The center cannot hold

A new Nikkei-TV Tokyo poll conducted at the end of November found that Prime Minister Aso Taro's approval rating is in free fall.

According to the poll, Mr. Aso's approval rating fell seventeen points to 31%, while his disapproval rating rose nineteen points to 62%. Twice as many respondents oppose the government's plan for a new stimulus package as support it (56% to 28%). The LDP remains more popular than the DPJ, but I doubt that's of much comfort to either Mr. Aso or the party's backbenchers.

The dramatic fall in support for the government reinforces the notion that the LDP-led government — and with it the Japanese political system — is shuddering to a halt along with the Japanese economy. Mr. Aso's own economy minister has indicated that he stands with the 56% of respondents in the Nikkei poll who oppose the stimulus package, telling the Financial Times that the stimulus package will not work. "The time for endurance has come," he said. Japan, it seems, is at the mercy of the global economy; domestic consumption will not be coming along to stand in for foreign demand for Japanese goods.

Little wonder that Mr. Aso may be losing control of his own party. It seems that the remaining reformists may finally be reorganizing themselves to pressure the prime minister and pull the LDP into the future. The latest sign is that Nakagawa Hidenao has announced the creation of a new study group with the goal of creating "secure foundation accounts" designed to consolidate payments to citizens and free up some 220 billion yen (approximately $2.3 billion) annually to meet the government's social security obligations. The idea is to both cut waste from budgets (including drawing down the so-called "buried treasure" of Kasumigaseki, the special accounts) and streamline administration by directing all government transfer payments (tax rebates, unemployment compensation, welfare payments, farm subsidies, etc.) into a single account.

At his blog Mr. Nakagawa claims that this study group — which apparently includes Koike Yuriko and Watanabe Yoshimi among its twenty members — is about policy, not politics. Why can't it be both? There is clearly unrest stirring within the LDP ranks. The clearest sign is that Mori Yoshiro felt the need to criticize critics of the Aso government in a speech Sunday. Speaking in Hyogo prefecture, Mr. Mori said, "Why only a little more than two months after selecting him do they not feel the need to defend the party president? This is not the Jiminto. This is the Jibunto. They think only of themselves." [For non-Japanese speakers, Mr. Mori was making a pun on the LDP's name, changing the middle character min, from minshu — democracy — into bun, making jibun, oneself, i.e., from the LDP to a party of one.] It's generally a good sign that things are even worse than they appear when Mr. Mori feels the need to discipline party members publicly.

Mr. Nakagawa may claim that he is thinking only of policy, but he doth protest too much. He is on record of having said, "If the dissolution of the lower house [and a general election] are delayed, I will not understand for what purpose Mr. Fukuda Yasuo resigned and a party president election was held" — and he was Ms. Koike's staunch backer against Mr. Aso in September. He clearly knows that forming a study group at this juncture would send a signal to both allies and enemies that he is preparing for both the aftermath of Mr. Aso and the aftermath of a general election, whichever comes first. Yamamoto Ichita writes at his blog that the new study group took his young reformist colleagues by surprise, and that they wrote to him inquiring about what Mr. Nakagawa has in mind. (Mr. Yamamoto responded with what is probably sage advice at this point in time — don't worry about maneuverings within the party, worry about getting reelected. There will be no miracle from above as in 2005.)

It remains unclear how events will unfold. The government continues to reject the idea of a general election any time before the spring. The government is still trying to make the most of the extended Diet session to respond to the crisis, even if it won't be submitting a new stimulus package. Instead Mr. Aso is looking at other measures to dampen the impact of the economic crisis on workers, appealing to big business to hire more unemployed workers in smaller municipalities and new graduates (perhaps hoping to avoid what happened in during the 1990s), regularize irregular workers (instead of sacking them), and to raise wages. I doubt government appeals to the good conscience of companies will work. Meanwhile Ozawa Ichiro has hinted that if Mr. Aso resigns, he will bring the DPJ into a grand coalition comprised of all parties to manage the government until a general election. Whether Mr. Ozawa is serious is irrelevant; he will undoubtedly make up his mind at the spur of the moment. I imagine, however, that his purpose in letting this slip now is an attempt to encourage "opposition forces" within the LDP to overthrow Mr. Aso in order to bring about the grand coalition — a national government to deal with the crisis? — and hasten the approach of a general election and with it a DPJ majority government.

For the moment, Mr. Ozawa's fantasy is unlikely to come to pass. Mr. Aso's predecessors were able to hold on despite crumbling support inside and outside the LDP, and I suspect that Mr. Aso is no less determined than Messrs. Abe and Fukuda to hold on despite adversity.

In the meantime, Japan will continue to sink.

Is the Mainichi poll right?

Considerable discussion has surrounded a new Mainichi Shimbun poll showing that 46% of respondents desire a DPJ victory in a general election, compared with only 33% for the LDP.

The same poll also showed that respondents would overwhelmingly (51%) vote on the basis of "policy," which may very well mean "pensions." Only 3% say they would vote on the basis of "image."

In light of this finding, I wonder what to make of the thinking of Tahara Soichiro, eminence grise of television political analysis.

In the January issue of Voice, Tahara has an article whose title pretty much says it all: "The DPJ will not take the government." The reason? Ozawa Ichiro. (Like must monthly magazine articles, this article is not online.)

Tahara believes that Mr. Ozawa's qualities as a leader make him entirely unfit to lead the DPJ to an election victory. Uncharitable to his enemies (unlike his mentors), maladroit at communicating a message to the public, and unwilling to consult others, Tahara is convinced that Mr. Ozawa will lead the DPJ to disaster — or at the very least, not to victory in a general election. He is especially critical of Mr. Ozawa's scheming on a grand coalition with the LDP, given the LDP's record of devouring parties that have joined it in coalitions. He pointed to the uproar over the mooted grand coalition as typical of Mr. Ozawa's operating style: decided in secret, on the basis of reasons entirely his own. As Jun Okumura notes in this post, citing a Yomiuri article that broke down the DPJ's factions, "The house, it seems, can still be divided, and Mr. Ozawa’s personality and old-school ways have little other to offer to party unity besides elective success."

And what if success in a general election is not forthcoming?

Tahara thinks — and I am inclined to agree with him — that in the absence of a DPJ (or perhaps more accurately, opposition) victory, the much-vaunted political realignment will come to pass to resolve the nejire kokkai. He does not foresee the DPJ surviving in its current form if Mr. Ozawa cannot deliver his party into government by way of electoral victory (not a corrupt bargain with the LDP).

But if the Mainichi poll is right, and the voters are actually inclined to vote on the basis of policy over personality, then the DPJ might once again be in a position to profit from the LDP's ongoing failures, only this time of course, the prize is the government. Given Mr. Ozawa's negative image among Japanese voters — as illustrated in a Keio University study discussed in a different Yomiuri article from last week — the DPJ better hope that this is the case.

Perilous weeks ahead

Prime Minister Fukuda, as I expected when he was chosen as prime minister in late September, has shown himself to be far more adept than most commentators expected. (And one hears fewer complaints about Mr. Fukuda's being a government of factions — I have no doubt that this is Mr. Fukuda's government.)

But while he has stabilized the LDP and made the best of the opportunities present in the political situation, the next two weeks will determine whether Mr. Fukuda's government is doomed to be short-lived or whether he will able to maneuver his government through perilous straits and survive until September 2009.

LDP officials continue to send mixed signals about the party's (and government's?) thinking about the timing of a general election. Nikai Toshihiro, the chairman of the party's executive council, suggested in a speech Saturday that a general election is "not far" and that the LDP should consider talks on a political realignment or a grand coalition in the aftermath of a general election. Nakasone Yasuhiro, grand old man of the LDP, suggested on Saturday that the LDP make the pursuit of a grand coalition with the DPJ a campaign promise in a general election campaign. Finally, in a sign of the LDP's need to regain the trust of rural Japan, Tanigaki Sadakazu, the PARC chairman, said in a speech in Fukui-ken, "I cannot say what amount of money, but the voice of farm households will be reflected and included in the 2007 supplementary budget." He received complaints about the government's failure to recognize the difficulties faced by farmers.

These remarks suggest that the LDP is thinking hard about calling a snap election sooner rather than later, contrary to recent remarks by Koga Makoto, the LDP's election strategy chairman and fourth senior executive. Or is it? Are these messages designed to keep the opposition off balance?

Meanwhile, should the persistent calls for a grand coalition be construed as a tacit admission of the hopelessness of the LDP's position in a general election? The LDP's election chiefs have made clear that it is giving up on the one-term Koizumi kids, writing them off as sure losers. Considering that Mr. Koizumi's followers are more competitive in more urban districts, does the LDP assume that it has no chance of besting the DPJ in urban Japan? How does the LDP plan to win if not by backing the 2005 incumbents associated with the still-popular Mr. Koizumi? Does the LDP really think that it will draw voters by promising to share power with the DPJ?

All of this could just be designed to keep the DPJ off balance, somehow tricking Mr. Ozawa into appearing unreasonable and undermining the DPJ's public support, but then again, it could be a sign that the LDP is improvising, that Mr. Fukuda doesn't have a plan for dealing with the six unanswered questions of the Diet session. As reported in a recent Mainichi article, the government will exercise prudence as to whether it will extend the Diet session a second time to ensure passage of the anti-terror law.

Prudence, or reading the air the moment of decision?

Ozawa, on top again

Ozawa Ichiro has granted an interview to Asahi (one of the papers he didn't single out for criticism in his "parting" remarks) in which he reviews the circumstances surrounding the meetings with Prime Minister Fukuda that resulted in his decision to resign, his plans for a general election campaign, and the DPJ's policy goals.

With a confidence that is perhaps the result of being firmly in control of his party, Mr. Ozawa is defiant and seemingly free of doubts surrounding his position and that of his party.

In recounting his discussion with Mr. Fukuda, he denied that they discussed the timing of a snap election or the distribution of cabinet posts in an LDP-DPJ grand coalition. But he did, as Amaki Naoto notes, "even now assert with amazing self-confidence and arrogance that the grand coalition plan was right," suggesting that the plan would have given the DPJ an opportunity to pass its cherished policy goals, enhancing its position for an election and helping DPJ members "know power." He also snapped at opponents within the DPJ. When asked about rumors that he was considering leaving the party with enough members to throw the Upper House back to the government, he said, "Isn't it stupid? It's awful that there is a group of people within the party who say such foolish things."

As for his party's strategy, he insists that winning the next election comes first — indeed, winning elections is the only thing that matters. He suggested, regarding the party's plan to aim merely to become the Lower House's largest party, that the DPJ is open to a coalition with all parties — Communists included — except the LDP. He demurred when asked about conditions that could lead to a snap election, and declined to say whether the DPJ would push for an Upper House censure motion in the event of the government's passing its anti-terror law over an Upper House veto.

Meanwhile, as far as policy goes, I detect a desire on Mr. Ozawa's part to shift the discussion away from foreign policy and the Afghanistan mission and back to the "lifestyle" issues that helped the DPJ win in July, the issues about which the Japanese people actually care. Indeed, asked about ISAF participation, he said, "Since we promised participation in UN activities to the people in our manifesto, from now on we will not speak of a debate. Why this simple debate is not understood — it's a mystery to me and can't be helped." Finally, he both dismissed the idea of a compromise with the LDP on a permanent law on JSDF dispatch and suggested that a DPJ government would prepare to revise the constitution to make provisions for JSDF dispatch.

In short, as is widely assumed, a DPJ government, especially one led by Mr. Ozawa, would differ very little from LDP rule. Beyond the policy questions, of course, there could be value to a DPJ victory in producing alternation of ruling parties, but then, if the DPJ doesn't try to take a majority of its own, a DPJ victory would just result in a sloppy reenactment of 1993 (especially if the JCP were to join a coalition government).

For my part, I think Mr. Ozawa comes across as arrogant in this interview, and, as I suspected, he seems to be in more control of the DPJ than ever before.

Ozawa in charge

Ozawa Ichiro addressed a conference of the DPJ's Upper and Lower House members on Wednesday, where he spoke at length about the crisis that saw him resign from the leadership of the party only to reverse his decision days later.

He was, of course, exceedingly apologetic in his remarks, and, I think, exceedingly forthright in explaining his reasoning for entertaining the notion of a grand coalition with the LDP. He recognizes the DPJ's predicament — he knows that winning the Upper House may not have been the best thing for the party after all. "In the twisted Diet in which the LDP has overwhelming numbers in the House of Representatives, how do we implement policies promised in the manifesto that place the life of the people first?" (The press conference following his remarks can be read in three parts here, here, and here.)

This problem remains for both the LDP and the DPJ; Mr. Ozawa may stay away from any formal arrangement, but the DPJ will still have to find a way to cooperate — quietly — with the LDP if it wants to see its bills pass both houses. This will undoubtedly entail some concessions from the DPJ. It is unclear to me why the Japanese political system, in which the LDP has for decades paid heed to the views of opposition parties through the Kokutai system, cannot handle a slightly more involved form of this cooperation between the LDP and the DPJ to ensure smooth management of parliamentary affairs. Neither side will get everything that they want, but then Mr. Fukuda is not Mr. Abe: unlike his predecessor, Mr. Fukuda does not necessarily believe that policy is everything. Procedure counts too.

The DPJ is to blame for having failed to change its approach the moment that Mr. Fukuda took over for Mr. Abe, with the party's intransigence effectively driving Mr. Ozawa into Mr. Fukuda's arms as a way out of the predicament — producing the latest drama in Japanese politics, and effectively exposing the party's frailty to the world.

Maybe Mr. Ozawa's wielding greater power over the party will be a good thing for the DPJ. Perhaps I have underestimated his ability to manage the delicate task of being an opposition party responsible for a whole house of the Diet. But he better get to work forging a cooperative Diet strategy that his party can support.

The Jiminto Rule Assistance Association?

The revelation that Prime Minister Fukuda is seeking a grand coalition with the DPJ has unleashed a flurry of political activity, as the parties and the Japanese people struggle to make sense of the swiftly changing political environment.

DPJ backbenchers and rank-and-file supporters have come out resoundingly against the idea of joining a coalition with the LDP, with someone close to Mr. Ozawa in the party executive saying, "Ozawa-san will probably resign as party head."

Mr. Fukuda too may find himself in a tougher spot following this gambit.

The Japanese people, meanwhile, seem divided, with some seeing the value in a grand coalition, and others rejecting the idea as detrimental to the political process.

Prime Minister Fukuda is arguing that a grand coalition is "for the people." Yomiuri made similar arguments for the grand coalition back in August, and is once again arguing this on its editorial page. On the face of it, this logic seems impeccable: There are problems that must be addressed, and anything that interferes with finding a solution to urgent national problems (i.e., political competition) must be subordinated to the greater good.

I don't buy it. Many of Japan's problems either result from — a hangover, so to speak — decades of unaccountable LDP governance or were ignored by the LDP as they emerged. And now the answer is to subordinate political competition (and the enhanced accountability and transparency that result from it) to the solution of national problems? The DPJ, for all its faults (and there are many), poses a real challenge to LDP rule, and thus the more powerful it gets, the more it is able to question the LDP and its bureaucratic allies, the healthier the state of the Japanese polity. Democracy is not an end state but a process through which sectional interests clash and are reconciled in the pursuit of national interests. The stronger the parties, the better this process works. It is also a process by which those in power are held accountable for their actions. With control of the Upper House, the DPJ is in a position to both hold the LDP accountable and articulate its own solutions to Japan's problems, compromising with the LDP on an issue-by-issue basis.

I would argue that the creation of a new political system is as important to restoring Japan's vigor as is resolving the economic and social problems that beset the country; insofar as a grand coalition dedicated to addressing the latter retards the former, the grand coalition "cure" could be worse than the diseases.

The problem with this is that advocates of the LDP-DPJ grand coalition assume that partisan conflict with vanish if the two parties join hands in government. Given that the DPJ is hungrier than ever to unseat the LDP, it is foolish to think that this is so. Just look at Germany's CDU/CSU-SPD grand coalition, which is now facing, according to Der Spiegel (in German), a "crisis climate." The SPD, its fortunes reviving after time spent in the doldrums, may yet prove to be a feistier partner for the center-right, potentially paralyzing Chancellor Merkel's government. The lesson here seems to be that it is an illusion to think that a grand coalition can spell the end of partisan conflict on issues of national importance. It could even make government more cumbersome and prone to gridlock than it is now. (Incidentally, I would curious to hear from my German readers what they think of their country's grand coalition and whether there are lessons from that that apply to the Japanese situation.)

I remain convinced that the LDP has less to lose from an LDP-DPJ grand coalition than the DPJ has to gain from joining it, and that if somehow the DPJ accepts Mr. Fukuda's offer, it will ensure the prolongation of LDP rule by demolishing the DPJ's prospects as an opposition party. The Fukuda government will try to present a grand coalition as a patriotic act, the only solution to the country's problems. The DPJ must utterly reject this idea by insisting that it is willing to cooperate with the government on some issues — and explaining the value of the competition between parties in a democratic system as beneficial for Japan over the long term.

Mr. Ozawa, just say no

Dear Mr. Ozawa,

I never properly congratulated you on a job well done in the Upper House election campaign. Many doubted you, but you managed to show them that you know what the Japanese voters want to hear.

But now, it seems, you're in the something of a bind. Maybe winning the Upper House wasn't such a great thing after all. Hard to be both an opposition party and responsible for a house of the Diet, isn't it?

And here comes Mr. Fukuda to the rescue, with designs for a grand coalition with the DPJ that will apparently save you from this dilemma. It seems that observers were right to suspect that Mr. Fukuda had something like this up his sleeve.

I am pleased to see that you rejected his initial entreaties. But surely this won't be the last you hear of Mr. Fukuda. Presumably he will take this act, this sob story about how hard it is to govern, to the people in the hope that they will pressure you to accept his offer. Perhaps you're thinking, maybe joining the government is the best way to undermine the LDP, a re-run of the LDP-Liberal coalition with Prime Minister Obuchi.

Dismiss any such thoughts now. The only party that will gain from a grand coalition is the LDP. The LDP, facing some tough decisions about the fiscal health of Japan (including a possible consumption tax hike), would love nothing more than to have a partner in crime. It would love to use you as a shield to protect it from public disapproval. Don't be that shield. Don't sacrifice the goodwill you've developed as the leading opposition party to become Mr. Fukuda's patsy.

You are, after all, virtually part of the government already. The government needs your cooperation to pass laws. That gives you considerable power over what happens in the Diet, if you use it right. It also gives you some distance to question the government when its priorities are mistaken, and will make it harder to disagree publicly on foreign policy.

So flirt with the LDP. Go on a few dates. But don't move in with it. You will, at some point, have to show that you're serious about this relationship; you'll have to find some legislation on which you're willing to work with the LDP, just to show them that you've moved beyond a purely confrontational stance.

This posture will not be easy to maintain, requiring careful calibration of when and how to disagree or cooperate. Joining the government looks the easy option. But the primrose path...

Finally, don't count on an early election. Do what you need to do to ensure that the party is ready for an election at any time, but assume that an election will be later rather than earlier.

You mustn't forget that your party has a hard enough time distinguishing itself from the LDP as it is; joining the government would likely blur whatever distinctions remain and perhaps destroy your own party.

Good luck, gambare, and just say no.

The return of the grand coalition (proposal)

After going into hiatus in the wake of Mr. Fukuda's election as LDP president, advocates of an LDP-DPJ grand coalition are making noise again. Feverish speculation about the meeting between Mr. Ozawa and Mr. Fukuda is focused on the idea that they were either a) planning a snap election or b) making plans for a grand coalition, and with that cue, Yomiuri is back to work proposing an idea it was keen on back in August as a way to salvage the Abe administration.

Mr. Fukuda no doubt fueled speculation by not dismissing the idea outright but instead talking about practical difficulties in implementation. Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura was slightly more open about his disdain for the idea, but even he didn't reject it outright. Former LDP secretary-general Takebe Tsutomu was more forthright in his support for the idea in a speech at a meeting of his campaign training school.

I remain as dubious about an LDP-DPJ grand coalition as I was in August.

I also remain skeptical about Mr. Ozawa's falling for a grand coalition. Doing so would mean watching his party crumble beneath his feet, and would likely demolish the rump DPJ's electoral prospects. The DPJ would become ever more like the anti-mainstream faction that Mr. Koizumi suggested it had become by winning the Upper House — and why would voters bother defecting from the LDP...for the LDP. I am convinced that Mr. Ozawa's goal is to unseat the LDP and make his own party the new governing party. It's hard to do that without a party.

But that doesn't mean that Mr. Ozawa isn't looking for a way to be able to work with the LDP to get legislation passed. I think the "secret" meetings between the party heads are concerned with drafting rules of the game for a divided Diet. As I've suggested earlier, the DPJ has no choice but to cooperate with the LDP if it wants to see legislation passed; the LDP has the luxury of not cooperating, even if, as Jun Okumura discusses in this post, the LDP is extremely reluctant to use its supermajority. Not surprisingly, the moment the anti-terror special measures law expires and the MSDF ships set sail for home, Mr. Ozawa's confrontational posture slackens and he sits down to talk with Mr. Fukuda. I agree with MTC: the end of the MSDF mission has, in a sense, let the air out of the tense political environment. Mr. Fukuda does not share his predecessor's enthusiasm for the mission, and now that Mr. Ozawa and the DPJ have earned their "victory," having done exactly what they set out to do in the aftermath of the Upper House election, the two leaders can get down to business and figure out how and on what issues the two parties and the two houses can work together to forge a national agenda.

And so to address Jun's question about why the LDP remains extremely reluctant to use its supermajority to pass the new law, I don't think the government is prepared to pay political costs well out of proportion to the benefits that could accrue to the LDP as a result of the continuation of the refueling mission. I really think that Mr. Fukuda would prefer that the issue go away, regardless of the tough rhetoric used by Mr. Machimura to criticize the DPJ (indirectly). (The CCS described Japan as returning to the "minor leagues" for pulling out of the Indian Ocean.) The new bill may very well die in the Upper House, the government will do its best to spin the defeat as irresponsibility on the DPJ's part, but it will do nothing further.

A new 1955 system?

With Typhoon Fitow bearing down on the Kanto plain, I have decided to take shelter from the storm for the evening, and so there's no better time to step back and ponder the evolution of the Japanese party system.

In the aftermath of the Upper House election, there was some talk of a political realignment as a possible result of post-election uncertainty. That talk has diminished somewhat, especially because Ozawa Ichiro has managed the DPJ adeptly, most notably by co-opting Maehara Seiji with a deputy leadership post. (Although I think the talk of a grand coalition by LDP leaders hints at a political realignment of sorts.)

An article in this week's Liberal Time, however, renews the conversation about the shape of a new political alignment. The speculation considers the usual actors. Mr. Koizumi, dissatisfied by his party's backtracking on reform (as Mr. Hiranuma's return suggests), could split from the LDP with his "children" to form the "Koizumi New Party." Joining him could be Mr. Maehara — Hatoyama Yukio is apparently convinced that he would — and Mr. Tanigaki, who has, with his faction, been effectively isolated within the LDP.

I don't think this scenario is particularly plausible at the moment. More interesting is the article's conclusion, which is called "the demise of the two-party system" and looks back to the founding of the LDP in 1955 to call for a new ruling party:

It was said by Miki Bukichi, who successfully created the "conservative fusion," "This will last ten years." The thought that the LDP has steadily exceeded its service life is strong.

Conversely, avoiding internal dissension in the midst of the suddenly changing international situation means (1) we should make a kyukoku cabinet [kyukoku, means patriotic in the sense of the salvation of the country], and (2) it is starting to be recognized that the LDP/DPJ grand coalition idea is an essential second "conservative fusion."

This might be what Mr. Ozawa has in mind — the article mentions the possibility of Mr. Ozawa's luring onetime allies from the former Tanaka faction to his side.

But the idea that a grand coalition (i.e, a new permanent ruling party) will save Japan is a dangerous illusion. In an ever more dynamic world, the homeostatic management of Japan's affairs implied by a new permanent ruling party (like the 1955 system, and the Tokugawa bakufu for that matter) is impossible, because such systems invariably focus on maintaining the delicate balance among factions (or daimyo) rather than making the good policy decisions required in a dynamic environment. Hence the Tokugawa shogunate's inability to cope with "troubles at home and abroad." Hence the suitability of the 1955 system in an international system frozed by the cold war, and its almost instant collapse in the aftermath of the cold war.

Japan needs a two-party, even a multi-party system because competition in politics as in other areas of life depends better performance from all actors, and the people's interests are served by having the government held accountable by active opposition parties (each with a reasonable chance of taking control of the government for itself).

So thank you, Liberal Time, for calling attention to 1955 and reminding us all why a grand coalition is an awful idea.

The press — for the most part — holds its praise

As the Japanese political world digests the newly announced cabinet reshuffle, the major dailies have each editorialized on the new cabinet, sounding some similar notes. Reading Asahi, Sankei, and Yomiuri, each editorial seemed pleasantly surprised by the quality of the individuals tapped by the prime minister for his new cabinet and the LDP executive. None, however, thinks that the new cabinet drastically alters the political landscape, because the Abe government still has to find the best way to deal with the Upper House being in opposition hands.

Asahi acknowledges that the new cabinet signifies a real change — although less than meets the eye, due to the retention of certain members of the first cabinet (i.e., Mr. Ibuki) — from the first Abe Cabinet, but by turning to a cabinet of LDP heavyweights, "the fading of Mr. Abe's presence will not be avoided. Asahi, of course, is not prepared to give the new cabinet a honeymoon period, demanding to know what the second Abe Cabinet's policy goals are, and it expects that the DPJ will be equally unforgiving.

The conservative Sankei Shimbun praised the new lineup, but pointed to the daunting task facing the new lineup in implementing policy in light of the ascendant DPJ — although Sankei thinks that rather than yielding to the DPJ and seeking compromise, the new cabinet should insist that it will not cave on important policies.

Right-of-center Yomiuri, which has easily been the Abe government's most loyal supporter in the media, acknowledges that the "journey ahead is full of troubles," but then proceeds to praise the talents of the new LDP leadership team, suggesting that Mr. Aso will be up to the challenge of uniting the party, and that Messrs. Ishihara and Nikai will be adept at working with the DPJ, Ishihara from his experience as one of the "new breed" of young policy-wonk legislators who worked across party lines in the 1998 "Finance Diet," Nikai from his time spent in opposition alongside Mr. Ozawa. Indeed, on this subject of cooperation with the DPJ, Yomiuri not surprisingly called for the new cabinet to cooperate with the DPJ as much as possible, echoing its recent call for an LDP-DPJ grand coalition (in fact, the last portion of the editorial more or less repeats the previous editorial, suggesting that if the government runs into trouble, it should form a grand coalition).

Yomiuri was equally effusive in its praise for the new cabinet, and has high hopes for Mr. Yosano's elevation to chief cabinet secretary. In fact, despite opening the editorial acknowledging the difficult task facing the new Abe cabinet, Yomiuri actually spends remarkably little time talking about the nature of the challenges and proposing the best course of action to overcome them. In short, there are lots of policy problems, and the best way to deal with them is cooperation. It's not exactly a vote of confidence, though, that in its editorial on the new cabinet Yomiuri once again suggested that the best course of action might be a grand coalition.

In general, then, the mood sees to be "wait-and-see." There is a sense that the new cabinet is certainly capable, but whether it will be able to do anything more than buy the LDP some time with which to sort out its structural problems remains to be seen. There is also the sense that Prime Minister Abe, now surrounded by serious, senior party leaders, will be taking a back seat in the management of his government, particularly with the able Mr. Yosano as chief cabinet secretary.

Said Yomiuri about the new CCS: "It is heard that there is hope that he will act not just as the cabinet's spokesman, but that he will play a central role in policy coordination within the government and between the government and the ruling parties." Rather than falling into line behind the prime minister, it seems that the new cabinet will be issuing orders to Mr. Abe, formulating the government's policy message, setting its Diet strategy, and otherwise trying to avoid the mistakes that doomed the first Abe Cabinet.

The DPJ united, the LDP in shambles

In Yomiuri on Wednesday, there was an article — not online, of course — on the creation of a new DPJ security policy discussion group by Maehara Seiji. The article noted that the group will meet once a week to discuss the content of the anti-terror special measures law, conditions on the ground in Afghanistan and the activities of other coalition members there, the UNSC resolutions supporting the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and the outline of DPJ security policy.

Meanwhile, on Wednesday Maehara spoke at the FCCJ and backed down slightly from his stance on the renewal of the law, placing the onus on the government to speak more openly about the impact the mission in Afghanistan has had — and indicating that he will obey his party's decision — even as he reiterated his belief that it is important for Japan to contribute to the fight against terrorism.

It seems that Mr. Maehara will not be going anywhere, and may even succeed at forging a compromise that enables Japan to continue to contribute even as the DPJ rakes the government over the coals for its subservience to the US. In fact, Sankei has reported, in another article not online, that DPJ members are preparing trips to Europe and the US to exchange opinions with officials about how Japan can contribute in Afghanistan.

Mr. Ozawa must be given credit for holding the line on the anti-terror law (even if I don't agree with his stance). Indeed, we're a month out from the Upper House election and the contrast between the LDP and the DPJ is revealing: the LDP is confused, seeing no way out of the hole that Mr. Abe has dug for the party, while the DPJ is confident, united, and fully prepared to use its Upper House veto power in the coming months. This may not be a permanent situation; the public can be fickle, after all. But if Mr. Ozawa can somehow keep the party's big tent together, assuaging both the Maehara group and the former Socialists, we may actually be witnessing the creation of a new permanent majority party, which may have been Ozawa's goal all along (veteran Tokyo correspondent Sam Jameson has speculated about this).

Much will depend, of course, on how the DPJ follows through on its promises, not least to Japan's small farmers, as MTC notes. But it's difficult to see how the LDP is going to revive itself without the DPJ making serious tactical mistakes. In fact, I think we can gauge the LDP's desperation by the growing calls from LDP members for the creation of an LDP-DPJ grand coalition. The latest call is from Takebe Tsutomu, former LDP secretary-general, who argued that such a coalition would ensure that the government would be accountable to the people. Meanwhile, Nakatani Gen, who was at the FCCJ Wednesday with Maehara, also suggested that a grand coalition might be desirable. I guess they reason that if the public supports a grand coalition, the LDP stands to gain if its members call for one and the DPJ repeatedly nixes the idea.

I remain unimpressed by the idea, and I don't think that the DPJ's troika is going to fall for it. As Maehara said at the FCCJ, there is a 99.99% chance that the DPJ will turn down any offer of a grand coalition. But even if the highly improbable grand coalition were to happen, the LDP's salvation will not come in the embrace of the DPJ. The party has yet to figure out what the post-Koizumi LDP is to be, and until it does, it will flounder. For Japan's sake, I hope it doesn't take too long. Japan is in need of a proper two-party system, not a new permanent majority party (even one with a reformist tinge).

While Abe's away...

Prime Minister Abe, on tour in South and Southeast Asia, has left behind a political situation in Tokyo in which the only certainty is Mr. Abe's continuing ability to say no to those who want him to step down.

But in Mr. Abe's absence, his opponents are, as expected, on the move.

Mr. Ozawa, speaking to assembled admirers at his annual "Ozawa Ichiro political cram school," has continued to lambaste the Abe administration, suggesting that there will no letting up in the DPJ's push for an early election, and joking about the government's "brain death."

Within the LDP, meanwhile, criticism of the prime minister continues. Kosaka Kenji's anti-Abe study group has announced that it is in the process of preparing a policy statement to be released in early September that will criticize the "Abe line" on economic policy and reform. It does not look as if the Kosaka group's membership has grown since the initial announcement, but it will be interesting to see if an anti-mainstream position rooted in concerns about the toll of "neo-liberal" policies on rural Japan can gain traction within the LDP. I would not underestimate the presence of sympathizers within the party — but the question is whether the Kosaka group can serve as an effective rallying point without a standard bearer. A platform is useless without an effective leader to stand upon it.

I expect that the composition of the new Abe cabinet will determine the future of the new "opposition forces." Should they be locked out of power, as looks increasingly likely, Abe's critics — whether those who criticize his policy priorities or his leadership (or lack thereof) — could rally under the Kosaka group's banner and serve as an intra-party force pressuring the prime minister to shift to the political center as a way of disarming the opposition and shoring up the LDP's support in rural Japan.

In a move that tacitly concedes that bankruptcy of Abe's ideological, symbolic politics and the need to change course, outgoing LDP Secretary-General Nakagawa Hidenao has echoed the Yomiuri Shimbun, calling for an LDP-DPJ grand coalition. Keeping in mind that such a coalition is politically impossible for the foreseeable future, Nakagawa's embrace of it suggests that Abe critics and skeptics are desperately searching for a way to temper the prime minister and undermine the opposition at the same time. They better start looking for another approach, because a grand coalition just won't happen, as I discussed here.

The frog and the scorpion?

From August 3rd to 6th, Jiji asked voters what kind of government they would prefer. The top? An LDP-DPJ grand coalition, with 27.5% of respondents supporting it. Only 11.9% wanted the LDP-Komeito coalition to continue, while only 10.8% wanted a solely LDP government. Respondents seemed indifferent to which party was at the center of the coalition, with 22.7% wanting an LDP-centered government and 22.8% wanting a DPJ-centered government.

Seemingly feeding off of this finding, Yomiuri used its most self-righteously nonpartisan tone in an editorial Thursday to argue for an LDP/DPJ coalition based on the recognition that the LDP stands no chance of regaining an Upper House majority in 2010 or 2013, and that the procedures for a Lower House override of an Upper House "veto" are cumbersome. Not surprisingly, Yomiuri looks to Germany and argues that Japan's serious, long-term problems depend a new, broad-based coalition: "Considering the life of the people and the national interest, there are probably more than a few cases in which they will not be able to avoid pragmatic compromises."

I can understand why the Japanese people, who have long since lost confidence in Japan's political leadership (aside from Mr. Koizumi, of course), would desire a grand coalition that would put national interests before partisan interests and make policy for the nation. This is probably the kind of thing Ozawa Ichiro would have been pushing for if he was still in the LDP.

But that's exactly why this idea is impossible, because if the DPJ were to join a coalition with the LDP, it would be a death sentence for the DPJ, whether because it would force a split in the party or because the DPJ's presence in a coalition government would make it a convenient scapegoat for policy failures and should serious reform prove impossible taint the party in the eyes of reform-minded urban voters. Surely the former Socialists in the DPJ remember their old party's pact with the devil in 1994 that resulted in Murayama Tomiichi's serving as prime minister on the back of the LDP — and drove a stake into the heart of the onetime leading opposition party. Meanwhile, with Ozawa and the DPJ leadership intent on using momentum from last month's elections to force the government to dissolve the Lower House prematurely, there is not a chance that they would entertain the idea of assisting the LDP in stopping the hemorrhaging of its support. Also, I have to wonder who exactly would serve as prime minister in Yomiuri's dream cabinet. I think it is safe to say that the DPJ will not become party to an Abe government.

Philosophically speaking, I have a problem with bipartisanship elevated to the level of a grand coalition. One of the benefits of partisan competition is that the party in opposition is capable of holding the government accountable — even if in some (or all) democracies this role is sometimes taken to extremes. Who will hold the government accountable if there are only a handful of small parties on the opposition side of the aisle? Yomiuri would say — has said — that the national interest supersedes partisan competition, but partisan competition is not solely or even primarily about policy, at least not in Japanese political system, with considerable overlap between LDP and DPJ policies. A strong opposition and the emergence of a proper two-party system with the LDP and DPJ alternating in power should result in better policy making for Japan, with governments punished for failing to deliver, meaning that future elections may well resemble the July Upper House elections in being more about the competency and priorities of the government than any particular disputes about the policy agenda. But in that case, it is imperative for the DPJ to take its role as the leading opposition party more seriously, questioning the government's failures to deliver whenever they occur. (And why should the DPJ join the government to try to force the LDP to compromise on policy when its control of the Upper House for the foreseeable future provides an excellent platform from which to force the government to bargain?)

Meanwhile, Yomiuri provides a list of national problems that must be addressed (social security, North Korea, the rise of China, tax reform, nursing care, et al). But if these issues are as important for Japan as Yomiuri insists, ought they not be deliberated upon publicly in Japan's elected legislature, rather than within the less transparent confines of the government? The solutions ought to be national, not the product of decisions made by a coven of two parties foisted upon everyone else.

Beyond this, I have to wonder whether an LDP-DPJ grand coalition would ultimately resemble the parable of the frog and the scorpion, in which the scorpion offered a frog a ride across a river, only to start stinging the frog midway across, drowning them both. A grand coalition would most likely serve as catalyst for the much-ballyhooed political realignment, essentially turning the clock back to 1993 and raising the possibility for a more rational two-party system. All the more reason to dismiss the possibility, because neither party seems ready to commit suicide.