Looking to 2014

The future of the US-Japan alliance increasingly rests on Guam, a 209 square-mile island 1500 miles from Tokyo. The intricately arranged realignment process that envisions the relocation of roughly 8,000 Marines (and their dependents) from Okinawa to Guam by 2014 depends on both governments funding and executing major construction projects in Okinawa and Guam in a timely manner.

However, in testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on 1 May (available for download here), Brian Lepore, director for defense capabilities and management at the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) raised serious questions about whether Guam will be ready for the 2014 target.

The problem, Mr. Lepore noted, is that the Defense Department and the US military have not moved past the initial planning stages.

"DOD has established a framework for the military buildup on Guam; yet, many key decisions must still be made, such as the final size of the military population, which units will be stationed there, and what military facilities will be required...the exact size and makeup of the forces to move to Guam and the housing, operational, quality of life, and service support infrastructure required are not yet fully known."

Despite these unanswered questions, DOD is preparing a budget request for FY2010 that will provide for the first phase of construction on Guam. And the government of Guam and its representatives in Washington are still crying out for federal assistance for expanding Guam's infrastructure to handle the influx of US military personnel and their dependents. To this end, Madeleine Bardallo, the territory's congresswoman, introduced the Joint Guam Projects Oversight Act in April, calling for the creation of a "Guam Defense Policy Review Initiative Account" at the Treasury that will fund off-base construction and including a clause calling for a memorandum of understanding between the DOD and the government of Guam on federal assistance. (Also see Congresswoman Bardallo's remarks on 7 May introducing the bill.)

Mr. Lepore goes on to outline the realignment process, explaining the various actors involved in the process, the division of labor among them, potential obstacles. He notes that a particular concern is the environmental impact assessment for Guam, not due until 2010, which could significantly impact the shape of the US presence in Guam (and thus the realignment process as a whole). He further notes that the Marine Corps has yet to determine the best mix of forces to base on Guam. Beyond these unanswered questions, the GAO noted potential funding shortfalls (DOD's estimates leave out significant elements of the process) and operational shortcomings on Guam (including the inadequacy of training facilities).

In short, it is reasonable to ask whether Guam will be ready to host the USMC's Okinawa refugees in 2014 (plus a year or two) — and if not, what's plan B?

It is imperative that the US consolidate and shrink its military presence in Japan, without which Japan will continue to underperform as an alliance partner, threatening the survival of the alliance. With US forces in Guam, they will be five days by sea to Korea instead of the 1.5 days from Okinawa; they will be five hours by air to Korea instead of two. Japan will have to assess and improve its capabilities to respond to regional contingencies, something that the US has heretofore done on Tokyo's behalf; for my part, I don't doubt that the Japanese government is capable of adjusting to the post-realignment environment. But unless the realignment proceeds as planned, the Ministry of Finance and other opponents (for one reason or another) of more robust Japanese defense capabilities will undermine efforts to plan for the Guam gap.

Arguably what's needed is executive initiative, if not from the president, then from the secretary of defense. Neither will be forthcoming before January 2009. But the next administration will inherit this mess. And it should make a point of cutting through the intra- and inter-governmental disputes, guarantee funding for expanding Guam's infrastructure, moving the planning process up the ladder to the secretary of defense, and, as I've argued before, removing the Japanese government from the Guam side of the process entirely. The construction on Guam is messy enough without introducing Japanese money (and Japanese oversight) into the process.

2014 may seem like it's far away, but without immediate and sustained involvement by the highest levels of the US government, 2014 may pass with the 8,000 Marines of the III MEF still sitting on Okinawa.

Hadnott released; trouble remains

Not long after Secretary Rice expressed her "regrets" for US Marine Corps Staff Sergeant Tyrone Hadnott's alleged rape of a fourteen-year-old Okinawan girl, Japanese authorities released him after the alleged victim's family dropped charges.

US Ambassador Schieffer made clear that although Japanese charges have been dropped, the US will continue to investigate the case — although I am sure that Sergeant Hadnott is relieved to be back under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Okinawan authorities, including the prefectural assembly, should probably apologize for their overreaction — but won't. And regardless, the reaction of Okinawans is not the issue.

This incident illustrates yet again that the US-Japan alliance walks on the edge of a precipice and that the US presence has a distortionary impact on Japanese politics. This case may have been a false alarm, but does anyone think that this will be the last such case? In some way, the new countermeasures, once implemented, could have perverse consequences in raising the expectations among the Okinawan people that the situation is under control, thereby ratcheting the anger and disappointment to ever higher levels the next time an incident occurs, with untold consequences for the fate of the US forward presence and the alliance.

So, once again: the US must take the initiative in seeing the realignment process through to completion. The US government must be prepared to act unilaterally to accelerate the relocation of the III MEF to Guam.

A national embarrassment

US Forces Japan (USFJ) has issued orders that from today personnel attached to bases in Okinawa and Iwakuni are, for the time being, forbidden from leaving their bases except for a small handful of activities. The restrictions apply to approximately 55,000 people, covering both 29,000 members of the Armed Forces and their dependents.

USFJ has also called for Friday, 22 February, to be a day of reflection for the approximately 37,000 US military personnel stationed in Japan.

What, I wonder, will these measures accomplish? Tempers may cool if US personnel are cooped up for a few days, but the underlying problem still exists. Is it worth keeping US forces in Okinawa if their actions are going to undermine the US-Japan relationship and jeopardize the maintenance of more essential US military assets elsewhere in Japan?

As an American, I am ashamed that members of the US Armed Forces have so abused the hospitality of the nation hosting them as to undermine US national interests. Their actions have ranged from the heinous to the absurd — but they all indicate that the current US presence on Okinawa is unsustainable.

Washington has already accepted in principle that the US presence has to change dramatically. It is now incumbent upon the Bush administration — and its successor — to expedite the process of relocating the III MEF from Okinawa by any means necessary.

Time for decisive action

Another week, a couple more Marines arrested in Okinawa, more anger from the local and national officials.

On Sunday, a Marine was arrested for drunk driving. Then, on Monday, Shawn Cody Jake , a twenty-one-year-old Marine corporal was arrested for breaking into a home in Nago, where he was found sleeping. Sankei, dropping any pretense of objectivity, asks in its headline on these incidents, "Where are the morals?"

These incidents have occurred, of course, while anger in Okinawa at Staff Sergeant Tyrone Hadnott's alleged rape of a fourteen-year-old girl continues to burn. In fact, on Monday, Okinawa's lieutenant governor met with Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura, appealing to the government to strengthen "preventive measures." Nishimiya Shinichi, head of MOFA's North American Bureau, also called for tighter preventive measures by appealing to Joseph Donovan, deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy to Japan. Prime Minister Fukuda, meanwhile, stated his desire to get at the "root cause" of the incidents. Who exactly is in charge of preventing crime by US forces?

Mr. Machimura is acting as the point man on this issue. In a press conference Monday, he condemned the acts of Marines in the strongest possible terms. He insisted that the US government needs some serious soul-searching, and he will tell Secretary of State Rice himself if he has the chance to meet with her when she visits Japan later this month.

In the same press conference, however, Mr. Machimura expressed his hopes that the environmental impact study on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) scheduled to begin during February will proceed as planned, thus revealing the difficulty involved.

How long before members of the Diet — members of the LDP, even — began asking questions about why Japan should be paying for US Marines to leave Guam, asking why the US doesn't pay itself seeing as how US forces have behaved? At what point will one crime be one crime too many? At what point will Okinawans resigned to the continuing presence of the US Military, probably a majority at this point, become overtly and angrily opposed? Is the answer to the problem stricter controls on the movement of US forces?

The US response to this string of incidents has been inadequate at best. Yes, responsible officials in Japan have apologized, repeatedly. But Washington has been silent. This is not a local issue; treating it as such does not make it so. The alliance may be coming to another crossroads, and Washington has been silent.

It is probably a mistake to expect the Bush administration, whose world view in its final year does not extend too far east of Suez, to take the lead in addressing the Okinawa problem, which means that this problem, like so many others, will have to wait another year before being addressed by Washington.

But it must be addressed, and if the history of the alliance is any guide, it will require the commitment from the new president, if only to set the tone and direction for talks. The next administration, regardless of who is elected president in November, should offer Tokyo a chance to renegotiate the 2006 roadmap on realignment and furthermore offer to free Japan of its commitment to pay $6.9 billion towards the construction of facilities and infrastructure in preparation for the arrival of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). Doing so is in the interests of both governments.

From the US perspective, eliminating the Japanese portion of the project removes a major series of obstacles from the process of transforming Guam. Japanese financial contribution is one of two prerequisites for the relocation to proceed, the other being the construction of the FRF. Arguably the latter prerequisite is front-loaded, and requires Tokyo to work with the Okinawan prefectural government — tricky, but ultimately susceptible to financial carrots. The former, however, is a potential minefield. Even before last fall's scandal regarding the fuel provided to the US Navy in the Indian Ocean, some Diet members were concerned about how Japan's money would be spent; after the scandal, and after these latest crimes by Marines, the Diet will likely be even more vigilant about how the Japanese contribution is spent in Guam. The upshot is that the risks related to Japan's financial contribution are back-loaded and could delay the project well past 2014 should Tokyo demand rigorous audits of construction projects. In light of the debate of the road construction fund, that admittedly sounds a bit hilarious, but it is a real concern for Washington, especially if the DPJ, which is especially skeptical of the 2006 agreement, takes power between now and 2014.

Not having to pay for construction on Guam would, of course, be a boon for Japan, given the Japanese government's enormous fiscal burden. Tokyo's growing fiscal responsibilities are concentrated mainly in public goods — social security, health care — but the government will probably have to pump in economic development funds to make up for the absence of US forces if and when they leave Okinawa. Would it not be a meaningful gesture if the US, recognizing Japan's fiscal conditions, freed Japan from having to spend $6.9 billion to build houses in Guam?

This will not happen without US leadership. The next president will have to acknowledge the problems with the current agreement and take positive steps to fix it. The US will not be acting for sentimental reasons, as regrettable as the crimes in Okinawa are. It must take decisive action because doing so is in the best interests of the US and the alliance. The US has admitted that the III MEF is better off in Guam, on US territory. Removing the Marines from Guam will lessen the risks of a criminal incident sparking a national backlash that could undermine the long-term prospects for US naval and air bases that play an important regional role. It will make the alliance less about defending Japan and more about stabilizing the region.

Both governments have accepted the principles behind the relocation. Is Washington prepared to do its part?

The protests (and apologies) continue

The situation in Okinawa continues to worsen. Staff Sergeant Tyrone Hadnott, the Marine accused of raping a 14-year-old Okinawan girl, is now in Japanese custody. Japanese officials at all levels of government have expressed their outrage at the US.

On Wednesday morning, Onodera Itsunori, parliamentary vice foreign minister, arrived in Okinawa to meet with US military and local government officials. The latter demanded resolute action in response to the incident, with Tomon Mitsuko, mayor of Okinawa City (and a former Socialist HR member), suggesting that a reduction in the USMC presence in Okinawa is the only response. The assemblies of both Okinawa City and Chatan-cho have passed resolutions that criticize the US government and the US military's preventive measures to prevent the recurrence of these incidents, and call on the Japanese government to take responsibility for the situation. Nakaima Hirokazu, governor of Okinawa, also expressed his anger in a special session of the Okinawa assembly. These legislative actions follow a day of protests in Okinawa at the gates of US military facilities.

Prime Minister Fukuda has also taken up the cudgel, declaring his intention to raise the issue in talks with US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice at the end of February.

Christopher Hill, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, conveyed his regrets to Kato Ryozo, Japan's ambassador to Washington, on Tuesday (local time), following apologies by Kevin Maher, US consul-general in Okinawa, and Lieutenant General Richard C. Zilmer (III MEF), both of whom met with Governor Nakaima and discussed how the US can strengthen safeguards to prevent these incidents.

Will it make any difference in the long term? Talk of the Iwakuni election's strengthening the realignment process has undoubtedly been drowned out by the public outcry in Okinawa. US officials and military officers will be apologizing at every occasion for months to come, just as their Japanese counterparts will be using those occasions to highlight the need for safeguards. That doesn't sound like a recipe for progress to me.

The US has already conceded in the 2006 US-Japan realignment roadmap that the USMC does not have a long-term future in Okinawa, seeing as how the roadmap envisions the relocation of most of the III Marine Expeditionary Force to Guam, totaling approximately 8,000 Marines (and 9,000 dependents). The question is whether the US can afford to wait until the conditions for the relocation — progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab and Japanese financial contributions to construction work on Guam — are satisfied. The continuing presence of the USMC jeopardizes US air and sea assets, assets that bolster US deterrent strength and enable the US Navy to play a stabilizing role in the region.

The next US administration should strongly consider renegotiating the May 2006 agreement, perhaps giving ground on demands for Japanese contributions to Guam construction in exchange for progress on the FRF — and shortening the time line for the departure of USMC personnel from Okinawa.

The latter measure will require a crash building program, because Guam, lacking housing, infrastructure, and training facilities, is not even remotely ready to handle the massive influx of USMC personnel. This will require the exertion of political will on the part of the next president. While former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was eager to transform the US global military deployments and thus pushed hard for a realignment agreement with Japan, both the US and Japanese governments have failed to follow through on the May 2006 plan. Washington has been distracted; Tokyo has been slow (and heavy-handed) in efforts to overcome local resistance to the roadmap.

If the US is sincere in its desire to reduce and consolidate its presence in Okinawa, it needs to consider steps to hasten the process, starting with measures to ready Guam to serve as the US Military's hub in the Western Pacific sooner than expected.