" control of the party he exercised in the past will likely pale in comparison to what's to come. How could it not? The DPJ has practically admitted that it is lost without Mr. Ozawa at the helm, that only with him planning its Diet and election strategies can it contemplate winning a general election and forming a government. The party, should Mr. Ozawa remain, will be linking its fortunes to that of its leader.

Could this be a case of Stockholm Syndrome?

The DPJ stares into the abyss

Learning of Mr. Ozawa's intention to resign while in Nagoya, Hatoyma Yukio said, "I have received it, but I cannot accept it." He subsequently returned to Tokyo to consult with Mr. Ozawa.

The public sentiment among party leaders seems to be a desire for Mr. Ozawa to stay, but whether that desire stems from an appreciation of his leadership qualities or a fear of the chaos that will likely characterize the "post-Ozawa" era. The genuine shock emanating from the DPJ leadership strikes me as indicative of a lack of preparation in the party for the Ozawa succession. Messrs. Kan, Hatoyama, and the rest of the party apparently put their trust and hopes in Mr. Ozawa and were not prepared to deal with his departure.

While Mr. Ozawa left open the possibility of staying based on the appeals of his colleagues, it seems that reversing his decision at this point would do little more than deepen the turmoil and perhaps even force a rupture.

It seems to me that Mr. Ozawa has burned his bridges: "Doubts have been continually raised from the people, 'The LDP's hopeless, but does the DPJ truly have the ability to wield political power?" That strikes me as an odd complaint for the outgoing leader of a party to make, particularly for a leader criticized for his dictatorial control of the party. What did Mr. Ozawa do to address those doubts? He certainly exploited public dissatisfaction with the LDP effectively, but it's not clear to me that he had a constructive plan to demonstrate the DPJ's seriousness.

The concern now is that Mr. Ozawa will leave the party, with party members beginning to guess how many members he could take with him.

This succession crisis might get a whole lot worse before it gets better.

The Ozawa era is over

It looks like Mr. Ozawa won't be fighting one more general election campaign after all.

Facing outright chaos in the party due to the perception that he was willing to consider — even for a moment — a grand coalition with the LDP, Ozawa Ichiro, grand old man of Japanese politics, has announced his resignation as head of the Democratic Party of Japan. (His announcement — which includes a slam at the media's treatment of him — is available at Asahi.)

I am not surprised not only by his having to resign over this issue, but also that he won't be leading the DPJ into a general election. Whatever his talent for election strategy, I viewed him as more of a liability as the face of the party than an asset, not least because — as MTC so sardonically observed — by turning to Mr. Ozawa, the DPJ made a pact with the devil (the devil being Tanaka Kakuei-style LDP politics). Undoubtedly a number of DPJ members were aware of and uncomfortable with this deal, and finally got their opportunity to move against Mr. Ozawa.

There are three pressing questions. The first is the future of the DPJ. Will the resignation of Mr. Ozawa send into a tailspin the opposition party that was brimming with confidence not too long ago? It depends on his successor, I think. I am of the opinion that Mr. Ozawa was actually a terrible person to have in the party leadership in the post-election situation. He clung to a confrontational posture for far too long; once Mr. Fukuda replaced Mr. Abe, the DPJ should have begun echoing Mr. Fukuda's conciliatory tones and talking with the LDP about the rules of the game for the divided Diet. He also cemented his doom by antagonizing just about everyone within the DPJ by his maneuvers on the refueling mission, first upsetting the hawks by uncompromisingly opposing the measure, then shocking everyone else in the party by calling for an armed Japanese contribution to ISAF. Like geniuses and schizophrenics, he was playing by his own rules, but don't ask me if he is the former or the latter.

In short, the party could benefit from his departure, particularly if it chooses a leader who is capable of articulating an identity for the DPJ that distances it from the LDP but still leaves enough ground for the parties to cooperate on legislation. For the moment, Kan Naoto will serve as acting president, with a party election likely to be held after the Diet session (although I wonder what will happen if Mr. Fukuda gets his wish and the session is extended a month — more on this in a moment). The favorite among the DPJ's younger members appears to be Okada Katsuya (54), the former party leader who was trounced by former Prime Minister Koizumi in the September 2005 general election. I'm not sure whether Mr. Okada, who began his political life in the Tanaka faction and subsequently followed Mr. Ozawa through various opposition parties before winding up in the DPJ.

The DPJ, in fact, has a similar problem to the LDP: there is a dearth of leaders in their fifties. Having already turned to Mr. Maehara, one of the forty-something Young Turks, and encountered nothing but disaster, I suspect that the party will not be inclined to walk that path again. Mr. Kan, in fact, may find himself back in the leadership position by default.

The second question is what this means for the LDP. The departure of Mr. Ozawa, if followed by a protracted battle within the DPJ to choose a new leader, should give Mr. Fukuda plenty of momentum and will probably push back any suggestion of a general election. I suspect that the LDP might be tempted to call a snap election to take advantage of the DPJ's disarray, but even in disarray the DPJ will probably still be able to deprive the governing coalition of a supermajority, meaning that Mr. Fukuda will likely resist the temptation to submit his government to the approval of the voters. The more immediate question is whether Mr. Fukuda can use this window to revive the sagging fortunes of his government's new bill to authorize the MSDF refueling operation. Will an LDP PR campaign, under- or unchallenged by the DPJ, be enough to rally sufficient public support to the government's side for the measure and give the LDP confidence that it can use its supermajority without fear of backlash?

Relatedly, what does this means for Japan's security policy? The Bush administration will undoubtedly be thrilled to see the back of Mr. Ozawa, but the US might not like what follows in his wake. If Mr. Ozawa has an enduring legacy from his time as leader — apart from the DPJ's near-majority in the Upper House and turmoil within the DPJ's ranks — it will be in raising questions about how LDP governments since 2001 have conducted relations with the US. Mr. Ozawa never quite managed to elevate his opposition to the refueling mission into a coherent critique of Japanese foreign policy and Japan's relationship with the US, in part because he was playing a balancing act among disparate elements of his party and thus clung to UN-centrism, but the critique is there for his successor to take up, if he so chooses. If so, foreign policy could be at the center of the next general election campaign.

All depends, of course, on Mr. Ozawa's successor. Fortunately, with its control of the Upper House there is a limit to how far the party can fall. For the next three years, the party — provided it doesn't shatter — will have a seat at the table.