The strange death of the LDP

When the Hosokawa government — with Ozawa Ichiro, then secretary-general of one of the leading parties of the eight-party coalition backing the government — passed electoral reform in 1994, one of the arguments made then and ever since by Japanese politicians (and American political scientists) was that the new mixed single-member district/proportional representation electoral system would produce a British-style two-party system that would complement the British-style administrative and political reforms desired by Ozawa and other politicians.

In other words, the Japanese political system should favor the existence of a second large party to challenge the DPJ, if not the LDP then an LDP-like successor party. But presumably the LDP should be the favorite to survive in the two-party system. By virtue of its existence — by virtue of its possessing institutional infrastructure, finances, an organizational history — the party presumably has an advantage over any party not yet born, not to mention the various micro-parties that stand virtually no chance of expanding to rival the DPJ.

And yet the LDP appears to be stumbling along to destruction. Matsuda Iwao, an LDP upper house member from Gifu prefecture, recently became the fifth LDP member of that chamber to leave the party since the LDP's defeat last year. (Yomiuri suspects the hand of Ozawa, given Matsuda's membership in Ozawa's Japan Renewal and New Frontier parties during the 1990s.)

The party has failed to articulate a policy agenda to challenge the Hatoyama government's, as suggested by the LDP's four-day boycott of Diet budget proceedings — discussed here and here. Aside from calling for the heads of Ozawa Ichiro and Hatoyama Yukio and demanding a new election, the LDP has apparently nothing to say about the problems facing Japan.

Keidanren, an important financial backer of the LDP (2.7 billion yen in 2008, roughly ten per cent of the party's income that year), has once again decided to suspend its political donations, a serious blow to the LDP given that its public subsidies have also shrank due to the extent of its defeat.

Most seriously, at least for the party's current leadership, Masuzoe Yoichi, the popular former minister for health, labor, and welfare and the one party member that LDP candidates wanted to be seen with in 2009, has stepped up his criticism of party leader Tanigaki Sadakazu and other party executives. He has created a new study group with thirty members — the Economic Strategy Research Group, discussed here — but Masuzoe's power may be less in his numbers than in his ability to discredit the party's leaders every time he opens his mouth. Masuzoe provides a constant reminder of just how little the LDP has done to reform itself since losing last August. Indeed, speaking at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan Monday, Masuzoe identified Tanigaki as a cause of low public approval for the LDP and ann obstacle to party reform, and suggested that his resignation would open the way to reform. He did not rule out the possibility of forming a new party or a total political realignment including current DPJ members (including cabinet member Maehara Seiji).

In recent weeks party leaders have begun discussing dissolving the factions once again, an idea that flared up during the post-election leadership campaign only to die shortly after Tanigaki's victory, but abolishing the factions — or referring to them as mere study groups — is at best a cosmetic change and at worse no change at all. The kind of changes the LDP needs to make are the changes the DPJ made over the decade leading up to its taking power: centralizing control over party administration, policymaking, and electoral strategy in a small group around the party leader, and then developing a coherent policy strategy that actually speaks to the public's concerns.

Why has the LDP failed to reform up to this point — and why is it likely to fail to reform in the future, even if Masuzoe gets his way and forces Tanigaki out?

There is no shortage of plausible explanations. One explanation would suggest that the LDP is failing because it is not designed to exist in opposition. For all the headlines grabbed by LDP reformists over the past decade, perhaps most of the party's members may be simply incapable of saying anything of substance to their constituents. There is no longer any public money to do the talking for them. And presumably they also have less access to the bureaucracy, which might otherwise have been able to provide them with ideas and proposals. This problem may be common to other defeated dominant parties struggling to adapt in opposition.

Another — which I think is important — is the composition of the LDP after its defeat. Namely, it has too many senior (read: former ministers) and hereditary politicians in its ranks and not enough followers, especially of the reformist variety. The LDP members who survived 2009 showed that they can get reelected on the strength of their own names and campaign organizations. They owe little to the party headquarters, and, one would assume, they would be less likely to support efforts to centralize control of the party.

A further explanation might consider the role played by the LDP's policy ideas. In this argument, the LDP's internal organization is not irrelevant — the party's organization, after all, has some control of what's included in the party's platform and more generally what narrative the party tells in public — but the more important factor may be the balance of power among ideological camps within the LDP. As noted, Masuzoe has the popularity, but not the numbers within the party (and I find it odd that Masuzoe, who was a critic of Koizumi's "neo-liberal" reforms, is now the face for continuing those reforms). Similarly, the revisionist conservative wing may also lack the numbers — there was some overlap with the Koizumi Children, after all — and its surviving leaders are intimately associated with the LDP's downfall. That leaves the pragmatists, the party leaders who are at once the most flexible and pragmatic in policy terms and also the most wedded to existing party structures. At the same time, the LDP faces the same dilemmas facing any party in opposition in a (mostly) two-party system. Should it copy the governing party's policies and serve as the well-meaning critic in opposition? Or should it adopt a rejectionist pose and rail about the good old days before the DPJ took power? Koizumi's ambiguous legacy as party leader, not to mention the failures of its last prime ministers, makes the latter option difficult, and the LDP seems simply incapable of adopting the former approach. The result is that attacking Hatoyama and Ozawa on the seiji to kane issue appears to be the default option, the problem being that the public doesn't particularly care about money politics relative to other issues, especially when the LDP is the messenger.

Finally, the LDP may be failing to reform for precisely the reason suggested by Masuzoe: Tanigaki is simply not up to the task, being little more than a placeholder upon whom the faction leaders could agree when the party was in chaos following the electoral defeat. It seems dubious that Tanigaki is the primary cause of frustrated reform, but he is certainly not helping the process along.

In short, while it is easy to assume that organizations do whatever necessary to ensure their survival in their environments, making the changes necessary for survival is easier said than done. It may be the case that the survival imperative of individual LDP politicians is trumping the organizational imperative to survive. The LDP's days appear to be numbered, especially if Masuzoe decides that the party is not worth saving.

Whether Masuzoe could build a second party around his splitists, Watanabe Yoshimi's Your Party, and whoever they could coax from the DPJ is an open question. Theories about the effect of the electoral system would predict that Masuzoe's bid would be successful, but the LDP's woeful performance post-election suggests that nothing is for certain. Showing up is not enough: the second party actually has to make the right decisions too. Perhaps Masuzoe, helped by his personal popularity, will make the right decisions and be rewarded with public support and numerous prospective candidates from which to choose. Perhaps he might even draw some DPJ members to a new party.

ON this last question, I suspect that despite the mass media's longing for another political realignment, DPJ reformists close to Masuzoe have greater incentives to exercise voice within the DPJ — given that the party is in government — rather than to exit and join Masuzoe in opposition. In other words, I expect that one consequence of Masuzoe's departure from the LDP would be a rebellion within the DPJ to replace Hatoyama led by the party members most likely to join with Masuzoe — potentially a successful rebellion were the emergence of a Masuzoe New Party to make enough Hatoyama allies nervous about the new rival.

If Masuzoe cannot break the DPJ, the result could be an unusual party system, with the DPJ joined by a rump LDP, a rising but struggling reformist party, and the other smaller parties, including its two coalition partners.

What seems certain is that the LDP will be unable to reverse its decline. The party that seemed uniquely suited to governing may simply be unable to survive an extended period in opposition. Even a good showing in the upper house election this summer — by no means guaranteed — could be negated should Komeito, the LDP's erstwhile partner, continue to move closer to the DPJ.

"The DPJ that does not do any pork-barrel spending"

Watanabe Yoshimi and Asao Keiichiro, who, along with Eda Kenji are the three "partners" at the head of the Minna no to (Your Party), gave a press conference at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan this afternoon to explain their purposes to the foreign press.

The value of the talk was in providing information about how the new party views its relationships with the LDP and the DPJ.

About the LDP, Watanabe was unambiguous: "From the start," Watanabe said, "I have said that this party will not serve as a complementary party to the LDP." The YP, like the DPJ, stands for seiken kotai, for regime change. But Asao stressed that regime change cannot just be about changing the party in power. It must be about changing how Japan is governed. (I made the same point in my own remarks at the FCCJ last week.)

In other words, the YP's hope is that it will be in a position to serve as the DPJ's conscience, an idealistic voice reminding the DPJ of the importance of genuine regime change. When asked, Watanabe could not deny the fundamental similarity between the DPJ's and the YP's manifestos — available here — but said that the devil's in the details, that the DPJ's proposals are vaguer, that the DPJ depends, for example, on union support and so cannot go as far as the YP. But the fundamental aims are the same. The YP wants fundamental administrative reform, drastic changes to how public money is spent, regional decentralization, reconstruction of the social safety net, and changes to Japan's economic model to ensure that the country has the money to pay for social security. Like the DPJ, the YP reaffirms the importance of the US-Japan alliance, but also wants an "equal" alliance — and says, in a phrase that I think exemplifies what the DPJ wants to do in the alliance, that Japan should "say what must be said and demand that which should be demanded." It also emphasizes a foreign policy of "Japan at Asia's center," echoing Hatoyama Yukio's call for greater economic cooperation in Asia.

Not surprisingly, given the similarities between the manifestos, Watanabe stressed that the YP is open to a post-election coalition with the DPJ.

There is much to like in the YP's manifesto, but I find the party's idealism a bit frustrating. It is all too easy for a party fielding fifteen candidates to talk about eliminating this and ending that and stress that it won't do any pork-barrel spending. But the DPJ is trying to win a majority nationwide — the act of cobbling together enough support to win a majority means that compromises are inevitable. Is there a democracy in the world, after all, that is free from pork-barrel spending in one form or another? The question isn't completely eliminating waste but making government transparent, so the public is in a position to judge whether its money is being wasted and punish elected officials who go to far in wasting public money. This, of course, is the value of the DPJ's agricultural income support program, for example, which would make government support more transparent than the byzantine system of subsidies in place today. The same goes for amakudari, Watanabe's bete noire — it is much easier for a party to call for outright ban to a practice like this when the chances are against its ever being in a position to do something about it. (Although, to the YP's credit, its manifesto includes a call for ending the practice of encouraging bureaucrats to retire early, which might actually do some good in limiting the demand for amakudari positions.)

Of course, whether the YP will be able to serve as the DPJ's conscience will depend entirely on how will the DPJ performs in the general election. Naturally the best possible outcome for the YP is the DPJ's depending on it to wield a majority in the House of Representatives — but this scenario strikes me as highly unlikely. Meanwhile, should the DPJ win a majority of its own, the YP's voice can be easily ignored. It would be a shame if this group's ideas were completely ignored, but perhaps it is inevitable that the YP will be absorbed by the DPJ. Much as it is difficult to see why anyone would vote for Hiranuma Takeo's conservative "third pole" when they can vote for the LDP, so it is difficult to see why voters would vote for the YP when they can vote for the DPJ. If the DPJ manages to perform as well in the election as some have suggested, Watanabe, Asao, and company may be able to do more good within the DPJ than as a small party outside the DPJ.

Another Koizumi child leaves the LDP

As expected, despite their tenuous position in the party (and their bleak electoral prospects), the LDP has not seen young reformists rush to exit the party and sign on with Watanabe Yoshimi's Your Party.

Only a small number has left, one by one, and with only a week until the campaign officially begins, presumably not many more will leave. The latest is Shimizu Seiichiro, who won a Tokyo PR seat in 2005 and opted to leave the party Monday. He is seeking to run as YP's candidate in Tokyo's twentieth district.

It is getting harder to see the YP having much impact on this election. Watanabe will win his seat in Tochigi, Eda Kenji will be reelected in Kanagawa-8, Asao Keiichiro may well be in a position to win in Kanagawa-4, but beyond the nascent party's three heavyweights, the party's candidates are unlikely to score victories in single-member districts. For the YP to have a strong showing, it needed to trigger a media "boom," but it seems that in the excitement surrounding a likely DPJ victory on 30 August, the creation of the YP will be of marginal importance in this election. Perhaps in a close election three seats could be the deciding vote for a coalition government, but if the DPJ does as well as it appears it will do, the YP's votes will be inconsequential.

It seems that the significance of the YP is in giving Koizumi children like Shimizu and Kanagawa-9 candidate Yamauchi Koichi another chance to win a Diet seat against long odds.

What's in a name?

With his party's launch scheduled for 8 August, Watanabe Yoshimi has finally revealed its name.

Minna no tō.

Apparently the official English translation will be "Your Party." I'm not sure which is worse, the name in the original Japanese or its translation. I realize that Japanese parties have run the gamut when it comes to names, and their names often say little about the party's policy orientation: as the old quip goes, the Liberal Democratic Party is neither liberal nor democratic, nor a party. But surely the name of Watanabe's new party sets some kind of record as the worst ever name for a Japanese political party.

First, I'm simply annoyed with the English translation. Your Party isn't the name of a party: it's the negation of a party's name. Instead of an adjective that might reveal something about the party, there is the empty possessive pronoun "your."

Second, whose party is it? The Japanese suggests that it's "everyone's" party. What does that mean exactly? Given Watanabe's struggle to find candidates for his group — at this point they number five, Watanabe, Eda Kenji, DPJ outcast Asao Keiichiro, and LDP refugees Yamauchi Koichi and Hirotsu Motoko — the party's ranks hardly constitute "everyone." Incidentally, if Michels's iron law of oligarchy holds, a party that belongs to everyone is a logical impossibility. Sooner or later power will be consolidated in the hands of leaders: "Who says organization, says oligarchy."

Seriously though, couldn't they have come up with anything better? I leave it to you, my readers, to leave your suggestions for an alternative name in the comments.

To answer the question in this post's title, there is nothing in this party's name. Bad names certainly haven't paralyzed Japanese parties in the past (with an exception perhaps for the Japanese Communist Party, which may not perform as well in the general election as many expected earlier this year). In the case of the YP, a splinter party by any other name would be just as impotent. Watanabe's party seems premised on the idea that a realignment is bound to happen sooner or later, and the YP will be ready whenever that happens. It will probably stand to gain should the LDP's reformists get wiped out this month, as those reformists may gravitate to Watanabe in a bid to return to the Diet. Accordingly, the party's first real test will probably be in the 2010 upper house election than in this month's general election.

But Watanabe and his happy few are swimming against the tide. This month's election will likely continue the trend towards a two-party system. After all, the DPJ will surely gain some seats at the expense of other opposition parties.

Meanwhile, it is unclear what the YP offers to voters that the others don't. Watanabe might claim to be the purest proponent of administrative reform, but he is hardly alone. With any hint of economic neo-liberalism being played down, the YP is just another party promising to make the bureaucrats pay.

One more for Watanabe?

Watanabe Yoshimi, the onetime cabinet minister who left the LDP earlier this year to form a reformist "third force" with independent Eda Kenji, is still preparing to launch a new party before next month's general election. But while the prospects for his incipient (and still nameless) party looked bright as the reformist rebellion against Prime Minister Aso Taro grew, the squelching of the rebellion have raised questions about whether the political system can accommodate a third major party. (Don't even get me started on onetime postal rebel Hiranuma Takeo's own plans for a third major party, a "true" conservative party. Hiranuma now has fifteen candidates in his group, and he is aiming to be in a position to determine who controls the lower house should neither party secure a majority.)

Watanabe may be in a position to pick up individual LDP members fleeing the party like Yamauchi Koichi, but whatever chance that Watanabe would be in a position to provide a political home to a large-scale exodus from the LDP appears to have vanished. Watanabe is in talks with Yamauchi — it's hard to see why Yamauchi wouldn't link up with Watanabe — but Watanabe has been forced to stress his prospective party's focus on "quality over quantity." Nice motto, except that it is difficult to see how his party can make the least bit of difference without an adequate number of members. Indeed, if the LDP's reformists have had a failing over the past several years, it has been their abiding focus on the purity of their principles over building up their numerical strength by compromising with other portions of the party that might share some if not all of their goals.

Watanabe, however, might be able to grab a member from the DPJ. Asao Keiichiro, who has recently gained publicity as the shadow defense minister in the DPJ's "next cabinet," has announced that he will leave the DPJ and campaign as an independent in Kanagawa's fourth district. (Full disclosure: I worked for Asao — especially in his campaign organization in Kanagawa-4 — 2006-2007.) It is ambiguous from press reports precisely what Asao's plan is. There is, after all, a difference between campaigning as an independent and leaving the party. If Asao loses next month, will he remain in the upper house as an independent, or will he return to the DPJ fold? The incumbent in Kanagawa-4 is Hayashi Jun, ostensibly a Koizumi child (he was first elected in 2005), although it appears that Hayashi has solved the reformist's dilemma by not being one: he appears to have positioned himself among the Abe Shinzo-Nakagawa Shoichi conservatives instead of the reformists around Nakagawa Hidenao. Indeed, here he is pictured with General Tamogami Toshio (ret.) at one of Tamogami's speaking engagements. (Incidentally, this reinforces the image of the Abe cabinet as a tenuous coalition of conservatives and reformists, with the conservatives uniting with the bulk of the LDP after Abe's collapse and reformists like Nakagawa Hidenao and Shiozaki Yasuhisa becoming "anti-mainstream.")

It's possible that Asao is confident that his support group is strong enough to draw in the bulk of the DPJ vote in the district, but naturally there is a risk of a split that will enable Hayashi to return to the Diet.

To return to Watanabe, it is possible that Asao could link up with Watanabe. Before Asao decided to leave, Ozawa Ichiro reportedly offered the candidacy in Kanagawa's eighth district, running against Watanabe's partner Eda. The press is interpreting Asao's decision to stay in the fourth district instead of running against Eda as a sign of Asao's willingness to join forces with Watanabe. Perhaps. But he may simply be using the old LDP trick of running as an independent and then rejoining the party should he win the seat — or lose it, as the party would presumably still welcome him back in the upper house seeing as how it needs the seat. Indeed, it was the desire to not lose the seat in the upper house that reportedly led Ozawa to withhold the nomination from Asao.

What Asao's decision does not appear to represent is a fissure within the DPJ. Unlike LDP defectors, Asao appears to be leaving as a matter of personal ambition, not irreconcilable policy differences with the party. As such, I wonder whether he may well make his way back to the DPJ after all. Analysts anticipating a political realignment that consumes both parties should keep looking.

The LDP's disorder deepens, but it remains one party — for now

Asō Tarō's decision to dissolve the Diet on 21 July and hold a general election on 30 August rippled through the LDP on Tuesday, as the prime minister's critics increasingly recognized that with the political system shifting into election mode, the window of opportunity to replace Asō is closing.

Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintarō, whose position was directly undermined by Sunday's Tokyo assembly election results, was bitterly dismissive of the prime minister, labeling the decision as intended solely to shield Asō from criticism within the LDP, criticism that he added to by reminding reporters of the prime minister's struggles with kanji and his indecisiveness.

But while Ishihara's comments can be dismissed as bitterness from one unpopular leader trying to shift his share of the blame for Sunday's defeat to another unpopular leader, Asō faced more severe criticism from within the LDP on Tuesday. The conference of LDP members of both houses of the Diet met Tuesday, giving Asō's rivals an opportunity to criticize him to his face.

The man of the afternoon was Nakagawa Hidenao, the leader of the LDP's reformists and who at this moment has considerable power over the LDP's future.

Not surprisingly Nakagawa was angry about Asō's decision to react to the Tokyo election by calling an "early" election instead resigning. He wrote at his blog on Monday that the Japanese people had already rendered their judgment on Asō's leadership in local and prefectural elections in Shizuoka, Tokyo, Chiba, and Nara, and reiterated his argument that the only "honorable" course of action for the prime minister is resignation. In short, Nakagawa's argument is the polar opposite of the government's argument that local elections have no bearing whatsoever on national elections — local elections are explicitly judgments about the government.

On Tuesday Nakagawa rejected Asō's appeal for unity and once again demanded the prime minister's resignation, arguing that only the DPJ will benefit from an early election with Asō as the LDP leader.

Nakagawa was not alone in his criticism of Asō. Takebe Tsutomu, former LDP secretary general and Koizumi lieutenant, suggested that the prime minister acted "arbitrarily" in scheduling the election from 30 August instead of some date following the 10 September end of the Diet term.

The bitterness of the criticism from the senior reformists is an admission that they were outmaneuvered by Asō, who acted decisively for perhaps the first time since becoming prime minister, securing his position and placating his backers by scheduling an "early" dissolution followed by a long period before the election campaign officially begins on 18 August. [Readers will notice the quotes around early throughout this article, by which I am simply suggesting that early is relative: as far as I'm concerned this election should have been held months ago.] It is now highly unlikely that the LDP will oust Asō before the general election, despite Nakagawa's calls for his resignation.

It is beginning to occur to some LDP reformists just how isolated they are within the party. Yamauchi Koichi, a first-termer from Kanagawa, writes at his blog: "In the LDP, the structural reform group, which wants to build smart government that entrusts to the private sector that which the private sector can do, demolish the administrative corporations, cut the number of bureaucrats, and eliminate government waste, has become the minority group before we were even aware of it." (Why exactly did it take them so long to notice that they had become the LDP's new anti-mainstream? There were plenty of warning signs well before Asō set foot in the Kantei as prime minister, although for the first year after Koizumi Nakagawa Hidenao was too busy claiming that the Abe government was reforming "faster than in Koizumi-san's time" to notice that the LDP was reverting to form before their very eyes.)

Yamauchi's post is interesting as it shows a Koizumi child waking up to the predicament facing the reformists: "I'm afraid to say that it appears that both the LDP and the DPJ are at the point of 'Anti-Koizumi Structural Reform' and their thinking is converging in a similar way(?)." What's a reformist to do? Risk electoral defeat as a candidate for a party that has marginalized you and your peers? Join the DPJ, a party that rhetoric has it is no different from the LDP? Join with Watanabe Yoshimi in the hope that his nascent party might become the beginning of a powerful neo-liberal party?

In his futile campaign against the prime minister, Nakagawa Hidenao has been a poor leader for his fellow reformists. After all, as Nakagawa should himself recognize, the LDP's problems are more than skin deep. Why does he think that simply changing the face of the party will be adequate to revive the LDP's fortunes? Obviously he wants more than a change of leaders, but in the time to an election a change of leaders will be merely cosmetic and will ask voters to excuse the LDP's past and look to a brighter future under the new leader, assuming that the new leader can make the changes desired by Nakagawa. But the Koizumi experience suggests that changing leaders only takes the LDP so far. And does anyone see another Koizumi waiting in the LDP's wings anyway? (Yamamoto Ichita, another leading reformist, offers more criticism of Nakagawa's position here.)

The result is that it looks like it will be every reformist for him or herself: it appears unlikely that the reformists will leave the party en masse. Some will probably leave and join with Watanabe; perhaps others will stay and fight for the soul of the LDP; still others may soften their views. But I have a hard time seeing a repeat of 1993 when Ozawa Ichiro pulled his reformist faction out of the party as a group. It is wholly unclear which option Nakagawa will choose, which speaks volumes about Nakagawa as a leader of the reformists. The longer Nakagawa waits to make his intentions clear the more it looks like the same indecision that Asō is criticized for instead of wily gamesmanship.

Nakagawa's predicament comes through in this post at his blog Tuesday, in which he writes hysterically of his "mission to strive to the bitter end to prevent the birth of a DPJ government," a government he believes will utterly betray Japan's national interests. Rarely have I read something as unhinged as Nakagawa's anti-DPJ screed. He is convinced that the DPJ will ruin Japan (presumably more than it has already been ruined by the LDP?) — if this post does not rule out the possibility of Nakagawa's leading reformists into the DPJ, I don't know what does. Nakagawa is equally devastated by the LDP's failure to realize that it is imperative for to do whatever it takes to prevent the DPJ from taking power. But he offers no clue as to what he will do to "work vigorously on behalf of nation and people."

With the LDP's having successfully warned off reformists who might have been tempted to use the opposition's no-confidence motion to tweak the government — the LDP informed members that the party would withdraw its endorsement if they voted for the motion — but the day of reckoning is approaching. Or, given the confusion among the reformists, the days of reckoning.

Departures

Watanabe Yoshimi is on his own.

As Jun Okumura makes exceedingly clear, there is little chance that Mr. Watanabe will be joined by other LDP defectors in his effort to build a national movement to take down the old guard. (Although, surprisingly, Mr. Watanabe was joined by an LDP abstainer — Matsunami Kenta — in Tuesday's vote on the second stimulus, an act of rebellion for which Mr. Matsunami has already been punished by being stripped of his title as parliamentary secretary for the Cabinet Office.) Mr. Watanabe has indicated that he wants to build a "popular movement," not a new party.

The basis for this popular movement is anger at the bureaucratic conservatism that Mr. Watanabe believes lies at the heart of the "old, old LDP." For Mr. Watanabe, bureaucratic rule — to which the LDP is wedded — lies at the heart of the country's inability to cope with the once-in-a-century crisis facing Japan.

In a recent issue of Voice he wrote of the shift to a "postmodern" moment, arguing that Japan is in the midst of one of several great transformations, in the mold of the transitions to the Heian, Kamakura, and Edo periods. Arguing that a "once-a-century storm" requires a "once-a-century response," Mr. Watanabe advocates the wholesale transformation of the Japanese state, starting with administrative reform and the eradiction of amakudari. He further advocates decentralization and the consolidation of prefectures into states as a means of depriving Kasumigaseki of power — and with the reorganization of local governance, he suggests that the capital should be moved, as in earlier great transformations. (This is hardly a new idea.)

He offered an expedited version of this article in both his statement of secession and his Tuesday press conference.

The LDP may yet offer further confirmation of Mr. Watanabe's argument that the LDP is incapable of implementing the reforms Mr. Watanabe believes necessary to save Japan from ruin. As Uesugi Takashi argues in the February issue of Voice, the LDP may once again fight over the future of the road construction fund during the ordinary Diet session. For Mr. Uesugi, the road construction debate lies at the heart of the LDP's downfall. The road construction tribe has persistently blocked efforts not only to shift funds from road construction to other, less particularistic ends, it has blocked reform more generally. Surely behind obstruction to Mr. Watanabe's efforts to promote administrative reform lies the hand of the road tribe, for any serious attempt to uproot amakudari would be a blow to the construction companies, the bureaucrats responsible for the contracts, and road tribe members themselves. Aso Taro may become only the latest in a series of LDP prime ministers forced to back down in the face of resistance from the road tribe. Naturally while the media and the public busy themselves with the possibility of rebellion by reformists when the 2009 budget comes to a vote, the road tribe will be quietly looking for ways to water down Mr. Aso's promise to suspend the special fund and redirect the newly created "fund for the creation of a foundation of rural vitality" towards road construction funding.

Of course, it does not do to simply demonize the LDP's longtime reliance on public works spending (which some Americans have begun to do in anticipation of the Obama administration's stimulus plan). The LDP came to rely on public works as what Margarita Estévez-Abe has called a "functional equivalent" of welfare and unemployment assistance, a method of public support that also produced public goods for rural areas while conveniently solidifying the LDP's political position in rural electoral districts. As Estévez-Abe argues, the LDP essentially farmed out welfare provision to small companies, enabling Japan to create a welfare state without a large public sector or an unsustainable public debt for much of the postwar period:

Instead of aiding firms to shed their redundant workforce, the Japanese welfare state subsidized employment of excess labor — in both large and small firms. Rather than creating a large public sector — which would have benefited the opposition parties — or an extensive active labor market to pool and train redundant workers, Japan subsidized private sector employment instead. Japan's 'socialization' of capital was a crucial piece that made the system work. It allowed the state to invest in public works beyond its tax revenue. It also permitted private firms to function as primary welfare providers by shielding them from financial pressures. In short, Japan's small social welfare spending and its weak organized labor did not yield a form of laissez-faire capitalism. On the contrary, postwar Japan pursued a brand of capitalism, where economic units — that is, firms — were very much treated as units of welfare provision as if under a socialist regime. Furthermore, state intervention to protect businesses in Japan perpetuated the presence of a large number of inefficient firms. (Welfare and Capitalism in Postwar Japan, 198.)

The problem therefore is not that the road tribe is the mastermind behind a sinister conspiracy to wreck Japan. It's that this form of social protection — targeted at both firms and individuals located in rural Japan — is antiquated, and that continued efforts to perpetuate this system delay the construction of a more conventional welfare state and make life worse for the Japanese people.

The "redundant" worker who might at one point have worked in small construction company somewhere far from Tokyo is now a temporary worker struggling to find work in urban Japan and living without benefits. The Japanese state, having broken the bank in the 1990s, is no longer able to protect the small firms and their host communities with public works. Little wonder that Japanese firms, deprived of government support, are failing in the face of the global financial crisis. Bit by bit the old system is crumbling, but efforts to prolong its life have unfortunately made it difficult for the government to build a new system in its place.

But the road tribe, their local politician allies, the construction companies, the bureaucrats: they have all been doing what they can to preserve a system that played an important social role for decades. They might be acting out of self-interest, but it is hard to expect them to do otherwise. The time has come, however, for a new system that ensures that public funds are directed to those most in need of it, that public funds are used to create a new safety net that ensures that failing to secure a permanent position in a major corporation is not a sentence to a lifetime of penury and economic insecurity. Japan is in urban country — it needs to a universalistic system that reflects its demographics. Creating a universalistic system should not mean tossing rural areas on the rubbish heap, but Japan must discard a welfare system that now provides support to an increasingly narrow segment of the population.

The LDP, torn between advocates of a new system and defenders of the old, has been singularly incapable of doing what must be done to develop both new sources of wealth and new means of protecting the public. It is for this reason that Mr. Watanabe left, and why Mr. Watanabe is right to argue that questions of public welfare are inseparable from the question of administrative reform. Defenders of the old system, unwilling to surrender voluntarily, must be defeated if a new system is to be created. Of course, it is for this reason why the LDP must be defeated in the 2009 general election.

LDP members respond to Watanabe

Yamauchi Koichi, a first-term LDP member from Kanagawa's ninth district, making him a Koizumi child, has offered his response to Watanabe Yoshimi's leaving the LDP at his blog, a response that I think is typical of the Koizumi children as a whole.

Mr. Yamauchi shares Mr. Watanabe's ideas of political and economic reform and is thus does not quite know what to do about Mr. Watanabe. He offers a feeble explanation that political parties should be able to accommodate a variety of perspectives.

"In the matters of economic policy and the way of implementing adminstrative reform," he writes, "I think it is good that there is some breadth in ways of thinking." He maintains that "balanced" policy is the result of differing viewpoints within the same party. This vision of a political party sounds nice enough, but Mr. Yamauchi is not describing the LDP — at least not the experience of Koizumian reformists in the LDP over the past two years.

Mr. Watanabe's departure explodes the myth that the LDP has become a reformist party. He has forced members like Mr. Yamauchi to confront the reality of their position in the LDP: barely tolerated, excluded from the center of power within the party, marginalized when it comes to setting the party's agenda. As administrative reform minister, Mr. Watanabe had to struggle more against his fellow cabinet ministers than against a willing opposition. Mr. Watanabe has, in short, decided to stop the charade.

Criticism of Mr. Watanabe from members of the cabinet have similarly criticized him for undermining the idea of a harmonious LDP. Ishiba Shigeru, MAFF minister, claimed that one's opinions being ignored is no excuse for leaving a political party. Kaneko Kazuyoshi, transport minister, refused to believe that Mr. Watanabe is acting in good faith, accusing Mr. Watanabe of acting like a rat fleeing a sinking ship. Hatoyama Kunio, who has left political parties on more than one occasion, emphasized the Mr. Watanabe's foolhardyness for leaving by himself.

Mr. Watanabe is fortunately in a position where none of this criticism matters. If anything it may help make the case for why he had no business remaining in the party. He certainly has more important things to worry about than the bitter words of LDP members. Following up on his promise to create a popular movement, Mr. Watanabe has indicated that he will convene a "People's Congress" within the month that will include policy experts and the leaders of cities and towns.

At this point, he has no alternative but to build a grassroots movement, as long as his LDP compatriots remain mired in cognitive dissonance.

Aso the impervious?

The bad news keeps coming for Prime Minister Aso Taro.

He has been hit with another wave of negative poll results. In Yomiuri, his approval rating is a hair over 20%, while his disapproval has broken 70%, rising to 72.3%. In the same poll, Ozawa Ichiro remains gained another three points in the question of who would be better as prime minister, while Mr. Aso lost two more points — giving Mr. Ozawa a 39% to 27% advantage. It may not be an overwhelming lead, but considering that the LDP has long hoped to make Mr. Ozawa a liability for the DPJ, Mr. Ozawa's now persistent lead is enough to suggest that the LDP will have a hard time making the general election about Mr. Ozawa (as opposed to the LDP's numerous mistakes). Mr. Aso's numbers were just as bad in the Fuji-Sankei poll, 18.2% in favor compared with 71.4% unfavorable. Reportedly Mr. Aso received comparatively high marks for his personality, but receives little support for his foreign and economic policies, and his leadership capabilities. Moreover, Mr. Ozawa enjoys a 41% to 25.2% advantage over Mr. Aso, and receives higher marks in a variety of categories.

It is hard to put a positive spin on these results, although Mr. Aso did his best on Monday night in a live appearance on Fuji TV. He maintained that his unpopularity is a function of the economy, which implies that if he manages to fix the economy, the Aso LDP (recall that the LDP is using this phrase on its recent publicity material) will be fine. I suspect there are at least two things wrong with his response. First, if by economy he simply means the recession, Mr. Aso is overly optimistic. Clearly the LDP's spectacular unpopularity among Japanese voters predates the recession and the global financial crisis; its causes are numerous, with the recession being the latest black mark. Accordingly, if the LDP somehow manages to revive the economy in the next nine months — a feat that at this point would be miraculous — the Aso government's numbers will not magically elevate to new heights.

But such talk of recovery, at least before an election, is fanciful. Japan's economy shows no signs of becoming any less dependent on the US economy, and with no signs of a US recovery in 2009, Mr. Aso will be waiting in vain. Nevertheless, he is doing all he can to appear cool, impervious to the signs of his government's demise. (Indeed, I watched his Fuji TV appearance, which was a calculated effort to show just how calm the prime minister is. One segment showed Mr. Aso in his office, dressed casually and surrounded by piles of books — continuing to sell this image. He turned on the stereo and proceeded to belt out Simon and Garfunkel's "Bridge over Troubled Water." Mr. Aso may be in need of one of those. Perhaps his singing the song was a cry for help.)

Meanwhile, at the same time that Mr. Aso is facing ever greater disapproval, Watanabe Yoshimi, former administrative reform minister and prominent critic of Aso Taro, announced Monday that he will in fact by leaving the LDP on Tuesday, following through on his remarks of last week.

Mr. Watanabe told reporters Monday that before the lower house votes on the government's second supplementary budget, he will deliver his declaration of secession to LDP headquarters. He insisted that he will begin building a popular movement outside of the LDP in the hope of attracting discontent LDP members in Nagata-cho and in local chapters. In other words, Mr. Watanabe hopes that if he builds it — it being a new reformist party — they will come.

There is reason to be skeptical that this approach will work. As Jun Okumura suggests, Ozawa Ichiro's overt appeals for LDP defections will likely have the opposite effect, leading disgruntled LDP members to hang Mr. Watanabe out to dry so as not to give comfort to Mr. Ozawa. There remain precious few signs that Mr. Watanabe will have company in his new venture. I still give him tremendous credit for taking this step into the unknown, but thus far it is not the kind of move to shake the foundations of the Aso government any more than they have been shaken by wider events.

Indeed, in his Monday TV appearance, Mr. Aso shrugged off Mr. Watanabe's decision as an "individual matter," saying that he had no fear that Mr. Watanabe will be only the first of a series of defections.

Mr. Aso was similarly cool to Mr. Ozawa's appeal for a negotiated dissolution of the lower house, in which the DPJ would trade support for the FY 2009 budget for an agreed timetable for a general election, insisting that policy remains his top priority.

Mr. Aso's cool demeanor, however, should not distract observers from the extent of the crisis facing the prime minister and the LDP. It is too early to gauge the impact of Mr. Watanabe's defection, but I suspect that beyond numbers (which may or may not be forthcoming) Mr. Watanabe may undermine the government by exposing the illusion of the LDP as anything but an exhausted party resistant to structural change. Despite the tendency of some intellectuals to blame Japan's problems on Mr. Koizumi, the former prime minister's popularity has lingered. Whatever their thoughts about his specific policies, his message of a drastic break with the LDP's old way of conducting government undoubtedly continues to resonate. By leaving the LDP, Mr. Watanabe has made clear the extent to which Mr. Koizumi failed to change the LDP. Other reformists may remain in the party, but it is entirely possible that they will go down to defeat, while Mr. Watanabe, standing alone and for now without the prospect of a DPJ challenger, may survive to fight on after the general election.

And while Mr. Koizumi may have failed to change the LDP, it increasingly appears that he successfully delivered on his promise to destroy the LDP.

Watanabe to LDP: I'm outta here

It appears that Watanabe Yoshimi is nearing a decision regarding his future in the LDP. With the second stimulus package scheduled to come to a vote on January 13, Mr. Watanabe could leave the LDP in a matter of days.

Mr. Watanabe appears to be working hard to exacerbate tensions with the LDP. Not surprisingly, the prime minister rejected his demands regarding the timing of a general election and administrative reform, with the LDP mocking them as reflective of Mr. Watanabe's "heroic delusions." Not that it was ever likely that the prime minister would cave to the demands of a discontent backbencher.

Mr. Watanabe has also been going after the prime minister on the question of administrative reform. He expressed his dissatisfaction with Mr. Aso's response to a question in Thursday's Diet proceedings, suggesting that he has "given up hope" in the possibility of Mr. Aso's eliminating the practice of amakudari. Mr. Watanabe plans to question Mr. Aso directly in Diet proceedings on Friday on the same matter, which appears like a prelude to a vote by Mr. Watanabe against the second stimulus package on Tuesday.

All of this is to be expected. Mr. Watanabe has made it nearly impossible to remain in the party and have any measure of influence: better a flight to the wilderness than internal exile. His exodus may, however, be a lonely one. None of his fellow reformists have stood up to be counted with him. For all their opposition, none has publicly stated his or her intention vote against the stimulus package. The LDP is taking seriously the threat of rebellion on Tuesday — Asahi reports that the party is trying to get every member to commit to voting for the supplemental budget, along with trying to sell the plan to a wary public — but it seems unlikely that Mr. Watanabe will have company if he decides to oppose the bill.

For an example of the attitude of Mr. Watanabe's fellow reformists, see this blog post by first-termer Yamauchi Koichi, in which Mr. Yamauchi expresses his agreement with Mr. Watanabe's policy ideas, but indicates that he will not take the step of leaving the party, preferring instead to continue to work on improving the LDP from within. This attitude seems to be shared by Yamamoto Ichita, who at the same time that Mr. Watanabe has drifted further into rebellion, has created yet another study group opposing some dimension of the government's agenda, in this case the plan to raise the consumption tax in three years' time. Mr. Yamauchi is one of eight members of the new study group. For all the fanfare that surrounds some of these groups, I'm not certain that they accomplish anything, and as Mr. Watanabe is learning, they apparently do little to build solidarity among ideological compatriots. (Indeed, in the midst of all this, Mr. Watanabe just joined a study group with former Koizumi lieutenant Takebe Tsutomu.)

So the question remains then as to what will happen when he leaves the party. The DPJ is reportedly reaching out to Mr. Watanabe, but whether he will take the opposition party's hand is unknown. Presumably he won't do so without some position of prominence being given in return.

The result is that if and when Mr. Watanabe votes against the government's stimulus package Tuesday, the Japanese political system will step into the unknown. Mr. Watanabe's leaving could be the first domino of a political realignment or it could be a futile, isolated step that marks the end of Mr. Watanabe's career.

Before the deluge

After an abbreviated recess, the Diet will reconvene today for its 2009 ordinary session.

The situation facing Aso Taro, his party, and his country is dire, and growing darker by the day. The latest development is the tent village — is it appropriate to call it an Asoville or Aso-mura? — that has been growing in Hibiya Park, populated by unemployed temporary workers with nowhere else to go. From Monday the unemployed will relocate to four sites in the Tokyo area, but after next week it is unclear what will happen to them. Asahi reports that the denizens of the temporary village will be demonstrating at the Diet on Monday.

A crowd of unemployed workers sleeping in Hibiya Park, living on emergency food aid: it is with this backdrop that the LDP approaches what may be its final Diet session (for now) as Japan's ruling party.

Mr. Aso, in a press conference Sunday, did his best to remain positive, as is his wont. Far from heeding Franklin Delano Roosevelt's 1933 warning about "[denying] the dark realities of the moment," Mr. Aso insisted once again on speaking of a bright future while ignoring the ever bleaker present.

"The future," he said, "is built by us. We build. The future is bright...I want to build a bright Japan for all the people."

He insisted that the supplementary budget containing a second stimulus package must be passed before the end of the fiscal year. He repeated that he is not thinking about calling an election until the second 2008 supplemental and 2009 budgets are passed. He said that it is appropriate for the LDP to discuss a future consumption tax hike, following the restoration of economic growth. Finally, he concluded by saying that he is not worried about the possibility of rebellion by LDP malcontents, that he even understands their grievances.

It increasingly appears like Mr. Aso's anodyne remarks are intended not so much to reassure the public as to reassure himself. Perhaps it's working; maybe Mr. Aso really believes that a brighter future is right around the corner.

The reality, of course, is that it increasingly appears that not only will Mr. Aso preside over the continuing disintegration of the Japanese economy, he may also preside over a disastrous general election for the LDP and the disintegration of the LDP. Watanabe Yoshimi, the man in revolt, appears to be steeling himself for a break with the party. Speaking to his koenkai in Tochigi over New Year's, Mr. Watananbe told his supporters that he remains opposed to the government's two trillion yen payment plan and, moreover, that if the government does not continue to reform the bureaucracy — his pet issue — he is resolved to leave the party and place himself at the head of a popular movement. It remains to be seen whether Mr. Watanabe is bluffing. I'm inclined to believe he's not. Indeed, it appears that Mr. Watanabe may be setting the table so that it appears that the Aso government is to blame for his leaving for failing to accept his conditions (including an immediate dissolution of the lower house followed by a general election). The pertinent question then is whether anyone will follow him out of the LDP, or, failing that, whether a popular movement will materialize around him.

Unfortunately I'm pessimistic about both. The LDP's would-be defectors appear to have been sufficiently restrained by the party, at least until after a general election. As for the other alternative, would Mr. Watanabe be able to repeat Hosokawa Morihiro's feat of channeling popular discontent into a new micro-party that could propel him to power? Mr. Hosokawa's Japan New Party formed in 1992 and competed in upper house and local elections before the 1993 general election. Mr. Watanabe will have far less time. Would he be able to find enough candidates, not to mention enough field supporters, to make his movement into a factor in the post-election landscape? The presence of the DPJ will further complicate matters, potentially dampening enthusiasm that might otherwise have bolstered his movement.

In the meantime, Mr. Watanabe — along with Nakagawa Hideano and other reformists — will continue to agitate from within the LDP. Mr. Nakagawa began the year by declaring his belief in the need for a political realignment, and rejected all talk of a consumption tax hike. Discontent within the LDP will only grow in the coming months, whether or not Mr. Aso is prepared to address it.

Ozawa Ichiro is undoubtedly heartened by the news surrounding the start of the new Diet session. He reasserted the importance of putting the people's livelihoods first and, in a deft move, criticized both the government's delay in introducing a new stimulus package and the content of the stimulus package on offer. His point that a new stimulus package should reflect the DPJ's concerns too is a salient one, if only because the DPJ, as the master of the upper house, should be involved in the drafting of such an importance piece of legislation. The LDP still has not learned that the divided Diet means that consulting with the opposition should occur before the introduction of legislation. Of course, doing so would probably mean cutting side payments to important LDP and Komeito constituencies. (But the DPJ is the only party playing politics with an issue of national importance...)

Mr. Ozawa also voiced his approval of Mr. Watanabe's remarks before launching into an extended criticism of Mr. Aso's remarks. Addressing Mr. Aso's declaration that the key words for the Diet session are "security" and "vitality," Mr. Ozawa said, "While saying these words, the true figure of the Aso government is that by doing nothing for three months it created a political vacuum. I think the people really understand this. Therefore it's impossible for the people to be deceived by this word play."

In response to a question from a journalist, who wondered why Mr. Ozawa is spending so much time on rural districts, Mr. Ozawa reasserted the importance of the DPJ's campaigning in longtime LDP strongholds in rural Japan. He believes that the DPJ's message of opposition to market fundamentalism, competition, and the inequalities "that have resulted from globalization" can succeed across Japan — although he declined to offer specifics for what the DPJ is promise in place of these enemies.

For now, however, it seems that the DPJ will not be penalized for doing little more than campaigning on the basis of the insecurities, the grievances, and the anger of the Japanese people. The DPJ is setting the public agenda; the LDP is now talking of "protecting the people's livelihoods," not unlike Mr. Ozawa's "The people's livelihoods first." The party owns the issues that matter most to the public, and as the economy worsens may even appear to be a reliable steward of the economy compared to the LDP.

The DPJ should not be too upbeat. If current trends continue and if the DPJ wins this year's election, it may come to regret taking power thanks to a historic economic crisis that appears far from finished in Japan, not to mention everywhere else.

Mr. Watanabe's rebellion

On Wednesday the House of Representatives voted on a DPJ-backed resolution calling for an immediate dissolution of the lower house followed by a general election.

Watanabe Yoshimi broke with the LDP and voted for the resolution, backing his words with action. He stated that he was prepared for whatever punishment the LDP intends to mete out for his rebellion.

The LDP did opt to censure him. According to Asahi, the LDP has "admonished" Mr. Watanabe, admonishment being the second lightest of the LDP's punishments for disobedient party members. Nikai Toshihiro, head of the LDP's general affairs council, argued that Mr. Watanabe should be expelled from the party, but his proposal was rejected.

In a press conference after the vote, Mr. Watanabe made clear that his vote is not a prelude to a break with the LDP and the formation of a new party. He claimed that he acted alone, not bothering to consult with his fellows. Later in the press conference, he spelled out his credo: "...Party before faction, state and people before party. This is the starting point for a member of the Diet." It seems that Mr. Watanabe was acting in defense of Japanese democracy; he views a general election at this juncture as essential to making progress in solving the problems that plague the Japanese polity. A simple act, but considering that none of his colleagues joined him, an act that may have taken more courage than meets the eye. Despite the bold talk from other reformists, not one did anything more than offer tepid "understanding" of Mr. Watanabe's vote. Naturally his vote garnered praise from the DPJ — Hatoyama Yukio made a congratulatory phone call — which hopes to draw LDP rebels away from the party before a general election. Ozawa Ichiro suggested that if Mr. Watanabe is willing to leave the party, he will discuss electoral cooperation with him. (Not a particularly meaningful offer, I think: there is a reason that the DPJ has yet to pick a candidate to run against Mr. Watanabe in Tochigi-3, namely that Mr. Watanabe has been quite successful in past elections.)

This will not be last we hear of Mr. Watanabe. By giving him a light slap on the wrist, the LDP has ensured that Mr. Watanabe will defy the government again at his next opportunity. Mr. Watanabe dared the party to expel him, but it refused, perhaps out of fear that booting the rebel reformist could finally open the eyes of his colleagues that the party has no place for them. Of course, that may be too much to expect. The LDP, terrified that Mr. Watanabe will encourage others to follow him, acted quickly and softly in the hope of quieting talk of rebellion and not making Mr. Watanabe out to be a martyr. Time will tell whether the party's response will succeed. Mr. Watanabe said in an appearance on TV Asahi Thursday that there is the possibility of further defiance of the government when the second stimulus package comes to a vote next year.

Journalist Uesugi Takashi suggests that there is little danger of the bill's being rejected because the controversial portion — a fixed income and residential tax cut included to assuage Komeito — is not a separate bill but simply part of the larger supplemental budget bill (hence the DPJ's calling for the controversial portion to be submitted as a separate bill). Uesugi instead sees another battle over the plan to move highway funds to the general fund as the critical point when LDP reformists may decide to break with the party.

For now it is simply impossible to predict whether Mr. Watanabe will be able to gather enough rebels to deprive the government of its supermajority. It appears that Nakagawa Hidenao's argument that there shall be no moves towards realignment before a general election has won the day in reformist circles.

Nevertheless, I give Mr. Watanabe tremendous credit for standing up against the government. In what was, to paraphrase W.H. Auden, a low, dishonest year, Mr. Watanabe has provided a glimmer of hope that there might be a leader in either party capable of rising above the pusillanimity that has characterized the behavior of all too many leading Japanese politicians over the past year.

Can the LDP save itself?

In a vitriolic post at Shisaku, MTC goes after those who insist that despite the LDP's current crisis — which has only gotten worse since back in January when Fukuda Yasuo called it the worst since the LDP's founding — the LDP will recover as it has done before.

I have encountered this argument all too frequently, and share MTC's frustration.

Rarely have I encountered someone who offers a causal mechanism to explain how the LDP will escape the reaper this time. The argument is usually presented as the simple assertion that the LDP has survived to the present day, so it will continue to survive. This argument is logically flawed. The LDP's survival in the past, despite defections and internal divisions, tells us nothing about whether the LDP will survive in the future. Arguably the LDP has never faced the possibility of defections while facing a major opposition party that was a plausible contender for power (indeed, an opposition party that was the largest party in the upper house). More importantly, the LDP has never contended with a major opposition party that was a plausible home for LDP defectors. While it is common to complain that the LDP and the DPJ are too similar, on the plus side the ideological overlap — if their similarities can be attributed to ideology — means that the DPJ is better prepared to welcome LDP malcontents than the Socialist Party ever was. The DPJ might be less attractive to LDP defectors by virtue of Ozawa Ichiro's being the party president, but it's not inconceivable that Mr. Ozawa could cut a deal regarding the premiership in order to bring in LDP members.

That said, it is far from certain what will happen. The next six-twelve months in Japanese politics will depend on contingencies and accidents, on the decisions taken or not taken by key individuals. But I'm still willing to predict that the LDP will fail to win a majority in the next general election, that the DPJ will, if it doesn't win an absolute majority, will still win enough seats with which to form a government. I'm less certain about whether the LDP will splinter. I'm certainly convinced that the LDP divided among seemingly irreconcilable ideological tendencies, but I'm willing to admit the possibiliy that the party's leaders will find a way to keep the party together, despite being unclear about the tools LDP leaders have at their disposal to keep dissatisfied members in the fold.

Various LDP bosses have publicly chastized Watanabe Yoshimi and other young turks for their "anti-Aso" activities, but I don't know what pressure is being applied in private. I'm guessing that there is little the party can do to stop Mr. Watanabe, a second-generation politician who has won his four terms in Tochigi's third district by sizeable margins and enjoys a certain prominence. But what the LDP can do is lean on the other young turks who might otherwise follow Mr. Watanabe in opposing and possibly leaving the LDP (Yamauchi Koichi, a first-term member from Kanagawa-9, is desperate in this post to make clear that Nakagawa Hidenao's new study group is not aimed as undermining Mr. Aso). It is unclear whether Mr. Nakagawa is willing to cut his ties with the LDP. Sankei suggests that the Machimura faction is working to contain Mr. Nakagawa; Abe Shinzo's participation in Mr. Nakagawa's study group on social policy is conspicuous in this regard. The group had fifty-seven members attend its inaugural meeting, but it is far from clear how many of those members are contemplating rebellion or whether their leader is prepared to support an effort to overthrow the government. He is still criticizing Mr. Aso — he criticized the prime minister's handling of the tax reform debate on a radio program Friday — and desires an election sooner rather than later, but he is giving few hints as to whether he'd be willing to back a break with the LDP.

It may take an election to break the LDP. Depending on the balance of power within the LDP post-election, certain blocs could be convinced to split should the LDP fall short of the majority while a certain bloc strengthens its hold. I imagine that Mr. Nakagawa hopes that his group of reformists will be left standing after an election, giving them the upper hand in a power struggle.

Given the LDP's divisions, can the LDP possibly save itself at the ballot box?

History is not in the LDP's favor. The LDP has failed to win majorities in every election under the new single-member district/proportional representation system but for the idiosyncratic 2005 election. It is nearly universally acknowledged that the LDP and Komeito will lose the supermajority they won in 2005. The question, then, is how far the LDP will fall. It is reasonable to surmise that the LDP will win no more than what it won in 2000 (233 seats) or 2003 (237 seats). It could conceivably do worse, as a result of widespread dissatisfaction throughout Japan over how the LDP has governed since the 2005 election.

As far as I'm concerned, the important question is whether the DPJ will come close enough to an absolute majority that it will have no trouble forming a government.

It's possible that I'm wrong. Like a good social scientist, I'm willing to accept the possibility that I'm mistaken, that my assumptions are faulty. In fact, my theory can be easily falsified: if the LDP remains in power after the next election and (presumably) remains united, I've clearly missed something, at which point it will be necessary to figure out precisely what was missing. In the meantime, as I — along with others, like MTC — have postulated, all signs point to the LDP's facing a reckoning at the next general election.

I'm waiting for someone who believes that the LDP will recover to tell me, in advance, what I'm missing. What will serve to keep the LDP in power? Will rural voters ultimately be unable to vote for the DPJ in a general election? Will the LDP's reformist candidates survive in urban districts that are trending back in the DPJ's favor? Will Mr. Ozawa repel a sufficient number of voters to save the LDP (as the LDP hopes)? Is there anyone out there who is convinced that the LDP will survive who can venture a causal explanation for how it will save itself, other than "it has done so in the past, and it will do so again?"

I'm not even convinced that the LDP has saved itself in the past so much as it has been lucky in its opponents. Its luck may have run out. It's amazing how that as the Aso government's support has plummeted, there are fewer stories about the divisions within the DPJ in the media. Nothing like the prospect of success to quiet discontent in the ranks.

The liberals step into the breach

Watanabe Yoshimi is not relenting in threatening rebellion against the Aso government.

Speaking at a fundraising party on Monday evening, Mr. Watanabe speculated openly about scenarios for political realignment. Edano Yukio, a DPJ reformist, was in attendance and stated that if Mr. Watanbe decides to leave the LDP for the DPJ, he should be welcomed with open arms.

Mr. Watanabe's three scenarios for realignment include (1) a franchise model, the creation of a new party bearing the LDP label (the Tokyo LDP, for example); (2) the amicable divorce model, freeing Mr. Watanabe to bargain with all possible partners; and (3) the "without means" model, jumping from the LDP without any guarantee of a successful landing.

It is unclear which scenario will come to pass, if any. Mr. Watanabe may be able to rely on the support of other young reformers, but it's by no means a sure thing. The Koizumi children and their fifty-something older brothers and sisters have shown themselves to be remarkably timid. The lot of them have been waiting virtually since Koizumi Junichiro's term as prime minister ended for someone to challenge the drift within the LDP. But even now, with Mr. Watanabe talking openly about challenging the government and leaving if the LDP they cannot make up their minds. Yamamoto Ichita has, for example, argued at his blog that Mr. Watanabe speaks only for himself — he does not speak for the reformists en masse. It may be that even Mr. Watanbe does not know what he wants to do. Sankei suggests that he may be driven as much by resentment at having been bounced from the second Fukuda cabinet at then-LDP secretary general Aso's urging as by policy disagreements with Mr. Aso. As such, it remains an open question whether he has the courage to act. He may yet tell himself that he has too much to lose from breaking with the LDP (although if he keeps talking he may lose more reputationally from speaking openly about challenging the government only to back down).

In the meantime, an older generation is also speaking of realignment, namely those old allies of Mr. Koizumi, Kato Koichi and Yamasaki Taku. The self-styled liberals have little to lose from publicly challenging the Aso government and threatening to leave the party. Both are their own men, insofar as LDP members are capable of being independent. Mr. Kato, having left politics for several years after being accused of corruption, is not affiliated with any faction and is something of an outsider within the LDP. Mr. Yamasaki is a faction chief, but as a liberal (and an advocate of normalization with North Korea), he is increasingly out of place within the LDP. Little surprise then that both men have been active in discussing a possible realignment. The latest is that Mr. Yamasaki appeared on TV Monday to argue for a new party drawing members from both the LDP and the DPJ that will be able to govern following the next general election.

I would argue that neither Mr. Kato nor Mr. Yamasaki is in a position to be the catalyst for a realignment. The problem with being independent is that there are few guarantees that anyone would follow them out of the LDP. Such is the paradox facing the LDP's malcontents today. A rebellion by Mr. Watanabe is meaningfuly precisely because as a promising future leader, a former cabinet minister, and an LDP princeling he has something to lose by rebelling against Mr. Aso and the party establishment. But for those same reasons he might ultimately decided not to rebel, especially if he is unable to rely on his fellow reformists for support.

The fall

The Aso cabinet is in free fall.

The Yomiuri Shimbun has released its December public opinion poll, which found that not only has the Aso cabinet's approval rating fallen by half since the beginning of November (from 40.5% to 20.9%), but the cabinet's disapproval rating rose by twenty-five points to 66.7% during the same span of time. The poll contains bad news for the LDP on every front. The DPJ has edged ahead of the LDP in baseline approval rating (28.2% to 27.2%) and opened a commanding lead in support in the next general election (40%, a ten-point increase, to 24%, an eight-point drop) — and, moreover, Ozawa Ichiro scored higher than Prime Minister Aso when respondents were asked who is the most appropriate choice as prime minister (Mr. Ozawa's support rose to 36%, a fourteen-point increase, while Mr. Aso's fell twenty-one points to 29%). This last figure is a critical indicator for the next general election, because voters have not only abandoned Mr. Aso, they also appear to be warming to Mr. Ozawa, depriving the LDP of the argument that no matter how unpopular the LDP is, the public still does not trust Mr. Ozawa.

(For the record, Asahi's monthly tracking poll recorded similar numbers. Twenty-two percent approval rating compared to a sixty-four percent disapproval rating and a dramatic fall and rise in support for Mr. Aso versus Mr. Ozawa for prime minister.)

The only heartening news — if one can call it that — is that more respondents preferred a political realignment over a DPJ-centered or LDP-centered government, or a grand coalition, the second-most preferred option.

Of course, a political realignment is not good news at all for the LDP, seeing as how for the moment the realignment could consume the LDP while leaving the DPJ comparatively unscathed. While Nakagawa Hidenao has spoken of uniting reformers from both parties, it appears for the moment that there is no better cure for the DPJ's internal disputes than the belief that the party is poised to seize power.

But the LDP's reform movement continues apace. Appearing on Fuji TV Sunday, Watanabe Yoshimi doubled down on his challenge to Mr. Aso, suggesting that he is steeling his resolve to overturn the cabinet and arguing that an election at the close of the extraordinary Diet session is essential if Japan's government is to be capable of formulating policy. As MTC argued recently, Mr. Watanabe may be poised to do what his father was unable to do — deliver the death blow to the LDP. It is yet unclear whether he will be able to muster the support to overturn the cabinet, perhaps by voting against the government when one of the bills requiring a second vote by the House of Representatives comes before the lower chamber. He may have some help from Kato Koichi, who could be prepared to make a second bid to overturn an unpopular LDP prime minister and has been in talks with the DPJ and the PNP about electoral cooperation and the formation of a new party. Nakagawa Hidenao, undoubtedly an indispensable player in any rebellion by LDP reformists against Mr. Aso, is reportedly skeptical about leaving the LDP before a general election, presumably because to do so would be to diminish his bloc's bargaining power. At this point the plan seems to be close ranks, prepare to contest a general election under the LDP's banner but in opposition to the standard-bearer, and then see the post-election balance of power. If neither the DPJ nor the LDP achieves a majority, the LDP reformists may make all the difference in determining who controls the government. (Koike Yuriko, one of his lieutenants and another player in the fight between reformists and the LDP establishment, is reportedly "tired" of forming new parties, given that she spent the 1990s jumping from new party to new party. Her attitude may simply be a means of reinforcing Mr. Nakagawa's efforts to proceed deliberately.)

Mr. Aso's allies appear to be closing ranks, with both Abe Shinzo — representing the conservative bloc — and Machimura Nobutaka — representing the party elders — criticizing Mr. Watanabe and the other reformist opponents of the Aso government. Yamamoto Ichita, a natural leader of the reformists, has also been hesitant to echo Mr. Watanabe's full-throated opposition to Mr. Aso. In a post at his blog, he relates what he sees as the honne of the young reformers. Mr. Yamamoto dismisses the idea of replacing Mr. Aso before an election, arguing that the public would be gravely insulted, even if an election were held immediately after the formation of the new cabinet. Furthermore, he suggests that it is unreasonable to think that the LDP will be able to fix its problem simply by finding a new, more dynamic leader (he dismisses this as the Kimu Taku option, referring to Kimura Takuya's teledrama Change). This sounds like another version of Mr. Nakagawa's argument. Hold steady and prepare for the next election, but be ready to act following the election.

In considering the rapid decay of the Aso government, it bears mentioning that the reformist rebellion is not primarily an opportunistic response to the government's falling popularity. As I have argued previously, the rift between the LDP's reformists and the rest of the party has been building for years. Mr. Aso may have forced the rift open by making it clear upon taking office that his government would move away from Koizumi-ism and consolidate the LDP's counter-reformation, making it clear to reformers that the party no longer had a place for them, but he did not create the conflict between the LDP's ideological tendencies. The poll numbers may have provided the reformists with an opportunity to launch their attack, thanks to the combination of public sympathy for their efforts to trigger a realignment and a government powerless to stop their machinations, but this conflict has been a long time coming.

With even the LDP executive beginning to contemplate holding an election in January instead of convening the regular session of the Diet immediately following the New Year holiday to pass a second supplementary budget, the conflict may reach its climax sooner rather than later.

It appears increasingly likely that Mr. Aso will go down in history as having presided over the destruction of the party whose creation his grandfather so vociferously opposed. There is a certain rhythm to history, isn't there?

The DPJ will use administrative reform as a wedge issue

With the government's having finally dispensed with the gasoline tax and road construction issues — for now — attention is now turning to other portions of the Fukuda agenda, such as it exists.

Item number one is the government's — or perhaps more accurately, Administrative Reform Minister Watanabe Yoshimi's — administrative reform plan (previously discussed here). When I last addressed the administrative reform bill at the beginning of May, the bill had yet to come under discussion in the Diet, with bureaucrats and LDP sympathizers unhappy with the bill.

Now, as of 9 May, the bill is under discussion in the House of Representatives. (The initial proceedings can be read at the National Diet Library site here.) The Fukuda government has decided to prioritize the bill. Prime Minister Fukuda, after a meeting Thursday with the Diet strategy chairmen of the LDP and Komeito, declared that he wants to "exert as much effort as possible" to see the bill passed during the remaining weeks of the current Diet session. It is not clear what "exert as much effort as possible" entails. Does he mean that the government will extend the Diet session to leave the government time to overrule the HC again in the event of DPJ opposition? I ruled out the possibility before, and it seems clear that the Fukuda government will not keep the Diet in session past mid-June. Unlike his predecessor, Mr. Fukuda seems to recognize that freeing up Diet members to campaign in their districts is more important than keeping them in Tokyo to pass token (and watered down) pieces of legislation.

There may actually be some hope for the passage of the government's administrative reform bill, as the DPJ is considering cooperating with the government to pass a revised version of the bill. According to Mainichi, the main points that the DPJ wants to strengthen are provisions related to transparency in politician-bureaucrat contacts and centralized management of the civil service. On the former point in particular, the DPJ wants every case of contact between politicians and bureaucrats reported to the appropriate cabinet minister.

The government, especially Mr. Watanabe, is receptive to the DPJ's position. Nakagawa Hidenao, not in the government but certainly close to Mr. Fukuda, has also spoken favorably about LDP-DPJ cooperation on the administrative reform bill. In a post authored earlier this week titled "More than LDP v. DPJ, the important axis of confrontation is Kasumigaseki leadership v. political leadership," Mr. Nakagawa argued that the government is fully committed to the plan, that it hasn't been watered down from the initial conception of an advisory group to the prime minister, and that the LDP and DPJ must work together to contain the power of the bureaucracy, Mr. Fukuda's "quiet reform."

I still have my doubts about the strength of this bill, not least because as a basic law, it leaves too much detail about implementation unstated. And the DPJ is right to suggest that it doesn't go far enough in curtailing contacts between politicians and bureaucrats. But there is some merit to the bill, not least because it will cause turmoil within the LDP.

The problem is that some (LDP) politicians cannot conceive of a system in which they don't go to the bureaucrats whenever they need information. (Ed. — Or a favor...?)

Okashita Nobuko, an LDP member from Osaka, questioned Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Watanabe about the plan, stating her fear that "if Diet members cannot get essential information from bureaucrats, our activities as Diet members will be obstructed."

Ms. Okashita seems to miss the point of administrative reform (or she gets it too well): it is not aimed solely at bureaucrats, but also at backbenchers who have abused the current system of lax regulation of contact between politicians and bureaucrats to distort policy. (See the case of the late Matsuoka Toshikatsu for a more blatant example.) Presumably restrictions on contact between politicians and bureaucrats will change how the LDP makes policy. The current system, under which the bureaucracy supplies LDP members with information at every stage of the policymaking process thanks to the shadow bureaucracy that is the LDP's policy research system, presumably violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the current administrative reform bill. PARC therefore would have to become more like the British Conservative Party's Research Department, and the party executive — and the prime minister's office — would play an even greater role in establishing policy priorities.

Naturally there are more than a few LDP backbenchers who might be unhappy about this. The DPJ, lacking the dense contacts with the bureaucracy to begin with, has little reason to oppose greater restrictions.

By offering to cooperate, the DPJ is finally using administrative reform as a wedge issue, as the closer the bill gets to passage, the greater the pressure LDP backbenchers will put on the government to back away from the reform (or to make sotto voce promises to water it down in the implementation stage). Administrative reform has the potential to worsen the already strained relations between the Fukuda government and LDP members dependent on pork-barrel politics. In the process, the DPJ can claim that it is acting responsibly on an issue that concerns the public.

The government's administrative reform bill is dying on the vine

Nearly a month has passed since the government submitted its administrative reform bill to the Diet, and Mainichi reports that the bill's prospects are no better now than they were when the bill was submitted. Indeed, they are considerably worse.

With six weeks until the end of the Diet session — unless Mr. Fukuda does like Mr. Abe and gives himself an extension — the bill still has not come up for discussion in the HR. It was scheduled to be debated on 22 April, but was delayed because "there are many other bills that should be prioritized." The bill is now scheduled to be discussed on 8 May, after Golden Week. There is no enthusiasm within the bureaucracy and little within the LDP for administrative reform, and the government, aside from Watanabe Yoshimi, minister for administrative reform, is unprepared to exert significant effort to see the bill passed.

This sounds like the perfect combination to ensure that the administrative reform plan dies an unlamented death next month.

At the same time that the LDP is distancing itself from what was an important part of the Koizumi formula, the DPJ has announced its own "Kasumigaseki reform plan." Rather than imposing restrictions on interaction between politicians and bureaucrats, the DPJ's plan will ensure that bureaucrats see a lot more of politicians — in their own ministries. There is already little love lost between the DPJ and the bureaucracy, and the DPJ's new plan will do nothing to endear it to Kasumigaseki.

The party's administrative reform investigatory committee, chaired by Matsumoto Takeaki (49), an HR member representing the Kinki PR bloc, has announced that when the DPJ takes power, it will greatly expand the number of political appointees in the government. There are currently around seventy appointees to ministerial, vice-ministerial, secretarial, and advisory posts in cabinet ministries and the cabinet secretariat. The DPJ wants to expand that number to around 130, tapping Diet members (and experts from outside the Diet) to serve as advisers to cabinet ministers. And it doesn't just want to create new figurehead positions: the DPJ intends to give the political appointees control over bureaus and policy formulation. The plan also calls for the creation of a centralized bureau of cabinet personnel in the cabinet secretariat, and forbids ministries and agencies from finding new employment for retiring bureaucrats.

The further down into the ministries that the reach of the politicians extends, the more power the government will have to impose its will on the bureaucrats. But the politicians need operational control. Does the DPJ have enough policy experts in its ranks to dispatch them into ministries to battle day-to-day with bureaucrats? A massive influx of advisers long on titles and short on power will not change the situation. So I'm skeptical about whether the DPJ will be able to implement this broad-ranging plan. This shows, however, that a DPJ government would be free to consider radical reforms that the LDP cannot, thanks to its cozy relationship with the bureaucracy.

Administrative reform is not just something that concerns insiders in Tokyo. The people are paying attention. Note that in the Mainichi poll conducted before the Yamaguchi-2 by-election, administrative reform ranked third in order of priority, after health and welfare, and pensions. The public knows who is responsible for misgoverning Japan, and the DPJ is wise to discuss how a DPJ government will deal with the bureaucracy.