Australia plays the game

A day after reports that Australia is set to join the US and Japan in researching missile defense — an agreement reached at the first Australia-Japan 2 + 2 meeting — Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer has, in the words of The Australian, "defend[ed] China's military build-up."

Readers can probably imagine that I have no problem with Mr. Downer's "defense." Some could accuse me of doing the same as Mr. Downer.

There is good sense in not exaggerating China's defense modernization, which is still overwhelming concerned with Taiwan, and even as China looks further afield for a defense role, there is no guarantee that a great regional security role for China will necessarily be hostile to the US and its allies.

This idea is, of course, controversial in certain circles in Washington and Tokyo (just ask Mr. Downer's Japanese counterpart). But Australia is not in a position to join a grand coalition to contain China, and thus Australia's involvement in missile defense research seems to come with major caveats, bearing in mind Australia's relationship with China. Does the Japanese government really think it can afford to act differently?

So I must raise the same objections I raised back in March, when commentators burdened the Australia-Japan security declaration with meaning that it was not designed to bear. Rather Australia, like its ASEAN neighbors, is playing — and ought to play — the great game, maneuvering among the region's great powers to maximize its advantage.

The Economist on the Japan-Australia agreement

The Economist this week weighs in on the Japan-Australia Security Declaration, the main point of which can be found halfway into the article: "...The louder the denials from both sides, the more evident is the main catalyst for the security pact: the rise of China."

It's hard to deny that China's rise loomed large over security talks between Japan and Australia this week, but then China's emergence looms large over every discussion of Asia, and will continue to do so for the indefinite future. As I argued in this post, the joint declaration muddies rather than clarifies the regional balance of power, because no observer can exclude the extensive economic ties both Australia and Japan have with China. There is no indication of what either party would do in a crisis involving China. In short, making too big a deal out of a paper agreement is a mistake. Is it an important agreement on paper, especially for Japan? Indubitably. Does it transform the region in a stroke? Hardly.

I find the article's comments on Japan interesting, but flawed:

As for Mr Abe, the pact is of a piece with a more robust foreign policy for Japan that was begun by his predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi. Before sending troops to Iraq, Mr Koizumi had also dispatched supply ships from Japan's so-called Self-Defence Forces to the Indian Ocean to help with the war in Afghanistan in 2001.

Since he came to office last September, Mr Abe has redoubled Mr Koizumi's commitment to Japan's alliance with the United States, but wants to do more than just shelter under America's wing. He has pushed for faster deployment of missile-defence systems in the face of North Korean provocation. He has turned the Japanese Defence Agency into a full ministry, with a seat in the cabinet. And he wants the pacifist article nine of the constitution to be revised. Mr Abe has sought a new partnership with India, while building security ties with South-East Asia.

It all amounts to a strategy of balancing China's geopolitical reach: Japan, in other words, is not about to roll on its back to let China be the region's top dog. Mr Abe's domestic ineptitude may mean a short term in office, as the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its coalition partner face crucial elections for parliament's upper house in July. Even if so, Japan's emerging regional posture is likely to survive him.

I think one can just easily find examples from Abe's tenure that show how Japan is still a long way from becoming more assertive in anything but rhetoric.

I have no doubt that the Japanese government's rhetoric has changed. The prime minister and members of his cabinet are much more inclined to talk about Japan's actively contributing to resolving regional and global problems, in a much more assertive way than earlier governments. A recent example is this recent speech by Foreign Minister Aso, which borrows the US strategic concept of the "arc of instability" to outline a role for Japan.

At the same time, however, there are many examples that suggest that Japan's actions -- and the legal framework to act-- do not yet match the ambitious rhetoric. One could point to the twice-delayed 2 + 2 meeting of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee, the kerfuffle surrounding Defense Minister Kyuma's (and Aso's) remarks about US policy in Iraq -- oh, and the six-party agreement that has left Japan more or less isolated in the multilateral effort to disarm North Korea. And then there's the fact that Japan's defense budget continues to be constrained by demands for budgetary restraint. And the continuing difficulty in implementing the April 2006 agreement on the realignment of US forces in Japan. And how about the backlash to Abe's comments on the comfort women issue, which appears to have undermined the initial positive steps achieved by Abe in relations with Korea and China.

Even the examples cited by the Economist to support its arguments have problems. The elevation of the Defense Agency to full ministry status? Long planned -- Koizumi submitted legislation in early 2006 -- but I guess Abe deserves credit for guiding it to passage. Abe wants Article 9 revised? OK, but he first needs to pass a national referendum law, and then convince not only his own party, not only the opposition but also the Japanese public that his vision of post-pacifist Japanese security policy should be written into the constitution. (And what is his concrete vision anyway?) That's without even considering whether his faltering government will last long enough to see the national referendum law to passage, let alone a revised constitution.

And then there's this point: "Japan, in other words, is not about to roll on its back to let China be the region's top dog." I'm not altogether sure there's anything anyone can do to prevent this outcome, least of all Japan, which despite it's economic recovery remains poorly governed and insecure. The best that the region's powers -- not least the US, Japan, and Australia -- can do is to shape the regional environment so that China is convinced to choose cooperation over antagonism. Does Abe realize this, or is he listening to Nakagawa Shoichi instead?

Meanwhile, a step like this report of enhanced cooperation between the US, Japan, India, and Australia -- without commensurate efforts to calm Chinese fears of encirclement -- would be disastrous at this stage. Every country in the region needs to think carefully about the consequences of its decisions in the region; when the US and Japan urge China to be more transparent about its security decision making, they must be equally transparent about their own decision making in the region.

So the US, Australia, Japan, India and any and all comers are free to talk amongst themselves, but they better make sure to talk clearly and frequently with China, because for all the threatening signals, there are plenty of signs of cooperation -- and not just in economics, as this post by the Arms Control Otaku about Chinese PKO contributions suggests -- that cannot be dismissed lightly.

This is not another mutual security treaty!

I take issue with the opinion cited in this post at Japundit, which cites Shen Dingli, Chinese academic, as arguing:

If China wanted to invade Japan, Australia would come to Japan’s aid, and if China were to invade Australia, Japan would come to its aid. But if we don’t invade either of them, such a pact doesn't really work against China’s legitimate interests.

I'm not quite sure what agreement Shen is talking about. There is nothing in the joint declaration that evens hints at its being a mutual security treaty along the same lines as the Mutual Security Treaty (MST) between Japan and the US, in which,

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Take another look at the Japan-Australia agreement. Is there anything remotely resembling this kind of clause? Japan is still unable to promise any security reciprocity to the US. What makes him think that it is prepared to extend that kind of reciprocity to Australia, or that Australia is ready to commit fully to the defense of Japan in any and all circumstances?

Methinks that the international news media, which prefers the "conflictual" rather than the "cooperative" Asia in its news coverage, has blown this agreement far out of proportion.

Japan's second "ally"

As planned, Japan and Australia -- at a meeting between Prime Ministers Abe and Howard -- agreed to the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation.

The agreement, available at MOFA's website here, is as modest as the initial news reports have suggested. The concrete elements are all well within the prevailing constraints of Japanese security policy, and the agreement bears no resemblance to the US-Japan alliance, with its open-ended commitment on the part of the US to defend Japan.

But the value of the agreement is in its modesty. In particular, Japan needs to develop the habits of cooperating with partners other than the US. Australia, as a regional power with (limited) global reach, can help enhance Japan's ability to contribute to the missions outlined in the agreement, including maritime security, PKO, and humanitarian relief -- without the baggage that comes with security cooperation with the US, not to mention the thorny issues surrounding US bases in Japan.

At the same time, though, as I mentioned in this post, it is important not to overestimate the importance of this agreement. Paul Kelly, writing at the website of The Australian, provides one example of letting rhetoric run away from reality. Japan is normalizing, yes, but it is hardly a linear process -- nor is it clear to exactly the ends to which Japan's "normalization" is aimed. He wrote, "Japan is in the process of becoming one of Australia’s closest security partners. Nobody should have any illusions about the consequences. To believe this new agreement is a minor matter is to miss its import entirely."

But to accept Kelly's argument means accepting that hidden in the terms of this agreement is the core of a trilateral maritime alliance between Japan, Australia, and the US -- and accepting that Australia has chosen Japan over China. To the first point, I wonder if Kelly has watched the tortuous process of reforming the US-Japan alliance, which is strewn with seemingly ambitious agreements that proved hollow. And to the second, has Australia actually chosen Japan over China?

Kelly answers his own question: "...Australia is being sucked into the politics of a more complex Asia."

In other words, this agreement -- while perhaps an important milestone in the process of Japan's becoming a "normal" country -- is but another detail complicating the Asian balance of power, rather than clarifying it.

Trilateral alliance or limited hedge?

With Australian Prime Minister John Howard set to arrive in Japan today for a four-day visit, Australia and Japan have reportedly agreed to a new security declaration that will likely (I say likely because it hasn't been released to the public yet) enhance bilateral cooperation on a range of defense issues, including intelligence sharing, PKO, and humanitarian relief. Prime Ministers Abe and Howard will meet on Tuesday.

It is probably a mistake -- for both Beijing and Washington -- to overestimate the value of this agreement, because Australia is especially trapped between the prospect of an antagonistic China and a cooperative China.

On the one hand, relations between China and Australia have enjoyed something of a renaissance in recent years (see this speech from 2004 by Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer). The economic relationship has been particularly strong, with China hungrily importing a range of primary products and services from Australia, as this overview of the relationship provided by the Australian government as background to a China-Australia FTA attests.

At the same time though, under Prime Minister Howard, Australia has strengthened its alliance with the US, acting as the third partner in a kind of global Anglosphere posse (the activities of which are, to say the least, distinctly at odds with China's vision of the global order).

Howard captured Australia's unenviable position in this mealy-mouthed comment in a joint press conference with Vice President Cheney during the latter's recent visit to Australia:

In relation to China, Australia, as you know, has striven over the last decade to build a very close relationship with China. But we've always done it against a background of being realistic about the nature of political society in that country. We have no illusions that China remains an authoritarian country. We have sought to emphasize in our relations with China those practical things that we have in common. And we do, I hope, with appropriate modesty regard it as one of the foreign policy successes of this country over the last decade that we have simultaneously become ever closer in our relationship with our great ally the United States, but at the same time built a very constructive, understandable relationship with China.

But we always look at these things from a practical standpoint. We have no false illusions about the nature of China's society. But we see positive signs in the way in which China and the United States have worked together, particularly in relation to North Korea. And nothing is more important to the stability of our own region at the present time than resolving the North Korean nuclear situation. And I think the way in which China and the United States have worked together on that is wholly positive and is obviously to the credit of both of those countries.

So to view this agreement -- together with last year's US-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue -- as anything more than a slight hedging option in the midst of very real cooperation between all three countries and China is overblown. Each is trapped in its own way by mutual interdependence with China.

As overblown responses go, that includes China's, which, according to The Australian, has voiced reservations of the Australia-Japan declaration. If Australia, Japan, and the US are bolstering their hedge against Chinese belligerence, it's because China has given them enough reason for concern: hedging by these countries is a sign of Chinese policy failure, not belligerence on the part of the trilateral partners. If China were to sound slightly more conciliatory and look slightly less like a country eager for regional hegemony buttressed by military power, each party to the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue would be less likely to push for a hard hedge.

I can't help but wonder what post-Howard Australia will look like in terms of its Asia-Pacific policy. Will Australia, in some sense like post-Koizumi Japan, compensate for Howard's emphasis on strong ties with Washington by reorienting to continental Asia and placing less emphasis on the nascent tripartite maritime hedge?