The futility of Japan's global popularity

The BBC has released its annual survey of global attitudes, revealing once again that Japan is one of the most positively rated countries among those surveyed.

Jun Okumura provides a good wrap-up of the report's findings on Japan here.

As in years past, the survey found that Japan is viewed favorably in just about every country surveyed except for China and South Korea.

While nationalism and historical issues may partly explain the negative findings, I suspect that the negativity in Japan's relationships with China and South Korea — negativity that goes both directions — correlates with the density of those relationships. Thanks to proximity, the bilateral agendas are crowded with thorny, intractable problems that are regularly exacerbated by the behavior of one or both governments. This dynamic also contributes to Russia's low rating in Japanese eyes (15% mostly positive, 34% mostly negative). (And Russia's favorable view of Japan shows that most Russians aren't particularly attuned to their country's Far East.)

Of course, it is not particularly surprising that the dense, messy relationships in Northeast Asia have given rise to negative feelings towards the others. (40% of South Korean respondents viewed China favorably, compared with 50% who viewed it negatively.) What I'm interested in is what this says about the prospects for Japan's ambitions to play a greater global role, whether in political, economic, or security terms.

Some might argue that Japan's high favorable ratings are a source of soft power, the basis for Japan's extending its influence abroad. But I would argue that it's likely that the more Japan reached abroad, the less favorable it would seem and the less soft power it would possess. Not coincidentally, the one region in which Japan is especially active — Northeast Asia — is home to negative feelings about Japan. Not surprisingly, Japan is viewed favorably in regions where it is known mostly for its money and its culture. Thanks to Japan's economic problems and China's economic rise, Japan's money isn't nearly the negative it was at the height of the bubble. (Indeed, as during the Meiji period, Japan is shielded from negative attention from abroad by China, a much more attractive target for empire then and foreign criticism now.)

Japan simply lacks the dense, complicated relations, relations that entangle publics, that have contributed to antagonism with South Korea and China. Japan remained popular even in countries like Australia (where its popularity increased) and Britain, where media coverage of Japan over the past year focused on whaling, and the US and Canada, where history issues were on the agenda over the past year in the form of comfort women relations. (Although Japan's popularity in Canada did fall thirteen percentage points.) It turns out that these issues are a concern for an exceedingly narrow segment of educated public opinion.

So chalk this up as a success for Japan's low-posture foreign policy, which has become even lower thanks to Japan's shrinking ODA budget. (LDP HR member Yamauchi Koichi frets about Japan's declining ODA here, at his blog.) Japan is well-liked because it is mostly invisible and entirely harmless to most of the countries surveyed. A more active Japan, a Japan that took sides in important international disputes, would likely be less popular.

What does all this international goodwill actually do for Japan? Does it make Japan any more likely to succeed in trade negotiations? Does it make Japanese permanent membership in the UN Security Council any more likely? Does global goodwill yield any soft power for Japan?

What would a liberal Japan actually look like?

Project Syndicate has posted an essay based on a speech by Joseph Nye in Tokyo last month, in which he foresees the rise of a "liberal" Japan.

Calling attention to Asahi's series of twenty-one editorials [series available at Japan Focus] outlining a vision for Japan, Nye argues on its behalf, observing that Asahi's vision provides a path for "Japan to become a world power as a provider and coordinator of global public goods from which all peoples can benefit and none can be excluded, such as freedom of the seas or a stable international monetary system. This would be a way for Japan to escape its reputation for insularity, avoid the mistakes of its military history, improve its relations with Asian neighbors who still remember the 1930’s, and increase Japan’s 'soft' or attractive power."

Nye foresees Japan carrying a greater burden in a variety of ways, but few that would require the use of force.

This is all well and good, but it is not entirely clear how to get there, because in the quotation above there is a chicken-and-the-egg problem: will a more international role lead to Japan escape its reputation for insularity, or can Japan only embrace a more international role after it lowers its psychological walls and becomes far more willing to interact with the world?

Then, of course, there is the larger question of whether this is the role the Japanese people want their country to play in the world. Arguably, Abe Shinzo and other nationalists of a more Gaullist streak are not alone in desiring a foreign policy rooted in the defense of Japan's pride and the assertion of Japanese interests, particularly in relations with North Korea and China. And while the Japanese people are hardly clamoring for Japan to become more belligerent, content to see the JSDF play little more than a supporting role in multilateral missions abroad, they also support the government's misplaced emphasis on the abductions issue (as opposed to focusing on a mix of issues, with abductions but one among several).

So how can Japan actually become the liberal power outlined by Nye?

Well, first, as eloquently argued in this post by MTC, it requires vision on the part of the Japanese government as to what role it can actually play as a leader in the region and the world. Arguably, a broader vision of Japan's role is inconsistent with the kind of "standing up for Japan's pride at all costs" thinking that has motivated Japan's response to the comfort women resolution in the US Congress, the whaling issue, and historical feuds with South Korea and China. It's time to grow up. The of a serious great power capable of taking the lead on an issue — the environment, African development, etc. — is the ability to not let petty issues undermine national focus. Is Tokyo serious about protecting the environment? Marshal its resources, line up allies, force others to make commitments, and avoid stupid, avoidable mistakes and comments that give other countries can excuse not to follow your lead.

The other change is what Japan looks like at home. What happens at home matters incredibly abroad. Just ask Washington, which has found it hard to make allies follow its lead on a host of issues due to perceived human rights failures at home. Japan, of course, is free to do what it wants at home: approve textbooks with questionable interpretations of the war, emphasize patriotism in education over other skills that might serve Japanese children better, railroad those accused of crimes straight to prison, and prevent women from rising to positions of prominence. But it cannot do so and then turn to the world and proclaim that Japan intends to be a liberal great power. For Japan to be a liberal great power means building an international position largely upon how other countries view Japanese society. If Japan is respected for its domestic governance, its counsel will be welcomed by others, and so its power will grow.

For all the rhetoric, does the Japanese government truly appreciate what it will take to become this kind of global power?

Adrift in a sea of information

In this earlier post, I talked about how incapable the LDP and the Abe Cabinet are at coping with a messy, complicated media environment.

I might as well have been discussing the US government's public diplomacy efforts.

This problem has vexed me for some time. Joseph Nye's soft power concept is a useful way of thinking about power in the contemporary international system, but the problem with it is that it's hard to pin down, and thus nearly impossible for governments to wield.

As such, I find that the US government's current public diplomacy initiatives are useless at best, counterproductive at worst. And thus I do not find this chart showing a decline in the number of trips abroad by Karen Hughes, under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs (hat tip: FP Passport) the least bit alarming. In fact, I think Hughes's position is irrelevant, and so her traveling abroad less can only help.

The days are gone when the US could beam radio news to a closed country and raise goodwill toward America among citizens who were told only the worst about the US. The global media environment is simply too sophisticated. How is the US supposed to get its message across when a civilian with a cell phone camera can take a video of American troops doing something wrong, hand it over to a media outlet, and create an uproar? How can the US really expect to get a fair hearing in a media environment in which every individual has tools with which to distribute his perspectives around the globe? [Ed. — Irony alert!! Irony alert!!]

As such, as an American taxpayer, and as a student of American foreign policy, I wish the US government would seriously reconsider how it goes about explaining US foreign policy to the world. It will probably have to wait for a new administration, which should have a nice honeymoon period following the departure of President Bush.

But the problem is not inconsiderable. The first step should be decentralizing US public diplomacy. The real heavy lifting should be done by ambassadors and their embassies — which means ensuring that the embassies are staffed by those with intimate familiarity with the countries in which they are based (and knowledge of the language spoken).

Any US public diplomacy strategy must also acknowledge that there is no way whatsoever to achieve universal acclaim for US policy. To be the sole superpower is to be feared and hated; public diplomacy (and Hollywood diplomacy) can soften that to some extent, but the US will never be able to make everyone happy while remaining a superpower. Given that those with grievances against the US have a host of ways through which to air them, that is truer now than ever.

If the government cannot handle that, then the US should just hang up its spurs now.

The california rolls are safe

After announcing plans to institute a certification system for Japanese restaurants overseas back in November, Japan's Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, headed by the beleaguered Matsuoka Toshikatsu (the subject of this superb book -- more on this soon), has decided to abandon these plans after opposition from citizens' groups and after a panel chaired by Ogura Kazuo of the Japan Foundation concluded that it is difficult to determine what exactly Japanese cuisine is.

So ends a bizarre attempt by Japan to flex its muscles in the cultural arena. Given that Japan remains a perennial favorite in this annual BBC survey, it's probably best not to give foreigners another reason to dislike Japan in light of the comfort women issue, which appears to be going from bad to worse, with the Abe Cabinet once again denying evidence of coercion, prompting US Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer to criticize the government's position.

As I've said before regarding soft power: difficult to measure, difficult to wield, and highly sensitive to the slightest change in perceptions. Between the ongoing disputes over whaling and the comfort women issue, I wouldn't be surprised if the BBC finds Japan to be slightly less popular next year.

Quality control for "Cool Japan"

The Washington Post has an interesting article about the corrosion of Japanese cuisine abroad. Of all the "products" that signify the export of "Cool Japan," Japanese cuisine might be the most significant, having grown to occupy a significant place in haute cuisine throughout the Western world.

The version of Japanese cuisine presented to Western diners, however, is an adulterated version of the real thing, as this article suggests. What surprises me is that Japanese officials haven't reacted sooner, given the important place food has in Japanese culture. One simply needs to turn on the television to see how the Japanese food. Countless shows have hosts visiting a region to try its specialties or tasting a unique dish in the studio. Restaurants and grocery stores are ubiquitous, and the food they provide is invariably fresher. And who can forget the omiyage, the gifts Japanese tourists bring back from trips (almost always some kind pastry or snack -- Kamakura is known for cookies shaped like pigeons, for some reason I've yet to discover).

As such, it surprises me that Japan has yet to try to exercise some control over how Japanese cuisine is marketed abroad. The vision of Japanese cuisine marketed abroad -- i.e., sushi as the staple of the Japanese diet -- hasn't harmed Japan's image, but it has presented a distorted picture of the national palate, in which sushi usually takes a back seat to donburi, noodles, and curry. The Japanese diet includes more meat, usually pork, than a visit to a Japanese restaurant in America would suggest.

That said, it's unclear how exactly Japan can exert control over how Japanese food is sold abroad. Will Japanese restaurants abroad buy into a kind of "seal of approval" system, especially considering that the most exclusive Japanese restaurants tend to deviate most from the Japanese way of food? And, moreover, as the article suggests, how can Japan criticize others for doing what Japan has long done to dishes imported from abroad:

But some here have expressed caution about the launch of the government approval system, arguing that Japan is a country also notorious for adapting foreign foods to local tastes. Indeed, that rare talent gave birth to Japanese seafood and mayonnaise pizza.

All this points to one of the major problems with soft power of the cultural kind: it's pretty much impossible to wield explicitly as a policy tool.