Ambassador Schieffer's farewell

J. Thomas Schieffer, US ambassador to Japan since 2005, left Japan Thursday.

To mark his departure, Ambassador Schieffer gave a farewell address at the National Press Club in Tokyo Wednesday, followed by a long press conference that ranged over a host of topics, not all of them having to do with Japan and US-Japan relations.

The central message of the address — and the Schieffer ambassadorship — is that Japan should do more internationally.

"Now, more than ever," he said, "Japan needs to focus on what it can do in the world. In a few days Barack Obama will be sworn in as the 44th President of the United States. He electrified America and the world with a simple slogan – 'Yes, we can!' Japan's first response to this new administration must not be, 'No, we can't.'"

Press coverage focused on Ambassador Schieffer's latest appeal for Japan to reinterpret the use of the right of collective self-defense, although in the ambassador's defense, his call for collective self-defense was but one portion of his call for a more active Japan, and he demurred from calling for constitution revision: "There is much more that needs to be done by the international community in trouble spots like Afghanistan and the horn of Africa. And Japan can do it...Some people will argue that Japan is prohibited from doing those sorts of things by its constitution but I would argue that Japan can fulfill the promise of its constitution by doing those things."

Nevertheless, as the Bush administration passes the baton to the Obama administration next week, it is worth asking whether the Bush administration should also pass on this method of conducting US-Japan relations by urging Japan to do more internationally.

Does calling publicly on the Japanese government to do more actually make any difference? Gaiatsu emanating from the embassy might give encouragement to certain Japanese politicians and bureaucrats, as gaiatsu always has, but in January 2009 Japan is probably further from revising the constitution or changing the collective self-defense interpretation than it was in April 2005, when Mr. Schieffer arrived in Tokyo. Japan is in the grips of a painful recession growing worse by the months, and the goal of a balanced budget is receding into the distance. Meanwhile, the Japanese establishment has been burned by the Bush administration over North Korea, despite Mr. Schieffer's best efforts to make the abductions issue a priority for the US. (He devotes a good portion of the introduction of his address to the plight of the abductees.) Japanese troops have returned from Iraq, proposals to play a greater role in Afghanistan have been scuttled, and the government is proceeding gingerly regarding the dispatch of JSDF vessels to fight pirates by the Horn of Africa. Despite Mr. Schieffer's best efforts, Japan is no closer to becoming the partner desired by many in Washington.

The problem is not political gridlock in Tokyo, which has become a convenient scapegoat for a number of deferred goals. Rather the problem may be that while Ambassador Schieffer talks of contributions to the international community, what many Japanese see are contributions to the US-Japan alliance, with Japan's serving as a spear carrier in US campaigns but receiving little in return for its contributions other than expressions of gratitude from US officials. Mr. Schieffer claims to desire an "alliance of equals," but in practice his ambassadorship and the administration under which he served did little to make an equal partnership a reality. An equal partnership appears to be the prize awaiting Japan after it has made the changes desired by Washington.

But to paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, you go to war with the ally you have, not the ally you want.

All too often under the outgoing administration pushing for a new (or "beautiful") Japan substituted for working with the Japan that exists, accepting its limitations and acting accordingly. While the Bush administration pushed for a new security relationship, little changed in the economic relationship, with, it seems to me, the greatest economic accomplishment being the avoidance of the "destructive aspects of trade disputes that plagued our relationship in the ‘80s and ‘90s." Moreover, the ambassador had little to say about China or the region more generally. This last point is revealing: while naturally as ambassador to Japan Mr. Schieffer's remarks were concerned with developments in the US-Japan relationship, it is unfortunate that so few of those developments concerned the alliance's role in the broader region.

This is the picture of an underperforming relationship. It is not underperforming solely or largely because of Japan's reluctance to bear a greater burden. It is underperforming because neither Washington nor Tokyo has put too much effort into building a relationship that acknowledges Japan's limitations and sought to find a bilateral approach to constructive engagement with China. The US government needs to stop pushing so hard for Japan to become a "normal" nation and let Japan find its own way. By pushing Japan, the Bush administration has created the unmistakable impression that contributing more to the international community means in practice contributing more to the US-Japan alliance. The Obama administration must work to undo this impression — and by doing so, it may find that Japan may be willing to contribute to alliance cooperation. A less "close" alliance could be a more productive alliance.

To that end, I strongly reject a recommendation included in AEI's new report, "An American Strategy for Asia," that the next administration should "press Japan, albeit quietly and with the requisite delicacy, to move forward in addressing the legal restrictions that still encumber and inhibit its security policy." If the US government is serious about Japan's contributing more to the international community, it should stop telling Japan's leaders how to do it.

Barring a miracle for the LDP, the US may be dealing with a DPJ-led government by year's end. Seeing as how a DPJ victory will likely depend in part on its skepticism towards the alliance as it has been managed under the LDP-Komeito coalition, the Obama administration should start thinking now how it will manage the relationship with a DPJ government. The Bush era methods of pushing for Japan to do more — quietly or loudly — will not do. Washington will have to be serious about treating Japan as an equal, which means leaving it to Tokyo to figure out how it will contribute to the international community and what role it wants the alliance to play internationally. Under a Prime Minister Ozawa, Japan might be surprisingly willing to play a greater international role, but it will not do so if it appears that Washington is issuing Japan's marching orders.

For the defense of Japan

After eight months of deliberations, the prime minister's defense ministry reform council, hastily convened after a series of scandals rocked the defense ministry in 2007, has released its final report on reforming the ministry.

The report is available for download here.


In the report, the council sought to address two issues. First, it investigated various institutional failures in the defense ministry and the Self-Defense Forces and recommended fixes. Second, it studied the organization of the ministry and the SDF and offered recommendations for enhancing the ability of both to defend Japan.

The former is ostensibly the reason for this council's existence, as demonstrated by the list of cases it investigated: the scandal surrounding MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, in which the JSDF and the defense ministry paid less than close attention to how the US was using fuel provided by Japan; information leaks by JSDF members, especially the Aegis leak; the Atago incident, in which a Japanese warship collided with a fishing vessel; and the biggest scandal of all, corrupt dealings by Moriya Takemasa, the disgraced former vice defense minister.

To address these failings, the council offered three broad principles for reform: (1) total adherence to rules; (2) the establishment of professionalism; and (3) changing the bureaucratic culture to emphasize the execution of duties.

Under the first heading, the report admonishes senior officials to set an example for their subordinates by following the rules. It then proposes increasing workplace education so that staff will spontaneously follow the rules. It also proposes strengthening laws governing the protection of classified information. In regard to procurement, it proposes introducing greater transparency and competition into the procurement process and more direct contracts with foreign arms makers (presumably side-stepping the trading companies that currently serve as middle men for the defense ministry).

Interestingly, buried in this section is a discussion of the ministry's inspector general (IG) office, which was created with little fanfare in September 2007. As of yet, however, the IG's purpose in the ministry appears unclear.

Having spent a summer in the inspector general's office of the US Department of Defense, I have an appreciation of the role played by inspectors general in inspecting, uncovering, and punishing cases of "fraud, waste, and abuse." The DoD IG serves under the secretary of defense but plays an independent role in policing the department and often works with members of Congress interested and concerned about how the defense establishment uses (or misuses) taxpayer dollars. The US government's IGs, including cabinet department IGs and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), play an important role in creating transparent government in the US, making it easier for the public and elected representatives to hold the government accountable for its misdeeds.

The report calls for the strengthening of the newly created IG office by giving it the power to conduct surprise inspections. That's a start, but it's not nearly enough. The IG needs to be independent and needs to be free to communicate with legislators. Whistleblowers need to be protected so that they can report to the IG without fear of reprisal. Strengthening the IG should be at the center of this reform package. A strong, competent IG would do more to stop corruption in the ministry than centuries worth of workplace education about obeying the ministry's regulations, because an IG is founded on the idea that wrongdoing will occur and standing agencies should be in place to ferret out and punish perpetrators quickly.

It's fine to call for more professionalization in the defense establishment. Considering the sordid tales of JSDF members compromising classified information by using work computers to trade pornography, it is clear that Japan's defense establishment is woefully lacking in professionalism. But moral injunctions and more education will not fix the ministry's problems.

Nor, for that matter, will Defense Minister Ishiba Shigeru's pet proposal of mixing JSDF members and civilian bureaucrats in the ministry's bureaus, which constitutes the second section of recommendations.

The second section addresses national strategymaking in addition to deficiencies in the defense ministry. The report's central proposal is that the role of the Kantei in strategymaking must be strengthened in order to better cope with the changing regional and global environment. The council made a number of recommendations to this end: drafting a national strategy, instituting regular meetings among the foreign minister, the defense minister, and the chief cabinet secretary to discuss national security, reviewing the defense procurement process, enhancing the system of prime ministerial advisers, and strengthening the chief cabinet secretary's foreign and defense policy staff. This section also includes proposals for strengthening the defense ministry's defense council, such as the inclusion of the chiefs of the joint staff office and the three services in the council's deliberations. It calls for the expansion of the ministry's policy bureau and enabling JSDF officers to serve in civilian bureaus in positions below vice-director. In expanding the policy bureau, it calls for enhancing intelligence and analysis skills.

It is unclear if and when these proposals will be implemented, but one thing is certain: this report punted on the issue that prompted the reform council in the first place, ministerial corruption, of which Mr. Moriya is but the most prominent example. While the report mentions the need to review the defense procurement process, the trading companies that are a major source for waste and corruption are not mentioned whatsoever. The details of procurement reform are left for another time, suggesting that they won't be addressed at all. It is encouraging that the government recognizes that it simply wasn't enough to call the former defense agency a ministry, that making it a proper ministry means instituting major changes in the ministry's mindset and ministerial culture. But more is needed, starting with, as the report suggests, a strategic review (perhaps something akin to France's recent white paper on defense). What are Japan's primary national security goals, and what capabilities does the defense establishment need to meet them? A discussion must proceed from these fundamental questions, starting from scratch and looking at the region and the world in specific terms, instead of relying on vague terms like "uncertainty."

Given that the defense budget will continue to fall, it is imperative that both the Japanese government think seriously about how it spends its increasingly limited defense appropriations. Funds are too limited and the defense of Japan too important to tolerate plans that line the pockets of the trading companies while doing little to enhance mational security.

In this regard, I must issue a mea culpa to US Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, who I criticized in this post for telling Japan it should spend more on defense. Thanks to a link from Shisaku, I was able to read the whole speech, which is less about how much Japan spends than the process by which Japan decides what to spend. The ambassador called for Japan to be smarter about procurement, to cooperate more with the US on developing weapons systems. In short, he calls for a bilateral version of the process I called for above: "...We must regularly engage in strategic dialogue to define our mutual goals. From there we must analyze our respective strengths and maximize productivity and savings. No one benefits when we take separate paths to reach the same point. Creativity and innovation are the byproducts of collaboration and teamwork." Press reports that focused on the sum of expenditures missed the point of the speech. I wholeheartedly support the ambassador's call for better defense procurement processes in both countries.

From this reform council's report, however, it seems that Ambassador Schieffer's call fell on deaf ears. The Japanese government has a long way to go before it can be said that the government is making procurement decisions on the basis of national defense instead of the enrichment of private interests.

Schieffer bemoans Japan's (lack of) defense spending

On Tuesday, J. Thomas Schieffer, US ambassador to Japan, spoke at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, where he called on Japan to spend more on defense.

Judging from the coverage in the foreign and domestic press, it appears that the ambassador spoke bluntly, declaring, "I think the Japanese are getting a bargain in the (US-Japan) alliance on what we bring on the table." The Japanese press seems to have emphasized his remarks on the Asian arms race; both Yomiuri and Sankei note little on the remarks other than that the ambassador called attention to rising defense expenditures in China, Russia, and South Korea at the same time that Japan's have continued to drop. (AP and Bloomberg also focus mostly on the regional dimensions of his remarks.)

The problem is not the message but the messenger. The US government has been urging Japan to spend more on its defense for decades (a half-century of remorse for giving Japan Article 9). What will these remarks achieve that decades of prodding haven't? Does the US have a solution to Japan's fiscal crisis that will give Japan the budget room to spend more on defense? What good is accomplished by telling the Japanese government to spend more on defense at the same time that it's trying to pay down the national debt and overhaul the welfare state?

How about some creative solutions for getting more out of what Japan is already spending on defense? Laudably, Ambassador Schieffer called attention to Japan's woefully corrupt defense procurement process. But what he didn't do is look at the US role in encouraging Japan to free or cheap ride on US defense expenditures. It is hard for the US government to complain about Japanese cheap-riding with some 40,000 US military personnel stationed in Japan. Japan has had no incentive to change its behavior thanks to the US security guarantee. As such, I would be more impressed if the ambassador spoke on what the US can do to change the incentives. For example, the US government could offer to renegotiate the 2006 realignment agreement and free Japan from paying for the relocation, which would both free up money for the Japanese government and hasten the realignment process (which should in turn force the Japanese government to reassess its defense policy in light of the III MEF moving 1500 miles eastward).

Ambassador Schieffer's remarks are probably harmless — it's easy enough for Tokyo to ignore them. But is this any way to run the alliance? Given that the budgetary (and legal) constraints on Japanese foreign and defense policy are unlikely to change in the short and medium terms, it would be better for the US and Japan to discuss how to make the most of existing capabilities and determine why exactly the alliance exists in the twenty-first century, a discussion that's been delayed (at least at senior levels) for too long.

Dubious prospects for the MSDF mission

With the MSDF's refueling ships set to leave the Indian Ocean later this week, the fight in the Diet and in the court of public opinion over a new law authorizing the MSDF mission continues to run against the government, in that public support for the new law, insofar as it exists, is tepid at best and unlikely to be strongly in favor of the government's using its Lower House supermajority to override the Upper House.

I think Michael Penn of the Shingetsu Institute gets it exactly right in his latest newsletter: "[The LDP's leaders] are nowhere near where they need to be politically in order to strong-arm passage of the bill in the near term, and I have little doubt that the main reason they haven't given up already is because they don't want to offend the US embassy and Washington just before the scheduled November 16th meeting of Prime Minister Fukuda and President Bush."

Ambassador Schieffer's repeated remarks about Japan's pulling out of the war on terror (an argument taken up, not surprisingly, by Gordan Chang at Contentions) may ultimately have an impact opposite of that hoped for by the ambassador. He may have conveniently provided Mr. Fukuda with cover for ending the mission, especially if the prime minister's meeting with President Bush in November is frosty, as it could very well be. Now that the ambassador has shifted from criticizing the DPJ to criticizing Japan as a whole, the government could make like the Indian communists and criticize the US for interfering with Japanese democracy, necessitating the withdrawal of the law from public consideration. Given that the feud over the abductions issue has now gone public, it is quite plausible that Mr. Fukuda would enjoy the support of the LDP's conservatives for a move like this, and it would conveniently allow the government to end the refueling mission on its own terms while undermining efforts by the DPJ to spin withdrawal as a victory for its side.

Should the LDP decide to persist, however, it still faces an uphill battle, as LDP secretary-general Ibuki Bunmei admitted on Sunday, suggesting that although the government wants to deal with the issue within the bounds of the session, it may be unable to avoid extending the special session so to send the bill to the Upper House, daring the DPJ to reject it. I'm sure the DPJ will have no problem doing just that, and it may also pass a censure motion against Defense Minister Ishiba, as both Hatoyama Yukio, DPJ secretary-general, and Yamaoka Kenji, the DPJ's Kokutai chairman, have suggested. Beyond its impact on the debate over the refueling mission, a successful censure motion against Mr. Ishiba raises an interesting question for the rules of the game in the divided Diet. Should Mr. Ishiba resign, despite a censure motion being non-binding? Is it right that the DPJ can use its control of the Upper House to force members of the cabinet to resign at will?

Meanwhile, I'm amazed at how little energy the government appears to have put into fighting for its new law; it's no surprise that public support is lukewarm. But maybe I shouldn't be surprised. Maybe the government is just looking for a way to make the whole issue disappear and find a scapegoat to blame for Japan's "pulling out of the war on terror." (Words that will undoubtedly haunt the alliance for years to come.) In which case, with the US bullying Japan on this issue, the Fukuda government now has its scapegoat — the challenge now for Mr. Fukuda could be how to spin a legislative defeat into a moral victory and prolong his government so that he can turn his attention to matters domestic.

The foreseeable crisis erupts

Ambassador Schieffer has, according to the Washington Post, sent a cable directly to the president (an unusual step) warning Mr. Bush of serious consequences to the US-Japan alliance should the US remove North Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism list without progress being made on the abductions issue. The ambassador also complained about being cut out of the six-party talks.

I hate to say I told you so, but I've been arguing for months that Chris Hill's Berlin agreement presented a serious problem for the US-Japan relationship, because while the US was determined to continue negotiations in good faith, Japan — first under Mr. Abe, now, apparently, under Mr. Fukuda — was unwilling to talk about anything but the unresolved abductions issue and essentially opted out of the negotiations. (Try this post from February, this post from March, this post from May, this post from July, this post from September, and this post from earlier this month.) This gap has grown as the negotiations with Pyongyang have matured, and now that there is a real chance of the US making a real concession to North Korea as a reward for progress on denuclearization, alliance managers in both countries are panicking.

Both governments must bear the blame, having missed opportunity after opportunity to discuss this gap and find a way to realign the US and Japanese positions.

Consider that since the February agreement, Vice President Cheney visited Tokyo, Prime Minister Abe visited Washington for a summit with President Bush, the US and Japan held a 2 + 2 ministerial on security, and Messrs. Bush and Abe met on the sidelines of the G8 summit in Germany and the APEC summit in Sydney. At the ministerial and sub-ministerial levels, Japanese officials have made frequent visits to the US, and US officials have been in Japan.

At each of these occasions, the allies could have had a frank and open discussion about the differences between the US and Japanese bargaining positions. (In Cheney's defense, he tried in February.) If Japan was unprepared to broach the issue itself, then the US government should have forced the issue months ago, and the man to do that should have been Ambassador Schieffer. It's too late in the game for the ambassador to complain about the consequences of the US bargaining position in the six-party talks. He should have seen this coming and worked with Japanese officials to try to close the gap or at least explain — loudly, clearly, and unambiguously — to Japan why the US is prepared to move forward. Part of the problem seems to be that Chris Hill is essentially on his own, meaning that the US bargaining position is more of a Rice-Hill bargaining position.

At the same time, I have no sympathy for the Government of Japan. It had months to anticipate this development, but chose to do nothing. Of course, the problem is that with Mr. Abe and the conservatives in charge, the GOJ lacked the flexibility to alter its position in tune with the US. What MOFA bureaucrat would stand up to Mr. Abe, when doing so ran the risk of being treated as a "traitor" by the conservatives, much like Tanaka Hitoshi, former deputy minister for foreign affairs. Perhaps Japan's conservatives wanted a crisis to happen, as an excuse for Japan to pursue a more independent course. For them, perhaps it's a win-win situation. If the US chooses an agreement over the alliance, they have an excuse to clamor for a more assertive, independent foreign policy; if the US chooses the alliance over an agreement, so much the better.

In other words, both governments have been in disarray. With intra-governmental coordination lacking, it is unsurprising that inter-governmental coordination has been stunted.

This problem is indicative of a serious flaw in the alliance. It seems that Japan has the idea that if it supports the US unconditionally in places like Afghanistan and Iraq (which it did from 2001 onwards), it deserves the unconditional support of the US in the showdown with North Korea. As I suggested in this post, Japan views the alliance as mutual entrapment. The US clearly does not. And so over the past six years the purpose of the US-Japan alliance has become muddled, and now each ally has different expectations for the alliance; given this, it is no surprise that in the face of a shared concern they not only cannot agree on a common position, but they have even been unable to admit that serious differences exist.

Now that negotiations with North Korea might finally be ready to bear fruit, both governments are panicking about damage to the alliance. Inexcusable, really.

Will bullying have consequences?

Ambassador Schieffer has criticized, yet again, the DPJ's opposition to the extension of the MSDF refueling mission, this time in a speech at Japan's National Press Club.

"...I think if Japan stops doing this on a permanent basis," he said, "I think it would be sending a very bad message to the international community and to terrorists, because I think it would be saying that Japan is opting out of the war on terror for whatever reason." [The above link is to full text of the speech from the US Embassy in Japan.]

Once again, Ambassador Schieffer is given an opportunity to moderate his position and appear slightly less overweening, and once again, he chose to emphasize Japan's international responsibilities (and its purported alliance responsibilities) over Japanese democracy.

Is the ambassador, whether under orders from the White House or not, deliberately trying to make life harder for the Fukuda government as it tries to maneuver the new bill on the refueling mission to passage? Does Ambassador Schieffer think that reminding the Japanese government over and over again of the "very bad message" it will send if it brings its ships home ("If the MSDF stops giving gas to warships, the terrorists win!") will somehow ensure the smooth passage of the new law?

I suspect that with each statement the ambassador makes reiterating the (well known) US position on the anti-terror law, the resolve of LDP members weakens ever so slightly (and the determination of DPJ members firms up). After all, it's not like the LDP — especially its conservative ideologues — are pleased to be reminded of their dependence on the US, and so I wonder whether at some point too much goading from the US could prompt the LDP to stop fighting for the bill by arguing against the use of the supermajority to guarantee its passage. There must be someone within the LDP arguing that Japan should withdraw the MSDF as payback for the Bush administration's about-face on North Korea.

Ambassador Schieffer again

Just in case the LDP was unclear on US desires, Ambassador Schieffer said in a meeting with Foreign Minister Komura, "We desire the continuation of the MSDF's activities."

The discussion appears to have been part of routine meeting on the foreign policy agenda in advance of Prime Minister Fukuda's visit to Washington next month, and so some might say that of course he would repeat Washington's fervent desire that the MSDF continue refueling coalition warships in the Indian Ocean.

But he should have said something along the lines of, "The US government has made its wishes known, but we recognize that this is a decision that the Japanese government and people must make for themselves. We will respect whatever decision results from Japan's democratic process."

The intrusion of the US government through Ambassador Schieffer's comments (and sniping with the DPJ) is one of the more regrettable aspects of this debate, and probably played an important role in raising the stakes for all involved. And so the US may indeed get its wish of continuing Japanese involvement in the coalition, but it will be in spite of the activities of the US government and its emissary in Tokyo.

Ambassador Schieffer, stand down please

J. Thomas Schieffer, US ambassador to Japan, is continuing with his campaign to convince the DPJ to change its opposition to the extension of the anti-terror special measures law, giving interviews to major dailies on the spat between the US and the DPJ. (Mainichi interview here; Asahi interview here.)

The message is more or less the same in both of the interviews I read, but a quote in the Mainichi interview especially caught my eye. Ambassador Schieffer said, "If Japan makes this kind of statement of backing away from the war on terror, it will send a 'terrible message' not only to the United States but to the international community."

Now, I happen to think this is true. Japan's commitment in Afghanistan is to the UN-sanctioned coalition working to rebuild Afghanistan (and indirectly to the people of Afghanistan), not to the US. Go back and read the US-Japan mutual security treaty. There is no provision that provides for allied cooperation outside of the Far East, a term that has never been properly defined and is generally understood to apply to potential scenarios in the region and not to a foreordained geographic area. In any event, cooperation between the US and Japan in Afghanistan and Iraq are not explicitly included in the alliance, although naturally the alliance has a lot to do with why Japan is in both places.

However, if the international community is so concerned about Japan's pulling its refueling detachment out of the Indian Ocean, wouldn't that message be far more convincing coming from someone other than the ambassador of the US to Japan? Why not Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, secretary-general of NATO, twenty-five of whose member nations outside of the US have contributed to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan? Why not Ban Ki-moon, UN secretary-general, whose organization has approved the multinational coalition's activities in Afghanistan with multiple resolutions? Why not the governments of other countries involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, or the government of Afghanistan itself? Does Ambassador Schieffer not realize that regardless of what he says, his persistent lobbying on the issue makes it into a US-Japan issue and decreases the chances that Ozawa and the DPJ will compromise, if only to avoid appearing as to have caved in to US pressure?

Thankfully the White House has announced that President Bush will not be stopping in Japan when he goes to Australia next month for the APEC summit, a visit that would have occurred around the anniversary of 9/11 and would undoubtedly have resulted in even more US pressure on the DPJ to change its position.

I want Japan to continue to participate in the multinational coalition supporting Afghanistan; I think it's the right thing to do, and I think Japan ought to be involved in a mission in which nearly every developed democracy is involved. But Japan's continuing involvement should not be the result of US browbeating or arm-twisting, because the alliance will not last much longer if it functions on the basis of the US government's leaning hard on Japan when it wants Tokyo to do something. The Japanese government — ideally with the support of the Japanese people — has to want to participate in international missions. To make Japan do otherwise — to put the government in the position of having to force enabling legislation through the Diet — is to sow the seeds of the alliance's destruction. (Of course, the Abe government, as Defense Minister Koike made clear last week, seems content with US gaiatsu on this issue, whatever the consequences for the alliance.)

So, Ambassador Schieffer, consider the consequences of your continuing to pressure the DPJ to change course — and cease and desist. It is in the interest of the US for Japan to play a more active global role as a great power among great powers, not as the submissive ally of the US doing Washington's bidding.