Public discontent, in numbers

Sankei has published the fourth part of its analysis of recent public opinion polls (parts one through three discussed here).

The questions dissected here are related to the government's use of its two-thirds majority to pass the gasoline tax and MSDF refueling mission authorization bills a second time in the HR, and cooperation between the LDP and DPJ in response to the "twisted" Diet.

Sankei observes that while a majority of respondents in April poll stated that they opposed the reinstatement of the gasoline tax in a second HR vote, a majority of the public approved the use of the supermajority to pass the extension of the refueling mission in a November poll. Another poll conducted in January following the HR's second passage of the refueling mission bill, however, found that the public had turned against the use of the supermajority.

I don't see what the mystery is. In the gasoline tax debate, the public undoubtedly opposed the use of the supermajority to reinstate the temporary tax because...the public overwhelmingly opposed the measure. In the refueling mission debate, the public likely turned against the government's insistence on using the supermajority to send MSDF ships back to the Indian Ocean because it rejected the government's focus on it even while the pensions debacle continued (for example).

The point is, as noted previously, that the public is unhappy with the current political situation. To drive the point home, Sankei concluded by citing two more polls that showed sizable majorities in favor of LDP-DPJ policy coordination and the meetings between Messrs. Ozawa and Fukuda last autumn. Another poll, however, showed that the public has no more idea than the politicians about how to break the deadlock: in a poll conducted last November 41.3% wanted a quick general election, while another 41.3% wanted more cooperation between government and opposition.

No word if the public is still divided after watching the rapid decay of the Fukuda government.

The DPJ botches the endgame again

After holding the line against the government — forcing it to use its supermajority to override the HC — in both the special session of the Diet (the MSDF refueling mission) and the current regular session (the temporary tax), the DPJ has been unable to find the right way to respond to the government's use of the supermajority.

In January, the endgame was marred by Ozawa Ichiro's storming out of the Diet before the refueling bill came to a vote again.

Wednesday, the endgame was marred by the DPJ's boycotting the vote en masse and, more seriously, DPJ members barricading Kono Yohei, speaker of the House of Representatives, in his office for an hour before guards escorted him to the Diet chambers for the vote on the tax. The former is less troubling than the latter; not showing up is a great way to ensure that no one breaks ranks on the vote, and, as MTC notes in a comment to Jun Okumura's post on the boycott, "Boycotting sessions en masse is also a recognized form of Diet protest. That opposition members chose to boycott the session was a reasonable response to an unreasonable approach to lawmaking."

Barricading the speaker of the house in his office, however, is inexcusable. Reminiscent of the Socialist Party's futile raging against the LDP during the cold war, the use of physical pressure to restrain a legislative officer has no place in a democracy. Whatever the DPJ thinks of the government's use of the supermajority to reinstate the temporary tax despite public opposition, the government, contra Hatoyama Yukio (who according to Okumura-san likened the government's acting without formal disapproval by the HC to an act of violence), is acting in accordance with the constitution. Article 59 gives the HR the right to override the HC with a two-thirds vote if the latter does not act on legislation within 60 days.

The LDP may come to regret governing by Article 59, but that is for the people to decide. It is for the DPJ to act with dignity, register its complaints through the proper channels, and then campaign like hell against this manner of rule when the next general election comes.

A pyrrhic victory

Japan's "temporary" gasoline surcharge holiday is over, just as the Japanese people set off on their Golden Week holidays.

The government will use its HR supermajority to reinstate the temporary tax Wednesday, ensuring that the surcharge is in place for the start of the new month.

The opposition parties have, of course, strongly criticized the government's decision to proceed as contrary to the will of the people. The DPJ's "gasoline price reduction brigade," an organization of younger DPJ members that played an important role in the early stages of this debate in bringing this issue to the top of the agenda, was particularly apoplectic in its response to the government's widely expected decision to proceed as planned.

Based on the government's own statements about its plan to pass the tax bill again today, it appears that there is little doubt that the LDP and Komeito will be able to line up all of their members in favor of renewing the temporary tax.

The DPJ and the other opposition parties may have lost the battle, but if the Yamaguchi-2 by-election was any indication, another victory like this and Mr. Fukuda is done for.

Counting down to X-Day

With less than a week until 30 April — "X-Day" — when the government intends to bring the tax bill to a vote in the HR again, the DPJ is apparently stepping away from threats to censure the government in response to the revote.

Kan Naoto indicated at a press conference Thursday that the party has yet to decide how it will respond to the expected reinstatement of the temporary gasoline tax, noting that there is a discussion underway about whether a censure motion will pressure the government into dissolving the HR and calling a general election.

This should come as no surprise. It became clear last fall that despite being able to pass non-binding censure motions, the HC is largely powerless when it comes to resisting a government armed with a two-thirds majority in the HR. For all the complaints from the LDP about how irresponsible the DPJ has been acting, the government has still been able to get what it wants through the Diet, even if it has to wait sixty days on occasion (which would be less of a problem if the government planned better).

The DPJ's only ally in its fight against the government is public opinion. The public's ambivalence about the MSDF refueling mission meant that the DPJ was impotent in the face of the government's determination to restart the mission. Will the same dynamic apply next week?

Both parties are keenly watching how public opinion breaks in the days between the by-election in Yamaguchi-2 on 27 April and the HR vote on 30 April. As Sato Hiroya suggests:

Whether the LDP wins or loses, if there's a narrow margin, the LDP will likely go ahead and forcibly pass this bill again. However, if the LDP candidate loses by an unexpectedly large margin, it is likely that it will not be easy for the LDP to take the strong step of passing it again on the 30th.

In short, the government will conclude that the political consequences of the temporary tax are negligible and proceed as planned. A close and/or victorious election will stand in for the numerous opinion polls showing opposition to the temporary tax.

Pushing forward with the tax bill does, however, entail some risk to the government, particularly if public opposition translates into a vocal backlash following the bill's second passage.

It's possible that the situation is not as dire for the Fukuda government as it appears. Yamamoto Ichita thinks that both the potential rebels within the LDP and the DPJ are full of bluster but will ultimately fail to deliver: the rebels will fall into line and vote with the party, the DPJ will not pass a censure motion in the HC, and the government will get its way on the two votes (the tax bill vote next week, and the road construction bill sometime in May). In short, the government will survive this crisis by acting resolutely and not wavering.

As suggested above, he may be right about the DPJ. I'm still not convinced, however, that the LDP has stifled the rebellion, especially if Sunday results in a DPJ landslide, an entirely plausible outcome.

That's the flaw in Mr. Yamamoto's "election avoidance syndrome" theory. Of course elected officials would prefer to put off an election for as long as possible. But they would also like to win the election when it comes. Given a choice between taking an action that might bolster their electoral prospects at the risk of hastening a general election, which instinct wins out? If a DPJ landslide provides a clear illustration for LDP HR members of their vulnerability in a general election, will they be as inclined to vote again for a measure opposed by an overwhelming majority of the public?

In short, an overwhelming DPJ victory in Yamaguchi-2 could have far greater impact on how the government proceeds than the threat of a censure motion ever could.

Koizumi goes to work for the government?

The Fukuda government has announced that it will definitely proceed with plans to submit the tax bill to the HR for a second vote on 30 April, the day after the expiration of the sixty-day Article 59 window. No word from Asahi or Mainichi about whether the LDP and Komeito will face defections when the HR votes — recall that it will take all of eight defectors to defeat the measure and trigger a crisis. Presumably the government is confident that it has the votes if it is announcing that it will definite reimpose the tax. But it will still have to weather the blow to its popularity from reinstating the unpopular measure.

No better time for Koizumi Junichiro — who is, as discussed in this post, still more popular among LDP supporters and the public at large than Mr. Fukuda and his likely successors — to begin playing a role defending the government.

On Tuesday, Mr. Koizumi met with Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura, and stated that he thinks that a mooted HC censure motion will not have the support of the public. The government has already started to make the case that it has nothing to fear from a censure motion, and it will need all the help it can get in prelude and aftermath to the HR vote.

Whether Mr. Koizumi has the power to blunt public opinion running against the government may be tested this week. The LDP executive has stated its desire to harness Mr. Koizumi's popularity and use him to explain the government's new pensions plan to concerned elderly voters who may be leaning towards Hiraoka Hideo.

Unlike the Abe cabinet, which did everything it could to distance itself from the former prime minister, Mr. Fukuda and his leadership team have no concerns about letting Mr. Koizumi overshadow the prime minister if it means a victory for the party, whether in Yamaguchi-2 or in the showdown with the DPJ over the temporary tax.

Asahi reported that the LDP executive wants Mr. Koizumi's help. But no word on whether Mr. Koizumi wants to help — or whether his active support will be able to reverse Mr. Fukuda's declining popularity.

The LDP and DPJ talk past each other

A six-party conference of government and opposition parties met Friday to negotiate a compromise on the future of the special fund for road construction. Debate will begin in earnest on Wednesday, a week before the governing coalition is expected to use its HR supermajority to reimpose the temporary gasoline tax.

According to Mainichi, at the initial meeting Tanigaki Sadakazu, chairman of the LDP PARC, called for a review of the parties' positions on a broad spectrum of issues, including the absorption of the road construction fund into the general fund and the temporary tax, subsidies to local governments and the state of local government finances, road construction plans, and the reform of related public corporations. Yamaoka Kenji, the chair of the DPJ's Diet strategy commitee, objected, arguing that the conference should focus on the matter immediately at hand: the road construction fund and the temporary tax.

This dispute is revealing about the nature of the conference. The purpose of this conference is not to forge a compromise amenable to all parties. The purpose of this conference is to provide the LDP, and to a lesser extent the DPJ, political cover. The LDP needs to appear conciliatory before the HR votes again first on the temporary tax at the end of April and the road construction bill two weeks later, so as to undermine the inevitable argument that it is acting heavy-handed in overruling the HC. So why not call a compromise conference that has a broad remit, a remit so broad and a timeline so brief as to ensure that no agreement will be forthcoming? I find it hard to believe, as the LDP leadership argues, that it is the DPJ alone that is playing politics with important national issues.

For its part, the DPJ isn't interested in compromise at the moment. Why should it be? It has painted the Fukuda government into a corner by opposing the temporary tax, forcing the government to take the potentially unpopular step of reimposing the tax. It has used road construction plans as a wedge issue, forcing the LDP's reformists to fight with the zoku giin over the future of road construction, with Mr. Fukuda caught in the crossfire. Accordingly, the DPJ is divided less over whether to compromise than over the party's response to the increasingly inevitable HR re-vote on the tax and road construction bills. That decision may now rest solely in Mr. Ozawa's hands as the DPJ's HC caucus has announced that it will respect party policy.

Going into the conference, it is the LDP that has yet to figure out what it stands for in this debate. The official stance, of course, is Mr. Fukuda's plan to move road construction funds into the general fund from FY2009 while renewing the temporary gasoline tax and possibly re-envisioning the tax as a "green tax." But as Sankei points out, there is considerable (and open) discontent with Mr. Fukuda's approach on all sides of the LDP. Some fear the electoral consequences of restoring the temporary tax. The zoku giin oppose a compromise, and hope that the HR will re-pass the same road construction bill in May that it passed in March, instead of considering a new compromise bill. The reformists want a compromise bill and are supposedly ready to vote against the prevailing bill. And the party's cautious elders — perhaps we should call them the 慎重派 (the shincho-ha, the cautious faction) — are, as always, cautious.

The LDP's internal discontent shows no signs of abating. Ishihara Nobuteru, a potential reformist contender for the LDP's leadership in the future, gave a speech in Fukuoka Friday that described Mr. Fukuda's compromise plan to move road funds to the general from 2009 as "clearly inconsistent." On the other side of the debate, Mr. Tanigaki argued in Hokkaido that neither bill should be revised: the temporary tax should be reimposed and gasoline tax revenue should continue to go to road construction, otherwise the finances of local governments will suffer and public works projects will not be completed. (Mr. Tanigaki's hardline position is interesting considering that he is involved in the compromise conference discussed above.)

It remains unclear whether internal discontent will manifest itself when the HR votes on the temporary tax and the road construction bills. It is entirely possible that the LDP will be torn asunder by rebellion in the coming weeks.

The unknown but limited power of the censure motion

During the fight over the MSDF refueling mission and at other junctures in the months since the DPJ took control of the HC, the DPJ has threatened to use its "censure motion" card. It has yet to play it, whether against Prime Minister Fukuda or one of his cabinet ministers.

It is still unknown what will happen if and when the DPJ passes a non-binding censure resolution. I stand by what I wrote in this post back in November.

"By its very nature as a non-binding resolution, its power derives entirely from outside factors. Would a non-binding censure resolution have any power against a prime minister with Koizumian popularity? Would it have power if used against the prime minister over a policy issue in which he enjoyed public backing?"

This is once again a pressing question now that the DPJ is threatening to censure the government if it re-approves the temporary gasoline tax at the end of April. If this scenario transpires, the censure motion will trigger a short, fierce battle for public opinion. The government will claim that it was acting in the public interest and is not obligated to do anything in response to the HC's censure; the DPJ will try to claim that it has the public's support and that the government is acting without a mandate from the people.

Mainichi has provided a first glimpse at how the public might respond to this scenario. In a national phone poll conducted on 5-6 April, 55% of respondents said that the government should dissolve the HR and call an election in response to a censure motion. 21% said that no action is necessary since it would be a non-binding resolution, and only 19% said that the cabinet should resign in response. Interestingly, the poll found that even 43% of self-described supporters of the Fukuda government approve of a general election in response to a censure motion, compared with 42% who feel that the government should do nothing.

It is worth noting that respondents did not see the need for the government to resign in response to a censure motion. In short, the government should stand and face the direct judgment of the people — which also means that the government would be given the opportunity to explain itself directly to the people in an election campaign. I suppose that's a suitable compromise position regarding a censure motion.

That said, I'm still skeptical of the ability of the DPJ to pressure the government into calling an early election. The DPJ, of course, has plenty to gain from calling an election now, but by the same token the LDP has everything to lose. I am not convinced that the government will throw away its one means to avoid genuinely compromising with the DPJ over a censure motion. Barring a massive public outcry, which may be hard to come by in the midst of Golden Week, the government would most likely survive a censure motion, which raises the question of whether it's worth it for the DPJ to bother passing one. Passing a censure motion that the government proceeds to ignore is a great way for the DPJ to illustrate its weakness.

But then, censure motion or no censure motion, the DPJ is weak. Even the threat of a censure motion is inadequate and easily dismissed. Faced with a government armed with an Article 59 supermajority, when the stakes are high and the government acts "forcefully" there's little the DPJ can do but complain (with censure motions by the constitutionally approved form of complaining).

Is a tax revote a sure thing?

Yamamoto Ichita, who is a far more prolific blogger than I despite (because of?) his membership in the House of Councillors (I've just added his blog to the blogroll after linking to him for months), lays out the reasons why the government must use the HR supermajority to reintroduce the temporary tax.

His four reasons are: (1) the government must demonstrate its consistency to the public by following through on its promises, (2) a failure to revote will undermine the government more than a revote will, (3) the end of the temporary tax leaves a hole in the road construction budget, and (4) lowering the gasoline tax weakens Japan's credibility as a global environmental leader in advance of the July summit.

A successful vote in the HR will likely buy Mr. Fukuda some time, but it will not fix the LDP, not by a long shot. After all, the temporary tax has become a sideshow. The main attraction is the fight within the LDP over Mr. Fukuda's plan to phase out the road construction special fund and halve the road construction plan to five years. At stake in this fight is nothing short of the LDP's last shred of reformist credibility, and with it the party's prospects in the next general election. That fight is far more uncertain, giving the smoldering anger of the doro zoku and the vigor of the reformists (not to mention the DPJ's implacable opposition). As Yamauchi Koichi, one of the young LDP reformists supporting Mr. Fukuda, notes colorfully, Mr. Fukuda is caught between "the DPJ, the tiger at the front gate, and the doro zoku, the wolf at the back gate."

The LDP as we know it is in terminal decline, as how the LDP governs appears to be more important to many LDP members than the mere fact of LDP government.

As such, I do not share Jun Okumura's confidence that Mr. Fukuda has the LDP factions lined up in support of the temporary tax, not to mention the road construction plan. Okumura-san does the math and finds that the prime minister should have no problem lining up the factions behind him — all but three already have — giving the prime minister the support of at least 260 LDP HR members, meaning that he has only to persuade the remaining LDP independents and Komeito to ensure the restoration of the tax. But that assumes that factional discipline is ironclad.

As we saw in Mr. Fukuda's election as LDP president in September 2007, factional unity cannot be taken for granted, for reasons that even Okumura-san recognizes. Commenting on the fact of the factions' holding regular Thursday meetings, he tells us, "That’s useful in maintaining unity within the factions, since their ability to raise money for their members and find them Cabinet appointments has been greatly diminished." I doubt that meetings are enough to maintain factional unity in the absence of the latter. Given that it will take a mere sixteen nays to derail the tax, the decline in factional unity cannot be written off so easily. It might make all the difference in whether the tax passes — and whether Mr. Fukuda survives to fight another day.

For that reason, I suspect that DPJ is working hard to remind vulnerable LDP members of the political consequences of restoring an onerous tax on consumers.

Three weeks and counting

Aso Taro continues to position himself as the LDP's savior in a rapidly approaching post-Fukuda period — in MTC's extended (and excellent) Fukuda-as-currency analogy, Mr. Aso is hoping that he is the best store of value in a chaotic environment.

His latest move is to come out on behalf of the restoration of the temporary tax on gasoline, using the environmental logic to make the case for the tax (and perhaps to present himself as a kinder, gentler Aso Taro.) Appearing at an event in Yamaguchi prefecture with Abe Shinzo in advance of the April 27 by-election in Yamaguchi-2, Mr. Aso said, "Since the gasoline tax is cheaper, it invites the consumption of more gasoline; for Japan, which is hosting an environment summit, this is an extremely bad state of affairs." Mr. Abe used the somewhat contradictory road construction logic, placing road construction above the environment, odd given his new environmental policy responsibilities: "I think that the consumers had a good feeling about the fall in the gasoline price, roads cannot be built and maintained. The LDP has a great responsibility to resolve this situation immediately."

I think that while Mr. Aso (and his fellow conservatives) believe that the tax should be reinstated irrespective of the politics of the matter, Mr. Aso also figures that supporting it strengthens his political position. In the event of a new leadership election, it hardly matters that his position is antithetical to the vast majority of Japanese. It does matter that his position is consistent with forty-one LDP prefectural chapters, according to an Asahi survey of LDP and DPJ prefectural chapters. His views on the tax are also consistent with the bulk of the LDP's parliamentary membership, although as noted by Yamamoto Ichita, it remains uncertain whether Mr. Fukuda will be able to muster the necessary two-thirds majority to pass the temporary tax at the end of April. Mr. Yamamoto reports that nearly 200 LDP representatives support passing it again, leaving the government 120 votes short. Even if the government manages to corral Komeito members and the majority of the remaining LDP members, it will take a mere sixteen votes to scuttle the tax bill.

Would the LDP be willing to exile the sixteen (or more), in the process tossing away its supermajority? The potential dissenters, whoever they are, are incredibly powerful at this moment in time — their actions, aside from determining whether Japanese citizens have to pay more for gasoline, could be decisive in toppling the Fukuda government, breaking up the LDP, triggering a realignment, forcing a general election, or all of the above. It's safe to assume that Mr. Ozawa will be working hard to get them to defect to the DPJ, just as the LDP's elders will be doing the best they can to buy their allegiance (and/or threaten them with political oblivion).

As for the DPJ, based on the Asahi survey, the DPJ has its own problems with its prefectural chapters, which are split nearly evenly on the question of absorbing gasoline tax revenue into the general fund, with a slight majority (23-20) in favor of it. Oddly enough, forty-six of forty-seven chapters support Mr. Ozawa's response to the LDP's plan; forty-six (all except Tochigi) also oppose the extension of the temporary tax. In short, nearly half the DPJ's prefectural chapters support the continuation of the road construction special fund, just with less revenue due to the end of the temporary tax.

The DPJ can do little more but hold the line, try to tempt LDP defectors, and watch as the LDP continues to tear itself apart on this issue.

And Mr. Aso? He may yet get his chance to lead. As before, the deciding vote will be cast by the Machimura faction's elders, Mori Yoshiro, Machimura Nobutaka, and Nakagawa Hidenao. For the moment, Mr. Fukuda still has their confidence, but how long before they begin looking for a safer investment? And does Mr. Aso stand a chance of earning it?

It's probably safe to say that the revote on the tax bill will make or break Mr. Fukuda. If he can somehow muster the supermajority, he will likely survive until the G8 summit, if not longer. If he can't, his government will be finished.

The imperial guard coalesces

It's been less than a week since Prime Minister Fukuda made his eleventh hour appeal to the DPJ to cooperate in the gasoline tax/road construction dispute, discarding much of the road tribe's program in the process and leading Kono Taro to remark (noted here) that the young reformers had gone "from opposition forces to imperial guards."

Now Mr. Kono, along with Tanahashi Yasufumi and Mizuno Kenichi from the LDP and Komeito's Ueda Isamu, has created a study group with the horribly clumsy name "Club to Support the Fukuda Plan and Move the Road Construction Fund into the General Fund." Thirty-seven Diet members reportedly participated in the preparatory meeting. At a press conference Wednesday Mr. Kono warned, "If it [the road maintenance fund special law revised bill] passes the House of Representatives again, there will be rebellion!"

According to Yamamoto Ichita, not all participants are as brazen as Mr. Kono. He notes that he was surprised to hear that some protested including mention of the end of the special fund into the club's name, so as to not exacerbate internal conflict within the LDP.

With that in mind, it's hard to take Mr. Kono entirely seriously when he speaks of rebellion. That said, it does look like the LDP's young reformers may finally be stepping out from the shadow of Koizumi Junichiro and speaking up for themselves. The fight pits them against the party's elders, some of whom think that the government must pass the tax and road construction bills again as soon as possible. The reformers may be flying Mr. Fukuda's standard, but they will also be pressuring him not to revert from the proposal made last week. The mood within the LDP's leadership suggests that Mr. Fukuda will be under pressure to forgo efforts to seek agreement with the DPJ, meaning that the LDP may very well batten down the hatches, ride out the April confusion, and push ahead to pass first the tax, and then, a couple weeks later, the road construction plan again, whatever the consequences for the party's incumbents. Could it? Will it?

I remain convinced that Mr. Fukuda is on the brink of a fight for the survival of his government.

April fools?

Today, April 1, the Japanese people have received an April Fool's Day gift in the form of a potentially temporary tax cut on gasoline and automobile purchases. There is, reports the media, chaos at the car dealerships and chaos at the petrol pumps. There is uncertainty regarding current road construction projects. And in a press conference Monday Prime Minister Fukuda apologized for the chaos resulting from the expiration of the temporary gas tax.

Mainichi is using the occasion to condemn both the LDP and the DPJ for their failure to act in the national interest.

The people, Mainichi argues, just want the parties to stop playing politics and compromise. What's happening instead is mob rule: "On big themes like national security and the tax system that influence the circumstances of state and society, democratic public opinion is divided. If a political party uses the other side as a pretext for digging trenches and not leaving, only sterile debate will arise. This is not the modern politics of persuading the public; this is the shape of mob rule that incites the public."

Both parties, the newspaper argues, are ultimately to blame for engaging in all-or-nothing politics, the DPJ for be unwilling to listen to alternatives to the immediate lifting of the temporary tax, the LDP for the behavior of the road tribe.

I don't buy this argument. I am proud of how the DPJ has held its ground on this issue, although admittedly it was easier to take a stand knowing that nearly three-quarters of the public supported an end to the temporary tax. For once the DPJ found an issue that enabled it to oppose the government on principle and indicate a way forward for Japan. Mainichi is mistaken to assume that Japan's national problems will be solved by half measures and compromises with the LDP's old guard.

No one ever said that the birth of a new Japanese democracy was going to be easy or clean. The process is ugly. There is much stubbornness and opportunism. None of the urgent national problems are being solved. But then Japan's broken political system is arguably urgent problem number one in that it has undermined efforts to fix everything else. Yes, the current dispute may resemble, in Mainichi's words, "a barroom argument," but an argument — in public — in which the two leading parties are fighting over a matter of principle with real-world implications is a major improvement over what has come before. I'm also pleased that the road tribe has been open in its opposition to efforts by Mr. Fukuda to cooperate on road construction. Better that opposition be in the open and subject to public scrutiny.

In an ideal world, the media would be welcoming this development and encouraging it, instead of haranguing the parties for their failure to come to a gentlemen's agreement to avoid "chaos."

Hopefully one day April 1 will be remembered as the beginning of a new era in Japanese democracy, not the latest sign of Japan's declining international influence.

Cry havoc

Painted into a corner over the gasoline tax issue, Prime Minister Fukuda attempted to undercut Ozawa Ichiro in an interview on NHK Sunday, suggesting that the impetus for a grand coalition came from Mr. Ozawa. The facts of the negotiations surrounding an LDP-DPJ grand coalition — especially Watanabe Tsuneo's role in it — may never be known, but the significance of Mr. Fukuda's mentioning this now has everything to do with undermining Mr. Ozawa's position at the head of the party.

The grand coalition fiasco, after all, was the end of the DPJ's love affair with Mr. Ozawa, insofar as it was a love affair. Recalling the fiasco can only undercut Mr. Ozawa's relationship with his own party.

But Mr. Fukuda must be encouraged by the results of an Asahi poll that shows that the public is favorable towards his latest compromise solution to the gasoline tax dispute. In a phone survey of approximately 650 respondents from across Japan, 58% approved of delaying the transfer of the road construction fund into the general fund until fiscal 2009, while only 24% opposed. At the same time — and more than slightly contradictorily — only 31% approve of the plan to retain to the temporary gasoline tax and use the revenue for road construction in fiscal 2008 (55% opposed). Respondents were pleased at the prospect of a drop in gasoline tax in April by a margin of 72% to 12%, but that did not translate into more support for the DPJ. Asked whether they approve of the DPJ's position, 40% approved, 44% disapproved. Less significantly, the DPJ saw a one-point drop in its support rate to 20%, compared with the LDP's two-point increase to 31%. The LDP, however, should not be too encouraged by this poll: respondents overwhelmingly blamed both parties for the gasoline tax dispute, and when asked about the BOJ dispute, respondents approved of neither the LDP's nor the DPJ's approach to the succession battle.

There is now the open question of whether Mr. Fukuda truly has the support of the LDP in pushing for a compromise that includes provisions for the demise of the special road construction fund, whatever the time line. The opposition parties consulted with Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura on Friday on this question, who replied, "I think that individual members hold various opinions, but I think that since it is the prime minister's decision and leadership, understanding will be reached." Mr. Fukuda indicated Friday in response to a question in the HC Budget Committee that he consulted beforehand with the ministers of finance, transportation, and internal affairs, but not with the whole cabinet.

Neither response sounds particularly convincing to me, hence Mr. Fukuda's effort Sunday to change the subject to Mr. Ozawa's shenanigans last autumn.

Hence Kono Taro felt compelled to describe Thursday's about-face as a "palace coup," with Mr. Kono and his comrades, who believe in the need to transfer special road construction funds into the general fund and are prepared to vote against the prevailing measure if it comes before the HR a second time, "transformed in a stroke from opposition forces to imperial guards" as Mr. Fukuda wholly embraced their ideas.

The idea that road tribe and its allies in prefectural and local governments will be cowed by Mr. Fukuda's sudden shift is unrealistic. Confident that they had won the argument — convinced that the government, having passed the bill, would simply wait for sixty days to elapse and then pass the bill again — there is no reason to think that the advocates of business as usual will be silenced. As Mr. Kono wrote, "Within the party there are still various voices. Whether or not the LDP will completely cut longstanding ties of obligation, whether or not it can do the ordinary things — there will not be a second chance."

The just-passed compromise bill that extends to the end of May various taxes in the special measures bill on taxation except the temporary tax means that the price of a liter of gasoline is set to drop from Tuesday. It also means that both Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Ozawa will now be under tremendous pressure that will grow by the day. Mr. Fukuda will be pressured by the reformists to hold the new line, even as the road tribe and its allies pressure Mr. Fukuda to back down from his newly announced plan. The prime minister will also face some pressure from the DPJ, which has promised once again to pass a non-binding censure motion against the prime minister if the HR re-passes the tax bill at the end of the sixty-day period. (Mind you, I don't take this threat particularly seriously — and I'm sure neither does Mr. Fukuda — because the prime minister is free to ignore the censure motion and carry on as if nothing happened. But it's worth mentioning...)

Mr. Ozawa, meanwhile, will be under pressure from opponents within his own party not to cave, lest his position as party leader become forfeit, just as the DPJ as a whole will be under pressure from the media (AKA "public opinion) and the government to compromise. Every day that passes will help the DPJ, as consumers become accustomed to paying less for gas and less willing to countenance a tax hike (and worried LDP backbenchers less willing to risk their seats to see the higher rate restored in a month's time).

The newly passed agreement may momentarily ease the sense of crisis, but not for long. The LDP and the DPJ are in the midst of a battle with significant consequences for the future of the Japanese political system.

Fukuda resignation watch?

(Readers looking for my response to Fukuda Yasuo's resignation, see this post.)

In a handful of days, Prime Minister Fukuda has gone from cool and collected, to angry, to shaken and desperate.

On Friday, Mr. Fukuda called an emergency press conference to make one final plea to the DPJ to compromise on the gasoline tax, agreeing to reduce the sunset clause on the use of gasoline tax for road construction to one year.

Not surprisingly, DPJ Secretary-General Hatoyama Yukio signaled that the DPJ will not accept Mr. Fukuda's latest plea. LDP Secretary-General Ibuki Bunmei and Komeito Secretary-General Kitagawa Kazuo are reportedly working on an emergency one-month extension to avert "chaos," i.e. to not give the Japanese people a one-month tax cut that they might not want to see reversed in a month.

More interesting, however, is the impact of Mr. Fukuda's plea within the LDP. The road tribe is of course, apoplectic over his compromise; the Koizumians are pleased that the prime minister is coming around to one of the maestro's cherished positions. Considering that even some ostensible "reformists" have been spinning the road construction plans as beneficial for rural areas (as opposed to construction companies and the politicians they back), this last-ditch effort may well throw the party into complete disarray, more than it already is. Mr. Fukuda, already struggling to impose discipline and order on the LDP, may find himself completely friendless after this gambit. Will someone dare to act in the coming weeks to force him out? Will Mr. Mori withdraw his support and suggest that Mr. Fukuda ask for indefinite sick leave?

The debate in the coming weeks over whether to pass the tax bill at the end of next month over the objections of the HC, the opposition, and much of the Japanese public could well be the trigger for a realignment, with Mr. Fukuda's premiership consumed in the process.

Fukuda loses his cool

At a press conference Monday, Prime Minister Fukuda expressed his anger at the DPJ's rejection of the government's efforts to pass compromise legislation on taxation.

"[The DPJ] has an attitude of entirely not deliberating on the budget-related tax bill. What can the Diet do about this? Speaking honestly, this is incomprehensible."

Mr. Fukuda and the LDP executive has reportedly been leaning on Kono Yohei, HR speaker, to forge yet another compromise with the DPJ to forestall the "chaos" anticipated by some LDP members if the tax bill doesn't pass by the end of the month. (Jun Okumura argues here that the chaos might not be nearly as bad as suggested.)

Perhaps the impression that Mr. Fukuda is not worried about his situation — suggested here — is mistaken. With his government's six-month anniversary approaching Wednesday, his government is in trouble. Low popularity may be the least of his troubles. Most worrying is that Mr. Fukuda has had little success quelling internal conflict within the LDP, which will make it difficult for him to extricate himself from his situation. One conflict, of course, is the rift between the conservatives centered around the True Conservative Policy Research Group and risk-averse party elders, who are desperate to preserve unity; another rift, discussed in this article in Sentaku magazine, is between growth-firsters (led by Nakagawa Hidenao and Takenaka Heizo) and financial reconstructionists (led by Yosano Kaoru and Tanigaki Sadakazu). Keeping each of these groups content is a difficult, if not impossible task.

Who will Mr. Fukuda disappoint in the war over the tax bill? If no compromise emerges in the next week, will the government bow to the inevitable and not override the HC at the end of April? Mainichi suggests in this article that Mr. Nakagawa believes the government should not use the supermajority. Of course, if Mr. Fukuda lets the temporary tax lapse, he risks enraging his financial reconstructionist supporters, like Mr. Tanigaki.

The demise of the Fukuda cabinet is underway, although it will take months to play out. The timing will depend on who the government disappoints most over the next month.

Signs of compromise?

With the end of Fukui Toshihiko's term as BOJ president rapidly approaching, there are signs that the LDP and the DPJ might be able to come to terms on the nomination of his successor.

Messrs. Oshima and Yamaoka, Diet strategists for the LDP and DPJ respectively, met once more on Thursday and agreed that a vacancy at the BOJ is undesirable. The two reportedly discussed an idea, emerging from within the LDP, to revise the BOJ law to allow for a temporary extension of the BOJ president's term. There is also the possibility that Shirakawa Masaaki, a Kyoto university professor already confirmed by both houses as vice president, could serve as acting president until the parties agree on a BOJ president.

In the meantime, the LDP has announced that it will wait until Monday to submit Mr. Muto's nomination once again, giving the parties time to pursue a compromise while ensuring that the BOJ presidency will not be vacant. Sankei suggests that there are signs that the LDP might be willing to reconsider its support for Mr. Muto.

On the gasoline tax front, Mr. Fukuda alluded to the possibility of a compromise in deliberations at the HC Budget Committee Thursday, although he provided to details on what a compromise might entail. Ota Akihiro, Komeito head, suggested that the compromise could entail shortening and trimming the 10-year, 59 trillion yen road-construction plan, directing more gasoline tax revenue to the general fund, and putting a shorter time limit on the temporary tax. Koishi Azuma, the head of the DPJ group in the HC, dismissed Mr. Ota's suggestions off hand.

Compromise on this issue has proved elusive even among the LDP's and DPJ's young reformers, who agree on so much else. At a debate on Thursday, each party's Young Turks repeated the party line: LDP members emphasized the importance of road construction for rural areas, DPJ members emphasized the importance of redirecting road construction funds into areas that have even more importance for the lives of Japanese citizens. The DPJ reasons — not inappropriately, I think — that it stands to gain from letting the gasoline tax lapse, at least for the month until the HR can automatically pass it again. Local governments will be unhappy with the DPJ, of course, but then with so many local governments in LDP hands, should the DPJ be bothered by their criticism? What matters is how voters will respond, and I find it hard to believe that they will be too irate about a tax break.

Koizumi Junichiro has used the stalemate to continue raising his political profile. The former prime minister, speaking in Hamamatsu on Thursday, appealed to the leaders of both the LDP and the DPJ to compromise for the good of the nation. Will Koizumi power be enough to break the deadlock? I'm skeptical.

More discouraging numbers for Fukuda

Following on the heels of a Mainichi poll that shows a public both increasingly opposed to the Fukuda government and its plans related to the temporary gasoline tax and the road construction plan and eager for the LDP and DPJ to compromise (discussed in this post by Jun Okumura), Asahi has released its first opinion poll for March.

In regards to road construction and gasoline taxes, the numbers are no better (for the government) than the Mainichi poll.

Support for directing gasoline tax revenue into the general fund has risen to 59%, with 30% opposed. Similarly, 59% are opposed to the ten-year temporary gasoline tax extension, while only 28% approve of it. 71% want the government's road maintenance plan trimmed, while only 15% want it to remain as is. Not surprisingly, when asked to evaluate Mr. Fukuda's position on the gasoline tax/road construction issue, only 18% "valued" it, while 66% did not. (Beyond that, the poll recorded a drop in the cabinet's approval ratings similar to other polls: disapproval at 50%, approval at 32%.)

Interestingly, the Asahi poll recorded stronger support for Mr. Ishiba than the Mainichi poll. The latter showed 49% in favor of his resignation, 47% opposed; the former found only 34% in favor of his resignation, while 57% felt it is unnecessary. Among those who want him to resign, only 18% thought he should resign soon. 80% felt he should resign after resolving the situation. It's not entirely clear to me why this poll found a reservoir of support for the besieged defense minister, but it does suggest that Mr. Ishiba might be able to remain in office for longer than it seemed last week.

Despite all this, the poll did show that the LDP stills enjoys an edge in support, with 29% to the DPJ's 21%. The DPJ's approval rating actually dropped three points.

Unlike Okumura-san, I don't think that the DPJ should be particularly worried about the results of this and other polls. Yes, there is always the danger that the DPJ, convinced it has founded the miracle solution to unseating the LDP, will go too far with an issue, abandoning public support in the process. But the LDP crackup is continuing apace, with the gasoline tax/road construction debate revealing not only the lingering power of the road tribe and its prefectural allies but also the frailty of the LDP's reformists, a frailty that even Mr. Koizumi's reemergence in the midst of this debate cannot correct. This debate has revealed the extent to which the government is out of touch with the public and the LDP at war with itself. Even if the LDP manages to retain a slim (simple) majority in a general election, I remain convinced that an election will serve simply as a catalyst for a transformation of the political landscape.

The DPJ gets its groove back (for now)

The past six months in Japanese politics have seen some surprising and unexpected events and reversals of momentum — and it looks as if we're in the midst of the latest shift in momentum. The DPJ, after a shaky start to the current Diet session following the government's deft maneuvering on the MSDF refueling mission (and a last-minute ambush by the other opposition parties), now appears to have gotten its act together and is pushing hard on the government on multiple fronts. It's beginning to look a lot like August 2007.

The Atago incident is turning into a major boon for the DPJ. As Jun Okumura notes, intensifying the push for Ishiba Shigeru to resign as defense minister may stymie the government's efforts to pass the budget by Friday, thus ensuring that it will pass even if the HC rejects it: "The less time that there is, the more inclined the LDP will be to make concessions and the less willing the DPJ will be to oblige." Of course, it looked like Mr. Ishiba would be immune to DPJ pressure, thanks to a vote of confidence from the prime minister and his status as probably the one man in the LDP willing (and possibly able) to reform the woefully deficient defense establishment. Even as recently as Tuesday, when Mr. Ishiba faced questioning in the HR Security Committee, he seemed confident dismissing calls for his resignation over this incident. On Wednesday, however, more reports emerged pointing to failures in the gathering and sharing of information between the Defense Ministry and the Coast Guard, implicating Mr. Ishiba's leadership in response to the incident.

Mainichi reports that pressure is now coming from within the LDP, especially LDP leaders in the HC. The prime minister continues to stand by Mr. Ishiba, but it seems that my initial impression was correct: Mr. Ishiba will likely be forced out. Presumably his replacement will be someone less likely to rattle cages and therefore more acceptable to both the LDP and the defense establishment. In short, despite this scandal, it will be business as usual in Ichigaya, once Mr. Ishiba is out of the picture.

Meanwhile the compromise on the leadership succession at the Bank of Japan that everyone — including myself — expected to occur remains elusive. The government decided Tuesday to delay the official presentation of Muto Toshiro, the government's nominee, until next week. With just under three weeks until Mr. Fukui's term expires, there is still time for the LDP and the DPJ to come to an agreement and avoid having a vacancy at the BOJ, but the DPJ is clearly content to make the government wait, to make the point that unlike on other issues, the Fukuda government has no choice but to work with the DPJ. This appears to please Mr. Ozawa to no end. As I suspected, the DPJ may eventually cooperate — but it has no reason to follow the government's desired timetable. Mr. Fukuda, at least according to this Asahi article, sounds a bit exasperated. When asked about Mr. Ozawa's comments on Mr. Muto ("I also know a lot from his time at the Finance Ministry, but whether he is appropriate as BOJ president is a different matter"), Mr. Fukuda said, "He's not really saying anything. We have no choice but to wait."

Finally, on the budget, the DPJ, together with the SDP and the PNP, absented themselves Wednesday from HR Budget and Finance and Monetary subcommittees to protest the government's plan to pass the FY 2008 budget on Friday. Hatoyama Yukio described the government's plan as making "scrap paper" of the LDP-DPJ agreement negotiated by Messrs. Eda and Kono, and warned of consequences in the battle over the BOJ succession. This afternoon the opposition will return to the Budget Committee to debate the special road construction fund. On Wednesday the DPJ announced the basic principles for its own legislation the fund: (1) repealing the temporary gasoline tax; (2) folding the special fund into the general fund; and (3) abolishing the "burden charge" for local communities for state-mandated projects.

Thanks to Mr. Koizumi, the DPJ now has less reason to compromise on this issue than ever. Mainichi reports, "...There is also the hope that the LDP is being rocked internally by the appearance of remarks in favor of the 'general fundization' [of road construction funds] from former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and others. Kan Naoto, DPJ acting president, emphasized at a press conference on the 27th: 'Mr. Koizumi's opinion is close to the DPJ's opinion. If he wants to get us to do reforms that he could not do himself, we welcome that. We also want to urge the LDP's young members who aim for true reform to rise to action."

It looks like the DPJ is finally learning to use "reform" as a wedge issue to get the upper hand in parliamentary battles.

As we have seen, the momentum could easily shift again, but for the moment, the DPJ, which has nothing to lose at this point by taking the mantle of reform from Mr. Koizumi, has painted the government into a corner. On every issue the LDP is playing not to lose.

Collision ahead

Thanks to Mainichi, we have a calendar of this week's events related to the progress of the budget and budget-related legislation — the latter including the special measures bill on taxation — through the House of Representatives and its committees.

It'll be a busy week.

The budget will be discussed in the Budget Committee all this week. Budget-related legislation will be discussed in the whole House on Tuesday, after which it may or may not go to the Financial and Monetary Affairs Committee. The Budget Committee will debate the subject of road funding on Thursday, with the government's bill directing the balance of gasoline tax revenue to the general fund going before the whole House the same day, after which the bill may or may not go before the Land and Transportation Committee. (In the midst of all this, Kan Naoto — apparently a glutton for punishment — will be debating the temporary gasoline tax at another meeting of the National Governors Association in Tokyo on Tuesday.)

As Mainichi notes, with the DPJ's having shifted its focus from the tax to the special fund for road construction, the battle will be particularly fierce over the government's bill shifting the gasoline tax revenue left after "essential" road construction to the general fund. The DPJ, not surprisingly, considers the government's proposal watered down and ultimately meaningless.

The deal negotiated between Messrs. Kono and Eda is likely doomed, especially once legislation is passed from the HR to the House of Councillors. Koshiish Azuma, head of the DPJ caucus in the HC, promised a decisive battle in the HC over the gasoline tax, which would presumably force the government to extend the temporary tax for two months to give the HR time to pass it again. The government has indicated that it will not relent in the face of HC (and DPJ) intransigence, and will do whatever necessary to prevent the "chaos" that would result from the expiration of the temporary tax.

I hope that the DPJ does not cave on this issue. Even if the government ultimately gets its way on both the temporary tax and the partial redirection of gasoline tax revenue, I hope the DPJ continues to make the point that the LDP would rather fund the construction of "necessary" roads (enriching the companies that build them) than, for example, the failing hospitals that dot the landscape.

Even if the LDP and the Fukuda government win this legislative battle, the DPJ can make it a Pyrrhic victory by using it to illustrate that the LDP, for all the talk of reform, remains a party unable to make the hard decisions required to secure Japan's future.

Intimations of change

The revised bill for the special measures law on taxation, which includes the government's ten-year extension of the temporary gasoline tax, has been scheduled for interpellation in the plenary session of the House of Representatives from Tuesday, 19 February. The bill on the road construction special fund will be under discussion from Thursday, 21 February. The tax bill will be submitted for questioning in the HR Financial and Monetary Affairs Committee on Wednesday.

In the midst of the slow progress towards the climax of the debate on the gasoline tax and road construction, Yamashita Yasuo (DPJ), chairman of HC State Basic Policy Committee, and Eto Seishiro, chairman of its HR counterpart (LDP), called upon Prime Minister Fukuda and DPJ President Ozawa to have a debate in the Diet. They have yet to do so this session, and did not debate last session until the final days of the session.

They're right: the party leaders should debate, regularly and publicly.

But even without regular clashes between Messrs. Fukuda and Ozawa, the current "Road Diet" (previously known as the Gasoline Diet) belies the popular notions that the Japanese political system is broken and that the DPJ is little more than a pale imitation of the LDP. The clash between the LDP and the DPJ over road construction is a policy debate with real consequences for the future of Japan — and shows that there are genuine and deep differences between the two parties. The DPJ, in taking a stand on the special fund for road construction, has placed itself firmly on the side of ending the privileged and corrupt system that has long characterized LDP rule; the LDP has shown, in the blatant attempt by road tribesmen to preserve the special fund, that vestiges of Tanaka Kakuei's LDP remain, even if their days are numbered. The line between the parties is clear; it is not just a matter of a twenty-five yen surcharge on gasoline.

Political change is happening before our eyes.

The end is near

If you haven't read it yet, go read MTC's account of the last days of "Tanakaism."