Amano's election deepens Japan's nuclear paradox

After a long stalemate to choose a successor for outgoing director-general Mohamed ElBaradei, the IAEA's board of governors elected Japanese diplomat Amano Yukiya to the position by a single vote over the requisite two-thirds majority.

The prolonged dispute was the result of a split between developed and developing countries, the latter of which preferred South African candidate Abdul Samad Minty, who would have prioritized reducing the arsenals of the extant nuclear powers over preventing nuclear proliferation. Amano, meanwhile, is seen as the candidate of the developed world.

This image of Amano precisely captures the ambiguity in Japan's nuclear posture, namely the paradox whereby Japan often speaks as a moral arbiter on nuclear affairs due to its status as the sole victim of the atomic bomb while being defended by the one of the world's nuclear powers (and the sole country to use the atomic bomb in wartime). It is particularly ironic that Amano's election immediately followed revelations by former administrative vice minister for foreign affairs Murata Ryohei about the existence of a "secret" pact between the US and Japan permitting the introduction of US nuclear weapons into Japan without prior consultation.

Murata spoke of a "single sheet of paper," passed from administrative vice minister to administrative vice minister, which permitted the US to introduce nuclear weapons to Japan without prior consultation with the Japanese government, as was supposed to happen under the terms of a 1960 agreement concluded at the same time as the US-Japan mutual security treaty. Although it was already an open secret that the US introduced nuclear weapons into Japan abroad its warships despite the official bilateral agreement and later three non-nuclear principles (promulgated after the agreement), Murata's comments mark the first such admission by an administrative vice-minister. (Murata's remarks were preceded by the remarks of other former administrative vice-ministers last month, who spoke anonymously to Kyodo. Murata is the first on the record.)

Nevertheless, as a testament to how important the Japanese government finds it to downplay Japan's nuclear paradox before the public, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kawamura Takeo denied the existence of the secret agreement. Kawamura's denial of reality prompted criticism from Kono Tarō, chairman of the lower house foreign affairs committee, who said that the government's position contradicted the evidence (and common sense) and suggested that his committee would look into investigating the matter.

Clearing the air on the precise nature of the US-Japan nuclear relationship in the past would be an important first step in debating that relationship going forward. Should Japan formalize the secret agreement and revise the three non-nuclear principles to 2.5 principles, as some have suggested? Would doing so reinforce the nuclear umbrella, or would Japanese elites still voice doubts about the soundness of the US commitment to defend Japan?

Of course, at the same time Amano's selection as IAEA director-general may rule out major changes in Japan's nuclear posture for the duration of his term. It seems to me that it would be difficult for Japan to have the nuclear weapons debate desired by conservatives with a Japanese official the face of the global non-proliferation regime. Pressures to have that debate will no dout continue as North Korea and China continue to bolster their arsenals, meaning that rather than resolving Japan's schizophrenic relationship with the atomic bomb, Amano's elevation will only intensify the gap between Japan's aspirations to serve as the world's conscience on nuclear weapons and the reality of the role of nuclear deterrence in the defense of Japan.

Fukuda should mention Iran

In the past week, the Bush administration has raised the intensity of its rhetoric on Iran to dangerously absurd levels.

Last week, President Bush suggested that Iran's possession of nuclear weapons could lead to World War III, which White House press secretary Dana Perino later played down as suggesting nothing more than the seriousness with which the president views the threat posed by a nuclear Iran.

More recently, however, Vice President Cheney said in a speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on Sunday, "The United States joins other nations in sending a clear message: We will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon," and that Iran faces "serious consequences" for its pursuit of nuclear arms.

Between talk by Mr. Bush — head of state of a country that has somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 nuclear weapons — of World War III and Mr. Cheney's using the same language that he used in advance of the Iraq War (Hat tip: Andrew Sullivan), observers in the US and elsewhere cannot be blamed for wondering whether the US will be at war with Iran in the waning months of the Bush administration. (Niall Ferguson dismisses the idea that war is imminent — imminent being a few weeks — but that's little comfort to me.) Even if the talk is bluster designed to make Iran give in somehow, the LA Times wonders whether the Bush administration, its credibility all but spent, can achieve anything but more Iranian recalcitrance with this approach.

For my part, like Fareed Zakaria, I'm not convinced that Iran is somehow beyond deterrence:

When the relatively moderate Mohammed Khatami was elected president in Iran, American conservatives pointed out that he was just a figurehead. Real power, they said (correctly), especially control of the military and police, was wielded by the unelected "Supreme Leader," Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Now that Ahmadinejad is president, they claim his finger is on the button. (Oh wait, Iran doesn't have a nuclear button yet and won't for at least three to eight years, according to the CIA, by which point Ahmadinejad may not be president anymore. But these are just facts.)

How does Japan enter the picture?

Prime Minister Fukuda will, of course, be in Washington next month to meet with President Bush. I think that the November summit might be a good opportunity for Mr. Fukuda to distinguish himself from his predecessors and state in no uncertain terms that Japan finds the Bush administration's rhetoric counterproductive to the resolution of the crisis, that Japan, as a state with official ties with Iran, wants to play a greater role in finding a solution, and that Washington cannot count on Tokyo's support in the event of war unless all other options are exhausted first.

In other words, for the US-Japan alliance to be more equal, Japan has to act like an equal of the US, making demands of its own on its ally.

Of course, given the Bush administration's expectations from its allies (i.e., seen and not heard), an interjection by Mr. Fukuda would probably have little impact on the administration's plans for Iran — and it's unclear to me how Japanese mediation could help resolve the crisis — but at least Mr. Fukuda could stake out a firm Japanese position now and perhaps prevent Japan from getting overwhelmed by events should a war come, all while signaling to the Japanese public that Japan's foreign policy will not be conducted from Washington.

Another August 6, the dilemma remains

Today is the sixty-second anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, an event that has perhaps more political significance than usual given the recent resignation of former Defense Minister Kyuma Fumio over comments in which he referred to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as "inevitable," as well as last autumn's debate (or non-debate, since it was one-sided) over having a debate on the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

As usual, the anniversary is being marked with a ceremony in Hiroshima and calls for the total abolition of nuclear weapons.

I find Yomiuri's editorial marking the occasion particularly useful, because it cuts to the heart of the nuclear "dilemma" for Japan. "We cannot approve the atomic bombings," says Yomiuri. "On the other, Japan has no choice but to depend on US nuclear deterrent power for our national security. This is the 'dilemma' that postwar Japan continues to shoulder." It is for this reason that it is not entirely appropriate for Japan to ask for an apology from the US. While it is not unreasonable for the US to express its remorse for its actions, however necessary they were or seemed at the time, it is inappropriate for Japan to demand an apology from the US at the same time that its security rests on US extended deterrence.

Raymond Aron's comments on this question are useful to consult. In The Imperial Republic (included in this recent anthology), Aron began from the recognition that "the decision to use both atomic bombs arose almost inevitably out of the circumstances." But he continues,

But that does not mean to say that American diplomacy was exemplary or rational. Five years later, the United States was asking Japan to take up again the arms it had made its vanquished enemy renounce forever. The United States had itself created the circumstances in which recourse to atomic bombs was almost inevitable: the demand for unconditional surrender; the decision to 'reform,' 'regenerate,' and democratize Japan; the timidity of some leaders, far-sighted though they might have been; the crusading language that made even secret negotiations no longer possible; and the hasty judgment of some of the government's military advisers who, thinking invasion was the only way of achieving US political purposes, had persuaded Roosevelt to ask for Soviet support and to pay for it with concessions made at China's expense.

This is an important reminder that even if the bombings were inevitable to save US and Japanese lives, even if they ended the war, Americans cannot, must not approach the bombings with a clean conscience. The Second World War will forever be a stain upon human history, and every nation that participated — Axis and Allies alike — emerged from the war with bloody hands. That is not to excuse the horrendous crimes of the Axis powers. Rather, it should serve as a cautionary lesson for those who believe that they are acting with the best of intentions: do good intentions (the defeat of Imperial Japan) justify any and all means (the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Japan, the fire bombings of Tokyo and other cities)? If so, where does that reasoning end? And who is the arbiter of good intentions? I don't think there are simple answers to these questions, and as the history becomes increasingly distant, the only appropriate stance should be humility and an emphasis on the constant need to remember.

Indeed, perhaps an appropriate step for the US to have taken after passing H.Res. 121 would be to send a representative to Hiroshima, suggesting that even the US has some thinking to do about the war.

Meanwhile, the persistence of Japan's nuclear dilemma points to an important reality of foreign policy change in Japan. The reason for the dilemma in the first place is that Japanese foreign policy has, since the Meiji Restoration, been driven by pragmatic conservative elites formulating Japanese foreign policy often in opposition to idealists of the conservative, liberal, or pacifist persuasion. Japan's reliance on the US nuclear umbrella is a product of the Yoshida doctrine, despite the pacifist left's outright rejection of nuclear arms and the ultra-nationalist right's desire for an independent nuclear deterrent, the latter two positions, of course, presenting solutions to Japan's nuclear cognitive dissonance.

But here we are, in 2007, and Japan still depends on the US nuclear deterrent — as reiterated by Condoleeza Rice on her visit to Tokyo last autumn. And, as convincingly argued by Llewelyn Hughes in the spring issue of International Security, there is little reason to think that Japan will choose to develop an independent deterrent anytime soon; in the absence of such a decision, it is wholly unlikely that Japan will reject the US umbrella with a nuclear or semi-nuclear North Korea next door.

Japan's worst nightmare?

If there's any truth to this article in the Chosun Ilbo, Japan should be worried. The article reports that North Korea is alleged to have asked the US at bilateral meetings earlier this month if it would be possible for the US and North Korea to normalize relations without North Korea's having to give up its nuclear weapons. (Tellingly, North Korea asked for the "India" treatment.)

While the article notes that Christopher Hill nixed the idea, that such an arrangement has been mentioned in US-North Korea bilateral talks should worry Japan, because while the US said no on this occasion, there's no guarantee that the US won't soften its opposition in the future. Given the unlikelihood that North Korea will give up the nuclear weapons it already has, the US may ultimately have to choose between an agreement that accepts a nuclear North Korea or no agreement whatsoever.

So how far is the US willing to go to secure an agreement? Aside from the abductions issue, what gaps remain between the US and Japan negotiating positions? Seems like the kind of thing about which Japan and the US should be exchanging opinions and working towards a common position.

Are they?